Di 1 juan. Zhe xue di chuang xin -- di 2 juan. Zhe xue di ao mi -- di 3 juan. Zhe xue si wei fang shi bian ge -- di 4 juan. Chuan tong zhe xue dao xian dai zhe xue -- di 5 juan. Zhe xue ti xi gai ge -- di 6 juan. Zhe xue zai zou xiang wei lai.

Education Research and the Question(s) of Time is a seminal volume edited by David R. Cole, Mehri Mirzaei Rafe, and Gui Ying Annie Yang-Heim (2024), which offers an in-depth exploration of the ubiq...

According to doxastic pragmatism, certain perceived practical factors, such as high stakes and urgency, have systematic effects on normal subjects’ outright beliefs. Upholders of doxastic pragmatism have so far endorsed a particular version of this view, which we may call threshold pragmatism. This view holds that the sensitivity of belief to the relevant practical factors is due to a corresponding sensitivity of the threshold on the degree of credence necessary for outright belief. According to an alternative but yet unrecognised version (...) of doxastic pragmatism, practical factors affect credence rather than the threshold on credence. Let’s call this alternative view credal pragmatism. In this paper, I argue that credal pragmatism is more plausible than threshold pragmatism. I show that the former view better accommodates a cluster of intuitive and empirical data. I conclude by considering the issue of whether our doxastic attitudes’ sensitivity to practical factors can be considered rational, and if yes, in what sense. (shrink)

It has been suggested that a reporting channel administered by a third-party may represent a stronger procedural safeguard of anonymity and avoids the appearance of impropriety. This study examines whistleblowing intentions among lower-tier employees, specifically examines whether an externally-administered reporting channel increases whistleblowing intentions compared to an internally-administered one. In contrast to the findings of an earlier study by Kaplan et al. :273–288, 2009), our results suggest that whistle-blowing intentions are higher when the reporting channel is administered externally than when (...) it is administered internally. We also find that an externally-administered reporting channel mitigates the negative effect of bystanders on whistleblowing intentions. Implications are discussed. (shrink)

We investigate the meaning of the wave function by analyzing the mass and charge density distributions of a quantum system. According to protective measurement, a charged quantum system has effective mass and charge density distributing in space, proportional to the square of the absolute value of its wave function. In a realistic interpretation, the wave function of a quantum system can be taken as a description of either a physical field or the ergodic motion of a particle. The essential difference (...) between a field and the ergodic motion of a particle lies in the property of simultaneity; a field exists throughout space simultaneously, whereas the ergodic motion of a particle exists throughout space in a time-divided way. If the wave function is a physical field, then the mass and charge density will be distributed in space simultaneously for a charged quantum system, and thus there will exist gravitational and electrostatic self-interactions of its wave function. This not only violates the superposition principle of quantum mechanics but also contradicts experimental observations. Thus the wave function cannot be a description of a physical field but a description of the ergodic motion of a particle. For the later there is only a localized particle with mass and charge at every instant, and thus there will not exist any self-interaction for the wave function. Which kind of ergodic motion of particles then? It is argued that the classical ergodic models, which assume continuous motion of particles, cannot be consistent with quantum mechanics. Based on the negative result, we suggest that the wave function is a description of the quantum motion of particles, which is random and discontinuous in nature. On this interpretation, the square of the absolute value of the wave function not only gives the probability of the particle being found in certain locations, but also gives the probability of the particle being there. We show that this new interpretation of the wave function provides a natural realistic alternative to the orthodox interpretation, and its implications for other realistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are also briefly discussed. (shrink)

According to evidentialist views, credence in a proposition p should be proportional to the degree of evidential support that one has in favor of p. However, empirical evidence suggests that our credences are systematically sensitive to practical factors. In this article, I provide a cost–benefit analysis of credences' practical sensitivity. The upshot of this analysis is that credences sensitive to practical factors fare better than practically insensitive ones along several dimensions. All things considered, our credences should be sensitive to practical (...) factors. (shrink)

