In the present inquiry, I defend the claim that the thesis that essence is the source of all necessity is compromised. I argue that, on pain of circularity, essentialists cannot successfully account for the necessity of essences. In response to the difficulties I raise, I discuss potential solutions on behalf of essentialists and explain why I find none of them compelling. My conclusion on the matter is that the best essentialists can hope for is a view where the necessity of (...) essences is left unexplained. (shrink)

Previous research showed that the repeated approaching of one stimulus and avoiding of another stimulus typically leads to more positive evaluations of the former stimuli. In the current study, we examined whether approach and avoidance training effects on evaluations of neutral stimuli can be modulated by introducing a regularity between the approach-avoidance actions and a positive or negative stimulus. In an AAT task, participants repeatedly approached one neutral non-word and avoided another neutral non-word. Half of the participants also approached a (...) negative fear-conditioned stimulus and avoided a conditioned safe stimulus. The other half of the participants avoided the CS+ and approached the CS−. Whereas participants in the avoid CS+ condition exhibited a typical AAT effect, participants in the approach CS+ condition exhibited a reversed AAT effect. These findings provide evidence for the malleability of the AAT effect when strongly valenced stimuli are approached or avoided. We discuss the practical and theoretical implications of our findings. (shrink)

Kit Fine famously objected against the idea that essence can be successfully analyzed in terms of de re necessity. In response, I want to explore a novel, interesting, but controversial modal account of essence in terms of intrinsicality and grounding. In the first section, I will single out two theoretical requirements that any essentialist theory should meet—the essentialist desideratum and the essentialist challenge—in order to clarify Fine’s objections. In the second section, I will assess Denby’s improved modal account, which appeals (...) to the notion of intrinsicality, and argue that it is untenable. In the third section, I will explain how, when combined with a modal-existential criterion, a hyperintensional account of intrinsicality—in the same vein as Bader (J Philos 110(10): 525–563, 2013) and Rosen (in: Hale and Hoffman (eds) Modality: Metaphysics, logic, and epistemology, Oxford, OUP, 2010)—can help successfully address Fine’s counterexamples. In the fourth section, I will evaluate how this novel analysis of essence stands with respect to sortal, origin, and natural kinds essentialism and discuss potential objections and difficulties. (shrink)

The aim of the present research was twofold. First, we examined the effects of perceived organizational support on workplace conflict (i.e., relationship conflict and task conflict). Second, we identified one mechanism explaining these relationships, namely failure-related trust. Using a sample of 263 teachers from Belgium, the results of Study 1 indicated that perceived organizational support is negatively related to relationship conflict and is also, unexpectedly, negatively related to task conflict. Furthermore, using a sample of 477 Belgian employees, Study 2 replicated (...) these results and further demonstrated that failure-related trust mediates the negative relationship between perceived organizational support and both types of workplace conflict. Theoretical and practical insights of this research are discussed. (shrink)

This paper argues that Epictetus’ ethics involves three features which are also present in Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics: 1) A major problem for agents is when they fail to render a universal premise effective at motivating a particular action in accordance with that premise. 2) There are two reasons this occurs: Precipitancy and Weakness. 3) Precipitancy and Weakness can be prevented by gaining a fuller understanding of our beliefs and commitments. This comparison should make clear that (...) akrasia is certainly not absent from Epictetus. Rather a very Aristotelian understanding of why we fail to act in accordance with what we take to be in our own best interests remains at the center of his ethics. (shrink)

This paper offers a revised political conception of human rights informed by legal pluralism and epistemic considerations. In the first part, I present the political conception of human rights. I then argue for four desiderata that such a conception should meet to be functionally applicable. In the rest of the first section and in the second section, I explain how abstract human rights norms and the practice of specification prevent the political conception from meeting these four desiderata. In the last (...) part of the paper, I argue that full-fledged tolerance in the international order – that is tolerance-as-non-intervention and tolerance-as-respect – should be attached to (1) compliance with jus cogens norms and to; (2a) a political community recognizably organized as a community of inquiry that is; (2b) committed to the specification and incorporation or expression of the idea of human rights within its local legal system. (shrink)

