This edited volume draws upon Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to examine the conscious and unconscious forces underlying race as a social formation, conceptualizing race, racial identity, and racism in ways that go beyond traditional modes of psychoanalytic thought Featuring contributions from Lacanian scholars from diverse geographical and disciplinary contexts, chapters span a wide breadth of topics including white nationalism and contemporary debates over confederate monuments; emergent theories of race rooted in Afropessimism and postcolonialism; Latinx and other racialized groups; apartheid and American (...) slavery; and applications of Lacan's concepts of the lamella, drive and sexuation to processes of racialization. The collection both reorients readers' understandings of race through its deployment of Lacanian theory and redefines the Lacanian subject through its theorizing of subjectivity in relation to race, racism and racial identification. Lacan and Race will be a definitive text for psychoanalytic theorists and contemporary scholars of race and appeal to readers across the fields of psychology, cultural studies, humanities, politics, and sociology. (shrink)

This article investigates Haast’s claim that in March 1862 he independently reached the same controversial conclusion as Ramsay, that lake basins in previously glaciated regions were formed by ancient glaciers. Both men's views fuelled a passionate debate in British scientific societies. However, science historians largely ignore Haast’s contribution or imply he knew about Ramsay’s ‘theory’ before coming to a conclusion about Southern Alps lakes.To assess whether Haast independently reached that conclusion in March 1862, field records, correspondence, reports, newspaper articles, and (...) scientific publications are examined. Of significance are communications with geologists Hochstetter, Hector, and Ramsay, botanist Hooker, and physicist Tyndall. Consideration of what Haast observed in March 1862 is also critical.However, Haast's 1862 conclusion differs from Ramsay's. While Ramsay was convinced ancient glaciers scooped out rock basins, resulting in deep lakes, Haast believed ancient retreating glaciers left moraines that dammed valleys, resulting in shallow lakes. Regardless of their differences, after Haast read Ramsay’s paper in 1864, he applied Ramsay’s ‘theory’ to New Zealand’s alpine lakes and proposed an excavation process.The essence of both Ramsay’s and Haast’s conclusions has been confirmed by research in formerly glaciated regions worldwide. However, Haast’s contribution to glaciology is overlooked or underemphasized, and warrants being more widely acknowledged. (shrink)

In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir revealed that it is just this freedom of withdrawal from self that woman cannot gain because of the constant effort of establishing and guarding her identity against an enforced background of passivity, ornamentality and self-enclosure. Even as a small child, woman is taught how to.

This paper reports a European Forum for Good Clinical Practice workshop held in 2011 to consider a research ethics committee training syllabus, subsequent training needs and resources. The syllabus that was developed was divided into four competencies: committee working; scientific method; ethical analysis and the regulatory framework. Appropriate training needs for each, with possible resources, were discussed. Lack of funding for training was reported as a major problem but affordable alternatives were debated. Strengths and weaknesses of this approach were discussed (...) and the resultant proposal will be disseminated through the European Forum for Good Clinical Practice and the research ethics committees of member states. (shrink)

George Smith argues that modern humanity suffers from a late-stage, pre-fatal addiction to scientific-technological thinking. Like most pre-fatal addictions, this one will most likely result in one of three ways: misery, extinction, or human transformation. The question remains, wherein lies the third way? According to Smith, mankind's chronic and as yet undiagnosed sickness originates in early Western metaphysics and has long been thoroughly globalized. It explains unstoppable extractionism and its relentlessly increasing by-product, carbon dioxide. It also explains today's ever-increasing (...) rate of species extinction, and it explains the increasingly likely collapse of the biosphere. Citing climate change tolerance and denial as symptomatic of pre-fatal addiction, Smith turns his analysis to Heidegger's "question concerning technology" and shows that even Heidegger had become "hooked" on scientific-technological thinking. Surrendering to his disease, Heidegger "steps back" into "meditative thought." This in turn opens Heidegger to an East-West mode of scientific-poetic consciousness, the thinking of artist-philosophers such as Laozi, Hölderlin, and Rachel Carson. For Heidegger, this way of thinking lays the path to mankind's transformative emancipation from an otherwise inescapable catastrophe. The book will be of interest to scholars of the arts and culture, histories of consciousness, and climate studies. