This book traces the intellectual revolution initiated by Thales in the sixth century BC to its culmination in the metaphysics of Parmenides.

This book traces the intellectual revolution initiated by Thales in the sixth century BC to its culmination in the metaphysics of Parmenides.

A history of the pre-Socratic philosophers, with selected writings and texts.

This work provides a text and an extended study of those fragments of Heraclitus' philosophical utterances whose subject is the world as a whole rather than man and his part in it. Professor Kirk discusses fully the fragments which he finds genuine and treats in passing others that were generally accepted as genuine but here considered paraphrased or spurious. In securing his text, Professor Kirk has taken into account all the ancient testimonies, and in his critical work he attached particular (...) importance to the context in which each fragment is set. To each he gives a selective apparatus, a literal translation and and an extended commentary in which problems of textual and philosophical criticism are discussed. Ancient accounts of Heraclitus were inadequate and misleading, and as Kirk wrote, understanding was often hindered by excessive dogmatism and a selective use of the fragments. Professor Kirk's method is critical and objective, and his 1954 work marks a significant advance in the study of Presocratic thought. (shrink)

This article deals with four almost classic problems in Anaximander. of these the first is of comparatively minor importance, and the second is important not for what Anaximander thought but for what Aristotle thought he thought. Problem i is: Did Anaximander describe his as ? Problem 2: Did Aristotle mean Anaximander when he referred to people who postulated an intermediate substance ? Problem 3: Did Anaximander think that there were innumerable successive worlds? Problem 4: What is the extent and implication (...) of the extant fragment of Anaximander? Appended is a brief consideration of the nature of Theophrastus' source-material for Anaximander; on one's opinion of this question the assessment of the last two problems will clearly depend. (shrink)

One of the curious things about Homeric studies is the way in which, although opinions in this field fluctuate violently, from time to time certain among them tend to become crystallized for no particular reason and are then accepted as something approaching orthodoxy. It is to try to delay such a crystallization, if it is not already too late, that I direct this brief coup d'ail at some current opinions on whether Homer—for the sake of clarity I apply this name (...) in the first instance to the monumental composer of the Iliad—used the aid of writing, and in general at the value of comparative inferences based on the heroic poetry of modern Yugoslavia. (shrink)

During the excavations of 1924–5 at Karanis a papyrus of the second or early third century A.D. was discovered, and subsequently published by J. G. Winter , which under its single column has a subscribed title which should almost certainly be restored as ‘Alcidamas, On Homer’. The first fourteen lines of the papyrus give most of the story of Homer's death and the riddle that caused it, which is common to all the extant Lives of Homer; the remainder is a (...) general eulogy of Homer and a profession of transmitting his works to posterity. The interest of the discovery lies in the knowledge that it gives of a hitherto unrecorded work by Alcidamas, the rhetorician and contemporary of Isocrates, and the new fuel that it provides for an old controversy about the origins of the work known as the Certamen. The first part of this article aims at both re-examining the value of the papyrus and reopening some of the old questions on the Certamen. (shrink)

The recent proliferation of settler colonial and Indigenous studies of Palestine have addressed the historical and present-day enclosure of Palestinian land, yet the question of ‘indigeneity’ is underexamined in this literature. Claims to indigeneity in Palestine straddle varied definitions: a racial category; as constructed through the colonial encounter or preceding colonialism; and as a local relation or an international juridico-political category. Using discourse analysis and ethnography of a specific Palestinian sustainable agriculture initiative, I show how for Palestinians, claiming indigeneity brings (...) into tension potential political economic gains, social relations of struggle, and discursive formations of collective subjectivity. A valorisation and commodification of indigeneity as a racial category narrows notions of indigeneity to the biological-cultural, offering challenges for Palestinian struggles for sovereignty. I conclude by asking what theorising from Palestine offers to Marxist theories of racial capitalism and settler colonialism, and whether indigeneity can exceed its commodification. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an account of what is frequently called Socrates’s “method,” and, more specifically, of what one is being asked by Socrates when he asks “what is x?” I argue that one is being asked to change one’s life, and to orient one’s life around the pursuit of wisdom. To answer Socrates’s question is to subject oneself to a process of extracting from oneself one’s accumulated prejudices; doing so requires one to abandon, not just ideas that have (...) been demonstrated to be false, but the aspects of one’s life that have been built around those previous un-reflected upon ideas. This means that the cumulative commitments of adulthood—predicated as many of them often are on un-reflected-upon presumptions—prevent initiation into philosophical life. The call to do philosophy is, for Socrates, the call to subject oneself to perpetual transformation, limiting who is capable of its pursuit. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that in his “reversal of Platonism” in The Logic of Sense, Gilles Deleuze does not adequately consider in what sense Plotinus identifies The One as “unparticipated.” I further claim that when The One is understood in the sense I consider Plotinus to have presented it, it shows itself to have attributes similar to Deleuze’s “dark precursor,” insofar as both The One and the dark precursor are ineffable, are inexhaustible, and contain absolute generative power. I propose (...) that examining conceptual similarities between the works of such figures—about whose concepts similarity is undoubtedly counter-intuitive—sheds interesting light on important characteristics of Platonism, and in particular about the underappreciated sense in which the concept of difference is richly developed in the Platonic tradition. (shrink)