Leibniz’s philosophy enjoyed a Russian fandom that endured from the eighteenth century to the death of the last exiled Russian philosophers in the twentieth century. There was, to begin with, Leibniz’s direct impact on Peter the Great and on the scientific development of Saint Petersburg. Then there was, still in the eighteenth century, Mikhail Lomonosov, who was sent to study with Christian Wolff in Marburg, and who came back to Saint Petersburg with a watered-down Leibnizian worldview, which he applied to (...) the study of chemistry and physics. Another eighteenth century philosopher, Alexander Radishchev, who studied in Leipzig, displayed acquiescence with a number of key elements from Leibniz’s philosophy. Russian Lebnizianism as a continuous philosophical movement was considerably reinvigorated in the 1870s when the Leibnizian German philosopher Gustav Teichmüller took a position at the University of Dorpat (nowadays Tartu, Estonia), which was then located within the Russian Empire. Teichmüller influenced a number of Russian philosophers into adopting a “Teichmüllerian” version of Leibnizianism. Among these philosophers were Evgeny Bobrov and Alexei Kozlov. In Saint Petersburg, Kozlov influenced his own son, Askoldov, and the latter’s friend — Nikolai Lossky. In the meanwhile, in Moscow Lev Lopatin, Nikolai Bugaev, and Petr Astafiev developed their own Leibnizianism in seemingly relative independence from Teichmüller’s influence and presumably, in some cases, under the partial influence of Vladimir Solovyov. Despite this relative independence, however, the fact remains that there was in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Russia a network of more or less loosely interconnected Leibnizian philosophers who read each other and wrote about each other, who exchanged ideas, and who constituted a movement that we might characterize as “Russian Leibnizianism” or “Russian Neo-Leibnizianism.” In this chapter, I tell the story of the intellectual lineage of Russian Leibnizianism. (shrink)

This paper examines Epictetus’ use of athletic imagery as a pedagogical tool and what this tells us about his views on what philosophers can learn from athletes. This paper argues that this imagery...

The Stoic Epictetus famously criticizeshis students for studying Stoicism as ‘mere theory’ and encouraged them to add training to their educational program. This is made all the more interesting by the fact that Epictetus, as a Stoic, was committed to notion that wisdom is sufficient to be virtuous, so theory should be all that’s required to achieve virtue. How are we then to make sense of Epictetus criticism of an overreliance on theory, and his insistence on adding training? This paper (...) argues that this tension can be resolved through an appeal to the metaphor of ‘digesting theory’. Epictetus discusses the digestion of theory in three parts of his existent work. While the use of digestion as a metaphor for moral progress in Epictetus has been noted, an explanation as to exactly what this process consists of has yet to be provided. This paper attempts to provide such an account. I argue that digestion consists of assimilating what we have learnt conceptually, at the level of general principles, into specific beliefs concerning existent objects. I argue further that this process of digestion can only be achieved through what Epictetus calls training (askesis). (shrink)

Clinical and laboratory studies have demonstrated that executing a demanding dual-task while recollecting emotional memories weakens the emotional intensity and vividness of these memories. While t...

This paper aims to deflate the idea that democracy would be in essence a privileged locus of civic trust. Three claims are defended: (1) there is nothing specific to democracy regarding the affirmation that trust is required for social cooperation; (2) democracy, when conceived discursively, depends on guarded epistemic trust and; (3) popular control may require, in some contexts, institutions that express and foster distrust towards a specific section of the population. The conclusion to be drawn is that the appropriateness (...) of trust for the achievement of popular control over government depends on a contextual and realist assessment. (shrink)

The Code for Global Ethics: Ten Humanist Principles By Dr Rodrigue Tremblay Prometheus Books -/- The world faces a crisis of civilization, which is in reality a moral crisis. The modern moral worldview that has evolved since the 18th Century Age of Enlightenment seems to be weathering. There is a recrudescence of the old moral formulas that encourage conflicts and wars. Humanity is in need of a new moral revival, free of sectarian references, in order to pursue its long (...) march for survival in a climate of progress and liberty. -/- The Code for Global Ethics proposes an imperative and more explicitly universal code of rights and obligations for all individuals, whether they be ordinary citizens or leaders of countries, of corporations, or religious organizations. It outlines the principles of rational humanism to be applied within the global context of a shrinking and a politically and economically interdependent world. Such a universal and global code of conduct is then compared to alternative moral codes—codes usually based on sectarian religious systems—with a demonstration of why such narrow or ethnically centered moral systems have failed humanity in the past. In our view, humanism is about idealism, compassion, and mutual tolerance, in a true spirit of humanity. It is a truly universal vision of humankind. http://www.amazon.com/The-Code-Global-Ethics-Principles/dp/1616141727/ref=pd_sim_sbs_b_3 -/- . (shrink)

