We propose simple nonlinear mathematical models for the legal concept of balancing of interests. Our aim is to bridge the gap between an abstract formalisation of a balancing decision while assuring consistency and ultimately legal certainty across cases. We focus on the conflict between the rights to privacy and to the protection of personal data in Art. 7 and Art. 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCh) against the right of access to information derived from Art. 11 EUCh. (...) These competing rights are denoted by ( \(i_1\) ) _right to privacy _ and ( \(i_2\) ) _access to information_; mathematically, their indices are respectively assigned by \(u_1\in [0,1]\) and \(u_2\in [0,1]\) subject to the constraint \(u_1+u_2=1\). This constraint allows us to use one single index _u_ to resolve the conflict through balancing. The outcome will be concluded by comparing the index _u_ with a prior given threshold \(u_0\). For simplicity, we assume that the balancing depends on only selected legal criteria such as the social status of affected person, and the sphere from which the information originated, which are represented as inputs of the models, called legal parameters. Additionally, we take “time” into consideration as a legal criterion, building on the European Court of Justice’s ruling on the right to be forgotten: by considering time as a legal parameter, we model how the outcome of the balancing changes over the passage of time. To catch the dependence of the outcome _u_ by these criteria as legal parameters, data were created by a fully-qualified lawyer. By comparison to other approaches based on machine learning, especially neural networks, this approach requires significantly less data. This might come at the price of higher abstraction and simplification, but also provides for higher transparency and explainability. Two mathematical models for _u_, a time-independent model and a time-dependent model, are proposed, that are fitted by using the data. (shrink)

The paper gives a detailed reconstruction and discussion of Peirce’s doctrine of propositions, so-called Dicisigns, developed in the years around 1900. The special features different from the logical mainstream are highlighted: the functional definition not dependent upon conscious stances nor human language, the semiotic characterization extending propositions and quasi-propositions to cover prelinguistic and prehuman occurrences of signs, the relations of Dicisigns to the conception of facts, of diagrammatical reasoning, of icons and indices, of meanings, of objects, of syntax in Peirce’s (...) logic-as-semiotics. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is threefold. Firstly, §1 and §2 introduce the novel concept logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia. If successful, the initial sections will draw attention to an interesting akratic phenomenon which has not received much attention in the literature on akrasia (although it has been discussed by logicians in different terms). Secondly, §3 and §4 present a dilemma related to logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano Arithmetic and Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem (...) it’s shown that either we must be agnostic about the consistency of Peano Arithmetic or akratic in our arithmetical theorizing. If successful, these sections will underscore the pertinence and persistence of akrasia in arithmetic (by appeal to Gödel’s seminal work). Thirdly, §5 concludes by suggesting a way of translating the dilemma of arithmetical akrasia into a case of regular epistemic akrasia; and further how one might try to escape the dilemma when it’s framed this way. (shrink)

The problem of how to rationally aggregate probability measures occurs in particular when a group of agents, each holding probabilistic beliefs, needs to rationalise a collective decision on the basis of a single ‘aggregate belief system’ and when an individual whose belief system is compatible with several probability measures wishes to evaluate her options on the basis of a single aggregate prior via classical expected utility theory. We investigate this problem by first recalling some negative results from preference and judgment (...) aggregation theory which show that the aggregate of several probability measures should not be conceived as the probability measure induced by the aggregate of the corresponding expected utility preferences. We describe how McConway’s :410–414, 1981) theory of probabilistic opinion pooling can be generalised to cover the case of the aggregation of infinite profiles of finitely additive probability measures, too; we prove the existence of aggregation functionals satisfying responsiveness axioms à la McConway plus additional desiderata even for infinite electorates. On the basis of the theory of propositional-attitude aggregation, we argue that this is the most natural aggregation theory for probability measures. Our aggregation functionals for the case of infinite electorates are neither oligarchic nor integral-based and satisfy a weak anonymity condition. The delicate set-theoretic status of integral-based aggregation functionals for infinite electorates is discussed. (shrink)