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Where It's At Let's Experiment Hooking Up Closer Up Problems and Socratic Experimentation A Daring Ideal.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:348 BOOK REVIEWS to God's commandments is "the way and condition of salvation" (VS # 12). Now obedience to the commandments entails, in addition to a good motivation or a willingness to strive, the conformity of an action's object to the specifying content of the commandment. What is the significance of a commandment to honor one's father and mother, if it does not specify actions? The commandments of God (...) specify what kinds of action are, or are not, in conformity with the true good of man. In his analysis of the moral act, the Pope holds that the object of the act is "the primary and decisive element for moral judgment" (VS # 79). Actions which by the nature of their object are unable to be ordered to man's true end can never be "good" actions. Further, he notes that acts, even individual acts, are determinative of the goodness or badness of the person. These points are summarized nicely in the following passage: Activity is morally good when it attests to and expresses the voluntary ordering of the person to his ultimate end and the conformity of a concrete action with the human good as it is acknowledged in its truth by reason. If the object of the concrete action is not in harmony with the true good of the person, the choice of that action makes our will and ourselves morally evil, thus putting us in conflict with our ultimate end, the supreme good, God himself (VS # 72). I believe that Keenan's study commendably highlights the freedom of the will in the order of exercise, and its power to exercise dominion over the intellect in the order of specification. Keenan also insightfully emphasizes the central role of the love of God as the root of our striving to live well. Yet any willing can only be consequent to some knowing. Further, the willingness to strive and be determined, if it is good, is a willingness to be determined, or specified, by the true good known by reason and faith. This willingness, which is a crucial element in moral goodness, must be completed by actions in conformity with the true good. Human goodness is in freely, and lovingly, living out the truth of human nature and its end. The Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. JOHN A. D. CUDDEBACK Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth. By JOHN FINNIS. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991. Pp. 113. $24.95 (cloth), $9.95 (paper). Not long after his conversion to Roman Catholicism, Alasdair MacIntyre told a group of Catholic bishops: " As a matter of autobio- BOOK REVIEWS 349 graphical fact, I came to the conclusion that there were exceptionless and binding [moral] norms prior to and quite independently of any faith in Divine Revelation." Within the Church Macintyre entered, however, there existed, and exists, widespread doubt and confusion about "moral absolutes" or " exceptionless moral norms." Certain eminent Catholic moral theologians today dissent from Pope John Paul's teaching that " there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object." In the face of this dissent, John Finnis has produced a powerful philosophical and theological defense of the papal teaching. Moral Absolutes presents the 1988 Michael J. McGivney Lectures which Finnis delivered at the John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and the Family. The hook consists of four chapters: "Foundations," "Clarifications," "Christian Witness," and "Challenge and Response." Like Macintyre, Finnis maintains that the authority of scripture and tradition supplement reason's grasp of certain specific types of act as intrinsically wicked and, therefore, never to he performed. Although his goal is to vindicate the proposition that there are moral absolutes, rather than to say which, or even how many, moral norms qualify as " exceptionless " (and therefore as, in the relevant sense of the term, " absolute "), his examples include norms against abortion (and, more generally, the direct killing of innocent human beings), adultery, fornication, contraception, homosexual sex, blasphemy, and disclaimer of the faith. As Finnis observes, the Church's tradition of proclaiming these norms and their absoluteness is "massively solid." Against certain neoscholastic... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RESPONSE TO BRUCE MARSHALL GEORGE LINDBECK There is an abundance of il'iches in Bruce Marshalrs essay. He makes me understand hoth myse1f and Aquinas hetter than I biaid done hefore; and, interestingly, it is chiefly hy his exegesis of St. Thomas that he does :bhis. If I had referred more to the Thomistic ideas he elucidates when I wirus writing Natrure of Dootrine1 it would have!been a better (...) hook. What he calls the " somewhat notorious " example of the crusadeT"s Christus est Dominus is a good oase in point. It would ihave helped if I had made dear that I was thinking in medieval [ashion of a an individual rutterance, the product of a pa•riticular :second 1aJct of the intellect, the ·acl of composing and dividing, of judging ·such and such rto ibe rthe ca,se. In Aquinas' intellectual setting, judgments, not sentences in ·abstraiction from 1 acls of affirmation, were propositions capruble of being true or f.a1se. Many of my ·reruders had a more modern or "Platonic " understanding of rpropositions, and therefore missed the force of the e:xJam:ple ·as Marshall so carefully and rightly explains it. Among his contributions, the major one, however, is system- •a1tically to introduce into the disCUJssion the distinction between the " truth " and " justification " of beliefs or pI'oposi- "'" tionS.- Once the point is made, it is evident that " alethiology" and " epistemology " (to mention a cognate, though not ~den­ tical distinction) ·are, 1 at least in some contexts, partially independent variables. There is no one-to-one relation between different meanings or theories of truth and the v:arious views as to how we know such ·and such is true. It was my failure to make this point explicit which confosed Fr. Colman O'Neill, of blessed memory, ias well as a good many other readers (1as Bruce Marshall quite rightly notes, though, with excessive 408 404 GEORGEl LINDBECK kindness to me, he!blames the,readers rather than the 'author for the misunderstanding). Once iclarfiied, as it has lbeen done hy Mr. Marshall, the issue turns on ·whether,a classical " correspondence " theory of truth can be ioombined,with, to empfoy O'Neill's terminology, the use of "coherentist" and " pragmatist " epistemological criteria in justifying rbelieis. I ·am not sure ·that this is possible for those who e:xdude any reference to an idea.I observer or knower (whether real or hypothetical) when defining truth, hut for any theist r.for whom God is prima veritas, as he was for Aquinas, the answer is dearly in the affirmative. In God, and only in God, are knowledge and reality, not only in correspondence, hut directly known to correspond. Only in him do truth·and knowledge of truth, 1 aleth:iofogy and epistemology, ooindde. In 1human knowledge in via, in contrast, there is always a gap. Our ibe1ieTs may correspond to reality, hut we are justified in holding that they do so, not by directly seeing the correspondence, 1but by some other means. That those other means might in part or w:hole be coherentist or pragmatist cannot :be e:xduded a priori. It is true that in the caise of an Aristotelian 1such 1as Aquinas, coherence •and rpmctise 1are not explicitly accorded major roles in the epistemological justification of natural kno·wledge or scientia, yet even here they are not e:xduded. Nothing can quali[y ais 1an item of knowledge unless it coheres with all other scientia, and right pra.ctice (i.e., training in virtue) is indispensible :llor ethical kno,wledge. Nor need one cease fo be an Aris,totelian, 1as far ·as I can see, if one accepts the contempOO 'ary oommonpJaice that sense experience itself is heavily dependent on linguistic and non-linguistic pmctices which are in part ·acquired rthrough variaible forim:s of aicculturation and not simply through the actualization of 1genetically encoded propensities. One could still, despite this increased emphasis on prwctiice.and on coherence 1 with webs of 1belief, ibe 'able to affum in good Aristotelian,fashion tha;t the knowledge naturally accessible to ra:t]onal animals such,as we a.re is primarily justified RESPONCE TO BRUCE MARSHALL 405 iby reference to... (shrink)

It is not just rhetoric to ask why we should still be reading the Young Hegelians today. In spite of their commitment to action, their influence on the politics of the times was marginal at best; and even as philosophers, the movement of thought which they represented was all but dead by 1848. Now that we read them at a distance of over a century, it is clear that for once at least the fate meted out by circumstances was well (...) deserved. The writings of the Young Hegelians appear painfully thin in insight and force of argument. This global judgment must of course be qualified. Protestant theology has not been the same since David Strauss, and Feuerbach’s conception of man stands as the first statement of modern scientific humanism. Still, the ideal of humanity that inspired either of them has none of the historical richness of Hegel’s “spirit”; in the case of Feuerbach there is also none of the scholarship that redeems at least some of Strauss’ work. The