Firms are increasingly personalising their offers and services, leading to an ever finer-grained segmentation of consumers online. Targeted online advertising and online price discrimination are salient examples of this development. While personalisation's overall effects on consumer welfare are expectably ambiguous, it can lead to concentration in the distribution of advertising and commercial offers. Constellations are possible in which a market is generally open to competition, but the targeted consumer is only made aware of one possible seller. For the consumer, such (...) a market could effectively resemble a monopoly. We call such extreme cases ‘targeting pockets’. Competition-law metrics such as the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and traditional means of public oversight of adverts would not detect this concentration. We, therefore, suggest a novel metric, the Concentration-after-Personalisation Index (CAPI). The CAPI treats every consumer as a separate ‘market’, computes a measure of concentration for personalised adverts and offers for each individual consumer separately, and then averages the result to measure the exposure experienced by an average consumer. We demonstrate how the CAPI can serve as a monitoring tool for regulators and auditors and thus help to enforce existing consumer law as well as proposed new regulations such as the European Union's Digital Services Act and its Artificial Intelligence Act. We further show how adding noise via randomly distributed non-personalised adverts can dilute the potential harm of overly concentrated personalisation. We demonstrate how the CAPI can identify the optimal degree of added noise, balancing the protection of consumer choice with the economic interests of advertisers. (shrink)

Capítulo I. 1891-1901 -- Capítulo II. 1902-1907.

The literature acknowledges a distinction between immoral, amoral and moral management. This paper makes a case for the employee (at any level) as a moral agent, even though the paper begins by highlighting a body of evidence which suggests that individual moral agency is sacrificed at work and is compromised in deference to other pressures. This leads to a discussion about the notion of discretion and an examination of a separate, contrary body of literature which indicates that some individuals in (...) corporations may use their discretion to behave in a socially entrepreneurial manner. My underlying assumption is that CSR isn’t solely driven by economics and that it may also be championed as a result of a personal morality, inspired by employees’ own socially oriented personal values. A conceptual framework is put forward and it is suggested that individuals may be categorized as Active or Frustrated Corporate Social Entrepreneurs; Conformists or Apathetics, distinguished by their individualistic or collectivist personal values. In a discussion of the nature of values, this paper highlights how values may act as drivers of our behavior and pays particular attention to the values of the entrepreneur, thereby linking the existing debate on moral agency with the field of corporate social responsibility. (shrink)

and I CaPI e D, then I Pl e D for all similar assignments. (2) For all values of P and q, I CPCNPql e D. (3) For all values of the variables in a, if la( e U then INal e D. (4) The F,P are constant functions such that, for all values of P, ~ FIP~ = 1, I F, Pl = 2,..., I F„t I = m.

v. 1. Livros e capítulos de livros -- v. 2. Artigos de periódicos -- v. 3. Eventos -- v. 4. Resenhas.

Are properties perfectly natural (or not) relative to worlds, or are they perfectly natural (or not) tout court? That is, could there be a property P that is instanti-ated at worlds w1 and w2, and is perfectly natural at w1 but not at w2? Here, we offer an original argument for the non-world-relativity of perfect naturalness. Along the way, we reply to a prima facie compelling argument for the contin-gency of perfect naturalness, based upon the connection between natural prop-erties and (...) laws of nature. (shrink)

Introducción -- Capítulo I Antecedentes y contexto -- Capítulo II Concepto de democracia y república -- Capítulo III Concepto de providencia y progreso -- Capítulo IV Relación e interacción de los conceptos.

This book is a critically informed challenge to the traditional histories of rhetoric and to the current emphasis on Aristotle and Plato as the most significant classical voices in rhetoric. In it, Susan C. Jarratt argues that the first sophists—a diverse group of traveling intellectuals in the fifth century B.C.—should be given a more prominent place in the study of rhetoric and composition. Rereading the ancient sophists, she creates a new lens through which to see contemporary social issues, including the (...) orality/literacy debate, feminist writing, deconstruction, and writing pedagogy. The sophists’ pleasure in the play of language, their focus on historical contin-gency, and the centrality of their teaching for democratic practice were sufficiently threatening to their successors Plato and Aristotle that both sought to bury the sophists under philosophical theories of language. The censure of Plato and Aris-totle set a pattern for historical views of the sophists for centuries. Following Hegel and Nietzsche, Jarratt breaks the pattern, finding in the sophists a more progressive charter for teachers and scholars of reading and writing, as well as for those in the adjacent disciplines of literary criticism and theory, education, speech communication, and ancient history. In tracing the historical interpretations of sophistic rhetoric, Jarratt suggests that the sophists themselves provide the outlines of an alternative to history-writing as the discovery and recounting of a set of stable facts. She sees sophistic use of narrative in argument as a challenge to a simple division between orality and literacy, current discussions of which virtually ignore the sophists. Outlining similarities between _écriture féminine _and sophistic style, Jarratt shows that contemporary feminisms have more in common with sophists than just a style; they share a rhetorical basis for deployment of theory in political action. In her final chapter, Jarratt takes issue with accounts of sophistic pedagogy focusing on technique and the development of the individual. She argues that, despite its employment by powerful demagogues, sophistic pedagogy offers a resource for today’s teachers interested in encouraging minority voices of resistance through language study as the practice of democracy. (shrink)