Philosophers have been particularly interested in providing an analysis of the concept of mental disorder that could accommodate and guide psychiatric practices (for example diagnostics, therapy, epidemiology, etc.). One of the most discussed propositions is Jerome Wakefield’s “Harmful Dysfunction Analysis” (henceforth HDA). Inspired by Wakefield’s own foray into experimental philosophy, we propose in this paper to test folk people’s intuitions on a wider number of mental disorders than he did as well as in different condition in which the symptoms could (...) be understand as the result of an evolved mechanism. (shrink)

Nikolai Lossky is key to the history of the Husserl-Rezeption in Russia. He was the first to publish a review of the Russian translation of Husserl’s first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen that appeared in 1909. He also published a presentation and criticism of Husserl’s transcendental idealism in 1939. An English translation of both of Lossky’s publications is offered in this volume for the first time. The present paper, which is intended as an introduction to these documents, situates Lossky within (...) the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Husserl in Russia and explains why he is central to it. It also explains what Lossky principally found in Husserl: he saw in the latter’s critique of psychologism support for his own ontology, epistemology, and axiology. Lossky characterizes his ontology as an ideal-realism. According to ideal-realism, both the realm of ideal beings and the realm of real beings are mind-independent. Per his epistemology, which he calls “intuitivism,” real beings are intuited by sensual intuition and ideal beings by intellectual intuition. The realm of ideal beings includes the subrealm of values, which is intuited by axiological intuition. This thoroughly realist conception contrasted sharply with the subjectivist tendencies of the time. So, when Lossky took cognizance of Husserl’s critique of psychologism, he thereupon found an ally in his battle against the various subjectivisms. But, when Husserl took the transcendental idealist turn, Lossky was at the forefront of the backlash against the new direction Husserl wanted to give to phenomenology. (shrink)

The twentieth century Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky was one of the earliest and most important proponents—but also critics—of Bergson’s philosophy in Russia at a time when many Russian philosophers were preoccupied with the same complex of philosophical questions and answers that Bergson was addressing. Thus, if only from the standpoint of intellectual history, Lossky is central to the study of the reception of Bergson in Russia. In this article, I present the principal historical links, points of agreement between Bergson and (...) Lossky, such as their respective anti-Kantianism, intuitivism, ontological realism, vitalism, organicism, Neo-Platonism, as well as their points of disagreement, including some of Lossky’s key criticisms of Bergson, with special emphasis on the issues of intuition, ideal being, substance and change, time, and sensible qualities. This paper is meant as an introduction to the translations of Lossky’s “Heдocтaтки гнoceoлoгiи Бepгcoнa и влiянie иxъ нa eгo мeтaфизикy” (The Defects of Bergson’s Epistemology and Their Consequences on His Metaphysics) (1913) and his review of Bergson’s, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932), which are published in the present issue of Studies in East European Thought. (shrink)

The Russian philosopher Nikolai Onufrievich Lossky adhered to an evolutionary metaphysics of reincarnation according to which the world is constituted of immortal souls or monads, which he calls ‘substantival agents.’ These substantival agents can evolve or devolve depending on the goodness or badness of their behavior. Such evolution requires the possibility for monads to reincarnate into the bodies of creatures of a higher or of a lower level on the scala perfectionis. According to this theory, a substantival agent can evolve (...) by being gradually reincarnated multiple times through a sort of process of metamorphosis from the level of the most elementary particles all the way up to the level of human beings or even higher. In ‘Ученiе Лейбница о перевоплощенiи какъ метаморфозѣ’, Lossky argues that the works of Leibniz contain scattered elements of such a systematic evolutionary doctrine of reincarnation as metamorphosis and he attempts to reconstitute this doctrine. The present article is intended as an historical introduction to the translation of Lossky’s ‘Leibniz’s Doctrine of Reincarnation as Metamorphosis.’. (shrink)