value of both men’s writings lay mostly in their iconoclastic nature. They cleared the air, though at the cost of grave oversimplifications, of the illusion that after Hegel things could quite ever be the same again - as if the speculative comprehension of the Christian faith that Hegel claimed to have achieved could have left that faith undisturbed. But now that the profane has become the commonplace, there is little to recommend them in our eyes; and now that we have also had plenty of opportunity to notice how quickly the spirit of revolution degenerates into faction and anarchy, there is even less to recommend the rest of the Young Hegelians. The later Marx stands out intellectually in comparison to them precisely because he succeeded in breaking free from their ideological hold. I sometimes wonder whether his figure has really been enhanced by the post-war attempt at reinterpreting Capital in the light of his supposed earlier “humanism.” Sidney Hook’s statement that the late Marx was a scientist, and that his theory is to be proven either right or wrong on strictly historical and empirical evidence, might be a bit far-fetched perhaps; it still is in my mind the best compliment that one can pay to Marx. (shrink)

The frequent use of metaphors in health care communication in general and clinical ethics cases in particular calls for a more mindful and competent use of figurative speech. Metaphors are powerful tools that enable different ways of thinking about complex issues in health care. However, depending on how and in which context they are used, they can also be harmful and undermine medical decision-making. Given this contingent nature of metaphors, this article discusses two approaches that suggest how medical health care (...) professionals may systematically and imaginatively work with metaphors. The first approach is informed by a model developed by cognitive scientists George Lakoff and Mark Turner. The second approach is a close reading and thus a text-immanent, hermeneutical strategy. Using the double perspective of an ethics consultant and a researcher in literature studies, we take a case from Richard M Zaner in which a metaphor is central to the clinical-ethical problem. The article shows that the approaches, which focus on creativity and the intersections of form and content, may be helpful tools in clinical ethics, enabling a competent and mindful working with metaphors in complex cases as well as supporting the consultant’s thoughts processes. (shrink)

The essays in this volume offer a thorough discussion of the relationship between addiction and rationality. This book-length treatment of the subject includes contributions from philosophers, psychiatrists, neurobiologists, sociologists and economists. Contrary to the widespread view that addicts are subject to overpowering and compulsive urges, the authors in this volume demonstrate that addicts are capable of making choices and responding to incentives. At the same time they disagree with Gary Becker's argument that addiction is the result of rational choice. The (...) volume offers an exposition of the neurophysiology of addiction, a critical examination of the Becker theory of rational addiction, an argument for a 'visceral theory of addiction', a discussion of compulsive gambling as a form of addiction, several discussions of George Ainslie's theory of hyperbolic discounting, analyses of social causes and policy implications, and an investigation of the problem of relapse. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Works of George Santayana, volume IX, Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion ed. by Martin A. Coleman, David E. Spiech, and Faedra Lazar WeissKrzysztof (Chris) Piotr SkowrońskiEdited by Martin A. Coleman, David E. Spiech, and Faedra Lazar WeissThe Works of George Santayana, volume IX, Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion Cambridge, MA, and London, England: The MIT Press, 2023; 359 pp., incl.indexIt is (...) not merely a re-edition of Santayana’s book that is at stake here. This ninth volume of The MIT Critical Edition of The Works of George Santayana is a next step in showing us his vast output with extensive range, depth, and, most importantly, significant stimulation for our generation of scholars and non-scholars. Just to illustrate the scope of Santayana’s work: volume V of the present MIT Critical Edition, published in the years 2001–2008, consists of eight thick books with Santayana’s correspondence throughout seventy years of intellectual activity (around 3000 letters to roughly 350 recipients, William James, Josiah Royce, Bertrand Russell, Sidney Hook, Horace Kallen, B.A.G. Fuller, Hugo Münsterberg, among them), containing philosophical and cultural insights that substantially compliment the views he expressed in his published texts.The original idea of the MIT Critical Edition was to present the published and unpublished works, followed