En este artículo postulamos que el trabajo de Kuhn es una revolución filosófica para la filosofía de la ciencia. La búsqueda de revoluciones filosóficas es una extensión de las ideas de Kuhn acerca de las revoluciones científicas. Las revoluciones filosóficas se distinguen de las revoluciones científicas en algunos aspectos que discutimos en este trabajo. Defendemos que la revolución kuhniana consiste en la naturalización de la filosofía de la ciencia que se desprende de sus trabajos y discutimos la analogía biológica que (...) Kuhn empleó como un ejemplo ilustrativo. (shrink)

On what grounds will the rational man become a Christian? It is often assumed by many, especially non-Christians, that he will become a Christian if and only if he judges that the evidence available to him shows that it is more likely than not that the Christian theological system is true, that, in mathematical terms, on the evidence available to him, the probability of its truth is greater than half. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate whether or (...) not this is a necessary and sufficient condition for the rational man to adopt Christianity. (shrink)

Henry Leonard and Karel Lambert first introduced so-called presupposition-free (or just simply: free) logics in the 1950’s in order to provide a logical framework allowing for non-denoting singular terms (be they descriptions or constants) such as “the largest prime” or “Pegasus” (see Leonard [1956] and Lambert [1960]). Of course, ever since Russell’s paradigmatic treatment of definite descriptions (Russell [1905]), philosophers have had a way to deal with such terms. A sentence such as “the..

Although ‘most contemporary analytic philosophers [endorse] a physicalist picture of the world’ (A. Newen; V. Hoffmann; M. Esfeld, ‘Preface to Mental Causation, Externalism and Self‐Knowledge’, Erkenntnis, 67 (2007), p. 147), it is unclear what exactly the physicalist thesis states. The response that physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical does not solve the problem but is a precise statement of the problem because ‘the claim is hopelessly vague’ (G. Hellman; F. Thompson, ‘Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, and Reduction’, Journal of Philosophy, (...) 72 (1975), p. 552). I argue that physicalism in fact should be the thesis that every existing particular essentially exemplifies properties the exemplification of which does not conceptually entail the existence of conscious beings. Physicalism thus is a purely philosophical thesis with no intrinsic relation to physics.1. (shrink)

— No 1, mars : S. Chollet et D. Valentin, Le degré d’expertise a-t-il une influence sur la perception olfactive ? Quelques éléments de réponse dans le domaine du vin ; G. Molina et J.-M. Fabre, Norme et contexte : influence d’une dichotomisation du matériel et de l’évaluation sur la contextualisation de jugements catégoriels ; S. Nicolas, J. Ségui..

In this book G. W. Leibniz presents not only his reflections on predestination and election but also a more detailed account of the problem of evil than is found in any of his other works apart from the _Theodicy_. Surprisingly, his _Dissertation on Predestination and Grace_ has never before been published in any form. Michael J. Murray's project of translating, editing, and providing commentary for the volume will therefore attract great interest among scholars and students of Leibniz's philosophy and theology. (...) Leibniz addresses such topics as free will, moral responsibility, divine causation, justice, punishment, divine foreknowledge, and human freedom, revealing crucial aspects of the genesis of his mature metaphysics and the theological motivations behind it. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce the notion of a set algebra S satisfying a system E of equations. After defining a notion of freeness for such algebras, we show that, for any system E of equations, set algebras that are free in the class of structures satisfying E exist and are unique up to a bisimulation. Along the way, analogues of classical set-theoretic and algebraic properties are investigated.

Aldo Antonelli offers a novel view on abstraction principles in order to solve a traditional tension between different requirements: that the claims of science be taken at face value, even when involving putative reference to mathematical entities; and that referents of mathematical terms are identified and their possible relations to other objects specified. In his view, abstraction principles provide representatives for equivalence classes of second-order entities that are available provided the first- and second-order domains are in the equilibrium dictated by (...) the abstraction principles, and whose choice is otherwise unconstrained.entities are the referents of abstraction terms: such referents are to an extent indeterminate, but we can still quantify over them, predicate identity or non-identity, etc. Our knowledge of them is limited, but still substantial: we know whatever has to be true no matter how the representatives are chosen, i.e., what is true in all models of the corresponding abstraction principles. This view is backed up by an “austere” conception of universals, according to which these are first-order objects, i.e., ways of collecting first-order objects. Antonelli thus claims that second-order logic does not import any novel ontological commitment beyond ontology of first-order, naturalistically acceptable, objects. Moreover, in the case of arithmetic, even if Hume’s Principle is construed as described above, Frege’s Theorem goes through unaffected, since there is nothing in its proof that depends on an account of the “true nature” of numbers. A viable construal of logicism is then given by the combination of semantic nominalism and a naturalistic conception of abstraction. [Editors note]. (shrink)

An attempt at a Montague-style reconstruction of the semantics of Buridan's logic on a regimented fragment of Latin.

