Der finanzielle Druck auf die Krankenhäuser in Deutschland führt zu einer Ökonomisierung medizinischer Entscheidungen, die die Qualität der Patientenversorgung beeinträchtigt und das Gesundheitspersonal erheblich belastet. Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht, welche Möglichkeiten ein organisationsethischer Ansatz bietet, den Herausforderungen durch die Ökonomisierung zu begegnen. Ausgewählte empirische Befunde sollen zunächst verdeutlichen, welche Auswirkungen die Ökonomisierung auf die Patientenversorgung und das Personal in den Krankenhäusern hat. Zudem liefern sie erste Hinweise auf mögliche Handlungsspielräume für die Krankenhäuser. Dabei wird deutlich, dass die Ökonomisierung einen organisationsethischen (...) Ansatz erfordert, der die Handlungsspielräume auf der Mesoebene, d. h. auf der Ebene der einzelnen Krankenhäuser nutzt. Der organisationsethische Ansatz wird in seinen Grundzügen vorgestellt und dann im Sinne eines Wertemanagements als Lösungsperspektive für die Herausforderungen der Ökonomisierung konkretisiert. Abschließend entwickelt der Beitrag Perspektiven, wie klinische Ethikkomitees mit organisationsethischer Arbeit den negativen Auswirkungen der Ökonomisierung auf die Patientenversorgung und das Personal im Krankenhaus entgegenwirken können. (shrink)

G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831), the influential German philosopher, believed that human history was advancing spiritually and morally according to God’s purpose. At the beginning of this masterwork, Hegel writes: “What the history of Philosophy shows us is a succession of noble minds, a gallery of heroes of thought, who, by the power of Reason, have penetrated into the being of things, of nature and of spirit, into the Being of God, and have won for us by their labours the (...) highest treasure, the treasure of reasoned knowledge.” In his introduction to this Bison Book edition, Frederick C. Beiser notes the complex and controversial history of Hegel’s text. He makes a case that this English-language translation by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson is still the most reliable one. (shrink)

For Descartes, minds were essentially non-extended things. Contemporary cognitive science prides itself on having exorcised the Cartesian ghost from the biological machine. However, it remains committed to the Cartesian vision of the mental as something purely inner. Against the idea that the mind resides solely in the brain, advocates of the situated and embodied nature of cognition have long stressed the importance of dynamic brain-body-environment couplings, the opportunistic exploitation of bodily morphology, the strategic performance of epistemically potent actions, the generation (...) and use of external representations, and the cognitive scaffolding provided by artifacts and social-cultural practices. According to the “extended mind” thesis, a significant portion of human cognition literally extends beyond the brain into the body and its environment. My goal in this book is to clarify the nature and scope of this thesis, and to defend its central insight that cognition is not confined to the boundaries of the biological individual. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop an understanding of recognition in terms of individuals’ capacity for conflict. Our goal is to overcome various shortcomings that can be found in both the positive and negative conceptions of recognition. We start by analyzing paradigmatic instances of such conceptions—namely, those put forward by Axel Honneth and Judith Butler. We do so in order to show how both positions are inadequate in their elaborations of recognition in an analogous way: Both fail to make intelligible the (...) fundamental nexus between relations of recognition and individuals’ capacity for conflict. We then move on to reconsider aspects of Hegel's view of recognition—ones that, from our viewpoint, have been unjustly neglected in the debate about recognition: his focus on the constitution of relations of recognition in conflict and on the status of being an author of acts of recognition. On this basis, we then spell out in a more systematic way what we take to be a more convincing conception of recognition. This puts us in the position to gesture at some consequences of this conception in practical contexts, above all with regard to the justification, role and structure of political institutions. (shrink)

"The actuality of the revolution: this is the core fo Lenin's thought and his decisive link with Marx."This essay on Lenin, which appeared in 1924, was intended to head off the massive criticism leveled at Lukacs History and Class Consciousness by Communist Party leadership. It was a period in which Lukacs was decisively influenced by Lenin and by Rosa Luxemburg, and his intellectual development proceeded concretely toward a political interpretation of history and of literature.In a postscript Lukacs remains essentially unchanged (...) in his view of Lenin as a practitioner whose theoretical superiority lay in his ability to assess the sociohistorical uniqueness of any given situation that required action. Looking back, Lukacs regards the book as a document of the mid-twenties--of how a number of Marxists of the period saw Lenin's personality and mission and his place in world events. Ideas in the book were determined by the concepts of the period, its prejudices, illusions, and extravagances. Nevertheless, the book established certain spiritual verities in perceiving Lenin as the active-practical sage who had a skillfull tactical grasp of realpolitik which was neither empirical nor dogmatic but the culmination of a theoretical attitude. "His life was one of permanent action, of continuous struggle in a world in which he was profoundly convinced that there was no situation without a solution, for himself or his opponents. The leitmotiv of his life was accordingly: always be armed ready for action--for correct action." Lukacs further notes that an essential dimension of Lenin's activism was unceasingly self-education and constant openness to the lessons of experience.Lukacs also emphasizes a number of points in the book that remain methodologically valid, including criticisms of Lenin's behavior which were implicit and accurate critiques of Stalin's later development and the increasing bureaucratization and mechanization of the party. (shrink)