En 1937, le philosophe russe Simon Frank (1877-1950) publia la Connaissance et l’être, une traduction française abrégée de Predmet znanija, auprès de la maison d’édition parisienne Fernand Aubier. Grâce à cette traduction, il attira l’attention de philosophes francophones, parmi lesquels se trouvait le suisse Pierre Thévenaz (1913-1955), qui donna une présentation s’intitulant « Connaissance et être d’après Simon Frank » à une rencontre de la Société romande de philosophie à Lausanne le 7 décembre 1940. Ce qui suit est une transcription (...) du texte manuscrit de cette présentation. Dans ce texte, Thévenaz s’appuie principalement sur la Connaissance et l’être afin d’exposer la pensée de Frank. Cependant, son objectif n’est pas seulement de résumer la pensée de ce dernier, mais aussi d’en dégager quelques problèmes philosophiques. Le texte est précédé d’une introduction qui présente Thévenaz et qui décrit le contexte de sa réception de la philosophie de Frank. (shrink)

Yann Allard-Tremblay ,Aude Bandini | : Les théories épistémiques et délibératives de la démocratie soulignent l’importance du processus de la délibération quand l’objectif poursuivi est de parvenir à de bonnes décisions. Dans cet article, nous nous intéresserons aux différents mécanismes grâce auxquels une délibération publique à la fois ouverte, libre et inclusive, peut parvenir à de bonnes décisions, avant d’envisager ce que la délibération peut apporter en cas de désaccord. Nous nous concentrerons plus particulièrement ici sur la fonction constructive (...) de la démocratie, c’est-à-dire sur cette capacité qu’a la démocratie délibérative d’identifier et de formuler, de manière épistémiquement instructive, les problèmes de justice auxquels doit faire face le corps politique. Il faudra donc d’abord expliquer comment la démocratie permet de colliger l’information et de la mettre à disposition de chacun, afin d’expliquer ensuite comment la délibération peut permettre l’émergence d’accords entre les individus. Nous verrons alors que la délibération a des limites, et pourquoi elle se révèle incapable de surmonter certains désaccords. Nous tâcherons enfin d’expliquer le rôle qu’elle joue dans la formulation des désaccords politiques. Sur ce point, nous montrerons que la délibération permet d’éviter que ne surgissent des désaccords politiques insoutenables, qui mettraient en péril l’intégrité du corps politique. | : Deliberative epistemic theories of democracy highlight the importance of deliberation for the achievement of correct decisions. The aims of this paper are to discuss the mechanisms which allow an open, free and inclusive forum of deliberation to achieve correct decisions and to discuss the impact of deliberation on disagreement. I concentrate on the constructive function of democracy which designates the capacity of deliberative democracy to identify and frame the problems of justice faced by a polity in epistemically positive ways. I first explain how democracy can pool information. This is then used to explain how deliberation can enable agreement to emerge. This is followed by a discussion of the limits of deliberation and how it is unable to resolve some disagreements. The final element of my discussion is an explanation of the role of deliberation in framing political disagreements. I argue that deliberation helps in avoiding unsustainable political disagreements which could bring about political decay. (shrink)

The politics of reconciliation, in Canada, finds its origin in judgements of the Supreme Court affirming the objective of reconciling the sui generis authority and continued distinct existence of I...