G. E. M. Anscombe; IX—Parmenides, Mystery and Contradiction, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 69, Issue 1, 1 June 1969, Pages 125–132, https://do.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:C. Suetonius Tranquillus: De Grammaticis et RhetoribusJames E. G. ZetzelR. A. Kaster, ed. C. Suetonius Tranquillus: De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus. Edited with a translation, introduction, and commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press. lx 1 370 pp. Cloth, $72.00.From a very early stage, the Romans were interested in their own literary history. In the second century B.C.E., Accius composed his didascalica; in the first century, Varro, Cornelius Nepos, and Julius Hyginus (...) all wrote biographies of literary figures; and early in the second century c.e. Suetonius wrote a set of books De uiris illustribus, giving accounts of the lives of Roman poets, historians, orators, philosophers—and teachers of grammar and rhetoric. Our knowledge of the first four categories of writers is exiguous: aside from Cicero’s Brutus, which is of more importance for chronology than for biography proper, we have the versions of some of Suetonius’ lives of the poets that are attached to scholia and the one-sentence notices excerpted from Suetonius by Jerome in his adaptation of Eusebius’ Chronicle; we also have occasional anecdotes in the elder Seneca, Aulus Gellius, and a few other sources. The vagaries of textual transmission, however, have left us much better off with the last of Suetonius’ rubrics: a single manuscript survived to the middle ages containing (along with Tacitus’ minor works) the portion of De uiris illustribus known as De grammaticis et rhetoribus (DGR). The text is badly preserved, and it is also incomplete: of the sixteen professors of rhetoric once included, lives of only five remain. Even so, it is a text of considerable importance for students of Roman education and, indeed, of Roman intellectual life: not only does it describe the origins of grammatical and rhetorical education at Rome, it discusses the origins, character, and students of the men who taught the elite of Rome; it preserves anecdotes involving the leading political and literary figures of the first centuries B.C.E. and c.e.; and along the way it offers quotations, otherwise unknown, from such figures as Valerius Cato, Helvius Cinna, Furius Bibaculus, Cicero, Asinius Pollio, and Asinius Gallus.Until now, DGR has been an extraordinarily difficult text to understand or [End Page 475] to use. Suetonius’ chronology is vague, his biographical reconstructions obscure, and his narratives maddeningly brief and anecdotal—not to mention the fact that the text itself is so corrupt that the words themselves are not always easy to ascertain. No longer: with Robert Kaster’s magnificent edition, DGR is a text that cannot only be read, but understood, used, and even (at times) admired. In some respects, K. is the perfect match for Suetonius: like Suetonius, K.’s principal interest is not in the internal history of ancient education, but in its external history, above all in the social context and significance of teaching at Rome. It should also be said, however, that in other ways K. is far better than Suetonius: where the ancient text is brief, elliptical, and anecdotal, K. is thorough, patient, and extraordinarily learned. K.’s edition includes a long introduction, a new critical text and facing translation, and an exhaustive commentary, followed by four appendices (of which the longest and most important concerns Suetonius’ use of the elder Seneca). A brief review can scarcely do justice to K.’s achievement; a few comments will have to suffice.Introduction: Although DGR is perhaps the portion of De uiris illustribus that modern scholars would most happily have done without, K. turns the very obscurity of the subject matter to good advantage. In writing of poets, historians, and the rest, Suetonius could make full use of earlier biographers such as Nepos and Hyginus; with the teachers, he had no such sources. As a result, DGR provides an excellent laboratory in which to observe Suetonius’ working methods: K. analyzes brilliantly the way in which he collected his information, how it is related to his research for the lives of literary figures, and the strengths and weaknesses of Suetonius’ approach. In both the introduction and the commentary (to singularly good effect in his analysis of DGR1–4 on the origins of grammatical teaching at Rome), K. pays close attention... (shrink)