by an elaborate editorial apparatus. As we can read in the present volume, “The goal of the editors is to produce texts that accurately represent Santayana’s final intentions regarding his works while recording all evidence on which editorial decisions have been based” (p. 307). How complex and fascinating the whole project has been we can also learn from a recently published book by Herman Saatkamp, who edited the Santayana edition for twenty-six years (Charles Padrón and Chris Skowroński, eds., Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., A Life of Scholarship with George Santayana: [End Page 462] Essays and Reflections, Brill/Rodopi, 2021). As we can read in Saatkamp’s book (p. 139), the story goes back to 1976, when John Lachs, top Santayana expert, asked Saatkamp to write the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) and put forward a proposal for The Works of George Santayana. As the latest of its results today, we have the ninth volume just published, while future volumes are still being prepared for publication (twenty volumes are currently projected).More specific answers to questions: Do we need a critical edition to do this? Is it not enough just to publish the original volume anew? depend largely on the target audience. For those who are unfamiliar with Santayana, having in hand Volume IX shows that it is just a part, although an important part, of a much larger project, and Paul Forster’s lengthy introduction would be very helpful. Forster competently outlines Santayana’s work and life, and subsequently analyzes the book, chapter by chapter, so that we have a penetrating insight into its whole substance. Also, further down in the volume (pp. 303–306), we find a “Chronology of the Life and Work of George Santayana” that is informative to those unfamiliar with Santayana.I suspect that those audiences who are familiar with Santayana have been waiting for this volume impatiently. The original 1913 publication, by Charles Scribner’s Son (New York)—which itself was a collection of rather independent texts in the form of chapters—has been expanded with Santayana’s preface to the second edition, of 1926. Most importantly, however, the whole text (these two editions: 1913 and 1926) have been re-edited, revised, and corrected according to the criteria of a critical edition. Some terms, phrases, names, as well as other issues are explained extensively in a 140-page part entitled “Notes to the Text” (pp. 159–302). Some of these notes are instructive indeed, not only because they explain passages in the text, but also because they refer to other works by Santayana where he explains the issue at hand into more detail or from a different viewpoint. From these notes we learn much more about the ideas discussed and the figures to which Santayana refers in his reflections than we would by reading... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:146 BOOK REVIEWS Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays. Edited by ROBERT P. GEORGE. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Pp. 371. $39.95 (cloth). As the editor of this volume, Robert P. George points out in his foreword that this hook is yet another manifestation of the renewed and growing interest in natural law theory. But why this recent increased interest in natural law theory? What purpose is this (...) theory supposed to serve, or in what way do its proponents see it as an improvement on existing theories? First of all, it must be noted, as the variety of essays in this volume makes abundantly clear, that natural law theory, as it is presently conceived, most certainly does not represent anything like a unified, single theory of tightly knit principles and conclusions. In the present volume one can easily see a half-dozen or more different approaches to natural law theory. So different in tone and spirit are some of the essays that one can easily wonder if they have enough in common even to classify them as " family resemblances." But if they all in their different ways do indeed evidence, as the editor claims, an increased awareness of and interest in natural law theory, the question immediately arises, why this increased interest? What problems do the advocates of these theories hope to solve by them or what questions do they think their theories will better address than the theories currently in place? First of all, one may make a division which places the theories, however divers~ among themselves, into two general groups. The first of these groups wishes natural law theory to function as a general approach to morality. For this group natural law does the work of a moral theory. In this group I would place the essays of Joseph Boyle, Robert George, Russell Bittinger, John Finnis, and Hadley Arkes (probably). The second group uses natural law theory as a way of determining the connection between moral law and positive law or legal theory. The essays of