Creative force or creative shaping? This unprecedented effort to plumb the workings of the ontopoiesis of life by disentangling its primordial forces and shaping devices as they enter into the originary matrixes of life yields fascinating insights. Prepared by the investigation of the first two matrixes (the `womb of life' and `sharing-in-life', Analecta Husserliana Volume 74) the present collection of essays focuses upon the third and crowning creative matrix, Imaginatio Creatrix here proves itself to be the source and driving force (...) which brings us to the origins of the human mind - human life. Studies by: Elof Axel Carlson, A-T. Tymieniecka, N. Milkov, Eldon C. Wait, K. Rokstad, M. Golaszewska, M. Küle, W. Kim Rogers, Piotr Mróz, R. Pinilla Burgos, A. Carrillo Canán, G.R. Ronsivalle, J.E. Smith, A. Pawliszyn, A. Rizzacasa, L. Galzigna and M. Galzigna, Jiro Watanabe, M. Jakubczak, K. Tarnowski, M. Durst, W. Pawliszyn, R.A. Kurenkova, Carmen Cozma, E. Supinska-Polit, I.S. Fiut, Gerald Nyenhuis, Osvaldo Rossi, R.D. Sweeney, and D. Ulicka. (shrink)

The Aesthetic Experience in Roman Ingarden’s thinking. In this article we study the ideas of the Polish philosopher, Roman Ingarden, as an essential key inthe discussion on literary reception. The notion of "aesthetic experience" is revised, especially in The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art. Ingarden begins aesthetic discussion, trying to answer two fundamental questions: How is the literary work structured? and Which procedure will lead to an understanding of the literary art work of art? These questions, besides serving (...) in his defense against psychologism and positivism of his time, also help him develop his two most popular works in Spanish: The Literary Work of Art and The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, in which the Polish philosopher clarifies the principles that of the Reception Theory. Nevertheless, the importance of the aesthetic experience in the linguistic and phenomenology dimensions of the literary text is only understood when we study both works. Ingarden, as his translator to Spanish, Gerald Nyenhuis recognizes, presupposes in his second book the first one where he performs a constant trip from ontology to phenomenology in the literary work of art. It is precisely in this search where he nails his concept of aesthetic experience that we study today in relation with other concepts, such as the aesthetic attitude, the pre-aesthetic knowledge, the role of the aesthetic values and the aesthetic object. (shrink)

This important new book develops a new concept of autonomy. The notion of autonomy has emerged as central to contemporary moral and political philosophy, particularly in the area of applied ethics. professor Dworkin examines the nature and value of autonomy and uses the concept to analyse various practical moral issues such as proxy consent in the medical context, paternalism, and entrapment by law enforcement officials.

I take as my starting point the “one very simple principle” proclaimed by Mill in On Liberty … “That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do (...) or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.”. (shrink)

In this book Gerald Vision argues for a new causal theory, one that engages provocatively with direct realism and makes no use of a now discredited subjectivism.

Business people often consider spirituality a means of increasing integrity, motivation and job satisfaction. Yet certain spiritualities are superficial and unstable. Religion gives depth and duration to a spirituality, but may also sew divisiveness. A spirituality's ability to develop good moral habits provides a positive test of the "appropriateness" of that spirituality for business. Many successful business executives demonstrate a spirituality that does develop good moral habits.

Abstract:Our critics confuse the role normative ethical theory can take in business ethics. We argue that as a practical discipline, business ethics must focus on norms, not the theories from which the norms derive. It is true that our original work is defective, but not in its form, but in its neglect of contemporary advances in feminist ethics.

This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever. Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that the bearers of conscious experiences—the objects (...) possessing inherent value—are not physical objects. This moral evidence is corroborated by introspective evidence. (shrink)

:Three strategies for developing just and consistent global business practices are examined: 1) international treaties and agreements, 2) global codes of business conduct, and 3) voluntary self-restraint. International agreements investigated are: NAFTA, Global Warming Treaty, OECD Anti-Bribery Treaty and Infant Formula Agreement. The codes examined are the Caux Round Table’sPrinciples for Business, The Global Sullivan Principlesand The United NationsGlobal Compact with Business. Each of these three strategies is probed for its relative strengths and weaknesses, and its prospects for developing ethical (...) business practices—especially in the areas of improving the environment, human rights and working conditions. (shrink)

This is the first comprehensive interpretive and critical analysis of the thought of one of America's foremost phiolosophers and psychologists- William James.

