Hunger striking is a form of nonviolent action of last resort. It is a tactic used by powerless individuals to challenge those in power and achieve change. Many authors have emphasized that hunger strikers are not suicidal, but when oppressed people run out of other ways to protest or demand sociopolitical change, some of them are willing to place their health and life at risk to achieve their goals. Hunger strikes have a long, widely diffused history, and studies reveal that (...) they are typically small, brief, and often successful. Some well-known examples are the fasts of the suffragettes in the UK, of IRA... (shrink)

Tracking theories of knowledge are widely known to have the consequence that knowledge is not closed. Recent arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne claim both that there are no legitimate examples of knowledge without closure and that the costs of theories that deny closure are too great. This paper considers the tracking theories of Dretske and Nozick and the arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne. We reject the arguments of Vogel and Hawthorne and evaluate the costs of closure denial for tracking theories (...) of knowledge. (shrink)

Philosophical interest in situated cognition has been focused most intensely on the claim that human cognitive processes extend from the brain into the tools humans use. As we see it, this radical hypothesis is sustained by two kinds of mistakes, confusing coupling relations with constitutive relations and an inattention to the mark of the cognitive. Here we wish to draw attention to these mistakes and show just how pervasive they are. That is, for all that the radical philosophers have said, (...) the mind is still in the head. (shrink)

Much of contemporary epistemology proceeds on the assumption that tracking theories of knowledge, such as those of Dretske and Nozick, are dead. The word on the street is that Kripke and others killed these theories with their counterexamples, and that epistemology must move in a new direction as a result. In this paper we defend the tracking theories against purportedly deadly objections. We detect life in the tracking theories, despite what we perceive to be a premature burial.

What are the meanings of empty names such as ‘Vulcan,’ ‘Pegasus,’ and ‘Santa Claus’ in such sentences as ‘Vulcan is the tenth planet,’ ‘Pegasus flies,’ and especially ‘Santa Claus does not exist’?Our view, developed in Adams et al., consists of a direct-reference account of the meaning of empty names in combination with a pragmatic-implicature account of why we have certain intuitions that seem to conflict with a direct-reference account.

Sven Bernecker develops a theory of propositional memory that is at odds with the received epistemic theory of memory. On Bernecker’s account the belief that is remembered must be true, but it need not constitute knowledge, nor even have been true at the time it was acquired. I examine his reasons for thinking the epistemic theory of memory is false and mount a defense of the epistemic theory.

In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other (...) areas already acknowledge as authentic in Philosophy. By way of an analogical argument we will argue that since Philosophy of Information has its own topics, method and problems it would be counter-intuitive not to accept it as a new philosophical area. To strengthen our position we present and discuss main topics of Philosophy of Information. (shrink)