On doit à l’économiste américain d’origine allemande, Richard A. Musgrave, la formulation des critères d’Équité Horizontale (ÉH) et d’Équité Verticale (ÉV). Étant donnée une base fiscale, l’ÉH veut que les égaux soient traités également, alors que l’ÉV exige que les inégaux soient traités inégalement (par exemple que les plus riches payent proportionnellement plus d’impôts). Musgrave opère en 1959 une redescription créative de considérations d’équité qui ont une longue histoire de Hobbes à Buchanan, en passant notamment par la fameuse maxime de (...) Adam Smith. La reconstruction généalogique montre que l’ÉV et l’ÉH relèvent de la justice distributive au sens aristotélicien du terme. Un critère purement formel, l’équité en matière d’impôt signifie l’égalité proportionnelle dans la répartition des charges communes à tous les individus membres d’une communauté politique. À défaut d’un consensus théorique sur la manière de conceptualiser les contribuables, l’ÉH conserve tout de même une valeur de principe régulateur dans le cadre non idéal de débats de réforme fiscale.Codes JEL : H20, B11, B12, B20, B40, D63. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper examines Martin Heidegger’s own interpretation of Being and Time in the Black Notebooks. The opening part addresses Heidegger’s singular notions of “thinking” and “questioning” which suggest a critically reflective stance, but involve an initiatory call to surrender to the hidden powers of Beyng. The second part addresses Heidegger’s lament in the Black Notebooks that Being and Time has not produced a “great enemy”, and his critique of the initial existentialist or “anthropological” receptions of his magnum opus. The third (...) part looks at how Heidegger’s thought moves beyond Being and Time, in light of the central role the thinker assigns to the German people in repeating the first “inception” of preSocratic thought, in order to overcome the legacies of Roman universalism, and what Heidegger as early as 1932 was calling “Jewish Christianity”. The final part addresses Heidegger’s conception of “the history of Beyng” as it is developed in the Black Notebooks of the early 1940s, from out of the account of “temporality” in Being and Time: a “history” in which Heidegger’s postulation of a need for the “annihilation“ ” of the essential enemy of the Volk become the lens through which Heidegger can read the Shoah as the “the peak of self-destruction in history”. (shrink)

When developing phylogenetic systematics, the entomologist Willi Hennig adopted elements from Nicolai Hartmann’s ontology. In this historical essay I take on the task of documenting this adoption. I argue that in order to build a metaphysical foundation for phylogenetic systematics, Hennig adopted from Hartmann four main metaphysical theses. These are (1) that what is real is what is temporal; (2) that the criterion of individuality is to have duration; (3) that species are supra-individuals; and (4) that there are levels of (...) reality, each of which may be subject to different kinds of law. Reliance on Hartmann’s metaphysics allowed Hennig to ground some of the main theoretical principles of phylogenetic systematics, namely that the biological categories—from the semaphoront to the highest rank—have reality and individuality despite not being universals, and that they form a hierarchy of levels, each of which may require different kinds of explanation. Hartmann’s metaphysics thereby provided a philosophical justification for Hennig’s phylogenetic systematics, both as a theory and as a method of classification. (shrink)

This essay takes, as its starting point, Andreas Malm’s effort, in How to Blow Up a Pipeline: Learning to Fight in a World on Fire, to legitimize and normalize property destruction in the context of the climate movement. The sabotage of energy infrastructures, I counter, cannot make sense, for it poses a threat to coherence, removing without replacing the material and discursive conditions that grant the climate movement its meaning and purpose within late capitalism and late liberalism. Recent protests entailing (...) the defacement of paintings share with ecocriticism an investment in an essentially liberal, pedagogical and moral covenant, one that urges witnesses to undergo an individual process of reflection in order to acquire or affirm values and priorities friendlier to the environment. Sabotage, by contrast, violates this covenant; blowing up a pipeline may be said to have met its goals by reducing and slowing the supply of oil, regardless of what the public learned from sabotage’s mediatization. Drawing on psychoanalytic accounts of aesthetic education, I argue that sabotage introduces absurdity into a category—action—that the climate movement otherwise insists is self-identical. Sabotage does this by subtracting the world wherein putatively future-bound actions, including having and raising a child, mean what they do. I test out this claim in a reading of Nell Zink’s novel The Wallcreeper and Benedikt Erlingsson’s film Woman at War (Kona fer í stríð), two absurdist comedies that formally amplify the semiotic crisis induced by sabotage and, in so doing, enable us to confront the necessary dislocation of politics from sense. (shrink)