According to pragmatic encroachment, whether an epistemic attitude towards p has some positive epistemic status (e.g., whether a belief is epistemically rational or justified, or it amounts to knowledge) partially depends on practical factors such as the costs of being wrong or the practical goals of the agent. Pragmatic encroachment comes in many varieties. This survey article provides an overview of different kinds of pragmatic encroachment. It focuses on three dimensions under which kinds of pragmatic encroachment differ: the type of (...) epistemic status affected by practical factors, the type of practical factors affecting the epistemic status, and the type of normative considerations encroaching on the epistemic status. (shrink)

The meaning of the wave function is an important unresolved issue in Bohmian mechanics. On the one hand, according to the nomological view, the wave function of the universe or the universal wave function is nomological, like a law of nature. On the other hand, the PBR theorem proves that the wave function in quantum mechanics or the effective wave function in Bohmian mechanics is ontic, representing the ontic state of a physical system in the universe. It is usually thought (...) that the nomological view of the universal wave function is compatible with the ontic view of the effective wave function, and thus the PBR theorem has no implications for the nomological view. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case, and these two views are in fact incompatible. This means that if the effective wave function is ontic as the PBR theorem proves, then the universal wave function cannot be nomological, and the ontology of Bohmian mechanics cannot consist only in particles. This incompatibility result holds true not only for Humeanism and dispositionalism but also for primitivism about laws of nature, which attributes a fundamental ontic role to the universal wave function. Moreover, I argue that although the nomological view can be held by rejecting one key assumption of the PBR theorem, the rejection will lead to serious problems, such as that the results of measurements and their probabilities cannot be explained in ontology in Bohmian mechanics. Finally, I briefly discuss three $$\psi$$ -ontologies, namely a physical field in a fundamental high-dimensional space, a multi-field in three-dimensional space, and RDMP (Random Discontinuous Motion of Particles) in three-dimensional space, and argue that the RDMP ontology can answer the objections to the $$\psi$$ -ontology raised by the proponents of the nomological view. (shrink)

By focusing on human virtues rather than the general morality of rational beings, Kant’s virtue theory presents systematic arguments from the perspectives of reason and experiential emotion, norms and disposition, spirituality and humanity, etc., which is of great significance to an overall understanding of Kantian ethics, thus clarifying misunderstandings from the past decades.

Hardy’s $$\psi$$ -ontology theorem proves the reality of the wave function under the assumption of restricted ontic indifference. It has been conjectured that restricted ontic indifference, which is a very strong assumption from the $$\psi$$ -epistemic view, can be derived from two weaker sub-assumptions: an ontic state assumption and a locality assumption. However, Leifer argued that this derivation cannot go through when considering the existence of the vacuum state in the second-quantized description of quantum states. In this paper, I present (...) a new analysis of Hardy’s theorem. First, I argue that the ontic state assumption is valid in the second-quantized description of quantum states. Second, I argue that the locality assumption is a locality assumption for product states and it is weaker than the preparation independence assumption of the PBR theorem. Third, I argue that Leifer’s objection to the derivation of restricted ontic indifference is invalid. Finally, I argue that although the vacuum state is irrelevant, the existence of the tails of the wave function will block the derivation of restricted ontic indifference from the ontic state assumption and the locality assumption. (shrink)

One challenge for moderate invariantists is to explain why we tend to deny knowledge to subjects in high stakes when the target propositions seem to be inappropriate premises for practical reasoning. According to an account suggested by Williamson, our intuitive judgments are erroneous due to an alleged failure to acknowledge the distinction between first-order and higher-order knowledge: the high-stakes subject lacks the latter but possesses the former. In this paper, I provide three objections to Williamson’s account: i) his account delivers (...) counterintuitive verdicts about what it is appropriate for a high-stakes subject to do; ii) the high-stakes subject doesn’t need iterated knowledge in order to be regarded as appropriately relying on the relevant proposition in practical reasoning; iii) Williamson’s account doesn’t provide a good explanation of why the high-stakes subject would be blameworthy if she were relying on the relevant proposition in her practical reasoning. (shrink)

In a recent paper (Found Phys 54:14, 2024), Carcassi, Oldofredi and Aidala concluded that the $\psi$ -ontic models defined by Harrigan and Spekkens cannot be consistent with quantum mechanics, since the information entropy of a mixture of non-orthogonal states are different in these two theories according to their information theoretic analysis. In this paper, I argue that this no-go theorem for $\psi$ -ontic models is false by explaining the physical origin of the von Neumann entropy in quantum mechanics.