In this article, I present John Russon’s phenomenological method of authorless description. I trace this method to Russon’s engagement with Aristotle, Hegel, and Heidegger. Speci????ically, I claim that he is informed by Aristotle’s practice of accounting for appearances, Hegel’s method of presuppositionless science, and Heidegger’s project of preparation to “let being be.” I apply this to Russon’s book, Sites of Exposure, and his account of both the human need to transcend the home towards an open-ended realm of indifference and the (...) concrete development of the conditions in which that is made possible in what we call the modern world. I present his account of the emergence of representative democracy, modern science, and glob-al capitalism. I argue that Russon’s method provides essential tools for understanding the promises and failures of what we call the modern world and the imperative of openness that ought to guide us in striving to address those failures. (shrink)

It seems very commonly agreed that Sappho's wedding-songs display none of the ritual obscenity so frequent in the genre. Thus D. L. Page wrote of fr. i ioa that ‘There is no trace here or elsewhere in Sappho of that ribaldry which was characteristic of the songs recited at this and other stages of Greek wedding-ceremonies’. Similarly Sir Maurice Bowra asserted of fr. 111 that it is ‘neither bawdy nor exalted, but playful. If the humour is a bit primitive, that (...) is due to tradition, which expected jokes at this level’. On the next page he writes of the songs sung outside the bridal chamber, as distinct from those sung in the procession thither, that ‘Here too Sappho seems to avoid bawdry but is not averse from rather elementary jokes’. (shrink)

Exploring Aristotle's concept of logos, this volume advances our understanding of it as a singular feature of human nature by arguing that it is the organizing principle of human life itself. Tracing its multiple meanings in different contexts, including reason, logic, speech, ratio, account, and form, contributors highlight the ways in which we can see logos in human thinking, in the organizing principles of our bodies, in our perception of the world, in our social and political life, and through our (...) productive and fine arts. Through this focus, logos reveals itself not as one feature amongst others, but instead as the feature that organizes all others, from the most "animal" to the most "spiritual." By presenting logos in this way, readers gain a complex account of the philosophy of human nature. (shrink)

This paper uses John Dewey's accounts of education, expression, and art to argue that the relegation of artistic expression to the private sphere in fact, paradoxically, undermines the opportunities for human beings to cultivate their own individual autonomy. Insofar as cultural objects are matters of artistic expression, they have the special quality of potentially drawing the attention of the public to their created and contingent character, provided that they are created in a self-consciously shared political environment. I use Bakhtin's account (...) of the " Carnivalesque " to provide an example of a social and political environment that encourages such social participation, and therefore encourages greater human agency, and use this example to point to criticisms of contemporary culture. (shrink)