This paper formally explores the common ground between mild versions of epistemological coherentism and infinitism; it proposes—and argues for—a hybrid, coherentist–infinitist account of epistemic justification. First, the epistemological regress argument and its relation to the classical taxonomy regarding epistemic justification—of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism—is reviewed. We then recall recent results proving that an influential argument against infinite regresses of justification, which alleges their incoherence on account of probabilistic inconsistency, cannot be maintained. Furthermore, we prove that the Principle of Inferential Justification (...) has rather unwelcome consequences—formally resembling the Sorites paradox—as soon as it is iterated and combined with a natural Bayesian perspective on probabilistic inferences. We conclude that strong versions of foundationalism and infinitism should be abandoned. Positively, we provide a rough sketch for a graded formal coherence notion, according to which infinite regresses of epistemic justification will often have more than a minimal degree of coherence. (shrink)

Following Lauwers and Van Liedekerke (1995), this paper explores in a model-theoretic framework the relation between Arrovian aggregation rules and ultraproducts, in order to investigate a source of impossibility results for the case of an infinite number of individuals and an aggregation rule based on a free ultrafilter of decisive coalitions.

In a recent paper, Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson [ Studia Logica, 89:333-341 ] have challenged the foundationalist rejection of infinitism by giving an example of an infinite, yet explicitly solvable regress of probabilistic justification. So far, however, there has been no criterion for the consistency of infinite probabilistic regresses, and in particular, foundationalists might still question the consistency of the solvable regress proposed by Peijnenburg and Atkinson.

This article sets out to research and resolve the conceptual lag between the family as defined and recognised in law and the multiplicity of queer constellations of ‘intimate citizenship’ in which families are actually done. The focus is on adult unions outside of conjugal coupledom. The family law practices, and awareness and expectations of adults in such unions were analysed through 21 interviews and the content analysis of 40 documents and were projected against the applicable legal mould. The article then (...) proposes to resolve the existing conceptual lag by advancing a conception of the family as a malleable, open-ended assemblage, in lieu of the current rigid status approach in family law, which is both under- and overinclusive. The proposed conception does justice to the increasing fluidity of family formations, which are not always already domestic, dyadic and sexual. (shrink)

I cannot possibly do justice to James Taylor's main contention that full-blooded epicureanism is true. But if it is true then, as he notes, this ‘bold’ philosophical position promises to revise our thinking about many areas in bioethics which presuppose that death is bad.1 Of course if Epicureanism is true, the implications run much wider and deeper than bioethics. Any human activity that in any way presupposes the badness of death will be groundless—killing or being killed in war will be (...) morally inconsequential, saving people from death will be without merit and execution could not count as punishment. But, Taylor assures us, the truth of Epicureanism need not force such drastic practical changes for two reasons: excising the mistaken non-epicurean portion of those practical matters might not exhaust our concerns with those questions, and in any case we might be hard-wired to think that death is bad, so we would be stuck with a view that we see on reflection is false .2 However, that much of our common sense practical thinking about life and death might remain intact despite being groundless is small comfort, since we would then be something like Christians trying to carry on who realise, on reflection, that there is no God.Taylor seeks to mitigate …. (shrink)

Łoś's theorem for bounded D -ultrapowers, D being the ultrafilter introduced by Kanovei and Shelah [4], is established.

The rejection of an infinitesimal solution to the zero-fit problem by A. Elga ([2004]) does not seem to appreciate the opportunities provided by the use of internal finitely-additive probability measures. Indeed, internal laws of probability can be used to find a satisfactory infinitesimal answer to many zero-fit problems, not only to the one suggested by Elga, but also to the Markov chain (that is, discrete and memory-less) models of reality. Moreover, the generalization of likelihoods that Elga has in mind is (...) not as hopeless as it appears to be in his article. In fact, for many practically important examples, through the use of likelihoods one can succeed in circumventing the zero-fit problem. 1 The Zero-fit Problem on Infinite State Spaces 2 Elga's Critique of the Infinitesimal Approach to the Zero-fit Problem 3 Two Examples for Infinitesimal Solutions to the Zero-fit Problem 4 Mathematical Modelling in Nonstandard Universes? 5 Are Nonstandard Models Unnatural? 6 Likelihoods and Densities A Internal Probability Measures and the Loeb Measure Construction B The (Countable) Coin Tossing Sequence Revisited C Solution to the Zero-fit Problem for a Finite-state Model without Memory D An Additional Note on ‘Integrating over Densities’ E Well-defined Continuous Versions of Density Functions. (shrink)

