Introduction -- 1e Intermed consid -- Marx -- Simmel -- Weber -- Lukács -- 2e intermed consid -- Horkheimer -- Adorno -- 3e intermed consid -- Habermas I -- Habermas II -- Habermas III -- Conclusion -- Postscript -- Bibliography.

In their review, Ruba and Repacholi summarize the methods used to assess preverbal infants’ understanding of emotions, and analyze the existing evidence in light of classical and constructionist ac...

Qu’est-ce que l’indignation ? Cette émotion est souvent conçue comme une émotion morale qu’une tierce-partie éprouve vis-à-vis des injustices qu’un agent inflige à un patient. L’indignation aurait ainsi trait aux injustices et serait éprouvée par des individus qui n’en seraient eux-mêmes pas victimes. Cette émotion motiverait la tierce-partie indignée à tenter de réguler l’injustice en l’annulant et en punissant son auteur. Cet article entreprend de montrer que cette conception de l’indignation n’est que partielle. En effet, l’indignation ne porte pas que (...) sur les injustices, mais plus généralement sur les torts injustifiés. Ce faisant, l’indignation peut être une émotion morale, mais aussi une émotion conventionnelle ou esthétique. De plus, elle peut être éprouvée par les individus victime des torts : elle n’est pas uniquement éprouvée par des tierces-parties. De la sorte, les individus indignés qui subissent les torts peuvent eux-mêmes chercher à les annuler et à punir leurs auteurs. Puisqu’elle peut être éprouvée tant par des spectateurs que par les personnes qui subissent les torts et qu’elle incline ceux qui l’éprouvent à faire appel à d’autres personnes pour réguler ces torts, l’indignation vécue individuellement est partageable : elle peut devenir une émotion collective jouant un rôle fondamental dans la régulation sociale en contribuant au renforcement de normes sociales existantes ou à l’émergence de nouvelles normes sociales associées aux idées du juste prévalant dans la société considérée. (shrink)

E. O. Wilson (1974: 54) describes the problem that social organisms pose: “On what bases do we distinguish the extremely modified members of an invertebrate colony from the organs of a metazoan animal?” This framing of the issue has inspired many to look more closely at how groups of organisms form and behave as emergent individuals. The possible existence of “superorganisms” test our best intuitions about what can count and act as genuine biological individuals and how we should study them. (...) As we will discuss, colonies of certain organisms display many of the properties that we usually reserve only to individual organisms. Although there is good reason to believe that many social insects form genuine emergent biological individuals, the conclusion offered here is of a slightly different sort. I will argue that to understand some social insects' interactions and the emergent traits they give rise to, it may be helpful to shift our understanding from a community-level approach to an ecosystem-level approach. I will argue that viewing certain insect colonies (termites) as parts of ecosystems allows us to better understand some of the adaptations that have emerged from their evolution. (shrink)

One of the trademarks of Nicolai Hartmann’s ontology is his theory of levels of reality. Hartmann drew from many sources to develop his version of the theory. His essay “Die Anfänge des Schichtungsgedankens in der alten Philosophie” testifies of the fact that he drew from Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. But this text was written relatively late in Hartmann’s career, which suggests that his interest in the theories of levels of the ancients may have been retrospective. In “Nicolai Hartmann und seine (...) Zeitgenossen,” Martin Morgenstern puts the emphasis on contemporaries of Hartmann: Émile Boutroux, Max Scheler, Heinrich Rickert, Karl Jaspers, and Arnold Gehlen. But there is another plausible source for Hartmann’s conception of levels that has so far remained overlooked in the literature. Hartmann studied with and was influenced by Nikolai Lossky. Lossky has a theory of levels that he adopted from Vladimir Solovyov. Solovyov presents his theory of levels, among other places, in Oпpaвдaнie дoбpa, where he says that the five principal stages of the cosmogonic process of ascension toward universal perfection, which are given in experience, are the mineral or inorganic realm, the vegetal realm, the animal realm, the realm of natural humanity, and the realm of spiritual or divine humanity. This theory appears to bear significant similarities with the theory of levels of reality that Hartmann will develop a few decades later. Solovyov was widely read in Russia and it would be unlikely that Hartmann was not at least minimally acquainted with his work. Chances are that Hartmann came into contact with it in some details. An intellectual lineage could thus likely be traced from Hartmann back to Solovyov. In this paper, I document and discuss this possible lineage. (shrink)