This edition of a recently discovered manuscript provides the first full look at Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. The lectures of 1827 go far beyond Hegel's previously published Encyclopedia outline, and provide a new introduction to the Philosophy of Spirit. Robert Williams's translation will stimulate interest in a neglected area in Hegel scholarship, but one to which Hegel himself attached special importance and significance.

Wegner, Giuliano, and Hertel (1985) defined the notion of a transactive memory system (TMS) as a group level memory system that “involves the operation of the memory systems of the individuals and the processes of communication that occur within the group (p. 191). Those processes are the collaborative procedures (“transactions”) by which groups encode, store, and retrieve information that is distributed among their members. Over the past 25+ years, the conception of a TMS has progressively garnered an increased interest among (...) social and organizational psychologists, communication scholars, and management theorists (Ren & Argote 2011). But there remains considerable disagreement about how exactly Wegner’s appeal to group memory should be understood. My goal in this paper is contribute to this debate, by articulating more clearly the value of conceptualizing groups as TMSs. This value, I argue, consists in providing us with a blueprint for how to explain group memory in terms of collective information-processing mechanisms. Collective information-processing mechanisms are dependent on, and interact with, the brain-bound information-processing of individuals, but cannot be reduced to the latter. In my analysis, I lean on extant accounts of mechanistic explanation in the philosophy of science (Bechtel & Richardson 1993; Machamer, Darden, & Craver 2000; Wimsatt 2007) that have been used to analyze the explanatory practices of psychology and cognitive neuroscience (Bechtel 2008, 2009). Based on my reconstruction of Wegner’s conceptualization of a TMS, I argue that the reality of emergent group cognition is compatible with its mechanistic explanation. More generally, my analysis shows that group cognition cannot be reduced to individual cognition, while avoiding the false dilemma between “wholism” and “nothing but-ism” which has hampered traditional construals of the “group mind” thesis (Allport 1968). (shrink)

Welche Rolle spielen die Begriffe des Zwecks und der Funktion für die Biologie und die Bestimmung ihres Grundbegriffs, des Organismus?

Dieses von Hegel als Leitfaden für die Hörer seiner Vorlesungen konzipierte Werk bietet einen programmatischen Aufriß seines gesamten philosophischen Systems. Es umfaßt die drei Teile: Wissenschaft der Logik, Philosophie der Natur und Philosophie des Geistes. Die 8., um ein Literaturverzeichnis erweiterte Auflage bietet den durchgesehenen Text der 6., nach der Originalausgabe neu herausgegebenen Text mit Anmerkungen von F. Nicolin und O. Pöggeler. Beigegeben sind eine Einleitung, Literaturverzeichnis und Personen- und Sachregister.

Vier Metaphysische Kapitel :1. Die Transzendenz des Lebens2. Die Wendung zur Idee3. Tod und Unsterblichkeit4. Das individuelle Gesetz.

What makes our brain a brain? This is the central question posited in Unlocking the Brain. By providing a fascinating venture into different territories of neuroscience, psychiatry, and philosophy, the author takes a novel exploration of the brain's resting state in the context of the neural code, and its ability to yield consciousness.

The best of Hegel's early writings, with an introduction on Hegel's philosophical development.