Jeffrey Stout, Neil MacCormick, Jeremy Waldron, Michael Moore, Lloyd Weinreb, Joseph Raz, and Ernest Weinrib fall into this second category. In all there are twelve essays in this volume. Space will not permit me to give a detailed analysis and critique of each. At most I can only indicate very briefly some of their more salient features. The book is divided into four parts, the first of which is titled "Natural Law, Practical Reasoning and Morality." In the very illuminating first essay of this section, "Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions," Joseph Boyle undertakes to clarify the question of the relation of natural law theory to tradition. Certain approaches to moral theory currently popular BOOK REVIEWS 147 which are called virtues ethics, of which Alasdair Macintyre would he an example, claim that natural law theory is tradition-dependent. If Macintyre and other virtues ethicists are correct, then since natural law theory is culture-hound, and since the culture in which it was horn and flourished, medieval culture, has irretrievably retreated into the pages of history, then natural law theory is equally dead, of interest, if at all, only in an antiquarian way. Boyle carefully points out that there is more than one sense of being tradition-dependent. It is true that natural law theory is tradition-dependent in the sense that it did indeed come into existence in a particular historic epoch and that its language and thought do indeed express the period of its flourishing, i.e. the medieval period. But this, Boyle is careful to point out, does not mean that its validity and meaning were exhausted with the end of that culture. Rather the tradition is a living tradition so that its rich resources can continue to be exploited as that tradition is enlarged by its application to present day moral problems. Boyle's conclusion then is that in some senses natural law is indeed dependent on an ancient and medieval tradition, hut not so totally dependent that it has lost all validity for contemporary moral theory. In the contribution by Robert George, "Natural Law and Human Nature," George tries to defend Germain Grisez's version of natural law... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:358 BOOK REVIEWS New Perspectives on Old-Time Religion. By GEORGE N. SCHLESINGER. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. Pp. 196. George Schlesinger ends one of the chapters of his hook by saying: In the last two hundred years or so, theism has mostly been on the defensive and in retreat. It is important to show that the believer can offer a rational justification (...) for his position that is at least as respectable as his opponent's. And it is also important to show that he can do this without having to reinterpret radically, demythologize, or dilute traditional religious doctrines; without having to take shelter in impenetrably opaque metaphors and mystifications; and without claiming immunity from the testimonies of empirical evidence and logical argument by in· voking the special, ineffable status of his beliefs (148). That is precisely what Schlesinger attempts to do in this hook. What we have, as a result, is a philosophically original, vigorously argued, literate, and even at times entertaining defense of religious belief cov· ering a wide range of topics which are seen to he interrelated in deep and sometimes surprising ways. After a brief introduction offering an over-view of what is to come, Schlesinger addresses in his first chapter the crucial topic of the concept of God. In it he argues the superiority of St. Anselm's conception of God as a greatest possible, or absolutely perfect, being. With the single idea of divine perfection as the governing constraint on any detailed elaboration of distinct divine attributes, Schlesinger suggests that many well known arguments against the coherence of theism can he answered very simply. In this intriguing chapter, he even goes so far as to suggest that " upon gaining a basic understanding of the nature of Divine attributes all problems disappear " (14). He illustrates his approach by examining difficulties that have been alleged to attend the theistic claim that God is both omniscient and immutable and the claim that God is omnipotent. Along the way, all sorts of interesting problems are touched upon, from the proper understanding of time to the nature of petitionary prayer. Chapter two tackles what is considered by many people to he the major obstacle to theism, the problem of evil. Schlesinger begins by arguing that it is an inadequate response for theists to suggest that God is justified in allowing the evils of our world because they are necessary, or their allowance is necessary, for the existence of a great good, namely, morally significant free will along God's creatures. Schlesinger contends that a simple free will theodicy has no way of explaining why God does not act in subtle ways so