The 1830s and 1840s are the formative years of modern public health in Britain, when the poor law bureaucrat Edwin Chadwick conceived his vision of public health through public works and began the campaign for the construction of the kinds of water and sewerage works that ultimately became the standard components of urban infrastructure throughout the developed world. This book first explores that vision and campaign against the backdrop of the great "condition-of-England" questions of the period, of what rights and (...) expectations working people could justifiably have in regard to political participation, food, shelter and conditions of work. It examines the ways Chadwick's sanitarianism fit the political needs of the much-hated Poor Law Commission and of Whig and Tory governments, each seeking some antidote to revolutionary Charitism. It then reviews the Chadwickians' efforts to solve the host of problems they met in trying to implement the sanitary idea: of what responsibilities central and local units of government, and private contractors, were to have; of how townspeople could be persuaded to embark on untried public technologies; of where the new public health experts were to come from; and of how elegant technical designs were to be fitted to the unique social, political and geographic circumstances of individual towns. Rejecting the view that Chadwick's program was a simple response to an obvious urban problem Professor Hamlin argues that at the time a "public health" focusing narrowly on sanitary public works represented a retreat of public medicine from involvement with the great social issues of the Industrial Revolution. In exploring the views of medical men who were critical of Chadwick, Hamlin suggests the parameters of a public health that might have been, in which concern for health and well-being becomes the foundation of a public medicine that is a principal guarantor of social justice. This book offers modern public heatlh professionals elements of a forgotten professional heritage that might be useful in responding to the bewildering range of health problems we now confront. (shrink)

In this paper I try to establish a relation between some fundamental concepts of Gadamerian philosophy—namely, the concepts of play, of transmutation into form, and of increase in being—and the concept of truth. The concept of play allows one to conceive the extra-methodical character of truth as an objectivity radically different from that of science: the objectivity of what happens and is thus unrepeatable, absolutely independent of any methodical mastery; the concept of transmutation into form is a theorization of the (...) effectual character of truth; the concept of increase in being shows its nonredundant character, i.e., the idea that truth is more than reality. Truth is eventually conceived as a “transformational concept,” in which ontology, knowledge, and ethics are indissolubly interconnected. (shrink)

: I shall discuss the relationship between the interventionist theory of causation and free action. Interventionist accounts of causation define causation on the basis of “intervention”. These theories can be reductive, if they explain causes on the basis of free human interventions, or non-reductive, if they consider causes and interventions as two inter-defined concepts, where interventions are regarded as explicitly not human. I will show that the dilemma between reductive and non-reductive interventionist theories of causality can be overcome in favour (...) of reductive accounts, with regard to what causation is in an anthropological sense, and with regard to the causal explanation of phenomena. Non-reductive accounts, explaining causes based on interventions and defining interventions as special causes create a dangerous explanatory circularity between cause and intervention and are not able to give a general and explanatory idea of causation. Reductive interventionist theories, by contrast, do not suffer from this circularity. Keywords: Causation; Free Action; Experiment; Interventionist Theory of Causality; Anthropomorphism L’azione libera e le teorie interventiste della causalità Riassunto: Intendo discutere il rapporto tra la teoria interventista della causalità e l’azione libera. Gli approcci interventisti alla causalità definiscono la causazione sulla base dell’“intervento”. Queste teorie possono essere riduttive, se spiegano le cause in base all’intervento umano come libero intervento umano, oppure non-riduttive, se considerano cause e interventi come due concetti inter-definiti, dove gli interventi sono considerati come esplicitamente non umani. Intendo mostrare che il dilemma tra teorie interventista della causalità di tipo riduttivo e non-riduttivo può essere superato in favore degli approcci riduttivi, con riferimento a ciò che la causazione è in senso antropologico e con riferimento alla spiegazione causale dei fenomeni. Gli approcci non-riduttivi, spiegando le cause sulla base di interventi e definendo gli interventi come cause speciali, creano una perniciosa circolarità esplicativa tra cause e interventi e non sono in grado di dare un’idea generale ed esplicativa della causazione. Le teorie interventiste riduttive, al contrario, non soffrono di questa circolarità. Keywords: Causazione; Azione libera; esperimento; Teoria interventista della causalità; Antropomorfismo. (shrink)

