Dans une société comme la nôtre, ébranlée par de multiples crises, et dans un monde en voie de globalisation générale, il semble manifeste, aux yeux de certains philosophes, sociologues ou théologiens, que nous assistons à une crise de la conscience collective. Or il ne fait aucun doute que les crises, de quelque ordre qu'elles soient, nous appellent à des remises en question et à des transformations, parfois radicales. Dans ce livre-entretien à trois voix, chaque interlocuteur partage ses interprétations "positives" de (...) nos crises actuelles : le théologien par rapport à la déchristianisation apparente et ses effets en termes de spiritualité, le sociologue par rapport aux nouveaux enjeux de société devant la globalisation galopante du monde et l'écrivain-thérapeute par rapport à l'individu en quête d'intériorisation et de recherche du sens de notre destinée. Que chacun et chacune puisse y trouver des pistes de réflexion dans sa quête de sens et des motifs d'espérance devant ces crises, vraisemblablement annonciatrices d'une future renaissance. Que chacun d'entre nous se persuade qu'il est toujours temps de quitter le monde des apparences pour atteindre la dimension profonde de l'humanité. Il est temps d'Être et non plus seulement de faire, de savoir et de connaître. (shrink)

In this paper we argue the need to reimagine research ethics frameworks to include notions of environmental sustainability. While there have long been calls for healthcareethics frameworks and decision-making to include aspects of sustainability, less attention has focused on howresearchethics frameworks could address this. To do this, we first describe the traditional approach to research ethics, which often relies on individualised notions of risk. We argue that we need to broaden this notion of individual risk to consider issues associated with (...) environmental sustainability. This is because research is associated with carbon emissions and other environmental impacts, both of which cause climate change health hazards. We introduce how bioethics frameworks have considered notions of environmental sustainability and draw on these to help develop a framework suitable for researchers. We provide a case study of data-driven health research to apply our framework. (shrink)

This paper examines the consequences of a culture of “personal ethics” when using new methodologies, such as the use of social media sites as a source of data for research. Using SM research as an example, this paper explores the practices of a number of actors and researchers within the “Ethics Ecosystem” which as a network governs ethically responsible research behaviour. In the case of SM research, the ethical use of this data is currently in dispute, as even though it (...) is seemingly publically available, concerns relating to privacy, vulnerability, potential harm and consent blur the lines of responsible ethical research behaviour. The findings point to the dominance of a personal, bottom-up, researcher-led, ‘ethical barometer’ for making decisions regarding the permissibility of using SM data. We show that the use of different barometers by different researchers can lead to wide disparities in ethical practice - disparities which are compounded by the lack of firm guidelines for responsible practice of SM research. This has widespread consequences on the development of shared norms and understandings at all levels, and by all actors within the Ethics Ecosystem, and risks inconsistencies in their approaches to ethical decision-making. This paper argues that this governance of ethical behaviour by individual researchers perpetuates a negative cycle of academic practice that is dependent on subjective judgements by researchers themselves, rather than governed by more formalised academic institutions such as the research ethics committee and funding council guidelines. (shrink)

I develop an interpretation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of motor intentionality, one that emerges out of a reading of his presentation of a now classic case study in neuropathology—patient Johann Schneider—in Phenomenology of Perception. I begin with Merleau-Ponty's prescriptions for how we should use the pathological as a guide to the normal, a method I call triangulation. I then turn to his presentation of Schneider's unusual case. I argue that we should treat all of Schneider's behaviors as pathological, not only (...) his abstract movements, as is commonly acknowledged in the secondary literature, but also crucially his concrete movements. Using these facts of Schneider's illness, I reconstruct a ‘fundamental function’ of consciousness, as Merleau-Ponty called it, in which there are two kinds of bodily agency: the power of the body to be solicited by a situation and the power of the body to project a situation. I propose that these powers became dissociated in Schneider's case, as evidenced by his abstract and concrete movements, while in the normal case, these powers comprise a dynamic unity, enacted as motor intentionality. I also discuss how my interpretation complements Merleau-Ponty's assertion that motor intentions exist between mind and matter. (shrink)

