This essay deals with plague and plagues in renaissance and early modern Europe over the longue durée, principally from a methodological perspective. I shall combine an historiographical approach with an historical account of developing reactions to plague and in passing compare measures to cope in the early sixteenth century with reactions to the impact of the Great Pox or the Mal de Naples. I shall concentrate on southern Europe and in particular on Italy and my aim is to re-assess the (...) historiography of plague through the lens of some of the more recent Anglo-Saxon literature in this field. In the process I shall outline some of the debates within the field and end with some general methodological observations drawn from early modern Italy. (shrink)

The reflexive character of enactive theory is spelled out, in an effort to make explicit that which is usually implicit in debate: that we are responsible for the distinctions we draw, and that ultimately, the world that we collectively characterize is a joint production. Enaction, as treated here, is not a positivist scientific field, but an epistemologically self-conscious way to ground our understanding of the value-saturated lives of embodied beings. This stance is seen as entirely congruent with the scientific field (...) of ecological psychology, which is itself then cast as a specific example of the kind of science that can be done in an enactive mode. (shrink)

Every preacher knows one ought not collapse the distance hetween the biblical text and our modern world—hence the discomfort in reading this letter as one wonders what happened to the nineteen centuries, and to the light-years of progress, that ought to lie between the text and us.

The essay seeks to disentangle the meaning or meanings of the catch word ‘‘cosmopolitanism’’. To contribute to its clarification, the essay distinguishes between three main interpretations: empirical, normative, and practical or interactive. In the first reading, the term coincides basically with ‘‘globalization’’ where the latter refers to such economic and technical processes as the global extension of financial and communications networks. A different meaning is given to the term by normative thinkers like Kant, Rawls, and Habermas. In this reading, cosmopolitanism (...) refers to a set of moral and/or legal norms or principles governing international politics, regardless of whether these principles are derived from ‘‘noumenal’’ consciousness, an ‘‘original position’’ or rational discourse. Noting the is/ought dilemma troubling normativism, the essay introduces the further meaning of practical interaction. Indebted to the teachings of pragmatism, hermeneutics, and virtue ethics, this reading mitigates the split between norm and conduct through practical engagement and education.Keywords: globalization; liquidity; banal cosmopolitansim; normativism; pragmatism; hermeneutics. (shrink)

Despite growing interest in ethical consumer behaviour research, ambiguity remains regarding what motivates consumers to purchase ethical products. While researchers largely attribute the growth of ethical consumerism to an increase in ethical consumer concerns and motivations, widened distribution of ethical products, such as fairtrade, questions these assumptions. A model that integrates both individual and societal values into the theory of planned behaviour is presented and empirically tested to challenge the assumption that ethical consumption is driven by ethical considerations alone. Using (...) data sourced from fairtrade shoppers across the UK, structural equation modelling suggests that fairtrade purchase intention is driven by both societal and self-interest values. This dual value pathway helps address conceptual limitations inherent in the underlying assumptions of existing ethical purchasing behaviour models and helps advance understanding of consumers’ motivation to purchase ethical products. (shrink)

The actual/virtual distinction is used to give an alternative account of quantum interference by way of a new theory of probability. The new theory is obtained by changing one of the axioms of the canonical theory of probability while keeping the other axioms fixed. It is used to give an alternative account of constructive quantum interference in the two-slit experiment. The account crucially involves a distinction between actual and virtual probabilities. Although actual probabilities are operational and virtual probabilities are not, (...) there is a substantial connection between them. Virtual probabilities may be obtained indirectly from actual probabilities. In showing this, interpretive considerations are brought to bear including some having to do with quantum non-locality. Directions for future research are discussed in closing.La distinción actual/virtual se utiliza para dar una explicación alternativa de la interferencia cuántica a través de una nueva teoría de la probabilidad. La nueva teoría se ha obtenido cambiando uno de los axiomas de la teoría canónica de la probabilidad y manteniendo los otros axiomas fijos. Se usa para dar una explicación alternativa de la interferencia cuántica constructiva en el experimento de la doble rendija. El informe fundamentalmente implica una distinción entre las probabilidades actuales y virtuales. Aunque las probabilidades actuales son operativas y las probabilidades virtuales no, hay una relación sustancial entre ellas. Probabilidades virtuales pueden obtenerse indirectamente a partir de las probabilidades reales. Para demostrar esta interpretación hay que tener en cuenta las consideraciones de interpretación que se ejercen entre ellos y que tienen relación con la no-localidad cuántica. Directrices para futuras investigaciones se abordan al final del artículo. (shrink)

In my essay I look at the specifics of the dispute between the Scottish metaphysician Andrew Baxter and the mathematician Colin MacLaurin in an attempt to identify the source or sources of their contradictory, yet in both cases Newtonian, positions regarding occasionalism. After some general introductory remarks about each thinker, I examine the metaphysical implications that Baxter sees as following from Newton's concept of vis inertiæ. Following this, I look at MacLaurin's commitment to the role of sense experience in natural (...) philosophy. Finally, I discuss the different passages from Newton's Opticks on which the two thinkers focus. (shrink)