An archive is a repository - that is, a place or space in which materials of historic interest or social significance are stored and ordered. A national archive is the storing and ordering place of the collective memory of that nation or people(s). This article provides a brief his torical/theoretical introduction to the politics of the archive in late capi talist societies and discusses this politics of memory via the performance of ordinary daily activities of librarians and archivists. Some (...) relevant political/discursive questions include: who controls, establishes and maintains the archive, and how do they do so? Which materials are preserved in the archive and which are excluded? As the documents and artifacts selected for the archive are ordered and classi fied, how do the schemas and structures applied include, exclude, fore ground or marginalize those materials? Finally, to what extent do the logical hierarchies for classification and arrangement reflect social or political hierarchies? Librarians and archivists face these concerns in HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES Vol. 11 No. 4 © 1998 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi) [0952-6951(199811)11:4;17-32; 006604]their professional practice as they make decisions influenced by budgets, finite amounts of both physical and computer storage space and limited staff resources. The authors give real-life examples of choices made as archivists struggle to balance ideological goals made contradictory by practical constraints. For example, is it more appro priate to acquire as many materials as possible but be unable to describe, preserve and present them adequately, or is it preferable to describe, preserve and make fully available a more limited range of records and documents? Because of such practical concerns in modern technicist cultures, the explicitly political who often is reduced to the technically instrumental how - that is, political-moral questions are displaced to nonmoral and nonpolitical technical discourse, thereby establishing a 'meta-politics' that is understood only by the initiated. Conversely, archival activities such as acquisition, classification and preservation are 'technical' activi ties that may become explicitly 'political'. The article concludes that technical activities always are political, at least latently or potentially, even when they are not contested and made explicitly political. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS: A Contribution to Recent Discussion* ST. THOMAS AQUINAS accepted and consistently defended Boethius' definition of person: "persona est substantia individua rationalis naturae." St. Thomas' analysis of this definition necessarily involves metaphysical questions because of the implications of the terms " substance" and " nature" and moreover it manifests the inescapahle imprint of the theological problematics which surrounded the issue (e.g. the (...) Trinity and the hypostatic union). Both of these influences, metaphysical and theological, have engendered problems of interpretation and criticism. Contemporary discussions of person largely either continue the scholastic controversies or adopt a modern perspective from which to expose apparent contradictions in St. Thomas' doctrine. The purpose of this article will be limited to a consideration of the metaphysical problems concerning the relationship between individual substance, universal, nature, and existence. It is hoped that such a clarification will resolve not only the neoscholastic controversies, but also some of the contemporary problems. I. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION OF PERSON AND ST. THOMAS' EXPLANATION A. BOETHIUS' DEFINITION Boethius develops his definition of person in the Liber contra Eutychen et N estorium after a careful consideration of na- * I have to thank cordially Father Brian Shanley, 0.P. for having revised completely this English version, devoting much time and energy to fit the text and the footnotes to the style of The Thomist. He adapted the version in good style and verified the Latin quotations. 435 436 HORST SEIDL ture and substance.1 In the first chapter he sets out to define nature and discovers four possible meanings. The first and broadest definition, embracing both substances and accidents, describes nature as belonging to all things which by their being can be in some way or another be comprehended by reason: "natura est earum rermn quae, cum sint, quoquo modo intellectu capi possunt." A second definition, comprising substances alone both corporeal and incorporeal, describes nature as anything that can effect or suffer something: " natura est vel quod facere vel quod pati possit." A third sense, taken from the Aristotelian analysis of the motion of natural substances, describes nature as the immanent principle of movement : "natura est motus principium per se et non per accidens." Finally, nature can also refer to the formal cause which provides the specific difference: " natura est unam quamque rem informans specifica differentia" (cf. ST Ia. 29, I ad 4). It is this last sense which is most important. In sum, "nature" is a broad term encompassing both composite beings and their causes. Boethius continues in chapter two by first narrowing the relevant sense of nature to substances (thus excluding accidents ) and then presenting a complete division of substances. The major distinction is between corporeal substances and incorporeal substances. Corporeal subdivides further into inanimate and animate, with animate dividing. into insensitive and sensitive and the latter dividing finally into irrational and rational. Incorporeal subdivides into rational and irrational (the life-principle of animals), with rational incorporeal substances being further distinguished into those that are immutable by nature (the Creator) and those that are not so by nature (the human soul and angels) but may become so by virtue of the immutable substance. Boethius then argues that person cannot be affirmed of inanimate beings or irrational animals. A 1 All citations from Boethius are taken from the Loeb text in Boethius: Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy, ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918). THE CONCEPT OF PERSON IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 437 final distinction of :substance into universal and particular leads to the conclusion that person must refer to an individual. Thus the background is set for the definition of person which opens the third chapter: " naturae rationalis individua substantia." Person must be an individual substance of a certain nature, namely rational, which nature accounts for the form or specific difference of the particular substance (the fourth meaning of chapter 1). The connection of this definition with Aristotle 's definition of man as a rational animal is unmistakable. It should also be noted that this definition of person is applicable not only to man, in whom the rational nature is not identical with his substance, but also to the... (shrink)