BackgroundThe health sector aims to improve health outcomes and access to healthcare. At the same time, the sector relies on unsustainable environmental practices that are increasingly recognised to be catastrophic threats to human health and health inequities. As such, a moral imperative exists for the sector to address these practices. While strides are currently underway to mitigate the environmental impacts of healthcare, less is known about how health researchers are addressing these issues, if at all.MethodsThis paper uses an interview methodology (...) to explore the attitudes of UK health researchers using data-intensive methodologies about the adverse environmental impacts of their practices, and how they view the importance of these considerations within wider health goals.ResultsInterviews with 26 researchers showed that participants wanted to address the environmental and related health harms associated with their research and they reflected on how they could do so in alignment with their own research goals. However, when tensions emerged, their own research was prioritised. This was related to their own desires as researchers and driven by the broader socio-political context of their research endeavours.ConclusionTo help mitigate the environmental and health harms associated with data-intensive health research, the socio-political context of research culture must be addressed. (shrink)

People in rich countries increasingly rely on paid workers to care for many of their health and personal care needs. We expect that, in most families, love or filial piety underpin caring relationships, and that these moral bonds ensure good quality care. If paid caring relationships are not underpinned by love, what moral bonds can they rely on? Exploring contract, professional duty, and compassionate gift as normative “resources” for good paid care, I conclude that we cannot expect paid carers to (...) reproduce an idealized private sphere. Instead we can expect “good enough” care, supported by a range of normative resources. (shrink)

Sally Haslanger offers the following concept of “woman”: If one is perceived as being biologically female and, in that context, one is subordinated owing to the background ideology, then one “functions” as a woman (2012b, 235). An implication of this account is that if someone is not regarded by others as their self-identified gender, they do not function as that gender socially. Therefore, one objection to this ascriptive account of gender is that it wrongly undermines the gender identities of some (...) trans people. In this paper, I will argue that Haslanger’s definition can be defended against this objection and that her account inevitably aids in liberatory efforts not only for cisgender women, but for all sexual and gender minorities. While Katharine Jenkins’s dual account of gender aims to rectify this objection (2016, 407), I will point out two important problems with her argument: “the inclusion dilemma” and “the abolition problem.” Finally, I will argue that Haslanger’s account of gender is preferable to Jenkins’s because it outlines the reality of gender as an oppressive, hierarchical system whose categories ought to be dismantled. (shrink)

In what follows I seek to answer the question on whether it is possible to integrate two different lines of research on human rationality: on the one hand, some philosophical lines of research of a cognitivist nature, and, on the other, lines of research on the logical reasoning of human agents and normative criteria. My answer to such questioning will be affirmative. To defend my point, I shall proceed as follows: first, in sec. 2 I offer the antecedents and characteristics (...) of the cognitivist notion of “intelligence” that has greater acceptance today, the general theory of intelligence, also known as the g factor. Throughout sec. 3 I present the elements thanks to which it has been considered that although g factor manages to satisfactorily evaluate the phenomenon of intelligence, it ignores relevant characteristics from the perspective of what rationality has been considered to be. Then, in sec. 4, I present some notions of rationality available in literature on the philosophy of logic, and I evaluate what are the distinctive elements of each of these characterizations. In sec. 5, I defend that it is possible to improve our understanding of cognitive styles from the elements of the philosophy of logic exposed in section four. (shrink)

The UK’s 100,000 Genomes Project has the aim of sequencing 100,000 genomes from UK National Health Service (NHS) patients while concomitantly transforming clinical care such that whole genome sequencing becomes routine clinical practice in the UK. Policymakers claim that the project will revolutionize NHS care. We wished to explore the 100,000 Genomes Project, and in particular, the extent to which policymaker claims have helped or hindered the work of those associated with Genomics England – the company established by the Department (...) of Health to deliver the project. We interviewed 20 individuals linked to, or working for Genomics England. Interviewees had double-edged views about the context within which they were working. On the one hand, policymakers’ expectations attached to the venture were considered vacuous “genohype”; on the other hand, they were considered the impetus needed for those trying to advance genomic research into clinical practice. Findings should be considered for future genomes projects. (shrink)

Digital phenotyping for mental health is an emerging trend which uses digital data, derived from mobile applications, wearable technologies and digital sensors, to measure, track and predict the mental health of an individual. Digital phenotyping for mental health is a growing, but as yet underexamined, field. As we will show, the rapid growth of digital phenotyping for mental health raises crucial questions about the values that underpin and are reinforced by this technology, as well as regarding to whom it may (...) become valuable. In this commentary, we explore these questions by focusing on the construction of value across two interrelated domains: user experience and epistemologies on the one hand, and issues of data and ownership on the other. In doing so, we demonstrate the need for a deeper ethical and epistemological engagement with the value assumptions that underpin the promise of digital phenotyping for mental health. (shrink)