During spring 2009 a Swedish senior paediatric intensivist and associate professor was detained and later prosecuted for mercy-killing a child with severe brain damage. The intensivist was accused of having used high doses of thiopental after having withdrawn life-sustaining treatment when the child was imminently dying. After more than 2.5 years of investigation the physician was acquitted by the Stockholm City Court. The court additionally stated that the physician had provided good end-of-life care. Since the trial it has become evident (...) that the accusation was based on a problematic medicolegal report. Nevertheless, the event has had severe negative consequences for the physician personally and professionally, and probably also, in general, for patients in the final stage of life. This case illustrates, together with other cases, that there is a lack of correspondence between ethical soft law/healthcare law and the Penal Code. To optimise medical practice we suggest that the criminal law be carefully examined and if possible changed. Furthermore, we suggest a peer-review system for assessing medicolegal reports in cases of suspected homicide. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la mineure « Rythmanalyses » de la revue Multitudes, n° 46, 2011. Nous remercions la revue Multitudes et Fédéric Bisson de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Anna Cruz passe dans la rue au bruit de ses chaussures. Telle une sorte d'aura sonore, le martèlement sur l'asphalte est une puissance. Anna enfonce en cadence ses talons dans la conscience comme les aiguilles d'un vaudou quotidien. Le rythme prend son pied. Il n'est pas seulement (...) la carrure objective des pas, - Pour une éthique et une politique du rythme – Nouvel article. (shrink)

This article defends a Platonist view of streaming. It is opposite to the mainstream representation that streaming has “liquidated” the structure both objective and collective of musical experience. On the contrary, streaming is the support of a new kind of musical object, which is distinct both from the allographic notational objects and from the phonographic ones. This third kind of object has to be characterized as a flux-object. The way it is diffused and accessible implies a new kind of experience. (...) Cyberspace in which this experience takes place is characterized as an “hyperobjective noosphere”: the relation of streaming with the subjects of musical experience is akin to the relation of atmosphere or biosphere to the living beings. This article invites to an ascetic exercise: the everyday experience of the listener has to become mindful of the “swarm community” in which s/he participates by streaming. Thus it develops a renewed musical Platonism, as a kind of response to “object-oriented ontologies”. According to this renewed Platonism, dispositional properties are essential to the objects. Objects have no sense apart from the relation to individual and collective subjectivations that are potential parts of them. (shrink)

The article is a lightly edited transcript of a digital roundtable discussion. The participants were invited based on their prior work on critical realism and epistemology. The roundtable discussion includes introductory statements on judgemental rationality by Jamie Morgan, Ruth Groff, Dorothea Schoppek, Leigh Price, and Frédéric Vandenberghe, followed by a discussion between the participants on a variety of topics related to judgemental rationality. The discussion demonstrates a variety of opinions and perspectives, as well as the clashing of opinions in (...) a respectful manner. The roundtable provides interesting discussion points about Bhaskar's approach to judgemental rationality, how we adjudicate between different meta-theories (such as between that of Bhaskar and Harré), and what role should normative values have in theoretical adjudication. (shrink)

The study by Levy et al. (2024) offers new insights into clinical trial participant experience when assessing a novel visual cortical prosthesis (VCP) during an early feasibility study (EFS). We ap...

"The extensive attention devoted to abortion has led Christians for too long to overlook much of the exploding bioethics agenda. Moreover, to focus only on 'issues' is to fail to address the profound changes taking place in the very nature of the medical profession. This book signals the commitment of the Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity to help expand the church's bioethical vision and to foster a more substantial Christian contribution to the public debate."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by (...) Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

