In this book G. A. Cohen examines the libertarian principle of self-ownership, which says that each person belongs to himself and therefore owes no service or product to anyone else. This principle is used to defend capitalist inequality, which is said to reflect each person's freedom to do as as he wishes with himself. The author argues that self-ownership cannot deliver the freedom it promises to secure, thereby undermining the idea that lovers of freedom should embrace capitalism and the inequality (...) that comes with it. He goes on to show that the standard Marxist condemnation of exploitation implies an endorsement of self-ownership, since, in the Marxist conception, the employer steals from the worker what should belong to her, because she produced it. Thereby a deeply inegalitarian notion has penetrated what is in aspiration an egalitarian theory. Purging that notion from socialist thought, he argues, enables construction of a more consistent egalitarianism. (shrink)

This essay responds to David Enoch’s “The Disorder of Public Reason,” published in a previous issue of Ethics. I seek to set the record straight on several of the many charges Enoch makes. More importantly, having clarified some of the more basic points, I make some preliminary efforts at identifying when his brand of moral realism and my version of public reason differ—and, perhaps, where they are more compatible than one might think.

First published in 1983. The primary argument of this book is that there is a coherent tradition of liberal thinking that extends from L. S. Mill, through liberals like T. H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet, L. T. Hobhouse and John Dewey to John Rawls. The author places Rawls within a longstanding tradition of liberal thinking, while also arguing that Green and Hobhouse are not simply of historical interest but represent genuine and interesting attempts to develop a modern liberal theory. It is (...) argued that modern liberal theory centres on a conception of human nature; that modern liberals have sought to harmonise the pursuit of individuality with participation in social and communal life. Although the book focuses on six modern liberals, the discussion proceeds topically rather than according to author, thus highlighting similarities and disagreements and providing a comprehensive study of modern liberalism. (shrink)

In " Re-Emergence" he explores the question of conscious properties arising from brute, unthinking matter, making the case that there is no equally plausible non-emergent alternative.

Simon Rippon believes that a certain argument is not sound.1 I agree. I do not agree with the role he assigns the argument in the debate about organ sales. Nor do I agree with the much stronger argument he puts forward that organ sales should be forbidden.The argument he believes unsound, which I shall use his terminology to refer to as the Laissez-Choisir or LC argument, has three premises. The one be believes false says, “If we take away what some (...) regard as their best option, we thereby make them worse off, at least from their own perspective”.Applied to the case of a market for organs, this says that if we take away what the potential organ seller regards as his best option, that is, there being a market for his organs, we make him worse off as judged by him. The reason Rippon thinks this argument is false is that, as I have argued and have been cited by Rippon, adding an option can, in addition to merely adding a choice, have adverse effects on the agents, can harm the agent by his own lights. Thus, says Rippon, if the argument is unsound, then it does not follow that if we deny the agent the option to sell his organs, we must be acting paternalistically. The option we are taking away is one that the agent himself regards as harmful.This is correct as far as it goes, but it might leave the reader thinking that the premise is never true. This would be to overlook the fact that even if the additional option …. (shrink)

This book is a guide to the poetics of the two Greek fountainheads of Western literary theory. Part I traces the development of Plato's great themes of inspiration and imitation but makes no attempt to reduce his disparate statements to a system. Part II demonstrates that Aristotle's Poetics embodies a powerful theory of literature that answers Plato's objections to poetry as an emotionally powerful, and therefore dangerous, communication of false opinion. Originally published in 1987. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- (...) UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value. (shrink)

Parmenides didn't mention reference as such, but if he had he would have undoubtedly agreed with the philosophers who nowadays hold what is called "the axiom of existence": that one can only refer to what exists. The sources of possible support for this view are examined and rejected. Primary support for the axiom is given by two sorts of argument; one concerning quantification, the other summarizing a standard Parmenidean puzzle. Weaknesses in both are exposed. Finally, the relations between the axiom (...) and connected claims about predication and truth are probed, and an attempt is made to determine the limits of the mutual support these claims give one another. (shrink)

Parmenides didn't mention reference as such, but if he had he would have undoubtedly agreed with the philosophers who nowadays hold what is called "the axiom of existence": that one can only refer to what exists. The sources of possible support for this view are examined and rejected. Primary support for the axiom is given by two sorts of argument; one concerning quantification, the other summarizing a standard Parmenidean puzzle. Weaknesses in both are exposed. Finally, the relations between the axiom (...) and connected claims about predication and truth are probed, and an attempt is made to determine the limits of the mutual support these claims give one another. (shrink)

This article is a follow-up to a previous one in Moreana 51, which provided a detailed analysis of the immediately preceding 464-word sentence. The two sentences placed near the end of Utopia I work together to illustrate the political wisdom which the fictional Hythlodaeus has acquired in his travels, and at the same time encourage readers of Utopia to look forward to, and to accept the wisdom of the Utopians way of life as a positive model for Europe. There is (...) an undoubted harmony between the sensible practices of the “Achorians” and “Macarians” and More's political philosophy as revealed in his epigrams. Nevertheless, the two long sentences also function as praeambula to the full-length account of the Utopians, and they are meant to guide our interpretation. The details of their structure, here analyzed, bring about certain rhetorical effects. In a crescendo of irony, the long sentences establish a rather peculiar character for Hythlodaeus as the sole narrator of Utopia II: he is an independent, utterly frank witness to this fictional “reality” of More's creation, and by the end of Utopia I we readers are prepared to listen to Utopia II with very critical ears indeed. (shrink)

Does theological ethics articulate moral norms with the assistance of moral philosophy? Or does it leave that task to moral philosophy alone while it describes a distinctively Christian way of acting or form of life? These questions lie at the very heart of theological ethics as a discipline. Karl Barth's theological ethics makes a strong case for the first alternative. Karl Barth's Moral Thought follows Barth's efforts to present God's grace as a moral norm in his treatments of divine commands, (...) moral reasoning, responsibility, and agency. It shows how Barth's conviction that grace is the norm of human action generates problems for his ethics at nearly every turn, as it involves a moral good that confronts human beings from outside rather than perfecting them as the kind of creature they are. Yet it defends Barth's insistence on the right of theology to articulate moral norms, and it shows how Barth may lead theological ethics to exercise that right in a more compelling way than he did. (shrink)

The idea of a unity of intellectual history (Geistesgeschichte) is a genuinely philosophical thought. In the shadow of Hegel, it is about the legitimation of historiographical work in a universal perspective thought centered in Europe. The legitimation strategies are complex and amount to the formation of a canon of philosophy. This project is associated with the name of the philosopher and historian of philosophy Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey saw it as his task to secure the unity of intellectual history. To this (...) end, he introduced a pluralism of methods – logic, psychology, anthropology, philosophy of history, hermeneutics, literary research and others – into the study of intellectual history. I am speaking here of the Dilthey project, whose actuality, chances and risks are discussed in the article. (shrink)