Critics of Divine Command Theory (DCT) have advanced the counterpossible terrible commands objection. They argue that DCT implies the counterpossible ‘If a necessarily morally perfect God commanded us to perform a terrible act, then the terrible act would be morally obligatory.’ However, this counterpossible is false. Hence, DCT is false. Philipp Kremers has proposed that the intuition that the counterpossible above is false is due to conversational implicatures. By providing a pragmatic explanation for the intuition, he thinks that DCT proponents (...) can then maintain that the counterpossible is actually true. In this article, I argue that Kremers's conversational implicature response fails because (a) there is good reason to think that no conversational implicature arises given what critics of DCT have expressed, (b) a competent reader would not understand the critics' utterance that TCC is false as implicating that TCC* is false, and (c) the counterpossible terrible commands objection can be easily modified to be immune to the conversational implicature response by cancelling any potential implicature. Thus, an appeal to conversational implicatures cannot save DCT from the counterpossible terrible commands objection. (shrink)

Can a human society suffer from illness like a living thing? And if so, how does such a malaise manifest itself? In this thought-provoking book, Fred Neuhouser explains and defends the idea of social pathology, demonstrating what it means to describe societies as 'ill', or 'sick', and why we are so often drawn to conceiving of social problems as ailments or maladies. He shows how Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and Durkheim – four key philosophers who are seldom taken to constitute a (...) 'tradition' – deploy the idea of social pathology in comparable ways, and then explores the connections between societal illnesses and the phenomena those thinkers made famous: alienation, anomie, ideology, and social dysfunction. His book is a rich and compelling illumination of both the idea of social disease and the importance it has had, and continues to have, for philosophical views of society. (shrink)

O postulado prático da existência de Deus é problemático por várias razões: primeiro, Kant nega que ele proporciona qualquer cognição da natureza ou existência de Deus como um ser em si; segundo, ele salienta a natureza prática do postulado contribuindo para o desempenho de nossos deveres; e, terceiro, Kant parece mesmo algumas vezes indicar que nosso postulado de Deus não corresponde a nenhuma realidade, mas é um mero pensamento. No meu trabalho, eu sustento o argumento que o postulado de Kant (...) de Deus pode ser melhor entendido como um conceito sem extensão que serve para unificar vários outros conceitos e obrigações morais mas que ele próprio não tem referência. Eu sustento esse argumento apontando para a relação do postulado para o propósito da filosofia prática, em oposição à teórica e pelo exame da função regulativa da razão em geral e invocando a teologia construtivista contemporânea. A fim de mostrar este ponto eu primeiro analiso a natureza de um postulado comparando postulados a hipóteses transcendentais e crenças da Crítica da Razão Pura. Em segundo lugar, eu examino o uso que Kant faz do postulado da existência de Deus como sendo “imanente... para propósitos práticos” e “somente em referência à lei moral e em função dela” na Crítica da Razão Prática. Terceiro, eu procuro pela função que o postulado de Deus desempenha no Opus Postumum e em outros textos de 1790 para mostrar que Kant chegou mais e mais a argumentar pelo papel funcional ao invés do referencial desse postulado. Ao longo do trabalho, eu discuto a natureza da filosofia prática – direcionada ao uso livre das nossas vontades – como sendo distinta da filosofia teórica – dirigida ao conhecimento dos objetos. Eu mostro como essa solução pode fazer Kant um naturalista metafísico. Eu também entro em questões contemporâneas da teologia relacionadas com o papel humano na construção de sistemas conceituais para ajudá-los a fazer sentido ao mundo que eles experienciam no contexto de um mistério maior que desafia a conceitualização.Kant’s practical postulate for the existence of God is puzzling for several reasons: first, he denies that it provides any cognition of the existence or nature of God as a being in itself, second, Kant stresses the practical nature of the postulate as contributing to performance of our duties, and third, Kant even seems on occasion to indicate that our postulate of God does not correspond to any reality but is a merely a thought. In my paper I advance the argument that Kant’s postulate of God is best understood as an extensionless concept that serves to unify various other moral concepts and moral obligations but that has no referent itself. I make this argument by noting the relation of the postulate to the purpose of practical, as opposed to theoretical, philosophy, and by examination of the regulative role of reason in general, and by invoking contemporary constructivist theology. In order to show this point I first examine the nature of a postulate by comparing postulates to transcendental hypotheses and to beliefs from the Critique of Pure Reason. I second examine the use to which Kant puts the postulate of the existence of God as “immanent . . . for practical purposes” and “only in reference to the moral law and for the sake of it” in the Critique of Practical Reason. Third, I look at the role that the postulate of God plays in Kant’s Opus Postumum and other texts from the 1790s to show that Kant came more and more to argue that the postulates have this functional rather than referential role. Throughout the paper I discuss the nature of practical philosophy – directed toward the free use of our wills – as distingushed from theoretical philosophy – directed toward knowledge of objects. I note how this solution could make Kant a metaphysical naturalist. I also touch on contemporary issues in theology related to the role of human construction of systems of concepts to help them make sense of the world they experience in the context of a greater mystery that defies conceptualization. (shrink)