A new approach to the ancient world is only too often a wrong approach, unless it is based on some concrete discovery. But I think it fair to talk of newperspectives, at least, in the study of Greek mythology. Certainly the old and familiar ones are no longer adequate. Indeed it is surprising, in the light of fresh intuitions about society, literacy, the pre-Homeric world, and relations with the ancient Near East, that myth—one of the most pervasive aspects of Greek (...) culture—has been left in its old and rather cobwebby pigeon-hole. Rose's simple paraphrases are accepted as adequate for students; Nilsson's sparse pages in his history of religion are rightly respected, though some of them are too simple; the Murray-Cook-Harrison-Cornford reconstruction of religion, ritual and myth is regarded as a little excessive, but perhaps not too far out; Kerényi and Eliade are roughly tolerated, if not widely read by Classicists, and their books are ordered in profusion for the library; the psychological side is adequately taken care of, or so it is supposed, by what is left from Freud and Jung, with Cassirer as sufficient authority for the sources of mythical imagination.Many of these critics had their moments of brilliant insight, but most were misleading in their theories taken as a whole. We can now accept that many myths have ritual counterparts, and some have ritual origins, without having to adopt Cornford's belief, developed after Harrison, Frazer and Robertson Smith, that all myths are such. (shrink)

In this paper, I perform an analysis of Aristotle’s organic analogy when discussing the different “organs” of the Greek polis. I argue that this analysis demonstrates that the proper functioning of the polis depends upon the generation of different forms of life that will incline towards tension with one another, due to the fact that some members will be prevented by their form of life from enjoying the chief virtue of political life, namely, the accomplishment of human virtue and the (...) good life. I argue that, at least within the context of the polis, there remains the possibility that those disenfranchised people experience sensuous recognition that they are contributing to human thriving. I contrast this with the modern city, in which what existed as a natural and visible tension in the polis becomes a concealed tension, with the result that no such recognition is possible, leaving modern city-dwellers alienated from the conditions that generate their forms of life. (shrink)

I do not mean to suggest that Kroner's book is not in many places interesting and learned, nor that, in its original form of lectures, it had no value. But, apart from the exaggeration and distortion of the central thesis, the detailed treatment of historical points leaves one with little confidence and robs the work of what usefulness it might have had. Thus an unquestioning application of Nietzche's division of Greek thinkers into 'Dionysiac' and 'Apollonian' leads to remarks like the (...) following: "Aristotle has little in common with the Dionysian romanticism and universal dynamism of Heraclitus, and yet there is a kinship between them based upon becoming instead of being". What evidence we have for the Presocratic period is harshly treated. On p. 85 this is the 'more literal' of two versions of Anaximander's fragment and its introduction: "All things are going back through destruction, whence they had come through generation, according to what is due; for they suffer just punishment by repayment to each other the wrong in the succession of time"--but Anaximander did not, in fact, write nonsense like this. Even a simple sentence like Heraclitus fr. 113 is mistranslated as "Thinking is the same for all," where the Greek is ξυνόν and not τὸ αὐτό. Nor is Kroner incapable of rebuking others for mistakes of his own; thus on p. 110 he writes: "J. Burnet, e.g., waters down the words of Parmenides which literally rendered are: 'The same is to know and that on behalf of which thought is,' by letting Parmenides say: 'You cannot find thought without something that is as to which it is uttered.'" But Burnet was translating not the line translated by Kroner, but the following one, a line ignored by Kroner and one which seriously damages his interpretation of Parmenides. Then the Greek word ἰδέαι, used of Plato's Forms, is implied to connote ideas existing in the mind; Socrates is the most worth-while of Greek thinkers because in some respects he resembled Jesus Christ; he was not really an ethical thinker, though, and in any case Plato's Forms owed nothing to him--and so on. The best treatment is of Aristotle; and there are many short sections of acute discussion, as, for example, on the meaning of the second part of the Parmenides. But the mind may be spinning so wildly by the time it reaches them that it is incapable of recognizing them. Cambridge University. (shrink)

In this interpretive commentary on Theaetetus, Gregory Kirk makes a major contribution to scholarship on Plato by emphasizing the relevance of the interpersonal dynamics between the interlocutors for the interpretation of the dialogue’s central arguments about knowledge. Kirk attends closely to the personalities of the participants in the dialogue, focusing especially on the unique demands faced by a student—in this case, Theaetetus—and the ways in which one can embrace or deflect the responsibilities of learning. Kirk’s approach gives equal consideration to (...) the dual demands of dramatic interpretation and philosophical argument that constitute the unique character of the Platonic text, and he develops an original interpretation of the Theaetetus, concluding that the uncertainty that characterizes wisdom supersedes the certainty of knowledge. (shrink)