Der Begriff der Toleranz in der Moderne wurde erdacht mit dem Ziel, Gesellschaften zu organisieren, die sich im Umbruch befanden auf Grund des plötzlichen Eindringens von Glaubensunterschieden in die politische Raumordnung. Die Definition der Toleranz als Tugend, die auf der Nachgiebigkeit gegenüber dem Andersartigen basiert, ist ein Pseudobegriff. Die hermeneutische Veranlagung, die mit der Philosophie einhergeht, zeigt, dass die Toleranz keine schlichte moralische Tugend sein kann, sondern vielmehr eine der Beschaffenheiten der Möglichkeit rationaler Handlungen (die Arten des Seins und des (...) Sagens fallen in der Vielfältigkeit ihrer Formen zusammen). Die Geschichte der Hermeneutik zeigt seit ihren Anfängen – die exegetische Arbeit war hierbei grundlegend – die Zwickmühlen der Existenzformen der Rationalität und lässt nur ein Denken an der Grenze zu, welche ihre Grundlage ist: Es gibt keine Tatsachen, sondern Interpretationen. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza el planteamiento de Reinhart Koselleck en torno a la Begriffsgeschichte desde el punto de vista de la productividad de la historia, el tiempo y la productividad propia de la dialéctica de los conceptos. Para ello se traen a colación aspectos muy precisos de la filosofía de Aristóteles, Hegel y Gadamer. La reflexión concluye extrayendo algunas aportaciones que podrían enriquecer la investigación de Koselleck.

The emergence of key concepts in Reinhart Koselleck’s sense has been much discussed in conceptual history, but mainly for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The article documents a post–World War II emergence of the concept of health, from relative anonymity to becoming a key concept, comparable to concepts such as politics, democracy, and culture. While previous research has emphasized conceptual mobility, this article focuses on conceptual aggregation, where the concept of health assembles and assimilates meanings, becoming essential to discourse. (...) This is explained with reference to the development of the welfare state and the political use of a positive, expanded health concept. The article utilizes a collocation analysis of Norwegian digitized newspapers 1950–2010, culled from the uniquely extensive database of the Norwegian National Library. (shrink)

Los autores de esta obra dedicada a la compilación y comentario de las concepciones de la guerra existentes en nuestra historia de la filosofía son conscientes de que ninguna filosofía podría dar una definición de qué sea la guerra, cuáles sean sus causas, sus justificaciones o bajo qué concepción de la naturaleza humana cabe explicar este fenómeno o cuál sea el papel jugado por los Estados sin que, para ello, ponga la filosofía en juego todas las dimensiones que la componen: (...) desde la política, la metafísica, la ética, el derecho, etc. presentes en su devenir histórico. Esto es lo mismo que decir que la filosofía sólo puede dar una respuesta compleja y plural a la pregunta acerca de qué sea la guerra y de cómo llega a producirse ésta. Complejidad y pluralidad que hacen aconsejable un seguimiento histórico de las concepciones mismas de la guerra, y aunque no esté en boga hacer uso de este tipo de seguimientos que examinan, implícitamente, a la filosofía en su historia misma, qué duda cabe, por otra parte –y vaya ello en defensa de esta inteligente compilación–, de que también estamos hoy día recuperados de esa visión peyorativa de la historia, precisamente porque la pluralidad y complejidad de los planteamientos o concepciones de este fenómeno han de ser estudiados en el conjunto de la historia o historias: un futuro pasado, como diría Reinhart Koselleck, a cuyo examen estamos todos convocados. (shrink)