as to curtail the scope of wicked- BOOK REVIEWS 359 ness in the world. If we agree that it would be morally incumbent upon any person capable of restraining a Hitler to attempt to do so in fact, we find it hard to see on what grounds God might diverge from our judgment. Does He view each of Hitler's acts of free will to be of such value as exercises of freedom that it is better to allow them than to prevent the \more horrendous of them? After his discussion of the free will solution, Schlesinger goes on to develop a line of thought that he has pursued in other writings, but which here is given most detailed elaboration. He begins by sketching the main lines of what is often called the virtuous response theodicy, or the soul-making theodicy. This is fundamentally the claims that (l) there are certain virtues which could not be had in a world bereft of suffering, (2) a world containing creatures with these virtues is superior to one devoid of suffering and thus of these virtues as well, and that (3) God is justified in choosing to create and sustain a world which allows of such virtues, that is to say, a world containing suffering. Of the many objections raised against standard explications of this sort of theodicy, one is especially difficult to overcome, an objection often known as the absurd morality complaint. It goes like this: It is an absurd morality which allows us to... (shrink)

abstractThis paper addresses the relation between morality and private thought. It is widely agreed that government and society have no business trying to control our thoughts—that, as long as we d...

A number of observations have led researchers to postulate that, despite being replication‐defective, human endogenous retroviruses (HERVs) may have retained the potential to cause or contribute to disease. However, mechanisms of HERV pathogenicity might differ substantially from those of modern infectious retroviruses or of the infectious precursors of HERVs. Therefore, novel pathways of HERV involvement in disease pathogenesis should be investigated. Recent technological advances in sequencing and bioinformatics are making this task increasingly feasible. The accumulating knowledge of HERV biology may (...) also facilitate the definition and general acceptance of criteria that establish HERV pathogenicity. Here, we explore possible mechanisms whereby HERVs may cause disease and examine the evidence that either has been or should be obtained in order to decisively address the pathogenic potential of HERVs. (shrink)

Includes writings on pragmatism by Ralph Waldo Emerson, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., George Herbert Mead, Percy W. Bridgman, C. I. Lewis, Horace M. Kallen, Sidney Hook, and, especially, William James, Charles S. Peirce, and John Dewey.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:524 BOOK REVIEWS Word is to interpret us" (189). That two-way response to the Word of God neatly summarizes William Hill's witness to us as theologian as well: to he the mediator between classical and contemporary idiomata in such a way as to enrich the deliverances of both, reminiscent of Matthew's commendation of the " disciple in the kingdom of Heaven [being] like a householder who brings out from (...) his storeroom new things as well as old" (13 :52). The excitement of this project will not he lost on students of theology confronted with novel theories periodically renewed. What makes William Hill a theologians' theologian is not only his conceptual clarity, hut his capacity to move among us as a fellow inquirer. Bereft of any need to kill off contenders to make room for his innovations, we rather find him recalling on every page how much he has learned from others and wishes to pass on to us. University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana DAVID B. BURRELL, c.s.c. The Diversity of Religions: A Christian Perspective. By J. A. D1NoIA, O.P. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1992. $29.95 (cloth), $17.95 (paper). For some time now the debate in the Christian theology of religions has centered around the question of ·the possibility of salvation for nonChristians. The answers to this question have often been placed in a threefold typology: exclusivism, inclusivism or pluralism. Exclusivists generally maintain that salvation is conditional on an explicit confession of faith in Jesus Christ, hence non-Christians are lost. Pluralists, on the other hand, maintain that salvation can he found in different religions in various ways, and that Christianity is one among many paths to the divine reality. Inclusivists agree that non-Christians may he saved, and if they are it may he through rather than despite their religion. Inclusivists differ from pluralists in believing that Christ is the constitutive cause of all salvation, even therefore the salvation of a non-Christian. DiNoia's hook claims to do two very significant things. First, to