Background: Nursing home residents are a vulnerable population. Most of them suffer from multi-morbidity, while many have cognitive impairment or dementia and need care around the clock. Several ethical challenges in nursing homes have been described in the scientific literature. Most studies have used staff members as informants, some have focused on the relatives’ view, but substantial knowledge about the residents’ perspective is lacking. Objective: To study what nursing home residents and their relatives perceive as ethical challenges in Norwegian nursing (...) homes. Research design: A qualitative design with in-depth interviews with nursing home residents, and focus-group interviews with relatives of nursing home residents. The digitally recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim. Analysis was based on Interpretive Description. Participants and research context: A total of 25 nursing home residents from nine nursing homes in Norway, and 18 relatives of nursing home residents from three of these nursing homes. Ethical considerations: This study was reported to and approved by the Regional Ethics Committee in Oslo, Norway. Findings and discussion: The main ethical challenges in Norwegian nursing homes from the residents’ and relatives’ perspective were as follows: (a) acceptance and adaptation, (b) well-being and a good life, (c) autonomy and self-determination, and (d) lack of resources. The relationship with the staff was of outmost importance and was experienced as both rewarding and problematic. None of the residents in our study mentioned ethical challenges connected to end-of-life care. Conclusion: Residents and relatives experience ethical challenges in Norwegian nursing homes, mostly connected to “everyday ethical issues.”. (shrink)

Excerpt from Recht, Staat und Gesellschaft Sdie eoften (c)chritte ließen hen (R)egmfah noch nicht in boller @chärfe herbortreten. $die Strannerficherung her 8nhufftriearbeiter gegen 'betriebßunfiille, roie fie gu erft im Sohn: 1881 hem hieichßtage gur Unnahme bov gefchlagen tourbe' tonnte auch bon jenem holtrinären 6tanhpuntte auß fehr trobl geforhert unh begrünhd toerhen. 23er hie $?raft he6 gefunhen Urbeiterß gum eigenen 23orteile bertoertet, mer ihn habei her (R)efahr auöfeßt, welche her mafchinelle (c)rofibetrieb mit fich bringt, muß her nicht haftir auflommen' menu her (...) 21 heiter berungllictt, wenn er teiltoeife bher böllig er trerb6unfähig wirh? Qbälgt er nicht hie 23erpflichtung, hie ihn trifft, auf unbeteiligte'. Dritte ab, inhem er hen Unterhalt he6 23erunglticlten unh feiner %amilie her öffentlichen emenunteoftlihung überläßt? %reilich. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In this article I am concerned with analogical reasoning in ethics. There is no doubt that the use of analogy can be a powerful tool in our ethical reasoning. The importance of this mode of reasoning is therefore commonly accepted, but there is considerable debate concerning how its structure should be understood and how it should be assessed, both logically and epistemically. In this paper, I first explain the basic structure of arguments from analogy in ethics. I then discuss the (...) diversity of analogical arguments that can be found in ethics. I analyse their structure, assess them from a logical viewpoint, and show how they can be epistemically challenged and defended. The result of this investigation is that, contrary to a commonly held view, analogical reasoning can be a logically valid type of ethical reasoning that can provide reasons for action that are not worse than the reasons provided by any other kind of practical reasoning. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom in the philosophy of mind holds that (1) minds are exclusively possessed by individuals, and that (2) no constitutive part of a mind can have a mind of its own. For example, the paradigmatic minds of human beings are in the purview of individual organisms, associated closely with their brains, and no parts of the brain that are constitutive of a human mind are considered as capable of having a mind. Let us refer to the conjunction of (1) (...) and (2) as standard individualism about minds (SIAM). Put succinctly, SIAM says that all minds are singular minds. This conflicts with the group mind thesis (GMT), understood as the claim that there are collective types of minds that comprise two or more singular minds among their constitutive parts. The related concept of group cognition refers to psychological states, processes, or capacities that are attributes of such collective minds. -/- In recent years, the once-discredited concept of group cognition has shown definite signs of a comeback in the social sciences, some regions of cognitive science, and among philosophers concerned with collective agency. However, there are important differences among their respective views of why some psychological property should count as a group level phenomenon. If we want to understand these differences, it is critical that we develop a shared ‘lingua franca’ that we can use to taxonomize different variants of group cognition. It is the goal of my paper to contribute to this larger enterprise. The paper is organized as follows. First, I elaborate on the distinction between singular and group minds, and draw a distinction between hive cognition, collective cognition, and socially distributed cognition. Then I briefly clarify the concept of mind that we can plausibly take to be at play in the present debate. In the rest of the paper, I sketch an analysis of the emergent character of socially distributed cognition that is free from the metaphysical shackles of vitalism. I close with a few remarks on the idea that there are multiple levels of cognition. (shrink)