Nicolas de Cues effectue au XVe siècle un geste métaphysique qui nous paraît décisif pour la métaphysique classique et particulièrement pour la philosophie de Leibniz : il élabore une métaphysique de la singularité créée à partir de l’affirmation de l’infinité du Principe. La puissance de l’infinité divine renforce la valeur de chaque créature singulière grâce à un dispositif d’expression de l’infini dans le fini. Cependant ce processus de singularisation universel ne va pas sans soulever des difficultés. Comment la singularité de (...) la créature peut-elle s’ouvrir à l’infini ? Comment les créatures singulières peuvent-elles former un monde commun et se rapporter à leur Principe sans abandonner leur puissance de distinction ? Nous exposerons trois temps de ce processus de singularisation : la déduction, par une métaphysique expressive de l’infini, de la singularité conçue comme contraction de l’Unité divine ; l’intégration cosmologique des êtres singuliers ainsi déduits ; enfin la destinée spirituelle de l’intériorisation mentale de l’ensemble du processus. (shrink)

Aristotle considered the plot the most important element in tragedy. By μῦθυς--from which our word "myth" comes--he meant an imitation of action--of action in the "real world," that is. Here, as elsewhere in Greek literary criticism, "imitation" does not mean simply "exact reproduction." To what extent it may mean something like "symbolic," or otherwise "oblique," representation, is hard to determine. It will be enough, for our purposes, to think of "imitation" as exact reproduction with allowance made simply for the transference--always (...) radically transforming--into another medium: from life into art. What, then, did Aristotle mean by "action"? The noun πρᾶξις takes us back to the verb πράττω. Action meant a "doing" to Aristotle, rather as poetry meant to him a "making." Such a "doing," then, is a time-crossing event, in fact an event whose nature is closely involved with its temporal status. Such an event has a personal agent, or vehicle, and transacts with other persons, or more generally, with the "other." In fact, the notion of a transaction is especially fitting to describe action, for that notion emphasizes the dialogue-like structure of action, which always involves its agent with "the world," whether of people or of things. Plot, for Aristotle, was the turning of such action into art. (shrink)

Roger Garaudy, the Hellenic tradition, and imaginative space.--Kazantzakis' making of God.--Existentialism and language.--The argument of water.--Literature as ikonic language.--Literature and morality.

Being part of a culture seems, on the face of it, empirically describable, and verifiable. But in fact that kind of participation is not so easy to characterize. Our existence as members of a culture is given to us fleetingly, and in awarenesses tightly locked to the awareness of the other, who is not our culture. Being part of aculture therefore is part of knowing yourself as limited. But to what are you limited? You are limited to being a presence (...) other than that of the other that you are defined off against. It is thus worth noting that being of a culture is a fleetingly given awareness of a condition in which your not being something else is what defines you. The logical consequence of this structural situation is that you, or I, exist foremost as a site, rather than as a substance, in our occupying a post within culture. (shrink)

Among the casualties of the rush to relativism is a central tenet of classical thought: that great works of literature are great in and of themselves and not because of the needs and values of their time. This “canon-based view,” supply taken for granted by Johnson, Arnold, Pope, and Eliot, has long since been shown the door by views ranging from Marxism to today’s cultural studies. These views hold that the great works become great because of the values and concerns (...) of their own times, and they remain effectual, if they do, because of the ways they speak to their times’ concerns. There are no transhistorical values and concerns, though of course there is a past to culture and its works continue their indirect .. (shrink)

L’article explore les méandres de la théorie humienne du contrat. Hume en effet refuse de penser la société à partir du schème du contrat social. Naturaliste, il est beaucoup plus proche de Machiavel ou de Montesquieu que de Rousseau à cet égard. Pourtant on trouve chez lui tout un réseau de notions constitutives de sa pensée politique : la convention, l’obligation, la promesse. Il s’agit de restituer la cohérence de sa théorie complexe du lien social.

The equation of consciousness with qualia, of wakeful awareness with awareness-of-cognitive content (perceptions, conceptions, emotions), while intuitivelyattractive, and formally referenced as the primary index of consciousness by many philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, nevertheless has significant difficulties specifying precisely what it is that distinguishes conscious from non-conscious cognition. Moreover, there is a surprisingly robust congruence of evidence to the contrary, supporting the notion that consciousness, as a state of reflexive awareness, is distinct from the content one is aware of, that this (...) awareness/content amalgam is actually the product of an incorporation process of various intermittent, and constantly varying streams of content onto a pre-existing reflexively conscious state which is not reliant on these streams for its constitution as a reflexive state. Consciousness, the evidence strongly indicates, is not qualia, not the awareness of this or that perceptual, conceptual or emotional content, but reflexive, autonoetic awareness as such. (shrink)