Fred Miller offers a controversial reappraisal of the Politics, suggesting that nature, justice, and rights are central to Aristotle's political thought. He sheds new light on Aristotle's relation to modern natural rights theorists, and to the current liberalism-communitarianism debate.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:L'autorité d'un canon philosophique. Le cas Descartes by Delphine Antoine-MahutFred AblondiDelphine Antoine-Mahut. L'autorité d'un canon philosophique. Le cas Descartes. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2021. Pp. 356. Paperback, €13.00.Henri Gouhier once asked, "Après le mort de Descartes, qu'est-ce que le cartésianisme?" to which he replied, "C'est la philosophie de Descartes vue par ses disciples" (La vocation de Malebranche [Paris: J. Vrin, 1926], 80). In L'autorité d'un canon philosophique, (...) Delphine Antoine-Mahut asks a similar question about who controls in just what a philosophical '-ism' consists, and she offers a nuanced and thoughtful answer. While "l'auctorialité du nom en question" is one part, she adds that we must also consider "l'auctorialité de celui ou de celle qui raconte cette histoire, dans un contexte et avec des enjeux très différent de ceux de l'individu d'origine auquel cette histoire est attachée" (10–11). The end result is that "un canon philosophique n'a rien de philosophiquement pur" (12). With this larger question in mind, she documents, as something of a case study, the genesis and development of the "impure" canon cartésien.The battle for authority over the content of canonical Cartesianism starts with the story of Descartes and his one-time devoted pupil and later disavowed outcast, Henricus Regius. Their relationship began in 1638, when Regius, a professor of theoretical medicine and botany at the University of Utrecht, wrote a letter of appreciation to Descartes. Over the next few years, Descartes offered both corrections to Regius's written work and advice on how best to handle the controversies that arose as a result of those writings. In 1645, however, Regius published his Fundamenta physices, in which he claimed that reason alone is not sufficient to prove either the existence of God or the real distinction between the human mind and body. In fact, he went on to speculate that the human mind is merely a mode of the body. [End Page 322] He also denied that we possess innate ideas, and the existence in us of a pure intellect. At the bottom of Regius's break with Descartes was his belief that Cartesian metaphysics is not needed to ground Cartesian physics. For Regius, consistency with empirical findings and simplicity are all that is required.At this point, as Antoine-Mahut puts it, "le sillon est creusé" (41). Descartes responded angrily, both in private letters and in his preface to the 1647 French edition of his Principles of Philosophy. He accused Regius of plagiarizing from his unpublished work and of confusing his views. Following the appearance of a broadsheet summarizing Regius's disagreements with Descartes (written by Regius's student, Peter Wassenaer), Descartes wrote Notae in programma quoddam, in which he reiterated his arguments for both God's existence and the real distinction. Regius and Wassenaer replied with their Brevis explicatio mentis humanae (1648). All of this is laid out clearly and in detail by Antoine-Mahut in part 1 of her book.Part 2 picks up with Descartes's literary executor Claude Clerselier and his campaign to disassociate Regius from what he believed to be "true" Cartesianism. In the preface to the publication of the first volume of Descartes's letters (1657), Clerselier revived the charge of plagiarism against Regius, who responded by publishing a second edition of the Brevis explicatio. This included a preface that attacked Clerselier for publishing Regius's private correspondence without his permission—in fact, because Regius had not made Descartes's letters to him available, Clerselier had had to reconstruct them from Descartes's notes— and claimed it was Descartes who plagiarized Regius. In Antoine-Mahut's narrative of these events, this "disassociation" was followed by a "combining" (her terms) of Cartesian thought with empiricist natural philosophy in the work of Louis de la Forge, for whom "le cartésianisme se spécifie comme une psychologie empiriste dans laquelle l'activité de l'âme joue un rôle essentiel" (175). There was then a subsequent "incorporating" (again borrowing Antoine-Mahut's terminology) by Nicolas Malebranche, who, she says, "occupe une place... (shrink)

The barn/barn façade thought experiment is familiar to most epistemologists. It is intended to present a counterexample to certain causal theories of knowledge; in it, a father driving through the countryside with his son says, ‘That's a barn’ while pointing to a barn. Unbeknownst to the father, however, a film crew is working in the area, and it has constructed several barn façades. While the father did correctly point to a barn when he made his assertion, he could have just (...) as easily pointed to a barn façade, and so, many hold, he does not know that the structure at which he is pointing is in fact a barn. If this is so, then it follows that true beliefs formed from reliable causal processes may still not qualify as knowledge. (shrink)

Examines the origins of life on earth, analyzes the Darwinian theory of evolution, and argues that life is the result of a deliberate plan.

In that it holds God to be the only true efficient cause, Malebranche’s occasionalism would seem to deny human freedom and to make God responsible for our sins. I argue that Malebranche’s occasionalism must be considered within its Cartesian framework; once one understands what it is to be an occasional cause in this context, Malebranche can be seen as saving a place for human freedom, and he can consistently hold that we are morally responsible for our actions.