The following text is a translation of Semyon Frank’s “L’intuition fondamentale de Bergson” published in Henri Bergson: Essais et témoignages inédits, edited by Albert Béguin and Pierre Thévenaz, Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1941. In this article, Frank addresses Bergson’s notion of intuition, his anti-intellectualism, his mysticism, his closeness to Lebensphilosophie, the notion of lived experience, the distinction between intuition as pure contemplation and intuition as living knowledge, the distinction between cognition of the atemporal essence of reality and cognition of (...) the world of becoming, pragmatism, the disinterested and open intuitive spiritual attitude vs the utilitarian attitude of social groups closed in on themselves, the transrational vs the irrational, spiritual life, psychic life, the Absolute, and the temporal flux. The article contains criticisms of Bergson on the issues of time and intuition: the durée, the intuitive time, is incomprehensible without an atemporal foundation. Therefore, according to Frank, Plato was correct—contra Bergson—to define time as the moving image of eternity. And, if there is such an atemporal foundation, then, contrary to what Bergson seems to think, intuition as living knowledge cannot be the sole mode of intuition. Moreover, unlike what Bergson appears to think, an intuition of the Absolute would be an intuition of the transrational rather than of the irrational. The translation is preceded by an introduction tracing the genesis of the article, which was commissioned by the Swiss philosopher Pierre Thévenaz. (shrink)

Russian philosophy underwent many phases: Westernism, Slavophilism, nihilism, pre-revolutionary religious philosophy, and dialectical materialism or Soviet philosophy. At first sight, each one of these phases seems antithetical to the preceding one. Yet, they all appear to have in common a certain negative attitude towards the subjectivism of Kantianism and German Idealism. In contrast to the latter, Russian philosophy typically displays a tendency towards ontologism, which is generally defined as the view that there is such a thing as being in itself, (...) i.e., being independent of cognition, and that this being is to some extent knowable. We discern, in these otherwise diametrically opposed movements, an underlying ontologism that constitutes a common thread running in a straight line through the history of Russian philosophy. In this article, I provide an overview of Russian ontologism. (shrink)

Cet article présente le contexte général ayant conduit à l’élaboration du Corpus de français parlé au Québec (CFPQ) et les principes méthodologiques ayant présidé à sa confection. Il illustre ensuite l’intérêt que représente cette ressource documentaire pour l’étude de la langue parlée en contexte informel par le biais d’un examen lexico-sémantique de la séquence je sais pas. L’intérêt pour cette séquence vient d’abord d’un constat : celle-ci est particulièrement fréquente dans le corpus pris comme cible. En effet, elle y occupe (...) le premier rang, en terme de fréquence, pour ce qui concerne la présence de trois unités graphiques figurant en contiguïté. Ce constat oriente vers l’idée selon laquelle son degré d’« entrenchment » (c’est-à-dire d’enracinement) doit être grand, qu’elle a toute chance d’être mémorisée en bloc dans un certain nombre de contextes, à la manière des séquences complexes ou expressions (semi-)figées. L’attention se focalise sur des exemples où je sais pas agit à titre d’expression verbale, puis d’expression discursive. (shrink)

In this article, I address (1) the anti-academic procedures by which Professor Thomas Sheehan affirms that I “continue” a “scam,” before (2) presenting in a greater detail my work on the notion of being as a code name (Deckname) in Heidegger. In sections 3, 4, and 5, I analyze the way in which Sheehan authoritatively hollows out the state of the debate around the interpretation of Heidegger and the weakness of his philological interpretation. Finally, in the last section, I return (...) to the necessity of the research that Sheehan’s “Emmanuel Faye: The Introduction of Fraud Into Philosophy?” attempts to discredit. (shrink)

Before the Darwinian revolution species were thought to be universals. Since then, numerous attempts have been made to propose new definitions. The twentieth-century German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann defined 'species' as an individual system of processes and a process of life of a higher-order. To provide a clear understanding of Hartmann's conception of species, I first present his method of definition. Then I look at Hartmann's Philosophie der Natur (1950) to present his concepts of "organism" and "species." And I end the (...) paper by pointing out two possible systematic inconsistencies. (shrink)

This paper assesses James M. Buchanan's claim of following a positive approach in stark contrast to the normative approach to public finance of Richard A. Musgrave. The goal of this paper is to shed light on the foundations of modern American public finance by analysing one aspect of the methodology of its two most prominent fathers. I show (1) that it is difficult to distinguish Musgrave's and Buchanan's theories of public goods along the positive/normative dividing line and (2) that Buchanan's (...) theory can also be considered normative. In the first three parts, I follow the Weberian methodological tradition in looking for value judgements in the theories, and by reflecting on the nature of ideal types. In the last part, I propose a broader interpretation of Buchanan's methodological stance within the academic context of the 1960s. (shrink)

