Sixth in the Harvard Monographs in the History of Science Series, this volume is both an excellent addition to the history of science and to Cartesian studies. Taking E. Gilson’s Index scholastico-cartésien for his inspiration, Hall offers us, by way of an excellent and well-documented set of annotations to his translation, an interesting view of the place of Descartes’ work in the history of science. Contained in the volume are: a foreword by I. Bernard Cohen ; a list of abbreviations; (...) an introduction; a synopsis of the physiology of Descartes; a synopsis of the contents of the first French edition of 1664; a list of bibliographical materials containing editions of the Treatise of Man and secondary sources "for the study of Descartes’ physiology;" the English translation and commentary; a facsimile of the first French edition; an index. (shrink)

This book represents an attempt to combine humanistic concern and pedagogic relevance in a systematic introductory textbook. A brief but enthusiastic introduction by Steve Allen asserts the importance of philosophic problems and Katen’s success at popularizing them in an entertaining fashion. The text itself is divided into three parts, dealing with the life, work, and persecution and death of the philosopher. Part I consists of a single short chapter which grants the poor public image of philosophers, but argues that philosophizing (...) is still an important activity. Part II is composed of three major chapters on the basic fields of epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics—logic and aesthetics are judged inappropriate for treatment here—plus two short chapters, "A Little Reflection on Some Big Questions", and "The Role of Philosophy in the Space Age". Part III offers a brief final chapter on "Philosophy, Human Freedom, and Tragedy" stressing philosophy as a way of life and the claim that no harm comes to good men since the good they do lives on even after their deaths. A few pictures and diagrams illustrate the text and each chapter concludes with a summary of points covered. There is a glossary of terms and an index, but no bibliography or list of suggested readings. The central discussion of major issues and viewpoints is quite traditional and generally competent. Relevance is sought mainly in the introductory sections and through such devices as catchy titles, contemporary idiom and references, puns, and double entendre. Lacking spontaneity, much of this appears forced, artificial, and dated, both chronologically and in its perceptions.—C.A.C. (shrink)

"One basic and underlying assumption of this investigation will be that there is a distinct continuity and development in Berkeley's thought which can be traced through all of his reflective analyses of the problem of perception." The essay argues for Berkeley's theory of perception as a "prototype of the phenomenalists." It argues also for Berkeley's incorporation of elements from the representative theory of perception. Of special interest is the treatment of Berkeley's doctrine of "suggestion" and its connection with the role (...) of imagination in the perception of physical objects. The linguistic aspect of Berkeley's work is minimized. Berkeley's theory of notions receives only a passing reference. The last third of the book is a clear and useful discussion of Berkeley and contemporary phenomenalism. It is suggested, though not shown, that Berkeley has affinity with contemporary phenomenology of perception.--A. S. C. (shrink)

Presupposing little knowledge of biology, this introductory work focuses on the question of "whether or not biology is a science like the sciences of physics and chemistry." In so doing, it attempts to unify various philosophical issues arising in biology; namely, the relationships among Mendelian, population and molecular genetics, the connection between evidence and conclusion in evolutionary theory, the definitional basis for taxonomy, and the epistemological status of teleology. In support of his claim that "evolutionists have the hypothetico-deductive model as (...) an ideal in some sense," Ruse finds certain fundamental laws in the theory, and he argues for the necessity of covering-law explanations which parallel those of the physical sciences. Further, he sees population genetics as being already "in fact axiomatized" and hence forming the deductive "core" for the entirety of evolutionary biology. Although the author recognizes the complexity of the practical problems which arise in his quest for a "logically rigorous deductive theory," he "can see no good theoretical reasons standing in the way of a deductive evolutionary theory," and he asserts that "the history of evolutionary theory seems to point toward an even greater exemplification of the axiomatic ideal." In short, biology is found to be within the same realm as physics. (shrink)

With the entry of this carefully reasoned book into the academic world, the current debate on the philosophical bases of feminism reaches a new depth. Richards's analysis of some of the most fundamental issues in women's situation falls into two broad areas: a critique of various methods of reasoning used by feminists and a suggested number of positions on some central feminist concerns. While Richards's book is extremely successful in the first area, it is uneven in the second.

This book is based on the Stewart Lectures given at Princeton in 1971. It argues the importance and the legitimacy of a scientific study of religion, and proposes Smart’s strategy for conducting such an enterprise. In brief, Smart wishes to look at religion as an aspect of human existence, to emphasize its intertraditional pluralism and intra-traditional complexity, to admit its lack of clear boundaries vis-à-vis other phenomena, and to draw on a variety of methods both to describe and to explain (...) it. This approach is scientific and broadly phenomenological, but in a way which is appropriate to the subject and which does not seek to reduce it to something else. Hence, Smart seeks to avoid both a theological commitment to the actuality of the object of belief, and the methodological atheism and projectionism of a Peter Berger. Against the former, which also typifies the apologetic preoccupation of much philosophy of religion, Smart proposes to bracket the existence of the object, while respecting the reality it manifests in the life of religious people. Against the latter, Smart prefers a stance of methodological neutralism or agnosticism. Thus, he criticizes Berger’s implicit theory of independent access to the "true" universe, and commends a context-dependent theory of rationality in religion. (shrink)

Helm criticizes contemporary—largely analytic—work in philosophy of religion which closes off dispute or objection by a simple appeal to "the grammar of religious language" or to "what the believer would say." "The argument of this book is that such approaches involve an important error in philosophical method, for they rest on the mistaken assumption that the ‘religious believer’ has an unmistakable identity, and that ‘religious language’ is a distinct, homogeneous form of language". The issue is methodological because it focuses on (...) "the conceptual imperialism that has plagued accounts of religious belief". Helm believes that philosophical models will more adequately and less dogmatically reflect the pluralism and complexity of religion if we separate religion or theology from metareligion or metatheology. Thus, Part I of the book argues for this distinction and for the interpenetration of meta- and object-languages, in order to reject what are presented as straightforward appeals to an uncontroversial univocity in the logic or language of religious belief. Part II illustrates the inadequacy of such appeals by describing four prominent models of religious belief: 1) the probability model, based on empirical data or natural analogies ; 2) the self-authentication model, based on the intuitively grasped character of a document ; 3) the regulative model, based on morality ; and 4) the acquaintance model, based on immediate awareness and a free or unconstrained interpretation. Part III suggests how each of these four paradigm theories might respond to the two basic questions in Flew’s "falsificationist challenge": What would falsify p? and What reasons would induce A to change his mind as to the truth of p? The variety of the responses is intended to reinforce Helm’s contention that philosophers must give over question-begging methodologies which surreptitiously impose favored models on religious belief.—C.A.C. (shrink)