Gemessen an Bedeutung, Rang und Wirkung steht die Rechtsphilosophie Hegels heute neben den Politiken von Platon und Aristoteles, dem Leviathan von Hobbes und dem Contrat social von Rousseau.Hegels "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts" zählen zu den bedeutendsten Werken der neuzeitlichen Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie. In ihnen entwirft er teils unter Rückgriff auf das frühere ›Naturrecht‹, teils im Blick auf die politische und rechtliche Lage nach der Französischen Revolution und zu Beginn der Restaurationsepoche eine Philosophie des objektiven Geistes. Seit ihrer Erstveröffentlichung im (...) Winter 1820/21 sind die Grundlinien Gegenstand heftiger philosophischer und politischer Auseinandersetzungen gewesen. Unter dem Aspekt der historisch-systematischen Erfassung und Bewertung der Hegelschen Leistung kommt es jedoch zunächst darauf an, den originären Gedanken Hegels klar von der mittelbaren Überlieferung zu trennen, die teils durch die von Eduard Gans für die zweite Ausgabe der Schrift 1833 herangezogenen Vorlesungsnachschriften, teils durch die von ihm vorgenommene Umformung und Umarbeitung dieses Sonderguts zu den sogenannten "Zusätzen" zum Hegelschen Text eigene Wirkung erlangte.Diese Neuausgabe beruht auf dem Text der kritischen Edition G.W.F. Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, Band 14 . Sie enthält den Text der Erstausgabe mit den Sachanmerkungen aus GW 14,3.Inhalt: Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse - Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Erster Teil. Das abstrakte Recht - Zweiter Teil. Die Moralität - Dritter Teil. Die Sittlichkeit. (shrink)

Talk of group minds has arisen in a number of distinct traditions, such as in sociological thinking about the “madness of crowds” in the 19th-century, and more recently in making sense of the collective intelligence of social insects, such as bees and ants. Here we provide an analytic framework for understanding a range of contemporary appeals to group minds and cognate notions, such as collective agency, shared intentionality, socially distributed cognition, transactive memory systems, and group-level cognitive adaptations.

This is a much-needed reissue of the standard English translation of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, originally published in 1970. The Philosophy of Nature is the second part of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, all of which is now available in English from OUP (Part I being his Logic, Part III being his Philosophy of Mind). Hegel's aim in this work is to interpret the varied phenomena of Nature from the standpoint of a dialectical logic. Those who still think of (...) Hegel as a merely a priori philosopher will here find abundant evidence that he was keenly interested in and very well informed about empirical science. The Philosophy of Nature is integral to his philosophical system and deserves the most serious attention. Students and scholars of Hegel and the history of European philosophy will welcome the availability of this important text, which also includes a translation of Hegel's Zusatze or lecture notes. (shrink)

Review of Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge by Georg G. Iggers.

L'Encyclopedie des sciences philosophiques de Hegel est la premiere, mais aussi la derniere pensee totale de la realite qui fonde sa necessite sur l'identite de l'identite a soi rigoureusement respectee de la pensee et de la difference d'avec soi consretement exploree de la realite; concept et experience triomphent ici conjointement. Cette premiere partie de l'ouvrage - la science de la logique - qui deploie dialectiquement toutes les significations organiquement enveloppees dans la pensee la plus simple qui soit, celle de l'etre (...) vise en toute affirmation, elle atteste l'immense pouvoir de l'esprit et par la fortifie en lui le courage de la verite. (shrink)

Fragments in Ancient Greek with German translation; introduction and commentary in German.

Der Band enthält Essays des bekannten Zürcher Philosophen, die auf vielfältige Weise so grundlegende Dinge wie den Ursprung des Bösen, die Machbarkeit des Glücks, die Möglichkeit von Hoffnung oder das Wesen der Verführung behandeln. Gemeinsam ist diesen Arbeiten die Absicht, die großen Philosophischen Themen aus ihrem Zusammenhang in den alltäglichen Empfindungen unseres Daseins zu verstehen. Das ist das, was Kohler die >Kunst des Philosophierens nennt: Kunst vergnügt, weil sie, ohne zu langweilen, viel zum Denken aufgibt.

Was ist Terrorismus? Wie kann man ihn verstehen und. erklären? Wie ist Terrorismus moralisch/rechtlich/politisch zu beurteilen? Und wie geht man mit ihm am besten um? Das sind die Fragen, die man sich bei einer rationalen Befassung mit Terror und Gegen-Terror-Maßnahmen zu stellen hat. Dieses Buch weicht diesen schwierigen Fragen nicht aus. Orientierungshilfe in solchen gesellschaftlichen Grundsatzfragen anzubieten - das ist eine der zentralen Aufgaben einer Universität: Und so gehen die Beiträge dieses Bandes auf eine zweisemestrige öffentliche Ringvorlesung an der Universität (...) Leipzig 2002/2003 zurück. Diese Veranstaltung war nicht rein akademisch: Außer Wissenschaftlern kommen daher auch Generäle, Journalisten, Pfarrer und Politiker zu Wort. Die Autoren kommen aus Deutschland, Australien, Israel, der Schweiz und den USA. Terror & der Krieg gegen ihn - beides ist, der Intention wie den Wirkungen nach, engstens mit Bildern verknüpft. Mit Bildern der Gewalt - und mit Bildern, mit denen Gewalt ausgeübt wird. Auch dieser Aspekt wird in diesem Band dokumentiert. (shrink)