In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act that ended the entitlement of poor families to government assistance. The debate leading up to that transformation in welfare policy occurred in the shadow of Speenhamland—an episode in English Poor Law history. This article revisits the Speenhamland episode to unravel its tangled history. Drawing on four decades of recent scholarship, the authors show that Speenhamland policies could not have had the consequences that have been attributed to (...) them. The article ends with an alternative narrative that seeks to explain how the Speenhamland story became so deeply entrenched. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that shaming interventions and messages during Covid-19 have drawn the relationship between public health and shame into a heightened state of contention, offering us a valuable opportunity to reconsider shame as a desired outcome of public health work, and to push back against the logics of individual responsibility and blame for illness and disease on which it sits. We begin by defining shame and demonstrating how it is conceptually and practically distinct from stigma. We then (...) set out evidence on the consequences of shame for social and relational health outcomes and assess the past and present dimensions of shame in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, primarily through a corpus of international news stories on the shaming of people perceived to have transgressed public health directions or advice. Following a brief note on shame (and policymaking) in a cultural context, we turn to the concept and practice of ‘shame-sensitivity’ in order to theorise a set of practical and adaptable principles that could be used to assist policymakers in short- and medium-term decision-making on urgent, tenacious, and emerging issues within public health. Finally, we consider the longer consequences of pandemic shame, making a wider case for the acknowledgement of the emotion as a key determinant of health. (shrink)

McCall's system for contingent syllogisms is modified. A semantics for the resulting system is provided.

Despite holding to the essential distinction between mind and body, Descartes did not adopt a life-body dualism. Though humans are the only creatures which can reason, as they are the only creatures whose body is in an intimate union with a soul, they are not the only finite beings who are alive. In the present note, I attempt to determine Descartes'' criteria for something to be ''living.'' Though certain passages associate such a principle with the presence of a properly functioning (...) heart, I show that there are important reasons for also understanding life in terms of a degree of complexity of design. (shrink)

La philosophie ne peut se contenter de parler de questions éternelles ou intemporelles. Elle doit apporter sa contribution aux problèmes de son époque. Or, aujourd'hui, comme le souligne Jacques Derrida, " jamais la violence, l'inégalité, l'exclusion, la famine, et donc l'oppression économique, n'ont affecté autant d'êtres humains dans l'histoire de fa terre et de l'humanité ". Alors que, dans le même temps, après l'éclipse des grandes utopies sociales, le capitalisme nous est présenté comme l'horizon indépassable de notre temps. Sur fond (...) de globalisation, l'accélération vertigineuse de nos sociétés brouille les repères et déstabilise ceux qui voudraient changer ce monde traversé par tant de souffrances et de blessures. Un défi se présente alors : comment comprendre ce qui nous arrive, ce qui se déconstruit? Une telle visée ne consiste pas à jeter une vieille grille d'analyse sur la réalité actuelle, mais au contraire, à mieux saisir ce qui advient de radicalement neuf. Il est vrai que notre monde a profondément changé. Il ne s'agit plus, alors, de s'engager pour une cause comme on entre dans un jeu de colin-maillard. La nécessaire générosité achoppe sur la complexité du monde. Il faut penser avec rigueur les bouleversements actuels ; et appréhender, avec davantage d'acuité, les notions de droit, de justice ou de responsabilité éthique. Derrida propose une œuvre originale et passionnante qui aborde d'une manière nouvelle les grands défis de notre existence sociale : qu'est-ce que vivre ensemble? Qu'est-ce qu'un semblable? Ne doit-on vivre ensemble qu'avec des semblables? Ou bien encore, comment articuler la sécurité, la liberté et la paix après le traumatisme du " 11 septembre 2001 "? Dans un style à la fois clair et accessible, ce livre propose une introduction à la dimension sociale, éthique et politique de l'œuvre du philosophe français le plus traduit dans le monde. (shrink)