This book offers a new and original hypothesis on the origin of modal ontology, whose roots can be traced back to the mathematical debate about incommensurable magnitudes, which forms the implicit background for Plato’s later dialogues and culminates in the definition of being as dynamis in the Sophist. Incommensurable magnitudes – also called dynameis by Theaetetus – are presented as the solution to the problem of non-being and serve as the cornerstone for a philosophy of difference and becoming. This shift (...) also marks the passage to another form of rationality – one not of the measure, but of the mediation. The book argues that the ontology and the rationality which arise out of the discovery of incommensurable constitutes a thread that runs through the entire history of philosophy, one that leads to Kantian transcendentalism and to the philosophies derived from it, such as Hegelianism and philosophical hermeneutics. Readers discover an insightful exchange with some of the most important issues in philosophy, newly reconsidered from the point of view of an ontology of the incommensurable. These issues include the infinite, the continuum, existence, and difference. This text appeals to students and researchers in the fields of ancient philosophy, German idealism, philosophical hermeneutics and the history of mathematics. (shrink)

Gaetano Rametta,Roberto Formisano | : Le présent essai tente de dégager les structures fondamentales de la philosophie de la religion de Fichte après 1800. Une attention particulière est accordée à l’Initiation à la vie bienheureuse et à la Doctrine de l’État. La connaissance théorique, la version johannique de la chrétienté, ainsi qu’une nouvelle conception de l’État sont interprétées ici comme autant de visages différents d’un système philosophique strictement interconnecté. Dans sa période berlinoise, Fichte n’a plus conçu le sujet comme (...) le premier principe de sa Doctrine de la science, mais plutôt comme l’« image » transcendantale au travers de laquelle s’écoule le flot d’une vie indivisée et spirituellement transfigurée. | : The present essay tries to show the fundamental structures of Fichte’s philosophy of religion after 1800. Particular attention is focused on the Introduction to a Blessed Life and the Theory of the State. Theoretical knowledge, John’s version of Christianity, and a new concept of the State are here interpreted as different faces of a strictly interconnected philosophical system. In his Berliner period, Fichte did not conceive the Subject any more as the “first principle” of his Doctrine of science, but rather as the transcendental “image” through which flows the stream of an undivided and spiritually transfigured Life. (shrink)

It is well known that, from the second year of life, children engage in imaginative activities and pretend play. Pretending is changing the nature of perceptual inputs at will. In this paper I shall take up the question of young children’s knowledge about the pretend-real distinctions. According to Josef Perner, they have an immature concept, called prelief, because they do not differentiate between believing and pretending. But, we know that belief and pretense have different inputs. Imagination is at the whim (...) of our intentions, belief not. And, on the side of outputs, when children pretend, they carry out behavioral sequences “as if” they really had beliefs, but belief and pretense have different causal roles in action tendencies. So, when a boy pretends, he acts out his pretense within the scope of a supposition, but, why doesn’t he go all the way? That is, how are we to explain the limits children place on their activity? I shall answer these questions arguing that pretense is tied to conceptual knowledge. This will enable me to give a metaphysical account of this phenomenon, because it is based on the intentional manipulation of the identity of things and their properties. (shrink)

Luigi Pareyson’s concept of formativity is one of his most relevant and original concepts. In this paper I will give a short exposition of this concept in Pareyson’s Estetica and try to show how it can account, better as other object-, subject-, target- oriented theories, even of some features of contemporary art. The very relevant innovation that we can find in this concept is the shift from a concept of art as poiesis—as it is in Aristotle, namely, as a production (...) of an object—to the concept of art as praxis, that is, as an activity which involves the entire doing of the artist. As a doing that invents the form of doing, formativity appears as a kind of schematism that operates, not only without concept, as it is in Kant’s Critique of Judgement, but even without object. The thesis here suggested is that formativity can be understood as a transcendentalism of invention. (shrink)