Benjamin Franklin famously wrote that “the good [that] men do separately is small compared with what they may do collectively” (Isaacson 2004). The ability to join with others in groups to accomplish goals collectively that would hopelessly overwhelm the time, energy, and resources of individuals is indeed one of the greatest assets of our species. In the history of humankind, groups have been among the greatest workers, builders, producers, protectors, entertainers, explorers, discoverers, planners, problem-solvers, and decision-makers. During the late 19th (...) and early 20th century, many social scientists employed the notorious “group mind” idiom to express the sensible idea that groups can function as the seats of cognition, intelligence, and agency in their own right (Allport 1968; Wilson 2004). In their quest to stress (rightly) that group phenomena are something “over and above” the sum of individual contributions, a fondness for vitalist metaphors led them to believe (wrongly) that genuine group cognition must be the result of tapping into individualistically inaccessible, “holistic” forces. Today, inspired in part by historically unparalleled forms of mass collaboration enabled by the internet, it has once again become popular to speak of collective intelligence, group agency, or even the emergence of a “global brain” (cf. the wiki-edited MIT Handbook of Collective Intelligence). -/- In this chapter, I review some contemporary developments of the idea of group cognition, defined broadly as the collaborative performance of cognitive tasks such as remembering, problem-solving, decision-making, or verbal creativity for the purpose of producing a group-level outcome. My discussion serves a two-fold purpose. First, by discussing how the idea of group cognition can be operationalized, I seek to show that we can retain some central theoretical insights of the “group mind” thesis without succumbing to its eccentric metaphysical overtones. Second, by providing a useful array of generalizable taxonomic resources, I hope to foster greater degrees of mutual awareness among insufficiently integrated areas of research on group performance. (shrink)

We aim at a conceptually clear and technically smooth investigation of Ackermann’s substitution method [W. Ackermann, Zur Widerspruchsfreiheit der Zahlentheorie, Math. Ann. 117 162–194]. Our analysis provides a direct classification of the provably recursive functions of , i.e. Peano Arithmetic framed in the ε-calculus.

The paper outlines a novel version of mathematical structuralism related to invariants. The main objective here is twofold: first, to present a formal theory of structures based on the structuralist methodology underlying work with invariants. Second, to show that the resulting framework allows one to model several typical operations in modern mathematical practice: the comparison of invariants in terms of their distinctive power, the bundling of incomparable invariants to increase their collective strength, as well as a heuristic principle related to (...) the search for new invariants. (shrink)

Proponents of the “literacy” thesis share with proponents of the “extended mind” thesis the viewpoint that communication systems such as language or writing have cognitive implications that go beyond their purely social and communicative purposes. Conceiving of media as extensions of the mind thus has the potential to bring together and cross-fertilize research programs that are currently placed in distant corners of the study of mind, language, and society. In this issue, we bring together authors with a diverse set of (...) interests to identify promising areas of overlap, blaze new trails for us to explore, but also to highlight dissonances and challenges that will have to be addressed in future work. (shrink)

This article is a contribution to what we might call „commonsense-ontology“. The aim is to defend the commonsensical distinction between living beings and artefacts on the basis of ontological arguments. The distinction between living beings and artefacts is increasingly difficult to draw because of new developments in biotechnology. For developing criteria of an acceptable distinction I defend the existence of artefacts first. Subsequently I discuss three criteria how we might sensibly distinguish between living beings and artefacts. These criteria are metabolism, (...) active powers and the capacity to develop. In this context I rely on the ontological distinction between unity and whole. (shrink)

This article assesses some of the implications of globalization for the scholarly debate on business ethics, CSR and related concepts. The argument is based, among other things, on the declining capacity of nation state institutions to regulate socially desirable corporate behavior as well as the growing corporate exposure to heterogeneous social, cultural and political values in societies globally. It is argued that these changes are shifting the corporate role towards a sphere of societal governance hitherto dominated by traditional political actors. (...) This leads to a discussion of the ambivalent results of such a process for a responsible corporate role in a globalized world. While assessing the current reception these changes have received in the management literature, the contributions of the four articles in this Special Issue are framed and evaluated. The argument closes by highlighting avenues of future research on this new challenge. (shrink)

Georg Lukács wrote The Theory of the Novel in 1914-1915, a period that also saw the conception of Rosa Luxemburg's Spartacus Letters, Lenin's Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Spengler's Decline of the West, and Ernst Bloch's Spirit of Utopia. Like many of Lukács's early essays, it is a radical critique of bourgeois culture and stems from a specific Central European philosophy of life and tradition of dialectical idealism whose originators include Kant, Hegel, Novalis, Marx, Kierkegaard, Simmel, Weber, and (...) Husserl.The Theory of the Novel marks the transition of the Hungarian philosopher from Kant to Hegel and was Lukács's last great work before he turned to Marxism-Leninism. (shrink)

Georg Simmel: an introduction by K. P. Etzkorn.--The conflict in modern culture.--On the concept and tragedy of culture.--A chapter in the philosophy of value.--Sociological aesthetics.--On aesthetic quantities.--On the third dimension in art.--The dramatic actor and reality.--Psychological and ethnological studies on music.