What kind of thing is a reason for action? Are reasons for action subjective states of the agent, such as desires and/or beliefs? Or are they, rather, objective features of situations that favor certain actions? The suggestion offered in this article is that neither strategy satisfies. What is needed is a third category for classifying reasons which makes them out to be neither purely subjective nor purely objective. In brief: a reason for action is a feature of the situation that (...) matters to the agent. On this proposal, subjective states of the agent are indeed indispensable in characterizing reasons for action. Precisely which set of situational features matter to an agent—precisely what shape the agent experiences the situation as having—depends on the agent's psychological makeup. Those features themselves are not psychological states, however, and it is precisely those features that constitute the agent's reasons for action. (shrink)

Through an in-depth study of four key figures - Pierre Rousselot, Joseph Marechal, Jacques Maritain, and Etienne Gilson - From Unity to Pluralism traces the evolution of Thomism in the first half of the twentieth century. Through their work, Thomisism encountered contemporary thought and rediscovered its authentic roots, and the ideal of a univocal, unitary doctrine of Scholastic truth embodied in the unambiguous teachings of Thomas Aquinas, which had inspired the Thomist revival at the end of the nineteenth century, gradually (...) gave way. The result is the emergence of pluralism within the system itself and the independent development of the theologies of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan. (shrink)

Das Volksmärchen L’Arbre du Bœuf vom Typ ATU 511 [Ein-, Zwei-, Dreiäuglein] ist nach P. Delarue und M.-L. Tenèze das einzige französische Märchen, welches dem Subtyp AT 511 A [Kleiner Roter Ochse] angehört. L’Arbre du Bœuf ist darüber hinaus aufgrund einiger Motive besonders interessant, weil sie vermutlich aus archaischen Glaubensvorstellungen stammen: So ist die mystische „Reise zur Sonne“ ein bestimmendes Thema, welches seinen Ursprung im indoeuropäischen Mythos findet. Der Weltbaum als Axis Mundi und die Seelenbrücke sind Verbindungen zwischen dem Dies- (...) und Jenseits, die der Märchenheld ebenso wie der Schamane bei seiner ekstatischen Reise in die lichte Himmelswelt benutzt. Magische Tier- und Helferwesen treten im Zaubermärchen auf und sind integrale Bestandteile schamanistischer Glaubenswelten. Wenn im Märchen auf oder aus dem geopferten Ochsen als heiliges Tier der Weltbaum sprießt, so findet dieses Sujet Entsprechungen in urtümlichen Kosmogonien. Damit ideell verwandt ist vielleicht das Motiv vom „Tierhorn als Weltbaum“, welches sich in archaischen kosmologischen Vorstellungen findet und sich von da her womöglich ebenso in die Märchenwelten eingemischt hat. Le conte populaire L’Arbre du Bœuf du type ATU 511 [Un Œil, Deux Yeux, Trois Yeux] d’après P. Delarue et M.-L. Tenèze est le seul conte de fées français appartenant au sous-type AT 511 A [Petit Bœuf Rouge]. En outre, L’Arbre du Bœuf est particulièrement intéressant en raison de certains motifs probablement issus de croyances archaïques : Le « voyage mystique au soleil » est un thème déterminant qui tire son origine du mythe indo-européen. L’Arbre du Monde en tant qu’Axis Mundi et le pont d’autre monde sont des liens entre l’ici et l’au-delà, que le héros de conte et le chaman utilisent dans leur voyage extatique dans le ciel lumineux. Les animaux magiques et les êtres auxiliaires apparaissent dans le conte de fées et font partie intégrante du monde de croyances chamaniques. Tout comme dans le conte de fées, l’Arbre du Monde pousse sur ou bien du bœuf sacrifié et sacré, ce motif trouve des correspondances dans les anciennes cosmogonies. Le motif de la « corne animale en tant qu’Arbre du Monde » est peut-être associé à ce concept mythique. Il se trouve dans les conceptions cosmologiques archaïques et s’est mêlé de là au monde des contes de fées. The folk tale L’Arbre du Bœuf of the type ATU 511 [One Eye, Two Eyes, Three Eyes] is according to P. Delarue and M.-L. Tenèze the only French fairy tale that belongs to the subtype AT 511 A [Little Red Ox]. In addition, L’Arbre du Bœuf is particularly interesting due to some of the motifs that probably stem from archaic beliefs: The mystical “journey to the sun” is a determining theme, which finds its origin in the Indo-European myth. The World Tree as Axis Mundi and the Soul Bridge are connections between this world and the hereafter which are harnessed by the fairy tale hero as well as the shaman in his ecstatic journey into the bright world of heaven. Magical animals and helping entities appear in the fairy tale and are fundamental parts of shamanistic beliefs. The World Tree as it sprouts on or out of the sacrificed and sacred ox finds its equivalent in ancient cosmogonies. Perhaps ideally related to this is the motif of the “animal horn as the World Tree”, which is present in archaic cosmological conceptions and has possibly interfered with the fairytale worlds as well. (shrink)