The predictive processing literature contains at least two different versions of the framework with different theoretical resources at their disposal. One version appeals to so-called optimistic priors to explain agents’ motivation to act (call this optimistic predictive processing). A more recent version appeals to expected free energy minimization to explain how agents can decide between different action policies (call this preference predictive processing). The difference between the two versions has not been properly appreciated, and they are not sufficiently separated in (...) the literature. They constitute two different theories with strikingly different accounts of motivation and action. By reducing all desire-like constructs to belief-like constructs, optimistic predictive processing entails a substantial revision of standard accounts of motivation and action in philosophy and cognitive science. By contrast, preference predictive processing introduces desire-like constructs that play Humean motivational roles in the explanation of action. In this Humean iteration, predictive processing resembles other prominent computational frameworks implementing a distinction between beliefs and desires, such as reinforcement learning and Bayesian decision theory. Ultimately, predictive processing faces a dilemma between parsimony of mental constructs and completeness of its explanations of agency and the mind. (shrink)

Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that firms are responding differently to the mounting concerns over environmental degradation and climate change. While a few studies at individual firm level do exist, relatively little is known about the longitudinal development of corporate environmental strategy at the population level of firms. Employing KLD data we explore the evolution of environmental strategy among a sample of S&P500 corporations over the period 1997 to 2006. We theoretically ground our study in Burgelman’s (1991) autonomous and induced (...) perspectives of strategy-making. Our findings suggest widespread inertia among firms to adjust to the changing socio-institutional environment. (shrink)

This article gives a brief overview of Christian-Muslim Relations in sub-Saharan Africa. It points out that in recent years, due to the pentecostalisation of Christianity and the increased influence of fundamentalist Islamic groups, relations in sub-Sahara Africa seem to deteriorate, despite initiatives to work on harmonious interfaith relations. The article then identifies three current trends in Christian-Muslim relations: an increase in polarisation and polemics, the debate on the implementation of shari’a and joint social action programmes.

In times of the coronavirus, complying with public health policies is essential to save lives. Understanding the factors that influence compliance with social distancing measures is therefore an urgent issue. The present research investigated the role of political and social trust for social distancing using a variety of methods. In Study 1, conducted with a sample from the United Kingdom in the midst of the virus outbreak, neither political nor social trust had main associations with self-reported social distancing tendencies. However, (...) both factors interacted such that social trust was associated with lower social distancing tendencies among participants with low levels of political trust. In Study 2, using an experimental longitudinal design and again conducted with a sample collected from the UK during the first wave of the pandemic, social distancing practices increased over time, independent of an experimental manipulation of political trust. Moreover, while the interaction between political and social trust from the first study could not be conceptually replicated, social trust was positively related to social distancing intentions. Moving from the individual to the country level and assessing actual behavior at both the first and second wave of the pandemic, in Study 3, country-level political trust was related to less social distancing during the first wave. Social trust was related to a higher growth rate of infections. Against the background of these inconsistent findings, we discuss the potential positive and unexpected negative effects of social trust for social distancing. (shrink)

This paper discusses the Uniqueness Thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation for uniqueness.