La defensa gadameriana del carácter extra-metódico de la verdad de las ciencias humanas, teorizada en Verdad y método, no es el simple rechazo del método; ella nace de la conciencia de que hay verdades que no pueden ser reducibles a las condiciones del método, porque se refieren a una dimensión ontológica que no se refiere a la repetitividad y a la conmensurabilidad. Tales aspectos de lo real son los acontecimientos contingentes, accidentales, aquellos que definimos como propiamente históricos. En este texto (...) me propongo poner a la luz esta dimensión ontológica, que en Aristóteles está en particular en aquella de la praxis, de la acción humana, buscando mostrar que la necesidad de su tematización está estrechamente ligada a las discusiones lógicas y ontológicas que atravesaron el pensamiento griego después del descubrimiento de las grandezas inconmensurables. La ontología de la praxis es una ontología que toma en consideración aquella “irracionalidad” constituida a partir de lo contingente y lo accidental, a la que corresponde una forma de racionalidad que no es más conmensuradora sino mediadora, representada por la phrónesis Gadamer’s vindication of the extra-methodical feature of truth in the human sciences put forward in Truth and Method does not mean a mere refusal of method: rather, it arises from the awareness that there are truths which are not reducible to the conditions of repeatability and commensurability set up by methodical thinking. In fact, the truths of the human sciences refer to the ontological dimension of the contingent and the accidental, i.e. to the dimension of the historical. In this essay I aim at highlighting this ontological dimension, which for Aristotle is eminently that of the praxis and of human action. I will show that such an ontology is a consequence of the logical and ontological discussions which crisscrossed Greek thought after the discovery of the incommensurable magnitudes. The ontology of praxis is an ontology which takes into account the “irrationality” represented by the contingent, the accidental, to which a new form of rationality corresponds: that of phrónesis. Phrónesis is in fact not a commensurative but a mediative rationality. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to analyse a passage of the pseudoepigraphic Carmen de resurrectione which relates to insipientes, interpreted as those who do not accept that the rational observation of nature proves the existence of a unique creator God. Such a refusal is believed to make them worthy of eternal damnation. The resulting concept of sapientia involves both ratio and voluntas; it is also connected with gnoseology and soteriology. A similar concept can be found in the Aquitanian poetry (...) of the fifth century and in the theology of the so-called Semipelagians. This similarity calls into question the traditional dating and the supposed area of origin of the Carmen. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to determine the historical and cultural context of the pseudoepigraphic Carmen de resurrectione. The Carmen treats poetically many subjects of Christian eschatology: the second coming of Christ, the final judgement, heaven and hell, the universal conflagration. The author believes that the end time is imminent. This perception is common to all the Christians who experienced tribulations: persecutions, natural calamities, barbarian invasions. These painful events urged the Christians to undertake a path of true conversion, in (...) the religious and moral sense. Unlike other poets, the Anonymous author emphasises the virtuous value of the hope of divine reward rather than the fear of divine punishment. The same perspective can be found in the poets and in the monks of early fifth-century Gaul, who suffered the barbarian invasion of 406. (shrink)

This essay emphasizes how Vico was one of the modern philosophers to set himself the goal to reconstruct the history of the primitive world. Differently from several authors who preceded him and also other contemporary thinkers, the Neapolitan philosopher showed that the world of the origin wasn’t idyllic, but it was affected by fear, anguish and basic needs. What mainly characterizes Vico, however, is the fact that he represented the primitive world not as a unitary and fixed block, but as (...) a world made of different historical phases and of class and social conflicts. As there were no written documents, Vico elaborated a reconstruction of history, basing it on a new and revolutionary theory of myths which, being based on creativity induced by fantasy, are called “universali fantastici”. (shrink)