If narrating—the feeling of stories, fictional or otherwise—is an inherent possibility of motion pictures , then Kracauer's distinction between the realist and formative tendencies must be questioned and, in effect, the two must be synthesized. Wasn't the practical problem for the earliest films how to construct a formative sequence of events within an absolutely real-looking visual context? Wasn't the paradox of film narrative the combination of an obviously unreal sequence of events with an obviously real visual and social setting? And (...) isn't that paradox the most intriguing and complex problem of narrative film today, when the visual and social setting have become increasingly real-seeming? And doesn't this paradox have something to do with the fact that narrative film today seems richer and more important than it did a decade ago, at a time when various admirers of both cinéma vérité and cinéma pur had announced the death of fictional filmed narrative? Kracauer's realist aesthetic, concentrating exclusively on the photographic surfaces of things in the material world , overlooks this paradox altogether. It overlooks the fact—extremely relevant to the cinema—that the term "realist" means one thing in its common application to a painting or photograph and quite another thing in its equally common application to a novel or play. A realistic visual image is one that is said to "look like," "resemble," "reproduce," "iconically represent" the surfaces of the visual world. We see—or think we see—in a painting what we see—or think we see—in the real world.1 But a realistic story is one that is said to chronicle "credibly," "probably," and "believably" the way we think people feel, think, or act, the way things happen, and the reasons they happen, all of which are consistent with the reader-audience-society's beliefs about psychology, motivation, and probability. The standard of one sense of realism is primarily visual while the standard of the other is primarily psychological. One might see the early films groping, then, toward a synthesis of the visual realism of late-nineteenth-century painting/photography with the psychological realism of late-nineteenth-century novel/drama. · 1. This equivocation deliberately avoids the question of whether there is anything actually real about what one sees in a painting or photograph. The fact is that a very large number of viewers operate in this assumption because they think there is something real about what they see, despite the theoretical imprecision of their holding such a belief. Gerald Mast is the author of, among other works, A Short History of the Movies, The Comic Mind: Comedy and the Movies, and Film/Cinema/Movie: A Theory of Experience. His previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, "What Isn't Cinema?," appeared in the Winter 1974 issue. (shrink)

One of the common and commonsensical ways to distinguish cinema from every other art and semiotic system, and to define the property of its uniqueness, is to claim that cinema is the only art/”language” that links images. This “linking” can imply three different yet complementary operations. First, cinema links individual still photographs into an apparently continuous sequence of movement by pushing the individual frames or photographs through a camera or projector at sixteen or twenty-four or however many frames per second. (...) Second, cinema links images by editing , by splicing together individual shots, which are continuous chains of linked frames. Finally, cinema links images with sounds, synchronously or otherwise. The only problem with such an apparently unrestrictive and unprescriptive definition of cinema and the “cinematic” is that it obscures an essentially cinematic operation that precedes the linking of cinema images: the image must first be framed before it can be linked with another.But is framing unique to cinema? Don’t paintings have frames? Aren’t photographs frames? Isn’t the theater’s proscenium arch a frame? A consequence of such perfectly sensible questions is a consistent undervaluing of the cinema frame as an essentially and uniquely cinematic tool, unlike that of any other art, producing serious errors in the writing of film theory and serious misunderstandings of the processes of film history. The goal of this article is to diagnose some of these errors so they might someday be cured. Gerald Mast is professor of English and general in the humanities at the University of Chicago. Among his many books are A Short History of the Movies, The Comic Mind: Comedy and the Movies, Film/Cinema/Movie, The Movies in Our Midst, and Howard Hawks, Storyteller. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are “What Isn’t Cinema?” and “Kracauer’s Two Tendencies and the Early History of Film Narrative”. (shrink)