Sería fácil afirmar que el objetivo de este texto es humanizar a los pájaros, concluir lecciones sobre los humanos a partir de su relación con ellos o utilizarlos como excusa para hablar de nosotros, pero Habitar como pájaro no hace nada de eso. De hecho, logra algo más minucioso, complejo y profundo: recoger sonidos y añadir opuestos. Así, el contrapunto como técnica melódica para conjugar voces es fundamental para entender el rigor y el detalle del libro, no sólo porque es (...) en sí mismo su estructura (las partes son acordes y cada capítulo tiene su acompañamiento, su siguiente sonido), sino también porque es un texto articulado a partir del discanto entre biólogos y ornitólogos, quienes han entendido (o intentado entender) a los pájaros a lo largo de la historia. Dado que el contrapunto es es- tructura y técnica, se lee un compromiso total con el cantar y el decir común. (shrink)

Entre as questões medulares que estruturam a filosofia política de Maquiavel observadas nos Discursos sobre a primeira década de Tito Lívio, verifica-se, por um lado, o secretário florentino confrontando diretamente as reflexões políticas suscitadas pelos gregos, romanos e humanistas cívicos acerca do valor da concórdia no âmbito político. E, por outro, ao promover esse confronto em relação à disseminada ideia de concórdia, apresenta a defesa, logo nos primeiros capítulos, de uma tese fadada a gerar alvoroço, a saber, a de que (...) “a desunião entre a plebe e o senado romano tornou livre e poderosa a república romana” (Discursos, I, 4). Trata-se de uma das teses mais ilustres e originais do pensamento de Maquiavel, mas, concomitantemente, uma das mais controversas dentro do panorama da história do pensamento político. Nesse sentido, Maquiavel difunde uma teoria política na qual a existência de “tumultos” se inscreve como resultado da forma política com maior capacidade de manter a virtù da república. Com efeito, nota-se no pensamento de Maquiavel um elogio acerca da forma política que provoca o conflito. Partindo dessa constatação, pretende-se neste artigo: analisar alguns aspectos da teoria política de Maquiavel, que se contrapõe à noção de concórdia cívica; valorizar a questão dos “tumultos” romanos e compreender como eles se inserem na órbita da referida teoria. (shrink)