This novel approach plunges the reader into the depths of our own brain.

A wide-ranging collection of philosophical essays in honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer.

We publish here the letters between Gadamer and Ricoeur, as they are found in the Archives of the two philosophers (Gadamer-Archiv in Marbach and Fonds Ricoeur in Paris). Starting from February 1964 and ending on October 2000, the thirty-five letters reproduced here cannot give a complete picture of their much richer correspondence and relations, because it seems that neither Ricoeur, nor Gadamer kept all the letters they received from one another. But altogether, they document their common concerns, their mutual respect, (...) even their intellectual solidarity and finally the particular context that brought them to write to one another, i.e. Ricoeur’s intention to publish a translation of Gadamer’s book, Truth and Method, in a new series he edited for the Seuil Publisher. This publishing and translation project will mark their entire correspondence. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the coordination challenge a partial cartel faces when payoff asymmetries between potential cartel insiders and potential cartel outsiders are large. We introduce two experimental treatments: a standard treatment where a complete cartel can be supported in a Nash equilibrium and a modified treatment where a complete cartel and a partial cartel can both be supported in a Nash equilibrium. To assess the role of communication both treatments are additionally run with a “chat option,” yielding four treatments in (...) total. Our results show that subjects frequently reject the formation of partial cartels in the modified treatments. In all treatments with communication subjects are more likely to form complete cartels than partial cartels. The implications of these results are important for antitrust: payoff asymmetries between cartel members and outsiders may jeopardize the formation of partial cartels. Yet complete cartels may be formed instead, if institutional mechanisms with frequent communication are used to form cartels. (shrink)

Traditionally Rousseau has been interpreted as an advocate of modern nationalism and nationalist education. This article tries to show that Rousseau defended a form of civic patriotism, which is in principle compatible with genuine moral as well as republican cosmopolitanism. While Rousseau attacked several forms of cosmopolitanism espoused at his time, such as commercial or natural law cosmo politanism, he himself developed a kind of »rooted cosmopolitanism« which tried to strike a balance between republican patriotism and legitimate forms of cosmopolitanism. (...) A careful reading of Émile shows that this is a book about the formation of a moral and cognitive cosmopolitan who avoids the deformations of commercial society. (shrink)

Nowadays Kant's practical philosophy is as highly regarded as his theoretical philosophy. This is an important development since the more constructive side of Kant's philosophy is to be found in his moral and political works. The main task of the Critique of Pure Reason is to clarify its concepts and to get rid of basic errors, and thus only ‘negative’. The moral and political writings, on the other hand, try to expand the scope of reason ‘for practical purposes’ . Establishing (...) principles of moral and political conduct, their main objective is not negative, but constructive. (shrink)

Die Selbstzweckformel des kategorischen Imperativs gebietet, einen Menschen jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel zu gebrauchen. Gerold Prauss zufolge hätte Kant genauer zwischen nicht bloß als Mittel, sondern zugleich als Zweck? und gar nicht als Mittel, sondern nur als Zweck? unterscheiden sollen. Die erste Formel beschreibe ein Rechts¬verhältnis zwischen zwei sich gegenseitig anerkennenden selbstbestimmten Subjekten; die zweite Formel hingegen beziehe sich auf Situationen, in denen mir ein auf Hilfe angewiesenes vernünftiges Wesen gegenübertritt. Lediglich in dem zweiten Fall verdiene (...) die sittliche Pflicht moralisch genannt zu werden. Die Abhandlung zeichnet Prauss' Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Recht und Moral sowie zur Rolle des säkularen Staats bei deren Verwirklichung nach und bewertet sie als überaus anregenden Versuch, der kantischen These von der für sich selbst praktischen Vernunft einen systematischen Sinn zu verleihen.The categorical imperative, in the formula of humanity as end in itself, demands to use every person always at the same time as end, never merely as a means. According to Gerold Prauss, Kant should have distinguished more carefully between 'not merely as a means, but at the same time as end' and 'not as means at all, but only as end'. Whereas the first formula describes a legal relationship between two self-determining subjects who mutually recognize one another, the second formula applies to situations in which I face a rational being that depends on my help. For Prauss, only in the second case the ethical duty deserves to be called moral. The paper traces Prauss' considerations regarding right and morals as well as regarding the role played by the secular state in their realization. These considerations are discussed as an extremely stimulating attempt to make sense of the Kantian thesis that reason is practical of itself. (shrink)