A key question in the philosophy of logic is how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical entailment (assuming we have such justification at all). Justification holism asserts that claims of logical entailment can only be justified in the context of an entire logical theory, e.g., classical, intuitionistic, paraconsistent, paracomplete etc. According to holism, claims of logical entailment cannot be atomistically justified as isolated statements, independently of theory choice. At present there is a developing interest in—and endorsement of—justification holism (...) due to the revival of an abductivist approach to the epistemology of logic. This paper presents an argument against holism by establishing a foundational entailment-sentence of deduction which is justified independently of theory choice and outside the context of a whole logical theory. (shrink)

Environmental philosophers are often concerned to show that non-sentient things, such as plants or ecosystems, have interests and therefore are appropriate objects of moral concern. They deny that mentality is a necessary condition for having interests. Yet they also deny that they are committed to recognizing interests in things like machines. I argue that either machines have interests (and hence moral standing) too or mentality is a necessary condition for inclusion within the purview of morality. I go on to argue (...) that the aspect of mentality necessary for having interests is more complicated than mere sentience. (shrink)

Frederik L. Schodt explores his lifelong fascination with the Heart Sutra: its mesmerizing mantra, its ancient history, the 'emptiness' theory, and the way it is used around the world as a metaphysical tool to overcome chaos and confusion and reach a new understanding of reality--a perfection of wisdom."--Back cover.

Deprivation offers a plausible explanation for the badness of death, so fear is not unreasonable. But horror at the prospect of one's death is not just extreme fear because horror is structurally different than fear. Horror requires a different explanation. For Sartre, horror is possible only in unique circumstances. I argue that Sartre's view, when combined with the subjective incomprehensibility of one's annihilation, can explain horror and other negative emotions that are not contingent on deprivation. Further, I argue that while (...) fear can be reasonable if one's death will deprive, Lucretius's Symmetry Argument shows that horror is unreasonable. (shrink)

The overall aim of this article is to reorient the contemporary debate about epistemic consequentialism. Thus far the debate has to a large extent focused on whether standard theories of epistemic justification are consequentialist in nature and therefore vulnerable to certain trade-off cases where accepting a false or unjustified belief leads to good epistemic outcomes. We claim that these trade-offs raise an important—yet somewhat neglected—issue about the epistemic demands on inquiry. We first distinguish between two different kinds of epistemic evaluation, (...) viz., backing evaluation and outcome evaluation, and then go on to outline and discuss a consequentialist metatheory about the right combinations of decision procedures to adopt in inquiry. Note that the piece is exploratory in the following sense: we try to explore epistemic evaluation in consequentialist terms, which involves stating a form of epistemic consequentialism, but also pointing to what non-consequentialist alternatives might be. Rather than trying to argue decisively for a particular conclusion, we aim to outline various intricate issues in an underexplored area of theorizing. In the course of doing this, we’ll transpose some well-known themes from discussions of consequentialism in ethics to the current debate about consequentialism in epistemology, e.g., agent-neutrality, options, and side-constraints. (shrink)

This article establishes the existence of a definable , countably saturated nonstandard enlargement of the superstructure over the reals. This nonstandard universe is obtained as the union of an inductive chain of bounded ultrapowers . The underlying ultrafilter is the one constructed by Kanovei and Shelah [10].