go beyond the three approaches and suggest a fresh way of dealing with the question. Second, in doing so, to create a new agenda for the Christian theology of religions. My verdict: he partly fails and partly succeeds, and both his failings and success are deeply instructive and profoundly illuminating. DiNoia's argument is advanced carefully and lucidly and is acces- BOOK REVIEWS 525 sihle to non-specialists. The bibliographic essay/notes related to each chapter indicate thorough research (with one exception) and are a pleasure to read. DiNoia (a Thomist with Barthian leanings) closely follows George Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic model of religion, arguing that the specific way of life, determined by the actual doctrines held, uniquely shapes and moulds the religious practitioner. The goal and means of the religious way are intrinsically related and cannot he separated. He then persuasively argues that the difficulty with pluralists and inclusivists is that they impose a soteriocentricism upon other religions where there may he none! In contrast, DiNoia maintains one cannot say anything about the meaning of another religion apart from specific and proper attention to the ways in which its doctrines regulate its practice and stipulate the goal to he achieved by that way of life. In Christianity, eternal fellowship with the blessed Trinity can be said to he the goal (salvation) which is carefully orchestrated in minute detail through the liturgical life of the community. To claim that other religions attain the same salvific goal is therefore problematic. DiNoia's argument creates a space for other religions to really disclose what they are about in their doctrines and practice, without a priori categorization, and this is to he welcomed. Hence, the necessity of dialogue as the proper location for disclosure of the "other". Dialogue thereby becomes central to a theology of religions. Only in this process can we ask the question as to whether and how these ways of life relate to Christianity. DiNoia allows for the possibility that doctrinal truth and good actions can he found in other religions, without compromising the cen· trality of the incarnation as constitutive... (shrink)

Not long before the change of Government in Britain in 1997, the then Heritage Secretary, Virginia Bottomley, made a speech in which she praised British contemporary art, describing it as the most exciting and innovatory in the world. Unexciting as it seemed, her observation was profoundly innovatory, indeed in its small way historic. To my knowledge no British Cabinet Minister, still less a Conservative, has ever given an official seal of approval to what is conventionally regarded as avant-garde art. The (...) Labour Government has echoed its predecessor's praise at a higher volume, as if determined to out-do it. The sanctification by the state of works of contemporary art has now become part of the discourse of officialdom. (shrink)

A Dedekind algebra is an ordered pair (B, h), where B is a non-empty set and h is a similarity transformation on B. Among the Dedekind algebras is the sequence of the positive integers. From a contemporary perspective, Dedekind established that the second-order theory of the sequence of the positive integers is categorical and finitely axiomatizable. The purpose here is to show that this seemingly isolated result is a consequence of more general results in the model theory of second-order languages. (...) Each Dedekind algebra can be decomposed into a family of disjoint, countable subalgebras called the configurations of the algebra. There are ?0 isomorphism types of configurations. Each Dedekind algebra is associated with a cardinal-valued function on ? called its configuration signature. The configuration signature counts the number of configurations in each isomorphism type that occurs in the decomposition of the algebra. Two Dedekind algebras are isomorphic iff their configuration signatures are identical. The second-order theory of any countably infinite Dedekind algebra is categorical, and there are countably infinite Dedekind algebras whose second-order theories are not finitely axiomatizable. It is shown that there is a condition on configuration signatures necessary and sufficient for the second-order theory of a Dedekind algebra to be finitely axiomatizable. It follows that the second-order theory of the sequence of the positive integers is categorical and finitely axiomatizable. (shrink)

The nineteenth century saw frequent appeals to the idea of a redeemer personality, a heroic leader – musings which culminated in the cults devoted to Hitler and Stalin. This article shows that the self-assertion of leaders can stimulate the self-abasement of the followers on whom they depend (and vice versa), and discusses in what circumstances such an interplay becomes dominant in a society, and with what advantages and disadvantages for it.