Using mathematical tools from number theory and finite fields, Applied Algebra: Codes, Ciphers, and Discrete Algorithms, Second Edition presents practical methods for solving problems in data security and data integrity. It is designed for an applied algebra course for students who have had prior classes in abstract or linear algebra. While the content has been reworked and improved, this edition continues to cover many algorithms that arise in cryptography and error-control codes. New to the Second Edition A CD-ROM containing an (...) interactive version of the book that is powered by Scientific Notebook®, a mathematical word processor and easy-to-use computer algebra system New appendix that reviews prerequisite topics in algebra and number theory Double the number of exercises Instead of a general study on finite groups, the book considers finite groups of permutations and develops just enough of the theory of finite fields to facilitate construction of the fields used for error-control codes and the Advanced Encryption Standard. It also deals with integers and polynomials. Explaining the mathematics as needed, this text thoroughly explores how mathematical techniques can be used to solve practical problems. About the Authors Darel W. Hardy is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Mathematics at Colorado State University. His research interests include applied algebra and semigroups. Fred Richman is a professor in the Department of Mathematical Sciences at Florida Atlantic University. His research interests include Abelian group theory and constructive mathematics. Carol L. Walker is Associate Dean Emeritus in the Department of Mathematical Sciences at New Mexico State University. Her research interests include Abelian group theory, applications of homological algebra and category theory, and the mathematics of fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic. (shrink)

The most remarkable aspect of Einstein’s 1946 address at Lincoln University is that it has vanished from Einstein’s recorded history. Its disappearance into a historical black hole symbolizes what seems to happen in the creation of a cultural icon. It is but one of many political statements by Einstein to have met such a fate, though his civil rights activism is most glaringly missing. One explanation for this historical amnesia is that those who shape our official memories felt that Einstein’s (...) “controversial” friends like Paul Robeson and activities like co‐chairing the anti‐lynching crusade might tarnish Einstein as an icon. That icon, sanctified by Time magazine when it dubbed Einstein “Person of the Century” at the end of 1999, is a myth, albeit a marvelous one. Yet it is not so much the motive for the omission but the consequence of it that should concern us. Americans and the millions of Einstein fans around the world are left unaware that he was an outspoken, passionate, committed antiracist. (shrink)

The contributions to volume 8 of the Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus/International Yearbook of German Idealism pursue from various perspectives the multifarious relations of German Idealism to the natural sciences and mathematics. The concepts of nature and of the basis for mathematics develop complexly in German philosophy after Kant. At issue are: the foundation of mathematics; the relation of freedom to nature; the significance of philosophy to emerging research in biology, chemistry, and physics, and reconsideration of the thought of Leibniz (...) and Spinoza. Contributors: Gideon Freudenthal, Michael Friedman, Hans-Peter Neumann, Wolfgang Neuser, Konstantin Pollok, Sebastian Rand, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Thomas Sturm, Lars-Thade Ulrichs, Eric Watkins, John Zammito, Paul Ziche, Rachel Zuckert. (shrink)

In an age where diversity is increasingly accepted as a value as well as a fact, ethico-political cosmopolitanism should propose a notion of global unity that is composed of rather than imposed on difference. Jacques Derrida and Walter Mignolo offer different versions of this view of cosmopolitanism. Derrida’s version is based on his notion of “democracy to come”. He characterizes this notion as an “unconditional” or “quasi-transcendental” injunction. Mignolo castigates this injunction as an “abstract universal”. He offers instead “a critical (...) and dialogic” view of cosmopolitanism that is based more speci cally on the “colonial difference” or “border thinking” of Latin American subaltern groups. I argue that Derrida’s many implicit and explicit references to “voices” suggest a third alternative. This contender avoids certain problems in Derrida’s and Mignolo’s otherwise compelling views of cosmopolitanism. It also retains the universality of Derrida’s unconditional injunction but on the basis of the sort of worldly immanency urged by Mignolo’s border thinking. (shrink)