En un periodo de profundos cambios en el sistema internacional, es aún más necesario contar con los marcos de análisis e interpretación adecuados para una comprensión adecuada de su alcance y significado. Esta obra pretende ofrecer una aproximación asequible, pero a la vez exigente y rigurosa, a las principales corrientes y debates teóricos de la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales, incluyendo tanto las teorías tradicionales, que siguen ejerciendo una notable influencia, como las aproximaciones más críticas y novedosas que han centrado (...) el debate teórico contemporáneo. Con ese propósito se ha reunido una destacada muestra de especialistas de la escuela española de Relaciones Internacionales, cuyos orígenes y formación son a su vez objeto de estudio. En sus capítulos se examina críticamente el etnocentrismo de una disciplina que no es ajena a la hegemonía estadounidense, material e ideacional, como marco para el estudio de las distintas teorías: el realismo y el institucionalismo, así como los debates y síntesis de sus revisiones neorrealistas y neo-institucionalistas; la Escuela inglesa de la Sociedad internacional, el social-constructivismo, la teoría crítica, el postestructuralismo, y la teoría feminista de las Relaciones Internacionales. El volumen también abarca las teorías de la integración y la seguridad internacional. Todo ello constituye un aporte fundamental para estudiantes e investigadores de este campo científico, así como para quienes, desde la práctica de las relaciones internacionales, aspiren a un conocimiento más reflexivo sobre su quehacer. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Black and White:A Note on Ancient NicknamesAlan CameronDistinguishing homonyms is a problem in any society, and it is not perhaps surprising that the same simple devices recur over long periods of time and in different parts of the ancient (and modern) world.P. Amh. LXII.6–7 lists two Ptolemaic soldiers called Apollonios, distinguishing them as μέλας and. Some years ago Frank M. Snowden suggested that the first of the pair was (...) actually black–skinned.1 A. M. Devine raised two different objections to this hypothesis.2 First, he finds "little hard evidence to suggest that general colour–terms like μέλας by themselves carried any specific racial connotations in antiquity." Yet it depends what is meant by hard evidence. There is certainly some evidence, for which reference may now be made to Lloyd A. Thompson's useful book Romans and Blacks (1989). But "racial connotations" are not really the point at issue. The question is rather, did the writer intend to indicate the color of the first Apollonios' skin?Personal descriptions in Egyptian documents do in fact very frequently specify skin color as an identifying characteristic. But they normally use a more subtle vocabulary than just black/white:.3 I do not recall seeing plain μέλας and used for this purpose. If skin color were the explanation here, we should have to assume that two men described bluntly as black and white one after another on the same document stood at opposite ends of the spectrum in skin color. That this should happen in the case of men who were in addition homonyms would surely be an improbable coincidence. The explanation must [End Page 113] lie in their homonymy. Second, Devine proposed a satisfying alternative, an exact parallel where explanation in terms of skin color is excluded: Alexander's two Macedonian marshals called Cleitus, again distinguished as μέλας and.4Devine went on to suggest that the black/white antithesis "was doubtless a commonplace... in Hellenistic armies." There is no need to restrict the practice to the military—or indeed to the Hellenistic world. I can add another three or four examples, from a much wider social, chronological, and geographical range. First another Hellenistic case. Diogenes Laertius names two Epicurean philosophers from Alexandria called Ptolemaios who were also distinguished in this way: δύο τε Πτο (10.25).5 It is suggestive that no explanation of the nicknames was felt necessary. Next an example from Ostrogothic Italy. Anicius Acilius Aginantius Faustus cos. A.D. 483 and Anicius Probus Faustus cos. 490 were distinguished as Albus and Niger respectively.6 Third, the consuls of 61 and 53 B.C., cousins who both bore the names M. Valerius Messala, were distinguished as Niger and Rufus respectively.7 Last, those who have seen the recent film Donnie Brasco may recall two capi in the Bonanno crime family, Alphonse "Sonny" Indelicato and Dominick "Sonny" Napolitano, distinguished as "Sonny Red" and "Sonny Black."8Roman cognomina were often based on physical peculiarities (Ahala, Ahenobarbus, Balbus, Cincinnatus, Crus, Dentatus, Nasica, Paetus, to quote the merest handful), and Niger and Rufus appear often enough as regular cognomina.9 The earliest Rufi were no doubt so called because of their red hair,10 but then the name was passed down to descendants regardless of hair color, as a fixed part of their nomenclature. The phenomenon under discussion is something different, perhaps picked up by the Romans from Hellenistic practice. [End Page 114]In most cases, these homonyms could have been and doubtless often were distinguished satisfactorily enough by the use of a father's name or ethnic or (for the Romans) full nomenclature. But in many contexts this must have seemed too formal. The color–nicknames were an informal device. Like (for example) νέος or iunior,11 they had the limited function of distinguishing people in a specific, often informal context. Like νέος and iunior again, they were not a formal or permanent element in a man's nomenclature and should not be so treated in modern works of reference.For example, after the death of Black Cleitus, White Cleitus was presumably known as just Cleitus. The two Fausti were by no means exact homonyms. It was only in contexts where they were styled simply... (shrink)

Both Nietzsche and Lawrence have been identified as important fore- runners and progenitors in the development of an ecocentric, “posthumanist” worldview. Nietzsche suggested, and Lawrence developed, the notion of an anti-mechanistic “gay science”. Both writers rejected the Christian denigration of nature, the Romantic notion of a “return to nature” and the instrumentalisation of nature by industrial rationality in favour of a conception of the good life founded in the body and an almost utopian “ascent to nature”. However, since the ascent (...) to nature required an overcoming of existing humanity, both Nietzsche and Lawrence faced the task of articulating a conception of the Over-man – or post-human, as contemporary theory would put it – that is not merely a figure of authoritarian brutality. Deep ecologist Del Ivan Janik has claimed that Lawrence “saw man as part of an organic universe, living best by acknowledging its wonder and rejecting the temptation to force his will upon it. In this sense he stands at the beginning of the modern posthumanist tradition and of the literature of environmental consciousness.” 1 Accurate as this assessment is, however, the struggle with questions of power, gender, sexuality and religion that early posthu- manism involved has tended to be airbrushed out of the dark green reading of Lawrence. And Lawrence's personal spiritual and intellectual struggle was also a creative conflict with Nietzsche. A useful point of departure is Anna Bramwell's comment in Ecology in the Twentieth Century on the somewhat surprising ubiquity of Nietzsche in ecophilosophical works, as it might be applied with equal force to Lawrence: Nietzsche ... is frequently described as an important figure. Why should this be? In reality, he does not conform at all to the model ecologist ... Yet Nietzsche still hovers, worrying but relevant. I will get on to the worries in due course; for the moment, a few words on the relevance of Nietzsche might be in order. For one thing, Nietzsche was not much interested in nature per se; unlike Lawrence, he never concerned himself with either natural beauty or the threat posed to it by late 19th century industrialisation. This may be due in part to his actual environment, which was largely congenial, as Robert Solomon reminds us: From snatches of prose, one might well conclude that Nietzsche wants nothing more fervently than the life of Conan the Barbarian, a role for which he, in particular, was notoriously ill-suited. "Live dan- gerously" he tells us, from the posher resorts in Southern Europe. It seems reasonable to suggest that if Nietzsche was more fascinated by the Provencal art of the troubadours than by the resistable rise of the capi- talist machine economy, his convalescent exile by the Med, away from the industrial heartlands of Northern Europe, may be partly responsible. His chief concern is the overcoming of the Christian and moral misreading of nature – especially human nature – and the corresponding articulation of what HM Robinson calls a “somatic conception of the good life” to replace it. However, Nietzsche only calls for such a conception, rather than fully elaborating it – let alone living it – so he has “little to say about how human intelligence could be so immanent in our physical being as to make our articulation of our physical will to power something expressive of a properly human nature and not of brute strength.” 4 In short, the problem is how to distinguish the ideal, noble Overman from the mere thug. We should not expect to find the close and often reverent attention to the non-human world as such that is an attractive and central feature of Lawrence's writing; Nietzsche's interest is lively but essentially abstract. (shrink)