Hume pense le moi comme une idée fictive, produit de l'imagination sans référent spirituel objectif ni assise substantielle. Cessant d'être un principe pour devenir un effet, le moi peut être objet de science. Derrière l'apparente hétérogénéité des deux explications humiennes du moi, l'une par la mémoire et l'autre par l'orgueil, l'unité profonde de la doctrine dévoile les enjeux à la fois anthropologiques et politiques d'une conception qui demande qu'on abandonne le dualisme dogmatique du moi et du non-moi, de l'individu et (...) de la société. The self is thought by Hume to be a fiction produced by the imagination, without any substantial basis. No longer a principle, the self becomes an effect, liable to become the object of a science. Behind the apparent heterogeneity of the two explanations of the self (constituted either by memory or by pride), the real unity of the doctrine reveals both the anthropological and the political stakes of a conception that does without the dogmatical duality of the self and the non-self, of the individual and society. (shrink)

Cet article se propose de traiter la question de l’autorité. Après l’avoir définie selon un point de vue sociohistorique et linguistique, c’est dans une approche lacanienne que l’autorité est abordée afin d’appréhender ses soubassements. L’élucidation de cette opération psychique est essentiellement entreprise par le truchement de l’analyse de la paternité et nous avons tâché de repérer sur lequel de ses registres l’autorité est effective. C’est dans la prise en compte de la dimension du symbolique que l’autorité révèle le paradoxe qui (...) la fonde, à savoir qu’elle n’est pas due à la personne qui la manifeste, contrairement aux apparences, dans la mesure où elle est fondamentalement reçue de l’Autre. Cette perspective ne peut manquer de réinterroger la thèse du déclin de l’image paternelle et de ses conséquences sur le devenir de l’autorité. (shrink)

Dans les prises en charge éducatives d’adultes handicapés, il arrive que des parents imposent leur directive. L’auteur repère et analyse ce mode singulier du lien d’emprise en proposant la notion de fratrie imaginaire pour caractériser la relation dans laquelle sont pris ces professionnels auprès des parents. Dans une lutte d’appropriation du sujet, ils sont alors minorisés à hauteur des craintes qu’ils suscitent et de l’ampleur de la minorisation que les parents ont eux-mêmes subies auprès d’autres professionnels du secteur médico-social. Une (...) extension de l’enveloppe familiale peut être le fruit des parents comme de la fratrie réelle. Ceci étant, une fois l’éclairage intersubjectif réalisé, il va s’agir de trouver des moyens institutionnels pour restaurer un dialogue basé sur un fondement stable repositionnant les acteurs de l’institution sur un terrain professionnel. (shrink)

L’utilisation de méthodes informatiques dans la conception pré-clinique de molécules thérapeutiques s’est développée à partir de 1970 dans le cadre d’une stratégie dite de « rational drug design ». Une analyse de cette approche est d’abord développée. Deux contextualisations de ces pratiques sont ensuite proposées. Certains résultats de l’historiographie des médicaments permettent, premièrement, de préciser la doctrine particulière du médicament à laquelle cette stratégie se rattache. Deuxièmement, puisque la rationalité déclarée de cette dernière s’appuie sur des outils scientifiques développés en (...) (bio)chimie, une analyse de leur statut épistémologique est conduite en étudiant leur émergence. Ceci permet de comprendre les spécificités que la rationalité véhiculée par ces outils computationnels comporte (représentation de la matière particulière dont la validité est uniquement pragmatique, emploi d’un grand nombre de données empiriques, réalisation d’estimations et approximations, diffusion de ces dernières sous forme de programmes informatiques). Nous soulignons l’importance de l’ordinateur dans la standardisation de ces méthodes. (shrink)

La publication de ce recueil de fragments et d'articles, écrits par Madame Marie-Madeleine de La Garanderie à des dates diverses au cours de quarante années d'études consacrées à l'humanisme parisien et essentiellement à l'oeuvre de Guillaume Budé, a pour but d'apporter un complément à sa grande thèse Christianisme et Lettres profanes, à laquelle il fait maintes fois référence.Ce volume constitue une véritable somme des recherches sur Guillaume Budé et son oeuvre, encore largement inexplorée.