Waxman has reversed the historical process and gone from Kant to Hume. In his previous book on Kant, Kant's Model of the Mind, it was pointed out that Hume's philosophy seemed to come to grief with the failure to account for the identity of the self, and this in turn was a consequence of Hume's inability to account for how the imagination is able to yield a consciousness of succession. There seemed no way to obtain either the unity, spatial and (...) temporal, in the objects perceived, or the unity of apperception in the perceiver. The problem of knowledge for Kant in many ways becomes simply the problem of how, from a manifold of entities spread out spatially and occurring in a temporally developing intuition, the mind is able to achieve the unity of apperception which, as Plotinus, Bayle, Leibniz, and perhaps even Hume when he recognized his failure to account for the unity of the self, all argued is essential to all thought. In trying to come to grips with this, Kant arrived at a transcendental idealism in which neither space nor time nor even sensations as ordinarily understood had any ground in the reality that transcends the only phenomenal empirical world. If Hume's failure led in Kant to a sort of empirical realism, it also led to the radical scepticism of the transcendental idealism. (shrink)

James Mark Baldwin was one of the leaders in the new experimental psychology that developed at the end of the 19th century. In a discussion of F. H. Bradley’s view of the self, he makes an apparently odd remark. Baldwin describes Bradley’s account of the active self, the self of volition and desire. In particular, he refers to Bradley’s account of the feeling of self activity. On the latter, certain contents defining the ‘I’ remain constant, while there is change in (...) which certain other contents replace others; in acting on desire the self expands itself to include certain new contents within itself. Bradley puts it this way: ‘In desire and volition we have an idea held against the existing not-self, the idea being that of a change in that not-self. This idea … is felt to be a part of that self which is opposed to the not-self…’. We have ‘the expansion of the self so far as that is identified with the idea of the change’. Often the desire has consciously before itself the idea of those elements which it wishes to include within itself. But often, too, these elements are below the threshold of consciousness, implicity rather than explicit: ‘… in some cases where the self apprehends itself as active, there seems at first sight to be no idea. But the problem is solved by the distinction between an idea which is explicit and an idea not explicit’. Baldwin comments on this account, that. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: Introduction Dretske's Adaptation of Information Theory to Knowledge Interesting Open Questions Current Philosophical Debates.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Mystery of Sacramentality:Christ, the Church, and the Seven SacramentsCharles JournetTranslated by Aaron D. Henderson, with Introduction and NoteOriginally: Charles Journet, "Le Mystère de la sacramentalité: Le Christ, l'Église, les sept sacrements," Nova et Vetera 49 (1974): 161–214.Translator's IntroductionThe thought of Charles Cardinal Journet, venerable founder of the present journal and unparalleled twentieth-century master of Thomistic ecclesiology, merits a wider reception and a more ardent love.1 Not a (...) few have recognized this of late, producing articles and books dedicated to explicating his teaching.2 Nevertheless, much remains to be done to ensure that English speakers have fuller access to Journet's corpus. For instance, only the first [End Page 611] volume of L'Église du Verbe incarné,3 his magnum opus, has been translated into English.4 It is with this in mind that we set out to translate the article below. And it is no meager article that is reproduced below (though such a work is foreign to Journet), but one of considerable substance and importance. After all, it is a wonderful (and wonderfully extensive) expression of his post-conciliar Christology, ecclesiology, and sacramental theology. Indeed, written in 1974, but one year before his death, this article represents the mature fruit of many years of contemplation and prayer.With respect to his ecclesiology, Journet was influenced by the Second Vatican Council, in which he participated after his elevation to the episcopacy and cardinalate. As an example of this influence, an influence evident in the article below, the conciliar documents speak in several places of the sacramentality of the Church.5 The Church is, in Christ, a sacrament, "a sign and instrument both of a very closely knit union with God and of the [End Page 612] unity of the whole human race."6 Describing the Church as a sacrament is part of the Council's effort to unfold for the Catholic faithful and for the whole world the Church's inner nature and universal mission. Following the teaching of the Council, therefore, Journet includes the Church herself, in her being and action, in "the mystery of sacramentality."7But the mystery of sacramentality includes more than the Church. Indeed, there is a respect in which the entire economy of salvation is sacramental. Furthermore, the Church is a sacrament (a sign and instrument) only in a derived sense, in a way wholly dependent on her divine Spouse and Head. It is for this reason that Journet refers to Christ as "the sacrament of the divine life in its source" and to the Church as "the sacrament of the divine life communicated." Both Christ and the Church, then, are sacraments, but not in precisely the same manner. As Journet puts it, "Now, to which of these two is the Second Vatican Council's definition, 'universal sacrament of salvation,' suited? To Christ and to his Church respectively, though proportionally (that is, analogically)."8Journet's systematic ordering (first Christ, then the Church, and finally the sacraments) is intelligible and consonant with others who suggest that, had St. Thomas written an ecclesiological treatise in the Summa theologiae, it would be situated between the questions on Christ (ST III, qq. 1–59) and the questions on the sacraments (ST III, qq. 60–90).9 Journet begins [End Page 613] his work, however, with a reality that he refuses to call a sacrament, namely, the Most Holy Trinity. The Trinitarian mystery stands at the heart of the Christian faith; it is the source of the mystery of sacramentality. We see the splendor of the entire economy of salvation, and of the New Law especially, in the mystery of the Trinitarian indwelling and missions of the Son and Spirit. The Word became flesh, became human, so that he might rescue our sin-ravaged world. Jesus is, in his sacred humanity, the sacrament of the Trinity, the sacrament of the divine life in its source, to employ again Journet's language.Journet describes the Word as seizing or taking hold of the depths of his sacred humanity in his being and in his action. The Gospels bear authoritative witness to this, but they... (shrink)