When Andre Bazin's most important essays on film were collected together in a single volume and titled What is Cinema? they raised a question that Bazin did not answer. Nor did he intend to. Nor has it been answered by any of the other theorists who have written what now seem to be the major works on film theory and who now seem the most influential spokesmen for the art. Rudolf Arnheim, Andre Bazin, Stanley Cavell, S. M. Einstein, Siegfried Kracauer, (...) Christian Metz, Hugo Munsterberg, Erwin Panofsky, and Gene Youngblood have failed to define what cinema essentially is.1 Unlike Ionesco's comically methodical Logician, they have been less than careful about posing the problem correctly. As a result they have been less than successful and less than precise with a deceptively difficult and complicated issue. They have defined some kinds of cinema, they have defined some of the qualities unique to those kinds of cinema, they have defined the characteristics and devices they find most valuable in some of those kinds of cinema, they simply have not defined cinema. · 1. Relevant sections of all these theorists can be found in Gerald Mast and Marshall Cohen, eds., Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings . Gerald Mast, associate professor of humanities at Richmond College of the City University of New York, has written A Short History of the Movies, The Comic Mind: Comedy and the Movies, Filmguide to the Rules of the Game, and Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings . This article is part of a forthcoming book, What Isn't Cinema? He has also contributed "Kracauer's Two Tendencies and the Early History of Film Narrative" to Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

Bruns lucidly depicts the distinctions and convergences between these two lines of thought by examining the works of Mallarme, Flaubert, Joyce, Beckett, and ...

This essay comments on some accomplishments and future challenges concerning research and teaching in social issues. The author chaired the All-Academy of Management Task Force on Ethics. The SIM Division’s role is to examine critically the suitability of the actions and policies of business managers, organizations (mostly business firms), and the free market system itself. The scope of inquiry covers ethics, governance of organizations, and stakeholders. The emphasis in that inquiry is on the benefits and harms to people from businesses (...) and the market system. Three major issues deserve our examination: 1) the growing influence of the global corporation, 2) global climate change and the negative environmental impact of our lifestyles, and 3) the moral maturity or lack thereof of contemporary decision makers and citizens. Corporations have immense influence, reflected in the growing role of lobbying. Environmental degradation is one of the most serious problems that face people of our ever smaller planet, so it challenges us to examine our lifestyles and the carbon footprint of our actions. We are now able to research and teach the development of good moral habits (virtues) and character. (shrink)

Prologue : on the freedom of non-identity -- Otherwise than human (toward sovereignty) -- What is human recognition? (on zones of indistinction) -- Desubjectivation (Michel Foucault's aesthetics of experience) -- Becoming animal (some simple ways) -- Derrida's cat (who am I?).

The extraordinarily rapid growth of global communications, information technology, and investments have energized hundreds of millions of business people and opened up immense opportunities in most of the countries of the world. Yet this apparently inevitableglobal business growth also has parallel dangers for people. In two areas the weaknesses of the global economy are evident: (1) Global business and financial operations with little accountability for long-term human needs; and (2) Goals and values of business managers that are not sufficient for (...) business or for life. (shrink)

Amongst the numerous difficult passages of the anonymous Constitution of the Athenians the present one, as a whole, has particularly tenaciously resisted attempts at interpretation or elucidation in spite of progress made as to a number of details. One major obstacle to a real understanding of this sentence is the corrupt phrase in the final clause.