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Response to Cathy Benedict, “Naming Our Reality: Negotiating and Creating Meaning in the Margin.”Frederik PioIn this paper we are offered a reflection on the historical and present marginalization of music education. As Cathy Benedict says, "What of this marginalization and what of its possibilities? I would like to suggest in this paper that this marginalized status partly reflects our own complicity as we have historically allowed others (...) to speak for us." The field of music education in other words is suffering from a lack of independence. She goes on to say, "music educators have copied the perceived successes of the basic disciplines instead of striving for transformation." However, the radical transformation which is called for seems to lie neither in the integration of music education as part of general education nor in the isolation of music education for she adds, "if we continue to 'concern ourselves with possible future scenarios for music education as part of general education' and in a music education vacuum, then we will probably continue to construct what 'could be' in the guise of what has 'always been.'"The assumption seems to be that music education belongs in the margin, for Benedict also adds, "it is misguided to think of our goal as simply to place music education as part of general education." Instead it is the margin that is claimed to be ripe with possibillities of transformation: "It is true that we need to envision 'what could be' scenarios for music education as part of general education.... It seems more important, though, even imperative, to grapple with the systemic issues that continually haunt us." From the margin music education "must begin narratives with the other disciplines." In other words, the margin seems to be the place from which one can "go about facilitating the creation of liminal space [End Page 69] and facilitate the habits of mind that will relativize taken-for-granted beliefs." It is from the margin that the transformations asked for can be carried out.The margin however has been infected with a dominance which stems from outsiders: "This margin... is our standpoint and a perspective from which we have allowed a worldview to be constructed for us." So the tension regarding the status of music education, between autonomy and integration, is not resolved.At the same time music education must become free. That means tearing loose from the "hidden hegemonic structures that inevitably serve to obscure the purpose of education" while an integrative effort on behalf of music education is called for in relation to general education: "In many cases, we have allowed other disciplines to name what we are and can be. We have crafted and named our importance in a version of their eyes." Consequently what is demanded here is that we craft a version of our field according to our own eyes. So far the field of music education has been marginalized (isolated), but it has never-the-less created itself according to the eyes of outsiders.On behalf of the field of music education, Benedict however seems to ask for a new productive or transformative kind of autonomy (exercised from the margin). The challenge then must now be to create the field of music education in our own eyes. Then perhaps the margin becomes the borderline between autonomy and integration.It would be helpful if Benedict could shed some light on the concept of 'the margin' positioned within a field of tension between autonomy (isolation) and integration. In other words, is the margin a place which has until now remained undiscovered? Does it mark out the limit between isolation and integration (on behalf of the field of music education)?Given the state of things described above the agenda created in the margin is seen as liberatory and transformative: "the space we need to facilitate is liberatory with change as a given not a goal oriented end-point" (emphasis added). In other words a liberation is called for which amounts to an attempt to oppose an oppression: "the field of music education has in fact manifested several characteristics of an oppressed society" (emphasis added). But what is meant by this reference to a liberation/oppression... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Øivind Varkøy, “The Concept of ‘Bildung’”Frederik PioThe process of Bildung has to do with something that “becomes.” The dimension of moving and developing makes the Bildung-metaphor of ‘the journey’ come into focus in Øivind Varkøy’s paper. As Varkøy states in his article, in relation to the Bildung concept one can see that “[the] relation between what is known in everyday life and what is new, unknown, (...) and strange, can in a sense be regarded as the meaning and intention of the concept.”This tension between that which is known and that which is unknown is handled by means of the metaphor of the journey. The journey is about leaving one’s homeground behind. The homeground is all that which is known. Then there is a venture into something not yet known. And then finally the individual returns home, enriched with a new experience, as a deeper and more encompassing human being. This is the blueprint of ‘the journey.’Thus the metaphor of the journey tells us that the crucial Bildung-factor is connected with a transgression of all that is familiar and well-known. So an experience is conducive to a process of Bildung to the extent that a transgression [End Page 97] occurs. That is as a movement that takes place beyond that in our ordinary lives which is all too well-known. Varkøy puts it this way:To have an experience is to be stricken, shaken, and affected. In this way, an experience is something which exceeds all boundaries, it notifies the arrival of something new and unknown. The subject is jerked out of its usual pattern and meets something that makes it look at itself with new eyes, experience its own subjectivity from unfamiliar quarters. Such experiences, such journeys, mean that we come into contact with important sides and dimensions of our way of being human.This translates into an educational context where a focus is on subject content “which enable[s] the students ‘to make journeys’... so that students can thereby not only emerge as educated music educationalists, but also as cultured (bilded) people.”All this belongs to the dimension of freedom. But as mentioned by Varkøy, Bildung is also about that which is authoritative and un-free. Thus Varkøy mentions Jon Fosse who found that “Norwegian schools certainly need a dose of Harold Bloom” and his book The Western Canon.So we have a tension between freedom (the journey into the unknown) and that which is un-free: the score we all have to settle with a great tradition that was there long before we arrived here and broke the surface of existence. In continuation of this I sense that Varkøy is touching upon a theme that tells us this: Today a process of Bildung should neither reject the tradition (to become anti-traditional). Nor should a process of Bildung become something that is just blindly reproducing the tradition and its values. So, it is not about being either anti-traditional or completely traditional, but about a quality which could be termed un-traditional. Varkøy says it like this:It is true to say... that the concept of Bildung’s cultural heritage perspective does not nescessarily mean a one-sided backwards glance focusing upon old masterworks... but also that it can to a considerable extent open up for focusing on the new and unknown.”So the Bildung concept contains simultaneously a directedness towards the past and a tradition which is authoritative, coupled with a directedness towards the future: and all that which is new and unknown, the open horizon of existence. It is in the light of this double directedness that Varkøy questions whether “the concept ‘cultural heritage’ should be considered, as something static or as something which is continually moving and developing.”So the past and our cultural heritage and the masterworks our cultural heritage is based upon, do not belong to bygone days. They do not belong to a finished [End Page 98] past. On the contrary, it is all still with us. That is how I read Varkøy. And this reading has a tremenduous resemblence to... (shrink)