When the Environmental Protection Agency banned DDT late in 1972, environmentalists hailed the decision. Indeed, the DDT ban became a symbol of the power of environmental activism in America. Since the ban, several species that were decimated by the effects of DDT have significantly recovered, including bald eagles, peregrines, ospreys, and brown pelicans. Yet a careful reading of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring reveals DDT to be but one of hundreds of chemicals in thousands of formulations. Carson called for a reduction (...) in the use of all chemical insecticides. Carson’s recommendations notwithstanding, policymakers focused on DDT and other chlorinated hydrocarbons, culminating in the DDT ban, passage of the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, and subsequent bans on aldrin and dieldrin. Similarly, the history of pesticides has focused inordinately on DDT, providing a myopic image of the ongoing challenges of pesticides in agricultural practice and ongoing environmental protection efforts in the modern world. “Pesticides and the perils of synecdoche” argues that focusing on DDT oversimplified the environmental risks of chemical insecticides and narrowed the parameters of the debate, and in the process both policy and subsequent histories neglected the highly toxic organophosphate insecticides, which dominated agriculture in the United States and the world after the DDT ban, with unintended consequences for farmworkers and wildlife. (shrink)

Genetic determinism can be described as the attribution of the formation of traits to genes, where genes are ascribed more causal power than what scientific consensus suggests. Belief in genetic determinism is an educational problem because it contradicts scientific knowledge, and is a societal problem because it has the potential to foster intolerant attitudes such as racism and prejudice against sexual orientation. In this article, we begin by investigating the very nature of belief in genetic determinism. Then, we investigate whether (...) knowledge of genetics and genomics is associated with beliefs in genetic determinism. Finally, we explore the extent to which social factors such as gender, education, and religiosity are associated with genetic determinism. Methodologically, we gathered and analyzed data on beliefs in genetic determinism, knowledge of genetics and genomics, and social variables using the “Public Understanding and Attitudes towards Genetics and Genomics” instrument. Our analyses of PUGGS responses from a sample of Brazilian university freshmen undergraduates indicated that belief in genetic determinism was best characterized as a construct built up by two dimensions or belief systems: beliefs concerning social traits and beliefs concerning biological traits; levels of belief in genetic determination of social traits were low, which contradicts prior work; associations between knowledge of genetics and genomics and levels of belief in genetic determinism were low; and social factors such as age and religiosity had stronger associations with beliefs in genetic determinism than knowledge. Although our study design precludes causal inferences, our results raise questions about whether enhancing genetic literacy will decrease or prevent beliefs in genetic determinism. (shrink)