Marx's theory of alienation has some elements of an epistemology, but it is primarily a methodology. This is because alienation and the supersession of alienation are nothing but negation and a negation of the negation, a kind of historical dialectics. In using this methodology to analyze the contradictions between human existence and essence, Marx thoroughly exposed and criticized the callousness of relationships among humanity in capitalist society. On this basis, he considered socialist revolution and socialist production to be the means (...) for eliminating human alienation and for realizing human freedom, and thereby set forth an epistemology. (shrink)

The unique relation between logic and truth is crucial for understanding Fregean conception of logic. Frege has an insight that the nature of logic resides in the “truth“, which he finally locates in the assertoric-force of a sentence. Though Frege admits that assertoric-force is ineffable in ordinary language, he coins in his conceptual notation for such a force a much-disputed sign, i.e., judgment-stroke. In this paper, I will try to demonstrate that judgment-stroke is not adequate for the task its inventor (...) has assigned to it. Accordingly, it is misconceived and inconducive to clarify Frege’s vague insight into the protorelation. The mistake of judgment-stroke for the sign of assertoric-force has its root in Frege’s ignorance of the significant difference between “judgment” and assertion”, which will be elucidated at length in the light of Husserl’s theory of “doxic-modification“. In the end, based on a further elucidation of the activity of assertion, I will advance a tentative interpretation of the vague insight Frege has concerning the protorelation. (shrink)

According to the laws of physics, the state of a physical system can only be measured by another system (usually a particular measuring device) via a physical interaction. However, when our brain is in a conscious mental state, it can in principle output the information about its physical state based on the psycho-physical correspondance between the mental state and the physical state. It is argued that this suggests that the conscious mind violates physical laws and it is not physical as (...) physicalism claims. (shrink)

We give a new argument supporting a gravitational role in quantum collapse. It is demonstrated that the discreteness of space-time, which results from the proper combination of quantum theory and general relativity, may inevitably result in the dynamical collapse of thewave function. Moreover, the minimum size of discrete space-time yields a plausible collapse criterion consistent with experiments. By assuming that the source to collapse the wave function is the inherent random motion of particles described by the wave function, we further (...) propose a concrete model of wavefunction collapse in the discrete space-time. It is shown that the model is consistent with the existing experiments and macroscopic experiences. (shrink)

Science has made a mighty advance since it originated in ancient Greece more than 2500 years ago. Yet we still live in Plato's cave today; we think everything around us moves continuously, but continuous motion is merely a shadow of real motion. This book will lead you to walk out the cave along a logical and comprehensible road. After passing Zeno's arrow, Newton's inertia, Einstein's light, and Schrodinger's cat, you will reach the real world, where every thing in the universe, (...) whether it is an atom or a ball or even a star, ceaselessly jumps in a random and discontinuous way. In a famous metaphor, God does play dice with the universe. Discovering motion is not continuous but discontinuous and random is like finding the Earth is not at rest but moving. The new discovery may finally solve Zeno's paradoxes and the quantum puzzle, and it will lead to a profound shift in our world view. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a new analysis of the meaning of the phase in quantum mechanics. First, I give a simple but rigorous proof that the global phase is not real in $$\psi$$ -ontic quantum theories. Next, I argue that a similar strategy cannot be used to prove the reality of the global phase due to the existence of the tails of the wave function. Finally, I argue that the relative phase is not a nonlocal property of two regions (...) together, and adding a relative phase to one local branch of a superposition only changes the local properties at the boundary of the region of the branch. (shrink)