Uno de los efectos de la aceleración revolucionaria e industrial que terminó suprimiendo, entre otras cosas, la concepción de un estado estamental ha sido la constante necesidad de describir el sucederse de aquellas notas que supuestamente darían con la clave para descifrar el sentido de los tiempos. Nuestra época —se ha dicho— ya no es la de la era de la información, la sociedad no aspira ya a organizarse ni a entenderse a sí misma en virtud de nuestras capacidades lógicas (...) ni computacionales. Nuestra época parece simpatizar más bien con lo que algunos han llamado la era conceptual. Las aceleraciones producidas por la técnica en la anterior era, la de la información, y la profunda alteración sobre la estructura y sentido de las acciones consecuencia de la articulación y transmisión de los sistemas de comunicación en la era de la información, si no desaparecen, habrán al menos de convivir con la indagación de las variaciones de los conceptos en el tiempo como expresión de una mutación del contexto social, político y cultural. Parecerá a algunos una descripción un tanto grandilocuente pero si nos fijamos en la consolidación de la llamada Begriffsgeschichte o historia conceptual, así como en el impacto que dicha perspectiva histórica y filosófica ha ejercido sobre otras disciplinas, tal vez nos percatemos de que ni el tiempo histórico, ni el tiempo cultural se perciben ya de la misma manera. (shrink)

This entry contains the German text of Reinhart Koselleck's response to the papers given at the meeting in December, 1992 at the German Historical Institute, Washington to commemorate the completion of the lexicon, Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Published in English translation, Koselleck's Offene Fragen an die >Geschichtlichen Grundbegriffe<, presented inter alia, the first major confrontation between German Begriffsgeschichte, as practiced by Koselleck, and J.G.A. Pocock, speaking for the Cambridge School dominant in the English-speaking world, Koselleck's German text is accompanied by a (...) Note summarizing his reply to the critique by Pocock, who invoked arguments previously made by Quentin Skinner. Also included are the views on Begriffsgeschichte now held by Skinner and Pocock twenty years later. (shrink)

In this stimulating work of political philosophy, acclaimed philosopher G. A. Cohen sets out to rescue the egalitarian thesis that in a society in which distributive justice prevails, peopleâes material prospects are roughly equal. Arguing against the Rawlsian version of a just society, Cohen demonstrates that distributive justice does not tolerate deep inequality. In the course of providing a deep and sophisticated critique of Rawlsâes theory of justice, Cohen demonstrates that questions of distributive justice arise not only for the state (...) but also for people in their daily lives. The right rules for the macro scale of public institutions and policies also apply, with suitable adjustments, to the micro level of individual decision-making. Cohen also charges Rawlsâes constructivism with systematically conflating the concept of justice with other concepts. Within the Rawlsian architectonic, justice is not distinguished either from other values or from optimal rules of social regulation. The elimination of those conflations brings justice closer to equality. (shrink)

This paper investigates young children's knowledge of scalar implicatures and downward entailment. In previous experimental work, we have shown that young children access the full range of truth-conditions associated with logical words in classical logic, including the disjunction operator, as well as the indefinite article. The present study extends this research in three ways, taking disjunction as a case study. Experiment 1 draws upon the observation that scalar implicatures (SIs) are cancelled (or reversed) in downward entailing (DE) linguistic environments, e.g., (...) in the scope of negation (Chierchia, 2000). Experiment 2 was designed to determine if scalar implicatures are used by children, like adults, to influence the interpretation of disjunction in non-DE contexts, yielding an implicature of exclusivity for disjunction. Whereas adult controls always rejected assertions of the form A or B in positive (non-DE) contexts in which assertions of the form A and B were also true, many children accepted assertions with disjunction in such contexts. To provide an interpretation to the findings from Experiment 2, a new experimental technique was devised and used in Experiment 3. The new technique presents pairs of assertions to children, who are asked to judge which assertion is a ‘better’ description of the context. The findings from Experiment 3 demonstrated children's awareness that A and B is more informative than A or B in positive contexts, where both statements are true. Taken together, the findings of Experiments 2 and 3 are compatible with the view that some children lack the computational resources to apply scalar implicatures when a single assertion is presented alone (see Reinhart, 1999). (shrink)