The paper investigates the kind of collective feeling – or, better, atmosphere – that is generated by the situation of protracted emergency. After asking whether ours is in general an age marked by (media) emergency, what are the structural char-acteristics distinguishing short-term emergency from protracted emergency and to what extent we can speak of an effectively shared collective feeling of “emer-gency”, the analysis focuses on the atmospheric properties of this collective affec-tive situation and shows what are the possible resources to (...) escape from it (at least in part). Irreducible to the classic phenomenological intentionality, the at-mosphere of protracted emergency (whose case study here is that of the COVID 19 pandemic, which is also related to the “terror from the air” theorised by Sloterdijk) proves to be a chaotic situation that establishes with those who experi-ence it a very particular felt-bodily communication, based essentially on narrow-ness and hypochondria. It is an invisible atmosphere of which it is fairly easy to identify the markers on the phenomenal level, whereas it is largely impossible to anticipate the long-term (affective, social, cognitive) effects. (shrink)

Este livro é uma coletânea internacional, transdisciplinar, formada por capítulos de pesquisas na pós-graduação por pesquisadores(as) de várias áreas do conhecimento que celebraram os cem anos de Paulo Freire, em 2021. O legado de Freire é articulado nesta obra com os estudos da Análise Institucional, com a Filosofia da Diferença e a educação como prática de libertação e transgressão. Também se materializa, neste conjunto de textos com autoria de vários países, uma homenagem in memoriam a Gregório Baremblitt, que faleceu em (...) 2021 no Brasil, e deixou importante trabalho de formação em Esquizoanálise, Esquizodrama e Análise Institucional no país, com ressonâncias relevantes em todas as regiões brasileiras, em diversas áreas e profissões, pesquisas e docências. Ainda, faz-se uma homenagem in memoriam a bell hooks, com iniciais minúsculas como resistência da autora. Ela também faleceu em 2021, deixando um consistente trabalho para diversas áreas e com intensa conversa com Paulo Freire. Portanto, este livro é marcado por afeto, lembranças, memórias, homenagens e celebra a importância de Paulo Freire, Baremblitt e bell hooks na relação com Guattari, Deleuze, Análise Institucional e Esquizoanálise. Em 2022, nos lembramos de Félix Guattari, que faleceu há 30 anos, em novembro, e que esteve várias vezes no Brasil. Guattari, assim como Paulo Freire, Baremblitt e bell hooks lutou e pensou por multiplicidade e com movimentos sociais libertários. Assim, este é um livro com apostas políticas, éticas e estéticas de afirmação de uma educação libertária e que desenvolve práticas materialistas marcadas pelas perspectivas polissêmicas, polifônicas e dialógicas"--Cover page 4. (shrink)

El volumen subraya la importancia de la filología como instrumento de salvaguarda y recuperación del patrimonio cultural lingüístico y literario. Consta de 18 capítulos distribuidos en cuatro secciones, en los que, tras unas reflexiones teóricas sobre el concepto de patrimonio literario actual, autores de distintas áreas filológicas de la Facultad de Letras de la Universidad de Málaga abren nuevas perspectivas de estudio para la conservación y difusión del patrimonio lingüístico y una mejor comprensión de la historia y la sociedad de (...) las culturas reflejadas en el patrimonio literario de Europa. Se cierra la obra con tres estudios que demuestran cómo además los textos literarios, mediante el análisis filológico que acentúa su valor testimonial de épocas pasadas, son documentos indispensables para un mejor conocimiento del patrimonio etnológico, social y artístico transmitido o condicionado por ellos. (shrink)