Self-deception is typically considered epistemically irrational, for it involves holding certain doxastic attitudes against strong counter-evidence. Pragmatic encroachment about epistemic rationality says that whether it is epistemically rational to believe, withhold belief or disbelieve something can depend on perceived practical factors of one’s situation. In this paper I argue that some cases of self-deception satisfy what pragmatic encroachment considers sufficient conditions for epistemic rationality. As a result, we face the following dilemma: either we revise the received view about self-deception or (...) we deny pragmatic encroachment on epistemic rationality. I suggest that the dilemma can be solved if we pay close attention to the distinction between ideal and bounded rationality. I argue that the problematic cases fail to meet standards of ideal rationality but exemplify bounded rationality. The solution preserves pragmatic encroachment on bounded rationality, but denies it on ideal rationality. (shrink)

It has been realized that the measurement problem of quantum mechanics is essentially the determinate-experience problem, and in order to solve the problem, the physical state representing the measurement result is required to be also the physical state on which the mental state of an observer supervenes. This necessitates a systematic analysis of the forms of psychophysical connection in the solutions to the measurement problem. In this paper, I propose a new, mentalistic formulation of the measurement problem which lays more (...) stress on psychophysical connection. By this new formulation, it can be seen more clearly that the three main solutions to the measurement problem, namely Everett’s theory, Bohm’s theory and collapse theories, correspond to three different forms of psychophysical connection. I then analyze these forms of psychophysical connection. It is argued that the forms of psychophysical connection required by Everett’s and Bohm’s theories have potential problems, while an analysis of how the mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function may help solve the structured tails problem of collapse theories. (shrink)

It is shown that Uffink's attempt to protect the interpretation of the wave function against protective measurements fails due to several errors in his arguments.

Quantum mechanics and experience -- The wave function: ontic vs epistemic -- The nomological view -- Reality of the wave function -- Origin of the Schrödinger equation -- The ontology of quantum mechanics (I) -- The ontology of quantum mechanics (II) -- Implications for solving the measurement problem -- Quantum ontology and relativity.

It has been argued recently that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. This norm can be formulated as a bi-conditional: it is appropriate to treat p as a reason for acting if and only if you know that p. Other proposals replace knowledge with warranted or justified belief. This paper gives counter-examples of both directions of any such bi-conditional. To the left-to-right direction: scientists can appropriately treat as reasons for action propositions of a theory they believe to be false (...) but good approximations to the truth for present purposes. Cases based on a variant of Pascal’s Wager and actions performed by a skeptic also illustrate the point. To the right-to-left direction: in certain circumstances, it can be unreasonable for a scientist to reason from propositions of a theory she knows to be true. (shrink)

According to an increasingly popular view in epistemology and philosophy of mind, beliefs are sensitive to contextual factors such as practical factors and salient error possibilities. A prominent version of this view, called credal sensitivism, holds that the context-sensitivity of belief is due to the context-sensitivity of degrees of belief or credence. Credal sensitivism comes in two variants: while credence-one sensitivism (COS) holds that maximal confidence (credence one) is necessary for belief, threshold credal sensitivism (TCS) holds that belief consists in (...) having credence above some threshold, where this threshold doesn’t require maximal confidence. In this paper, I argue that COS has difficulties in accounting for three important features about belief: i) the compatibility between believing p and assigning non-zero credence to certain error possibilities that one takes to entail not-p, ii) the fact that outright beliefs can occur in different strengths, and iii) beliefs held by unconscious subjects. I also argue that TCS can easily avoid these problems. Finally, I consider an alleged advantage of COS over TCS in terms of explaining beliefs about lotteries. I argue that lottery cases are rather more problematic for COS than TCS. In conclusion, TCS is the most plausible version of credal sensitivitism. (shrink)