Generating new ideas—innovation and novelty—is central to what those of us practicing science hope to accomplish. We call it research, but what we really aim for is new-search—learning new things about the world and how it works. Charles Peirce gave the name “abduction” to what he described as the only logical operation that introduces any new idea. In this paper, I will focus on an unconventional understanding of abduction, one that goes beyond its usual meaning and concerns the situation when (...) a surprising observation becomes reconfigured as an unintended experiment about a new research problem that previously was not being studied and possibly was unknown. For science, the consequences can be the beginning of a new field of investigation. For the researcher, the consequences can be life-changing. (shrink)

Everyday experiences include many mundane activities such as getting up, washing, dressing, eating, and going to work. Although most people take these activities for granted, it is possible to reflect on and experience them in special ways [I]. One can, for instance, adopt a scientific attitude. According to this view, there are universal laws that can account for the content of experience, and these laws can be revealed through scientific investigation. In this case, a scientific domain is superimposed on life (...) experience. Alternatively, one can adopt a religious attitude, in which case the mundane activities of life become full of religious meaning, reflections of God's creation of the universe and of life. In this case, a religious domain is superimposed on the experiences of everyday life. Of singular importance, the scientific and religious domains are derived from and then imposed back upon the world of experience. (shrink)

The Scientific Attitude presents a systematic account of the cognitive and social features of science. The work is unique in its attempt to understand science in terms of day-to-day practice. The book goes beyond the traditional description of science, which focuses on method and logic, to characterize the scientific attitude as a way of looking at the world.

Pierluigi Chiassoni’s Interpretation without Truth1 is a profoundly important book. And the book is important not only because of its deep, thorough, and impeccably fair analysis of numerous perspe...

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

There are two senses of the word “people”, first as an ethnic group and second as the collection of citizens of a state. How do they relate to one another and to the state? I show that in his political philosophy Kant insists that “people” in this second sense is constituted only in terms of being subject to a single state, while in his social philosophy he allows for an ethnic conception of peoples that share a language and culture and (...) have distinct characters. In his philosophy of history he insists that the general historical correspondence between ethnic peoples and states is both natural and positive for development toward peace, both because linguistic and religious differences deter the formation of a single world-encompassing state and because their competition through war eventually leads to perpetual peace. Nevertheless I argue that Kant’s insistence on the a priori basis of right combined with the mature development of state and international institutions give reasons that states should not correspond to ethnic peoples. (shrink)

Hegel once said that philosophy is the "world stood on its head" and Karl Marx credited his own philosophic genius with setting the Hegel ian world right side up again. But both of these intellectual Atlases hid before our mind's eye a symbol of the philosophical sphere that bears further reflection. Philosophy down the ages has always involved at least two elements, first, the universe of being as its objective pole and second, man gazing into this crystallic sphere as the (...) subjective pole. The "world" of Hegel and Marx and of most philosophers can be interpreted to mean the world we know and live in and about which all philosophers wonder. Thus for the philosopher - whoever he be - the concern of his interest is not limited to any particular segment of reality and no thing is off-limits to the beams of his mental radar. Yet this scope seems to many too vast and proud an enterprise. The philosopher seems to leap upon his horse and ride off in all directions at once. He is the day dreamer who indulges in fantasy and escapes from the world of practical concern and anxiety. On the other hand the reflective person must concede that it is the ideas ofthe philosophers more than the strategems of the generals that have shaped history and destinies. (shrink)

Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human purposive action cannot be an illusion because the concept of purpose is not theoretical. He argues that the concept is known directly to be instantiated, through self-awareness; and that to maintain that the concept is theoretical involves an infinite regress. I show that Schueler’s argument fails because all our concepts are theoretical in the sense that we may be mistaken in applying them to our experience. As a consequence, it is conceivable that (...) direct introspection of an event as a purposive action may be mistaken. I indicate ways in which the eliminativist may be able to explain why our perception and introspection is afflicted with systematic error. (shrink)

This book locates the paradoxical process of collecting (as an activity that necessarily involves displacement and dispersal) in the ways nineteenth- and twentieth-century German-language literature (and in one case, cinema) attempts to represent ephemeral, discarded, and trivial things.