Nonostante non tutti gli studiosi concordino sul valore e sulla validità della testimonianza di Agostino, non si può oggi mettere in dubbio che questi ebbe una conoscenza molto precisa non solo della dottrina manichea, ma anche delle pratiche rituali in uso nelle comunità delle sette, e in modo particolare di quelle che si imponevano agli Uditori. Del resto, egli stesso non manca di definirsi esperto dell’affare manicheo al fine di affermare l’autorità del suo modo di procedere nella polemica.Certo non si (...) può cercare in questi testi antimanichei un’esposizione serena né uno studio sistematico del catechismo manicheo poiché tali scritti hanno il carattere di un’“opera d’assalto” che Agostino, al di là degli aspetti anche caricaturali che mette in luce esponendo la dottrina avversa, dedica a quanti, come lui, corrono il rischio di essere sedotti e intrappolati da tale dottrina eretica.Quella lunga permanenza nella setta, nove anni come lui stesso afferma, e l’attività dispiegata al suo servizio permise ad Agostino di avere una larga conoscenza dell’organizzazione interna delle comunità, delle riunioni liturgiche e della catechesi, infine dei rapporti tra le due professiones che costituivano la chiesa manichea, i laici, Uditori o Catecumeni da una parte e, dall’altra, i religiosi, Eletti o Santi, tenuti, quest’ultimi, ad osservare rigide regole ascetiche raggruppate sotto tre capi, tria signacula appunto, relativi a tre ordini di attività, corrispondenti ad altrettanti organi quali bocca, mano, seno, ai quali il perfetto manicheo apporrà come un sigillo che rispetterà scrupolosamente.In particolare, lo studio del “sigillo della bocca”, quello, cioè, che ordina di astenersi dalle cibarie carnee e sanguinolente; dal vino; dalle bevande fermentate come la birra; nonché dai pensieri malvagi; dai discorsi menzogneri, violenti o blasfemi , permette di ricostruire, sempre attraverso la polemica agostiniana, la problematicità degli aspetti legati alle pratiche e alle abitudini alimentari della setta.Apporre un sigillo alla bocca, così come alla mano o al seno, significa chiudere, per usare una metafora cara al medioevo, le porte dei sensi: occhi, orecchie, naso, bocca, mani. Viceversa, aprirle o lasciarle aperte equivale a provocare e a permettere l’irruzione al proprio interno dei “demoni esteriori”, e, quindi, esporsi a peccare. Operare la “chiusura dei sensi” significa perciò sottrarsi alle sollecitazioni della carne e del mondo, rifiutando il male e conservando, così, la propria anima integralmente pura e buona quale essa è per essenza.Di fatto, la regola dei “tre sigilli” non viene osservata nel suo rigore più stretto che dai fedeli giunti o chiamati alla perfezione, dagli “Eletti” e dai “Santi”. Meno severe sono, infatti, le leggi che regolano il comportamento dei semplici credenti, degli “Uditori” o dei “Catecumeni”. La delineazione di quella che senza dubbio si potrebbe definire una sorta di “doppia morale”, una duplice regola di condotta, emerge chiaramente nei passi relativi alle pratiche alimentari, laddove, per esempio, Agostino fa notare come agli Uditori, per esempio, sia permesso persino dedicarsi ad attività profane quali l’agricoltura e tutto ciò che ad essa consegue come seminare e raccogliere, operazioni ritenute sacrileghe dagli Eletti, o, ancora, poter mangiar carne e bere vino.Diversamente vanno, invece, le cose per i “Perfetti”, il cui regime di sussistenza è ridotto allo stretto indispensabile secondo uno stile di vita improntato al digiuno, alla preghiera e all’astinenza. Sono così loro proibiti i cibi grassi, le bevande inebrianti ed ogni gesto dannoso perpetuato nei confronti dei vegetali.Tali proibizioni alimentari, discussi da Agostino nell’oris signaculum, la cui critica occupa da sola i tre quarti dello sviluppo dedicato ai tre sigilli nel suo De moribus manichaeorum, sono fonte di grande interesse per il vescovo d’Ippona il quale non manca di prendere in esame, spesso con tono sarcastico, ciascun aspetto di questi rigidi precetti rivelandone quelle che per lui sono immancabili contraddizioni: «Smettete ... di lusingare gli ignoranti celebrando il sigillo della bocca come qualcosa di grande. A meno che per caso non riteniate il mangiare crne e il non bere vino un sigillo della bocca degno di ammirazione e lode».Il colore, l’odore e il sapore, tre criteri che guidano e orientano i manichei nella scelta dei cibi e che corrispondono ad altrettanti organi sensoriali, la vista, l’olfatto sentinella del terzo dei sensi chiamati in causa, quello del gusto, divengono per Agostino occasione non solo di riflessione ma di spunto polemico al fine di dimostrare come, spesso, limitarsi a giudicare la bontà o meno di un cibo servendosi di solo uno di questi sensi alla volta , porti a cadere in terribili errori di giudizio. Del resto, Dio non è qualcosa di materiale che possa essere percepito con i sensi ed è, dunque, assurdo ritenere che lo si possa scoprire con la vista, con l’olfatto, o con il gusto. (shrink)

t. 1. Texto inédito de los doce primeros capítulos. Facsímil de la segunda versión suareciana (Lyon 1621).