Lucretius famously argued that if we think death is bad because it deprives us of time we could have had by living longer than we do, then when we are born must be bad too, since we could have been born earlier than we were, and so be deprived of that time as well. John Martin Fischer thinks Lucretius’s symmetry argument fails because we have a bias toward the future. I argue that Fischer’s approach does not answer Lucretius. In contrast (...) to Fischer, I think that we can show an objective difference between the time before our birth and the time after our death, which means that we are justified in adopting different attitudes towards them. I revise a point made by Thomas Nagel that while we might live longer than we do, we cannot exist earlier than we did and remain the same people throughout. (shrink)

Our contemporary society can correctly be described as multicultural and interreligious. Present-day theologians recognize that fact and this is reflected in their theologies of religions. These theologies tend to be subsumed under one of the following headings, namely, exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism. In this article I examine the position of the Asian Catholic theologian Aloysius Pieris within this field. Whereas the proponents of a pluralistic theology gladly characterize him as a pragmatic pluralist, I am of the opinion that the specific (...) theology he has developed as an answer to the challenges of the Asian continent, can more rightly be seen as inclusivistic. First I will examine which specific paradigm Pieris proposes for a theology that seeks to thrive on Asian soil . Next I reflect on the depiction of Pieris as a pragmatic pluralist by giving a rough sketch of his outlook on religion and on interreligious dialogue . Then I demonstrate by means of a reflection on his perspective on incarnation that Pieris is in fact more inclusivistic than pluralistic in his theology since he insists on the uniqueness and universality of Christ and Christianity . I therefore conclude by suggesting that Pieris can more rightly be called an inclusivist than a pluralist. I contend, however, that the case of Pieris makes clear that the traditional scheme for the theology of religions is obsolete and in need of replacement. (shrink)

Current European innovation and security policies are increasingly channeled into efforts to address the assumed challenges that threaten European societies. A field in which this has become particularly salient is digitized EU border management. Here, the framework of responsible research and innovation (RRI) has recently been used to point to the alleged sensitivity of political actors towards the contingent dimensions of emerging security technologies. RRI, in general, is concerned with societal needs and the engagement and inclusion of various stakeholder groups (...) in the research and innovation processes, aiming to anticipate undesired consequences of and identifying socially acceptable alternatives for emerging technologies. However, RRI has also been criticized as an industry-driven attempt to gain societal legitimacy for new technologies. In this article, we argue that while RRI evokes a space where different actors enter co-creative dialogues, it lays bare the specific challenges of governing security innovation in socially responsible ways. Empirically, we draw on the case study of BODEGA, the first EU funded research project to apply the RRI framework to the field of border security. We show how stakeholders involved in the project represent their work in relation to RRI and the resulting benefits and challenges they face. The paper argues that applying the framework to the field of (border) security lays bare its limitations, namely that RRI itself embodies a political agenda, conceals alternative experiences by those on whom security is enacted upon and that its key propositions of openness and transparency are hardly met in practice due to confidentiality agreements. Our hope is to contribute to work on RRI and emerging debates about how the concept can (or cannot) be contextualized for the field of security—a field that might be more in need than any other to consider the ethical dimension of its activities. (shrink)