This paper investigates young children's knowledge of scalar implicatures and downward entailment. In previous experimental work, we have shown that young children access the full range of truth-conditions associated with logical words in classical logic, including the disjunction operator, as well as the indefinite article. The present study extends this research in three ways, taking disjunction as a case study. Experiment 1 draws upon the observation that scalar implicatures (SIs) are cancelled (or reversed) in downward entailing (DE) linguistic environments, e.g., (...) in the scope of negation (Chierchia, 2000). Experiment 2 was designed to determine if scalar implicatures are used by children, like adults, to influence the interpretation of disjunction in non-DE contexts, yielding an implicature of exclusivity for disjunction. Whereas adult controls always rejected assertions of the form A or B in positive (non-DE) contexts in which assertions of the form A and B were also true, many children accepted assertions with disjunction in such contexts. To provide an interpretation to the findings from Experiment 2, a new experimental technique was devised and used in Experiment 3. The new technique presents pairs of assertions to children, who are asked to judge which assertion is a ‘better’ description of the context. The findings from Experiment 3 demonstrated children's awareness that A and B is more informative than A or B in positive contexts, where both statements are true. Taken together, the findings of Experiments 2 and 3 are compatible with the view that some children lack the computational resources to apply scalar implicatures when a single assertion is presented alone (see Reinhart, 1999). (shrink)

The program of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, formulated primarily by Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, calls for relating conceptual change to structural transformations of government, society, and economy in German-speaking Europe. J. G. A. Pocock, of Cambridge, identified the range of alternative and competing political discourses available to early modern writers, while Quentin Skinner, also of Cambridge, treated political theories in terms of those historical contexts and linguistic conventions which both facilitate and circumscribe legitimations of political arrangements, and (...) he described such theories as intentional speech acts. Despite the differences in the German and Anglophone modes of treating political language, however, there are no major obstacles in bringing them together. The GG could profit from Pocock's technique of analysis and comparison in identifying early modern political languages, and the issues raised by Skinner about political thought and theorizing as forms of linguistic action, as well as the effect of general linguistic conventions upon available modes of legitimating political arrangements. The Anglophone mode might profit from considering the GG's non-reductive use of social history in conjunction with that of concepts, and from the GG's systematic use of contemporary sources of language and linguistic definitions. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This book traces the intellectual revolution initiated by Thales in the sixth century BC to its culmination in the metaphysics of Parmenides.

Este artículo emplea algunas de las nociones fundamentales de la historia conceptual de Reinhart Koselleck para valorar la aportación de G.W. Leibniz a la semántica de la Ilustración. En concreto, se analizan el diagnóstico que el filósofo de Leipzig hace de su época, su filosofía de la historia y su teoría y praxis de la historia.

The history of the idea of progress and the history of the concept of progress are two different things, not least because they emanate from considerably different intellectual traditions. In anglophone history of ideas, progress has typically been viewed as a belief. Historians of ideas explore the past evaluating the extent to which a given society met certain conditions of belief. By contrast, in the history of concepts as developed by Reinhart Koselleck, progress has occupied the dual role of (...) a ‘basic concept’ that grasps modern sociopolitical reality and a ‘collective singular’ that aggregates previous and adjacent meanings in the one linguistic unit. This article compares these two historical research programmes, highlights their merits and deficiencies, and concludes by offering a new approach to the history of concepts as suggested by R.G. Collingwood’s theory of a scale of forms. In each of the approaches to the history of ideas and concepts addressed, particular attention is given to the problem of what qualifies as progress, and thus to a longstanding problem concerning the attribution of progress to past societies routinely excluded from its history, including those left out by Koselleck’s conventional secular-modern thesis. (shrink)