Epistemologias: Nesta obra, além dos capítulos de cunho epistemológico e antropológico, estão incluídos textos que problematizam a colonialidade e a decolonialidade. Essas concepções dinamizam a aproximação do pensamento crítico mundial a partir do lugar de reflexão dos(as) autores(as) dos continentes africano e latino-americano. Os temas abordados discutem a função que o racismo epistêmico desempenhou na reprodução de privilégios na estrutura social do pensamento contemporâneo. Assim, pressupostos epistemológicos aqui trabalhados sinalizam uma visão de mundo e de ser humano. Os apreciadores de (...) uma boa leitura identificarão nos quatro eixos (Filosofia, Bioética, Teologia e Direitos humanos) novos horizontes e o rompimento de fronteiras da afrocentricidade e ancestralidade epistemológica do pensamento diaspórico. -- Pucpress. (shrink)

La muerte de Hegel es tomada frecuentemente por los intérpretes como el acontecimiento que marca el final de la metafísica. Lo que generalmente se asume con ello no es sólo una determinada periodización de la historia de la filosofía, sino también una muy determinada interpretación de su “final” como agotamiento de algo que ha llegado al final de sus fuerzas y se desvanece como algo caduco y obsoleto. Pero si esto es así, ¿cómo explicar entonces los constantes repuntes del hegelianismo (...) a lo largo del s. XX? ¿Son las últimas apariciones de una sombra del pasado que se deja ver por última vez antes de desvanecerse por completo? ¿O son más bien las manifestaciones de un espíritu vivo que se niega a ser enterrado como un “perro muerto”? ¿Es verdaderamente la muerte de Hegel como la del perro, o más bien como la de espíritu que mira a la muerte a los ojos y emerge renovado de ella? ¿Son las diversas reacciones contra Hegel que se suceden a lo largo del pensamiento postmetafísico la clara expresión histórica de una nueva conciencia filosófica que ha conseguido romper el lazo con la metafísica, o son más bien el síntoma de una nueva enajenación del espíritu destinada a escribir un nuevo capítulo de la Historia universal? El objetivo de este artículo es evidenciar el hegelianismo como el momento decisivo y final del despliegue del espíritu en el camino hacia la autoconciencia universal. (shrink)

Mezcla de ensayo, comentario y memoria, recoge trabajos orgánicamente ensamblados sobre la acción de profesores franceses en la enseñanza de la filosofía en São Paulo durante la década de los años 60. Se destaca la obra de autores brasileños como Bento Padro Jr., Oswaldo Porchat, José Arthur Giannotti y Ruy Fausto. Un capítulo se dedica al historiador de la filosofía en Brasil, Joao Cruz Costa"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 58.

Cuando se habla de filosofía se habla de antropología. Del mismo modo, cuando se habla de antropología también se debería de hablar de la afectividad. Sin embargo, hasta hoy, pienso que muchos filósofos han comprendido mal la afectividad en la persona humana, pues han caído en dos reduccionismos: uno considera la afectividad como un componente irracional, es el caso del dualismo; el otro la asocia a un monismo, como se puede verificar en el sentimentalismo y en el psicologismo. De igual (...) modo, aquellos que permanecen en una posición intermedia también la han comprendido mal, como se puede ver, por ejemplo, en la perspectiva aristotélico- tomista. Para estos, la afectividad es siempre pre- moral y debe ser siempre subordinada a la razón y a la voluntad. De esta forma, no han comprendido que la afectividad tiene también un ámbito espiri-tual y que, así, es ella quien muchas veces debe integrar la razón y la voluntad, a fin de garantizar la autorrea-lización de la persona humana. En este sentido, tampoco han visto que la afectividad puede ser valorada desde el punto de vista moral. Debido sobre todo a estos errores que se han cometido en el ámbito filosófico con relación a la afectividad, he visto que sería bueno repensar la noción de afectividad de la persona humana. Así, de entre todos los autores que he conocido y estudiado, he visto que la propuesta de Dietrich von Hildebrand con relación a la afectividad podría proporcionar muchas respuestas y herramientas para poder solventar estas inquietudes filosóficas y poder evitar reduccionismos, proporcionando interpretaciones más completas. El filósofo, fenomenólogo-realista, Dietrich von Hildebrand se ha distinguido en muchas áreas de la filosofía, como en la metafísica, en la gnoseología, en la ética, en la antropología, en la religión, etc.. “Casi quiero decir que el genio (artístico) de Adolf von Hildebrand ha sido heredado por su hijo (...) como un genio filo-sófico” (Husserl: H. Sepp; L. Embree, Handbook of Phenomenological Aesthetics, Springer, London, 2010, p. 145 (Traducción del autor). No obstante, sin duda alguna, la principal área, aquella en la que con mayor prominencia ha destacado, creemos que fue en el ámbito de la afectividad, aportando, así, contribuciones que hasta hoy no hubieran sido tenidas en consideración. Husserl lo comprueba. Cuando ha dirigido la tesis de doctorado de Hildebrand ha decido: “Sin embargo, su verdadera fuerza y sus significativos y originales resul-tados residen principalmente en la esfera emocional, en los análisis que llenan los capítulos 3o a 8o, de la parte II, y que sorprenden con un conocimiento íntimo sin precedentes de las múltiples formas de la conscien-cia emocional y sus correlatos representativos. Dicho esto, sólo puedo solicitar el título de opus eximium para esta importante obra” [E. Husserl, Urteil Über Hildebrands Doktorarbeit, Ed. K. Schuhmann, Aletheia, V, 1992, p. 5 (Traducción al español del autor)]. El mapa afectivo en Hildebrand es muy vasto. Por esto, he decidido presentar directamente un solo tema, o sea de que modo la afectividad se relaciona con la libertad y así, en este sentido, como ella puede ser valorada moralmente. Para atingir este objetivo, inicialmente me propongo analizar como Hildebrand entiende y concibe la afectividad en la persona humana. Posteriormente analizaré la libertad humana y su relación con la moralidad. Finalmente relacionaré los distintos tipos de libertad en la persona humana con la afectividad, demostrando así al mismo tiempo como la afectividad puede ser moralmente evaluada. (shrink)