Dans la dernière phase de sa vie et de ses recherches, Michel Henry a fait dialoguer sa propre phénoménologie de la vie avec le kérygme et la pensée chrétienne, estimant que, depuis ses origines, le christianisme a vécu la révélation de Dieu non pas comme une connaissance mais comme une vie, la Vie même de Dieu dans laquelle les hommes sont invités à entrer, une vie qui configure les êtres humains à partir de la perspective trinitaire comme des fils dans (...) le Fils, relisant ainsi le christianisme en philosophe, ou comme une archi-phénoménologie. Grâce à la visée philosophique, les principes fondamentaux du christianisme peuvent avoir une nouvelle explicitation rationnelle, et la pensée chrétienne en tant que telle, agissant comme un prisme interprétatif, contribue à jeter un éclairage différent sur les principes généraux et les stratégies opérationnelles de la phénoménologie. De cette façon, on acquiert deux lieux forces, qui amènent Henry à mettre en évidence, d’une part, la connotation phénoménologique du premier et d’autre part, mais simultanément, à défendre le droit et l’importance de l’attention au phénomène chrétien par l’investigation philosophique. Parmi les nombreux thèmes pris en considération par Henry, pour cet essai, nous avons choisi d’analyser la relation Trinité-humanité et le concept de vérité du christianisme, que Henry oppose à la vérité du monde. (shrink)

El presente ensayo afronta la cuestión de la relación entre espíritu y naturaleza en la filosofía clásica alemana, por medio del análisis de esta problemática en las principales figuras del idealismo alemán, de Kant a Schelling y de Fichte a Hegel. El autor busca hacer emerger la complejidad y la actualidad de las respectivas posiciones, confrontándolas recíprocamente para sacar a la luz sus diferencias y analogías, e insiste en la irreductibilidad del idealismo a una pura y simple metafísica de la (...) subjetividad. (shrink)

Hermeneutic rationality arises from the idea that experience is a cumulative process, in which differences are not eliminated but preserved. The universality which derives from this process is an “intensional universality”, which follows a law of direct proportionality between extension and intension: the more an educated individual enriches her experiences, the more she is able to universalize her understanding of others. Experience is then inevitably open and never closed, that is, free for other experiences. If we use the word “domain” (...) to describe the condition of a closed and predetermined system or ontology, the entities of which are pre-assumed, we can therefore call this open universality a “universality without domain”.This description of hermeneutical experience leads to a question about its logical and ontological presuppositions. In the second part of the paper I refer to a particular practice which is central for hermeneutical theory in order to show how I understand these presuppositions: the practice of translation. In translation we experience the impossibility of rendering completely the sense of the source language in a target language, that is, we experience a difference which cannot be suppressed. I compare this experience to the discovery of the incommensurable magnitudes in ancient Greek mathematics, a discovery that shook Parmenidean and Pythagorean ontology: in my opinion, philosophical hermeneutics more or less implicitly develops the consequences of this incredible discovery, which marks the passage to a differential, comparative and integrative rationality and ontology. (shrink)

Advances a hermeneutic conception of truth as a mode of being, in dialogue with Aristotle, Nietzsche, Gadamer, Heidegger, Putnam, and Rorty. What does it mean to say that something is true? In this book Gaetano Chiurazzi argues that when we say that something is true, we do not say something merely about a state of affairs, but also about ourselves. Truth is not just the fact of “what is out there,” but a mode of existence that shapes and transforms (...) human understanding. Supported by an original reading of Aristotle’s theory of judgment and Heidegger’s hermeneutical theory of truth, Chiurazzi also engages the work of Nietzsche, Gadamer, Putnam, and Rorty to challenge the rising tide of theories that dismiss the importance of human experience to the idea of truth. “This is a work of original scholarship. It does not simply explain key ideas but makes a compelling case for regarding truth in a distinctive way from a hermeneutic perspective.” — James Risser, author of Heidegger toward the Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s. (shrink)

In the present article, the role of Gestalt concepts in clarifying the issues of perception is evaluated. Grounded in anti-atomism, Gestalt assumed organizing forces intrinsic to perception. Insofar these were identified with singularity preference, Gestalt is criticized for having failed to distinguish between perception and thought.