Estas páginas reúnen una serie de escritos personales, testimoniales o autobiográficos del filósofo, traductor, escritor y profesor José Gaos, uno de los pensadores de la lengua española más importantes e influyentes del siglo xx. Nace el presente libro de la necesidad práctica de tener un conjunto de textos suyos que contribuyan a dibujar su enérgico y rico perfil intelectual, filosófico y literario; y a la de explicar en cierto modo la fecundidad de la reflexión crítica diseminada en el orbe de (...) la lengua española, de la cual él mismo es en parte responsable, gracias a su misión y vocación intelectuales. El libro se abre con una introducción de Adolfo Castañón, académico de número de la Real Academia Mexicana de la Lengua, poeta, ensayista, editor, crítico literario y bibliófilo. En 2009 fue ganador del Premio Xavier Villaurrutia de 2008, máximo galardón para las letras mexicanas, por Viaje a México. Ensayos, crónicas y retratos, publicado por Iberoamericana Vervuert. El colofón corre a cargo de Ángeles Gaos de Camacho, quien evoca la imagen de su padre, en un emotivo monólogo. (shrink)

Protective measurement is a new measuring method introduced by Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman. By a protective measurement, one can measure the expectation value of an observable on a single quantum system, even if the system is initially not in an eigenstate of the measured observable. This remarkable feature of protective measurements was challenged by Uffink. He argued that only observables that commute with the system's Hamiltonian can be protectively measured, and a protective measurement of an observable that does not commute (...) with the system's Hamiltonian does not actually measure the observable, but measure another related observable that commutes with the system's Hamiltonian. In this paper, we show that there are several errors in Uffink's arguments, and his alternative interpretation of protective measurements is untenable. (shrink)

According to Penrose, the fundamental conflict between the superposition principle of quantum mechanics and the principle of general covariance of general relativity entails the existence of wavefunction collapse, e.g. a quantum superposition of two different space–time geometries will collapse to one of them due to the ill-definedness of the time-translation operator for the superposition. In this paper, we argue that Penrose's conjecture on gravity's role in wavefunction collapse is debatable. First of all, it is still a controversial issue what the (...) exact nature of the conflict is and how to resolve it. Secondly, Penrose's argument by analogy is too weak to establish a necessary connection between wavefunction collapse and the conflict as understood by him. Thirdly, the conflict does not necessarily lead to wavefunction collapse. The reason is that the conflict or the problem of ill-definedness for a superposition of different space–time geometries also needs to be solved before the collapse of the superposition finishes, and once the conflict has been resolved, the wavefunction collapse will lose its physical basis relating to the conflict. In addition, we argue that Penrose's suggestions for the collapse time formula and the preferred basis are also problematic. (shrink)

A recent issue of Topics in Cognitive Science featured 11 thoughtful commentaries responding to our article “What happened to cognitive science?” (Núñez et al., 2019). Here, we identify several themes that arose in those commentaries and respond to each. Crucial to understanding our original article is the fundamental distinction between multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary endeavors: Cognitive science began (and has stayed) as multidisciplinary but has failed to move on to form a cohesive interdisciplinary field. We clarify and elaborate our original argument (...) and reiterate the importance of a data‐driven evaluation of the current status of the field, which exhibits a marked disciplinary imbalance, a lack of a coherent conceptual core, and a striking absence of a consistent curriculum in the institutions that grant degrees in this domain. Half a century after the creation of cognitive science, it may now be a good time to revisit goals and visions for how to best approach the ever‐fascinating scientific study of the mind(s). (shrink)

This thesis is an attempt to reconstruct the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics. First, we argue that the wave function in quantum mechanics is a description of random discontinuous motion of particles, and the modulus square of the wave function gives the probability density of the particles being in certain locations in space. Next, we show that the linear non-relativistic evolution of the wave function of an isolated system obeys the free Schrödinger equation due to the requirements of spacetime translation (...) invariance and relativistic invariance. Thirdly, we argue that the random discontinuous motion of particles may lead to a stochastic, nonlinear collapse evolution of the wave function. A discrete model of energy-conserved wavefunction collapse is proposed and shown to be consistent with existing experiments and our macroscopic experience. In addition, we also give a critical analysis of the de Broglie-Bohm theory, the many-worlds interpretation and other dynamical collapse theories, and briefly discuss the issue of unifying quantum mechanics and special relativity. (shrink)