A general consensus has emerged among twentieth-century commentators on the Aeneid that pater ipse…superum must be taken together and understood as referring to the father of the gods and not to Mars, sire of Romulus. What remains a subject of debate is the meaning of honor here and its particular association with Jupiter. Does it betoken the abstraction itself or a concrete manifestation of it? Austin, following Donatus, opts for the former alternative , Norden and R. D. Williams for the (...) latter. Of these the first finds a reference to the Zeus-given sceptre of kings, the second to Jove's thunderbolt. The language of the passage argues in favour of metonymy for two reasons. First, we expect Anchises, when showing off Romulus, to adhere to the pattern he has already set in the two portions of his parade which have preceded. In the case of the initial hero, Silvius, we attend largely to genealogical background . The second segment, a group made up of Procas, Capys, Numitor and Aeneas Silvius, elicits from Aeneas' father a series of exclamations on the valour of their res gestae . Yet each also has a tangible symbol of martial virtus that distinguishes him. (shrink)

Na Co nd i ç ã o Huma na , publ i c a do e m1958, Hannah Arendt estabeleceu umadistinção importante entre a “condiçãohumana” e a “nat ur eza humana”. Apar t i r des t e anal i s e f enomenol ógi co,Arendt tentou circunscrever os limitesda “natureza humana”, e responder aosteóricos positivistas que consideravampossível conhecer o quid da naturezabiológica humana. Para Arendt, a açãohumana, a diferença dos eventos ocorrena natureza, consiste numa característicamui t o es peci (...) f i ca a l i ber dade. Comoresultado dele; uma correta compreensãodo fenômeno da condição humana, nãopode ser esgotada por apelar só à dimensãobiológica, devido a que, a ação humananão pode ser exatamente explicada pelasforças que atuam no exterior, o analisedo naturismo é insuficiente. E não podeesgot ar o pr obl ema do f enômeno daliberdade humana.Por sua parte, porém Hans Jonas, nãodes envol veu ampl ament e es t e t ema,inclui em O Principio de Responsabilidade,nos capí t ul os ci nco e sei s, uma duracritica ao projeto marxista que apela aoconceito desenvolvido por Arendt, de homolaborens, o qual é uma das manifestaçõesda “condição humana”.In The Human Condi ti on, published in1958, Hannah Arendt makes an importantdistinction between the “human condition”and t he “human nat ure”. Out of t hi sphenomenological analysis, Arendt triedto circumscribe the limits of the “humannat ur e” and t o r es pond t o pos i t i vi s ttheoreticians who considered possible toknow the essence of the biological humannature. For Arendt, human action, unlikethe events that occur in nature, consists ofa characteristic very specific of freedom.As a result, a correct understanding ofthe phenomenon of human condi ti onis not possible through the biologicaldimension, since human action cannot beproperly explained by the forces that actin the external world. This shows that thenaturalistic analysis is insufficient andcannot deal properly with the phenomenonof human freedom.On the other hand, though Hans Jonas didnot treat completely this problem in his ThePrinciple of Responsibility, he offers a hardcriticism of the Marxist project inspiredin Arendt’s notions , targeting the notion of homo laborens,as one of the manifestations of the “humancondition”. (shrink)