According to the doctrine set out in Book X of the Republic, art is for Plato three degrees far from truth. This doctrine is based on the representative character of art: in his productions, the artist takes sensible things and not the ideas as his model, and ignores the use of the objects that the craftsman produces. In the essay The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger completely reverses this Platonic hierarchy. The essay seems to be an indirect response (...) to Plato, as it discusses exactly the distinctions Plato draws, between natural object, object of use and work of art. The work of art – even when it imitates an object of use, as in the case of van Gogh’s painting of a pair of shoes – is for Heidegger the “setting-itself-to-work of truth”, because it shows the primarily ontological character of every work: its fabrication, that is, its historical being. The truth of the work of art lies in its historical character, and the work of art is the happening of truth because, more than any other object, its essence consists precisely in showing the temporal character as the essence of every object, even the natural ones. (shrink)

This is my first professional philosophical essay. I wrote "The twofold meaning of being" in 1996 when I was a student of Nunzio Incardona at University of Palermo (Italy) and before my degree thesis, "The difference in Aristotle’s Metaphysics". It still waits to be published.

I will argue for the similarity between some aspects of Aristotle’s doctrine of causes and a particular kind of interventionist theory of causality. The interventionist account hypothesizes that there is a connection between causation and human intervention: the idea of a causal relation between two events is generated by the reflection of human beings on their own operating. This view is remindful of the Aristotelian concept of αἴτιον, which is linked to the figure of the αἴτιος, the person who is (...) responsible of an action. Aristotle conceives of the efficient cause as the active element which, in the φύσις, gives rise to movement and imposes the form, in analogy with the active element that in τέχνη operates the production: the craftsman. This analogy suggests that Aristotle conceives of the causation on the basis of the human ability to modify the environment with aims. Within the debate on the manipulative theory the classical accounts worked out by Collingwood, Gasking and von Wright have been recently criticized by Woodward. von Wright’s reductive account explains causation on the basis of human free action, while Woodward regards this reduction as a dangerous move which makes causal explanations too much anthropomorphic. I will show that Aristotle’s doctrine of causes is more similar to von Wright’s account and that the Aristotelian analysis of becoming supports von Wright’s reductive interventionism against Woodward’s criticism. Furthermore, I will draw a comparison between interventionism and dispositionalism, where the latter is another contemporary account of causation that claims Aristotelian roots. (shrink)

Ma quei 500 cittadini che un complicato sorteggio aveva autorizzato a prendere posto sulle scalee del dikasterion non potevano essere in condizione di comprendere se quelle elevate a carico di Socrate davvero cogliessero il suo comportamento e la realtàche lo riguardava o invece fossero imputazioni speciose e strumentali. Non potevano intendere la discrasia tra i fatti attribuiti e una realtà fattuale vagamente somigliante ai medesimi, ovvero tra i suoi giovanili interessi naturalistici, il daimonion e l'amore per il filosofico dialeghestai. Non (...) potevano capire che nell'animo dell'Ateniese non c'era affatto un nuovo credo religioso né la smania di introdurlo in città, se mai il bisogno di una più consapevole religiosità accompagnato da una tensione sincera verso il vero e il giusto. Bisogni di spiritualità che difficilmente potevano trovare in delle menti - specie quelle dei meno giovani - ferme alle tradizioni, ai riti sacerdotali, alla sacralità degli oracoli, alla parola degli indovini, alle processioni, ai sacrifici votivi, e non ancora pronte a recepire la bellezza del pensare libero e l'urgenza etica di sottoporre a verifica ogni asserto di rilievo"--Page 2 of cover. (shrink)

Il CRED, Centro di ricerca per l’estetica del diritto, ha sede presso il Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza ed Economia dell’Università Mediterranea di Reggio Calabria.

Unlike most readings of Plato’s Theaetetus, which concentrate on gnoseology, this paper places it in the debate on commensurable and incommensurable magnitudes that distinguished Greek philosophical and mathematical thought at the beginning of the 4th century BC and in which Theaetetus played a leading role. The argumentation of the dialogue shows clearly how this debate was important for Plato, to the point that the entire dialogue can be considered as an attempt to consider seriously how incommensurability, and its ontological correlate, (...) the concept of dynamis, could elaborate a new form of logos. (shrink)