In their article, de Groot et al respond to a call to bring investigative genetic genealogy i to the bioethical debate.1 They explore the extent to which the ethical approach used in the medical clinical genetics context can be helpful for conceptualising the ethical issues associated with IGG. They conclude that such an individual-based model, which revolves around notions of consent and privacy, has significant limitations in the IGG context. The authors call for a broader balancing of the benefits and (...) risks of IGG, and the need for collective democratic engagement. de Groot et al ’s paper is a welcome addition to the literature—not only because it is an interesting and important analysis in its own right, but also because it foregrounds the importance of bringing forensic genetic debate to the bioethical audience. While forensic genetics has become increasingly widespread in the criminal justice system, bioethicists have often shied away from engaging with the ethical issues these practices raise.ii Perhaps this relates to the narrowing of bioethics debate over the past half a century to focus primarily on health-related issues,iii or to the techno-legal normative separation of DNA analysis in these two sectors, or perhaps both. Either way, as our desire for an ever-increasing collection and analysis of genetic data continues—and as we have seen in the IGG context—the lines between health, forensics and recreational associated DNA analysis and use are set to become …. (shrink)

This article aims to show how the changes to NEPA by the Trump Administration are an act of environmental racism, defined as “[i]ntentional or unintentional racial discrimination in environmental policy‐making, enforcement of regulations and laws, and targeting of communities for the disposal of toxic waste and siting of polluting industries.”.

The mechanistic concept of the body, as inherited from René Descartes, has generated considerable trouble in philosophy—including, at least in part, the mind-body problem itself. Still, the corps mécanique remains perhaps the most prevalent though least examined assumption in recent philosophy of mind. I discuss two notable exceptions. Gilbert Ryle and Maurice Merleau-Ponty rejected this assumption for surprisingly similar reasons. Writing at about the same time, though in different languages and in very different circles, they each attempted to articulate a (...) non-mechanistic concept of the body by stressing the importance of skill: skillful behavior constituting cognition in Ryle’s case, and the skill body constituting perception in Merleau-Ponty’s case. In this article, I turn to their cautions and insights. By drawing out the relation between these two seemingly unrelated theorists, I hope to show that together Ryle and Merleau-Ponty have much to offer philosophy today. (shrink)

Gilbert Ryle famously wrote that practical knowledge (knowing how) is distinct from propositional knowledge (knowing that). This claim continues to have broad philosophical appeal, and yet there are many unsettled questions surrounding Ryle’s basic proposal. In this article, I return to his original work in order to perform some intellectual archeology. I offer an interpretation of Ryle’s concept of action that I call ‘adverbialism’. Actions are constituted by bodily behaviours performed in a certain mode, style or manner. I present various (...) challenges to adverbialism – scenarios in which it seems we publicly behave one way, but privately feel another. And I offer a response – Ryle’s stated practice of re-describing those situations in ways that pose no threat to his adverbialism. I also present an interpretation of practical knowledge in Ryle’s work. Knowing how is a special kind of action, undertaken only when we progressively self-modify our behaviours in the presence of new challenges or opportunities. (shrink)

Patients are increasingly turning to medical crowdfunding as a way to cover their healthcare costs. In the case of Charlie Gard, an infant born with encephalomyopathic mitochondrial DNA depletion syndrome, crowdfunding was used to finance experimental nucleoside therapy. Although this treatment was not provided in the end, we will argue that the success of the Gard family’s crowdfunding campaign reveals a number of potential ethical concerns. First, this case shows that crowdfunding can change the way in which communal healthcare resources (...) are allocated. Second, within the UK’s National Health Service, healthcare is ostensibly not a market resource; thus, permitting crowdfunding introduces market norms that could commodify healthcare. Third, pressures inherent to receiving funds from external parties may threaten the ability of patients-cum-recipients to voluntarily consent to treatment. We conclude that while crowdfunding itself is not unethical, its use can have unforeseen consequences that may influence conceptions of healthcare and how it is delivered. (shrink)

Justice must both be done and be seen to be done. A legal principle designed to give effect to this fundamental proposition is that a judge must not sit to determine a dispute if he or she is biased, or if there exists a reasonable perception that he or she is biased. Across many common law jurisdictions – including the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and many jurisdictions in the United States – the judge in question himself or herself is (...) required to undertake the assessment of whether bias, or an apprehension of bias, exists. Drawing on insights from behavioural psychology and a series of case studies from across these jurisdictions, this paper offers an extended analysis of this practice and identifies and evaluates alternative proposals. (shrink)

In her paper, Galasso contends that transitioning precision medicine from its current emphasis on healthcare benefits, to a focus on precision public health, may help address the equity concerns th...