In this paper I shall venture into an area with which I am not very familiar and in which I feel far from confident; namely into phenomenology. My main motive is not to get away from standard, boring, methodological questions like those of induction and demarcation; but the conviction that a phenomenological account of the empirical basis forms a necessary complement to Popper's falsificationism. According to the latter, a scientific theory is a synthetic and universal, hence unverifiable proposition. In fact, (...) in order to be technologically useful, a scientific hypothesis must refer to future states-of-affairs; it ought therefore to remain unverified. But in order to be empirical, a theory must bear some kind of relation to factual statements. According to Popper, such a relation can only be one of potential conflict. Thus a theory T will be termed scientific if and only if T is logically incompatible with a so-called basic statement b, where b is both empirically verifiable and empirically falsifiable. In other words: T is scientific if it entails ¬b; where b, hence also ¬b, is an empirically decidable proposition. (shrink)

Let ZF denote Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (without the axiom of choice), and let $M$ be a countable transitive model of ZF. The method of forcing extends $M$ to another model $M\lbrack G\rbrack$ of ZF (a "generic extension"). If the axiom of choice holds in $M$ it also holds in $M\lbrack G\rbrack$, that is, the axiom of choice is preserved by generic extensions. We show that this is not true for many weak forms of the axiom of choice, and we derive (...) an application to Boolean toposes. (shrink)

Changes in healthcare financing increasingly rely upon patient cost-sharing to control escalating healthcare expenditures. These changes raise new challenges for physicians that are different from those that arose either under managed care or traditional indemnity insurance. Historically, there have been two distinct bases for arguing that physicians should not consider costs in their clinical decisions—an “aspirational ethic” that exhorts physicians to treat all patients the same regardless of their ability to pay, and an “agency ethic” that calls on physicians to (...) be trustworthy advisors to their patients. In the setting of greater patient cost-sharing, physicians' aspiration and agency roles increasingly conflict. Satisfactorily navigating the new terrain of consumer-driven healthcare requires physicians to consider these two roles and how they can best be reconciled so as to maximize quality of care while respecting the heterogeneity of patients' financial resources and willingness to pay. (shrink)

This article undertakes an exploration of Reinhart Koselleck’s ideas concerning historical knowledge and moral judgment. Koselleck’s position is exemplified by the maxim “knowing is better than knowing better,” declaimed throughout his career. I argue that Koselleck’s separation of knowledge and judgment was unstable, with the prescription to know repeatedly folded into the proscription against knowing better. This article begins with an analysis of Koselleck’s maxim and the underlying theoretical position that sustained it. I show how the separation resulted from (...) Koselleck’s attempts to delegitimate utopian philosophies of history and to maintain a plurality of possible histories. I also demonstrate how Koselleck’s maxim reveals the centrality of philosophical-historical schemata in current debates about the meaning and utility of the past, and how recognizing the tension between knowledge and judgment can reshape concerns about history and moral judgment. Throughout, I illuminate how Koselleck’s knowledge/judgment problematic is germane to the philosophy of history by reading him alongside R.G. Collingwood and Joan Scott. (shrink)

Zermelo once wrote that he had anticipated Russell's contradiction of the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. Is this sufficient for having anticipated Russell's Paradox — the paradox that revealed the untenability of the logical notion of a set as an extension? This paper argues that it is not sufficient and offers criteria that are necessary and sufficient for having discovered Russell's Paradox. It is shown that there is ample evidence that Russell satisfied the criteria and (...) that Zermelo did not. (shrink)

Reprint. Originally published: 1959; 1st Princeton/Bollingen pbk. ed. published: 1970.

Relatively congruence regular quasivarieties and quasivarieties of logic have noticeable similarities. The paper provides a unifying framework for them which extends the Blok-Pigozzi theory of elementarily algebraizable (and protoalgebraic) deductive systems. In this extension there are two parameters: a set of terms and a variable. When the former is empty or consists of theorems, the Blok-Pigozzi theory is recovered, and the variable is redundant. On the other hand, a class of membership logics is obtained when the variable is the only (...) element of the set of terms. For these systems the appropriate variant of equivalent algebraic semantics encompasses the relatively congruence regular quasivarieties. (shrink)