In the paper I trace the histories of four terms. All four words were originally translated from western languages or Russian, but have attained new meanings in China. The first is the "principle of the Party literature," an expression made by V. I. Lenin, which remained influential in China for a very long time. The change in its translation to the "principle of Party publication" eventually became a part of the ideological liberation of the early 1980s. The second is "imaged (...) thought." This term enabled Chinese literature to separate itself from the political ideology after the Cultural Revolution. The third is "subjectivity," a term originally translated as zhuguanxing, and then as zhutixing, which in the ears of Chinese philosophers substantially changed from a term with a negative sense, to one with a positive sense, and which paved the way for a philosophical revolution in China. The fourth is "ontology". The Chinese mixed the ontology criticized by Kant with the doctrine of noumena implied by Kant's philosophy, with ontology thus gaining its special meanings in Chinese philosophy and aesthetics. By presenting the histories of four terms, the author attempts to demonstrate how one and the same term can be ascribed different meanings in different cultures, and how it undergoes specific changes and historical transformations. (shrink)

We define some variations of the Scott rank for countable models and obtain some inequalities involving the ranks. For mono-unary algebras we prove that the game rank of any subtree does not exceed the game rank of the whole model. However, similar questions about linear orders remain unresolved.

We analyze the possible implications of spacetime discreteness for the special and general relativity and quantum theory. It is argued that the existence of a minimum size of spacetime may explain the invariance of the speed of light in special relativity and Einstein’s equivalence principle in general relativity. Moreover, the discreteness of spacetime may also result in the collapse of the wave function in quantum mechanics, which may provide a possible solution to the quantum measurement problem. These interesting results might (...) have some important implications for a complete theory of quantum gravity. (shrink)

The remarkable connections between gravity and thermodynamics seem to imply that gravity is not fundamental but emergent, and in particular, as Verlinde suggested, gravity is probably an entropic force. In this paper, we will argue that the idea of gravity as an entropic force is debatable. It is shown that there is no convincing analogy between gravity and entropic force in Verlinde’s example. Neither holographic screen nor test particle satisfies all requirements for the existence of entropic force in a thermodynamics (...) system. As a result, there is no entropic force in the gravity system. Furthermore, we show that the entropy increase of the screen is not caused by its statistical tendency to increase entropy as required by the existence of entropic force, but in fact caused by gravity. Therefore, Verlinde’s argument for the entropic origin of gravity is problematic. In addition, we argue that the existence of a minimum size of spacetime, together with the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in quantum theory, may imply the fundamental existence of gravity as a geometric property of spacetime. This provides a further support for the conclusion that gravity is not an entropic force. (shrink)

It is shown that the combination of unitary quantum theory and special relativity may lead to a contradiction when considering the EPR correlations in different inertial frames in a Gedankenexperiment. This result seems to imply that either unitary quantum theory is wrong or if unitary quantum theory is right then there must exist a preferred Lorentz frame.

Protective measurement is a new measuring method introduced by Aharonov, Vaidman, and Anandan, with the aim of measuring the expectation value of an observable on a single quantum system, even if the system is initially not in an eigenstate of the measured observable. According to these authors, this feature of protective measurements favors a realistic interpretation of the wave function. These claims were challenged by Uffink. He argued that only observables that commute with the system's Hamiltonian can be protectively measured, (...) and that an allegedly protective measurement of an observable that does not commute with the system's Hamiltonian does not actually measure this observable, but rather another related one that commutes with the system's Hamiltonian. In this paper we identify a number of unresolved issues in Uffink's proofs and argue that his alternative interpretation of what happens in a protective measurement has not been justified. (shrink)

We study computably enumerable equivalence relations (ceers) on N and unravel a rich structural theory for a strong notion of reducibility among ceers.

It has been widely thought that the wave function describes a real, physical field in a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics. In this paper, I present a new analysis of the field ontology for the wave function. First, I argue that the non-existence of self-interactions for a quantum system such as an electron poses a puzzle for the field ontologists. If the wave function represents a physical field, then it seems odd that there are (electromagnetic and gravitational) interactions between the (...) fields of two electrons but no interactions between two parts of the field of an electron. Next, I argue that the three solutions a field ontologist may provide are not fully satisfactory. Finally, I propose a solution of this puzzle that leads to a particle ontological interpretation of the wave function. (shrink)