Small wonder: finitude and its horizons -- The underside of modernity: Adorno, Heidegger, and Dussel -- Empire or cosmopolis: civilization at the crossroads -- Confronting empire: a tribute to Arundhati Roy -- Speaking truth to power: in memory of Edward Said -- Critical intellectuals in a global age: toward a global public sphere -- Social identity and creative praxis: hommage á Merleau-Ponty -- Nature and artifact: Gadamer on human health -- Borders or horizons?: an older debate revisited -- Empire and (...) faith: sacred non-sovereignty -- Appendix: A. The dignity of difference: a salute to Jonathan Sacks -- B. Religion and rationality: Habermas and the early Frankfurt school -- Nomolatry and fidelity: a response to Charles Taylor. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Overview A Medium for Thought Naturalization Mechanisms of Meaning Fodor's Meaning Mechanisms Dretske's Meaning Mechanisms Objections Conclusion.

Cognitive science's basic premises are under attack. In particular, its focus on internal cognitive processes is a target. Intelligence is increasingly interpreted, not as a matter of reclusive thought, but as successful agent-environment interaction. The critics claim that a major reorientation of the field is necessary. However, this will only occur when there is a distinct alternative conceptual framework to replace the old one. Whether or not a serious alternative is provided is not clear. Among the critics there is some (...) consensus, however, that this role could be fulfilled by the concept of a 'behavioral system'. This integrates agent and environment into one encompassing general system. We will discuss two contexts in which the behavioral systems idea is being developed. Autonomous Agents Research is the enterprise of building behavior-based robots. Dynamical Systems Theory provides a mathematical framework well suited for describing the interactions between complex systems. We will conclude that both enterprises provide important contributions to the behavioral systems idea. But neither turns it into a full conceptual alternative which will initiate a major paradigm switch in cognitive science. The concept will need a lot of fleshing out before it can assume that role. (shrink)

Professor Weinberg, in his recention, Relation, and Induction, has critically discussed the nominalistic tradition stemming from Ockham and continuing in the work of Berkeley and Hume. In this tradition there is one fundamental principle, which however divides into two parts. The first is Whatever is distinguishable is distinct, and conversely. The second is Whatever is distinct is separable, and conversely. Weinberg argues that both and are mistaken.In this paper I propose to explore the case against nominalism. I shall suggest that (...) Weinberg's argument against, though not defective in the way some recent critics believe, depends upon a hidden premiss. I shall also suggest that the argument against, when the needed premiss is added, is but a special case of a more general argument. The latter in no way depends upon considerations concerning relational predicates, though Weinberg does in his discussion specifically introduce such considerations. Nor is that unreasonable on his part. (shrink)

In two recent books, Jerry Fodor has developed a set of sufficient conditions for an object “X” to non-naturally and non-derivatively mean X. In an earlier paper we presented three reasons for thinking Fodor's theory to be inadequate. One of these problems we have dubbed the “Pathologies Problem”. In response to queries concerning the relationship between the Pathologies Problem and what Fodor calls “Block's Problem”, we argue that, while Block's Problem does not threatenFodor's view, the Pathologies Problem does.

The target article's approach is applauded, but it is suggested that the may be much larger than even the current authors suspect. Cartesian and mechanistic assumptions infuse not only the discipline of cognitive psychology, but all societal accounts of the person. A switch to dynamical accounts in which lawfulness is observed within a given systemic context is suggested.

This article discusses radical changes in the Muslim world during the last hundred years. The main emphasis is on the tension between secularism and religious authority and the prospect of political democracy. The article starts from Toynbee’s assumption that social-political change is a response to a preceding condition. Three countries are compared. Modern Turkey emerged in the 1920s from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and its traditionalist outlook. Under Mustafa Kemal, Turkey was transformed into a radically secular and modernizing (...) regime inspired by French laicism. Some 50 years later, Iran switched from the modernizing and anti-clerical regime of the Shah to a semi-theocracy under Khomeini. Thirty years later, the uprising in Egypt followed neither the Kemalist nor Khomeini’s example. Responding to a preceding autocracy, the goal was neither secularism nor clericalism but to correct a basic political deficit: the lack of democracy. (shrink)