Originally published in 1963. Can one discern certain regularities in the manoeuvrings and techniques employed by scientists and can these be formulated into the methodological principles of science? What is the origin and basis of such principles? Are they imposed by objective realities, do they derive from conceptual necessities or are they rooted in our own deep seated predilections? This volume investigates these questions and sheds light on the growth mechanism of the evolving structure of science itself.

The social aspects of causality in medicine and healthcare have been emphasized in recent debates in the philosophy of science as crucial factors that need to be considered to enable, among others, appropriate interventions in public health. Therefore, it seems central to recognize the bearing of social causes (broadly understood, e.g., social inequalities and socio-economic status) in bringing about certain concrete pathologies. Being aware of the relevance of social causes in medicine and healthcare is particularly important in the face of (...) the role that artificial intelligence-based systems (such as machine learning algorithms) are increasingly playing in these high-stakes fields. In fact, these systems bear the dangerous potential of concealing relevant social causes. This is highly problematic not only because it reinforces issues of distributive injustice but also because it can pave the way for issues of epistemic injustice. The central aim of this chapter is to make a first effort to point out possible connections between the importance of recognizing social causes in medicine and healthcare and forms of epistemic injustice. (shrink)

The difference between cognitive and conative mental states, such as beliefs and desires, has sometimes been held to be that they have different “directions of fit” between the mind and the world – mind-to-world for beliefs and world-to-mind for desires (see Desire). Some philosophers have pursued the idea that if this thought can be given a plausible explanation it can be used to ground Hume's claim that “reason is the slave of the passions,” i.e., that no moral or other “practical” (...) belief, e.g., about what is best or right to do, can ever by itself be enough to motivate action. A desire or desire-like state is always required (see Reason and Passion; Hume, David). This issue will be discussed below. (shrink)

But a body of rigorous mathematical theory has also gradually developed, and this is the first book to present that theory.