The article presents the conceptual groundwork for an understanding of the essentially improvisational dimension of human rationality. It aims to clarify how we should think about important concepts pertinent to central aspects of human practices, namely, the concepts of improvisation, normativity, habit, and freedom. In order to understand the sense in which human practices are essentially improvisational, it is first necessary to criticize misconceptions about improvisation as lack of preparation and creatio ex nihilo. Second, it is necessary to solve the (...) theoretical problems that derive from misunderstandings concerning the notions of normativity, habit, and freedom – misunderstandings that revolve around the idea that rationality is a form that is developed out of itself and thus works in a way similar to algorithms. One can only make sense of normativity, habit, and freedom if one understands that they all involve conflictual relationships with the world and with others, which in turn enables one to adequately take into account their constitutive connection to improvisation, properly understood. In outlining these conceptual connections, we want to prepare the foundations for an explanation of rational practices as improvisational practices. The article concludes by stating that human rational life is improvisatory because the conditions of human practice arise out of practice itself. (shrink)

Øystein Linnebo and Richard Pettigrew have recently developed a version of non-eliminative mathematical structuralism based on Fregean abstraction principles. They argue that their theory of abstract structures proves a consistent version of the structuralist thesis that positions in abstract structures only have structural properties. They do this by defining a subset of the properties of positions in structures, so-called fundamental properties, and argue that all fundamental properties of positions are structural. In this article, we argue that the structuralist thesis, even (...) when restricted to fundamental properties, does not follow from the theory of structures that Linnebo and Pettigrew have developed. To make their account work, we propose a formal framework in terms of Kripke models that makes structural abstraction precise. The formal framework allows us to articulate a revised definition of fundamental properties, understood as intensional properties. Based on this revised definition, we show that the restricted version of the structuralist thesis holds. 1Introduction 2The Structuralist Thesis 3LP-Structuralism 4Purity 5A Formal Framework for Structural Abstraction 6Fundamental Relations 7The Structuralist Thesis Vindicated 8Conclusion. (shrink)

In this paper we consider two major issues: conceptual–experimental approaches to the self, and the neuroanatomical substrate of the self. We distinguish content- and processed-based concepts of the self that entail different experimental strategies, and anatomically, we investigate the concept of midline structures in further detail and present a novel view on the anatomy of an integrated subcortical–cortical midline system. Presenting meta-analytic evidence, we show that the anterior paralimbic, e.g. midline, regions do indeed seem to be specific for self-specific stimuli. (...) We conclude that future investigation of the self need to develop novel concepts that are more empirically plausible than those currently in use. Different concepts of self will require novel experimental designs that include, for example, the brain’s resting state activity as an independent variable. Modifications of both conceptual and anatomical dimensions will allow an empirically more plausible account of the relationship between brain and self. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Der Materialismus in der Philosophie der griechisch-römischen Antike" verfügbar.

Entries provide detailed explanations of basic yoga concepts, identify important teachers, and include information on the history of yoga.

This volume is the first collection focusing on the claim that we cannot but account for emotions if we are to understand the processes and evaluations related to empirical knowledge.

Die intensive Auseinandersetzung mit Dispositionen und Kausalkräften innerhalb der analytischen Ontologie hat wesentlich dazu beigetragen, in der Handlungstheorie offener und ungenierter von den Kausalkräften des Handelnden („agent causal powers“) bzw. der Agenskausalität (AK) zu sprechen. In diesem Beitrag gehe ich auf diese Entwicklung ein, indem ich aktuelle Ansätze agenskausaler libertarischer Willensfreiheit (ALW) diskutiere. Zuerst stelle ich kurz die Konkurrenztheorie von ALW dar, welche libertarische Willensfreiheit im Rahmen ereigniskausaler Ansätze (ELW) zu entfalten versucht. Dann skizziere ich zwei Haupteinwände, welche Vertreter von (...) ALW gegenüber ELW einbringen, nämlich den Zufallseinwand („problem of luck“) und das Problem des verschwindenden Handelnden („problem of the disappearing agent“). Im Anschluss daran argumentiere ich dafür, dass Agenskausalität den Kontrolleinwand nur dann beheben kann, wenn sie nicht als rein kausales, sondern zusätzlich auch als ein rationales Vermögen bestimmt wird. Ich schließe mit einigen Überlegungen, inwiefern eine Metaphysik der Kausalkräfte positiv zur Fortführung dieser Diskussion beitragen kann, und wo die Grenzen eines solchen metaphysischen Ansatzes zu zeichnen sind. (shrink)