L’allergie de Bolzano à l’œuvre de Hegel est un fait souligné dans presque toutes les présentations de sa pensée. Pourtant, conformément à son éthique intellectuelle, il a tenté de se familiariser avec cette philosophie qu’il rejetait plus que toute autre. Il a même, tardivement, reconnu qu’il pouvait s’y trouver des propositions justes. Afin d’affiner la compréhension de la relation de Bolzano à Hegel, on se propose ici de reconstruire la polémique des Trois essais sur Hegel en montrant qu’elle recoupe bien (...) des formes d’anti-hégélianisme devenues canoniques (la critique de la philosophie de l’histoire notamment), mais dans un contexte qui lui est propre et la spécifie. Dans un second temps, on reviendra sur les divergences philosophiques à l’origine de la nécessité pour Bolzano de critiquer un auteur et ses disciples, dans lesquels il voit une forme de régression intellectuelle et sociale, divergences qui imposent et orientent une lecture. Ces divergences sur la compréhension du rôle du langage et de la philosophie, du rapport des représentations au réel, ou sur la définition de l’infini, sont sous-jacentes à la polémique des Trois essais, mais on doit en chercher la formulation dans le reste du corpus bolzanien. (shrink)

Pour soutenir les élèves du primaire dans leur apprentissage de la langue et des disciplines scolaires, tant en contexte de français langue d’enseignement que de français langue seconde, l’élaboration d’une liste de vocabulaire dit « transdisciplinaire » (Hiebert et Lubliner 2008) s’avère nécessaire. Il n’existe en effet pas de liste de référence pour l’enseignement ciblé des mots qui apparaissent fréquemment dans les matières scolaires au primaire en français et qui ont comme caractéristiques : soit d’être utilisés dans un même sens (...) quelle que soit la matière (souligner, examiner, répondre, expliquer, premièrement, enfin, etc.), soit de posséder des sens différents dans les différentes disciplines et dans la langue (nombre, base, somme, résultat, valeur, représenter, etc.). Dans cet article, nous rendons compte d’un projet de recherche ayant mené 1) à la constitution d’un corpus de plus de 4 millions de mots, à partir de manuels scolaires en usage au Québec pour tous les cycles du primaire, dans cinq disciplines (français, mathématiques, sciences, univers social, éthique et culture religieuse) et 2) à la sélection d’une liste de vocabulaire transdisciplinaire de plus de 2 000 vocables à des fins d’enseignement de la langue et des disciplines scolaires. (shrink)

In this article, we extend the research on the public interest to non-audit engagements performed by accounting firms and public accountants. Our thesis is that non-audit engagements, as private goods, require a distinct approach to the public interest than auditing. We suggest that a public value perspective can be used conceptually to provide substantial criteria for designing non-audit engagements conducive to public value creation and greater accountability. We illustrate the applicability and consequences of a public value perspective by analyzing and (...) contrasting the decision of two judicial opinions deciding whether Deloitte and the lead partner of a consulting engagement failed to act in the public interest in engineering the sale of collapsed British carmaker MG Rover. We advocate for a significant change in ethical codes of conduct by defining public interest obligations, not only in terms of professional attributes, but also in terms of outcomes. Our approach also suggests a requirement regarding planning a non-audit engagement, including establishing a public value proposition detailing the planned nature of the engagement, and extent of the assessment of the intended public value creation. We discuss the aspirational function of codes of conduct to provide accountability other than in terms of technical output, and to maintain the legitimacy and purpose of the profession. (shrink)

This paper presents a conception of corruption informed by epistemic democratic theory. I first explain the view of corruption as a disease of the political body. Following this view, we have to consider the type of actions that debase a political entity of its constitutive principal in order to assess corruption. Accordingly, we need to consider what the constitutive principle of democracy is. This is the task I undertake in the second section where I explicate democratic legitimacy. I present democracy (...) as a procedure of social inquiry about what ought to be done that includes epistemic and practical considerations. In the third section, I argue that the problem of corruption for a procedural conception of democracy is that the epistemic value of the procedure is diminished by corrupted agents’ lack of concern for truth. Corruption, according to this view, consists in two deformities of truth: lying and bullshit. These deformities corrupt since they conceal private interests under the guise of a concern for truth. In the fourth section, I discuss the difficulties a procedural account may face in formulating solutions to the problem of corruption. (shrink)