Après Discours, figure (1971) qui montrait l’irréductibilité du visuel, Lyotard est saisi, en lisant Levinas, par une autre altérité à la logique du savoir : celle de l’obligation morale. Sa méditation rencontre le nouveau geste de sa philosophie ( Le Différend, 1983). En articulant l’obligation à la pensée du tort et du différend, dans un dialogue constant avec Levinas et Kant et leur épreuve réciproque, Lyotard achève le mouvement lévinasien de rupture avec toute philosophie de l’autonomie et procédure d’universalisation. Tandis (...) qu’il conduit la pensée lévinasienne à l’acuité de ses justesses et de ses impasses, il la décentre et inscrit le régime de l’obligation dans une configuration générale du différend constamment conflictuel entre plusieurs régimes de « phrases » jamais apaisées. L’éthique requiert l’aporie, l’absence de garantie, et, par là, la ressource du jugement. Il n’y a pas plus à chercher de relève dans un terme-refuge ou une autre instance et modalité de dernier recours : ni politique, ni esthétique. Le dénuement est le paradigme de la responsabilité. L’écriture, évasive par avance, en est « la trace toute vide ». (shrink)

Cette analyse des textes de Leo Strauss sur « l ' art d ' écrire » en situation de persécution cherche à en faire ressortir la cohérence et l ' intérêt. Sont examinés successivement la question du contexte, les modalités de la preuve, le caractère crypté de la vérité, la position d ' infériorité du censeur, la nécessité de mettre plusieurs textes en relation, les rapports de la philosophie et de la foi. L ' analyse freudienne du Moïse de Michel (...) - Ange fournit enfin un contre - exemple de la méthode straussienne. This analysis of Leo Strauss ' texts about « the art of writing » in a situation of persecution aims at stressing out their coherence and interest. One after the other, the author studies in depth the concept of context, the modalities of evidence, the encrypted character of truth, the inferiority position of the censor, the need to relate several texts one to another, the relationship between philosophy and faith. The freudian analysis of the Moses by Michaelangelo shows a counter - example of the Straussian method. (shrink)

La lecture de Kafka a grandement contribué à l’élaboration de la pensée de Lyotard. Dans son commentaire de Devant la loi, Derrida oppose à l’éthique lyotardienne de l’exercice libre et réfléchissant de la faculté de juger, la scène dramatisée et mélancolique de la Loi qui est différance, atermoiement indéfini, Loi du récit. Dans son propre commentaire de La Colonie pénitentiaire, Lyotard met l’accent sur la prescription comme préjudice fait à l’affect et au sensible et sur les opérations de détournement par (...) le politique de la Loi qui la transmuent en instance de commandement. La représentation kafkaïenne de la loi, terrifiante et sacrificielle, ne correspond guère, selon lui, à la loi juive qui est loi de vie. Dans son débat avec Hannah Arendt et en lisant Adorno, Lyotard se tourne ainsi vers un autre Kafka, au plus près de l’exister, exposé d’un seul tenant à la naissance et à la mort de l’improbable. Ici s’esquisse une autre figure de mélancolie plus proche de ce que représente le judaïsme : celle du Survivant, ressource intime, dans la solitude, du jugement comme de l’écriture. (shrink)

As bishops, both Augustine and Ambrose wrote sermons on Psalm 118 towards the end of their lives. This article puts these two exegetical works in dialogue with each other by focusing on the common theological theme of participation operative in both commentaries. I argue that both Ambrose and Augustine present a Christological account of participation which functions as the basis of their respective ecclesiologies. Within this overarching Christological framework, the article notes that Ambrose grounds participation in the imago Dei, whereas (...) Augustine’s takes his starting point from the grace Christ offers through the incarnation. (shrink)

The realist belief in robustly attitude-independent evaluative truths – more specifically, moral truths – is challenged by Sharon Street’s essay “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value”. We know the content of human normative beliefs and attitudes has been profoundly influenced by a Darwinian natural selection process that favors adaptivity. But if simple adaptivity can explain the content of our evaluative beliefs, any connection they might have with abstract moral truth would seem to be purely coincidental. She continues the (...) skeptical attack in “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Rethink It”, concentrating on the intuitionist realism of Ronald Dworkin. The latter sees the issue fundamentally as a holistic choice between moral objectivity and the genocide-countenancing consequences of abandoning objective standards. Street counters that, because of realism’s skeptical difficulties, Dworkin’s Choice (as I call it) actually works in favor of her Euthyphronic antirealism. I will argue that she misrepresents the realist’s skeptical challenge, and that clarifying the character of that challenge renders the case for normative realism much more appealing. Indeed, I claim that Street fails to exclude the genuine possibility of a rational basis for moral truth. (shrink)