Leonhard Swidler, guru besar teologi Katolik di Universitas Temple di Philadephia dan pendiri Institute for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue, termasuk teolog Katolik Amerika Serikat sangat terkenal. Delapan tahun lalu ia menerbitkan buku yang pantas diperhatikan. Judulnya saja mengagetkan: Jesus was a Feminist. Namun kita tidak perlu berprasangka. Buku ini bukan salah satu dari pelbagai tulisan ideologis. Yang dimaksud Swidler dengan feminis Yesus seorang feminis sangat radikal (h. 33) adalah bahwa Yesus vigorously promoted the dignity and equality of women in (...) the midst of a very male-dominated society (ibid.). Swilder juga menyebut Yesus androgynous karena dalam kepribadiannya terdapat fusion and balance of so-called masculine and feminine psychological traits (h. 34). Seni Swidler adalah bahwa ia mengajak kita bersama membaca keempat injil dan, itulah kehebatannya, kita dibuat Swidler melihat sesuatu yang sebetulnya selalu kita baca, tetapi sekurang-kurangnya oleh penulis ini tidak diperhatikan (Swidler kadang-kadang sedikit menjemukan, karena ia membahas semua teks satu-satu dalam empat injil di mana perempuan muncul sehingga pengulangan tidak dapat dihindari). Swidler menunjukkan betapa tegas Yesus berdiri di pihak para perempuan, dan bahwa itu merupakan kontras keras terhadap sikap dalam lingkungan bangsa Yahudi, lingkungan Yesus sendiri, yang patriarkal. Feminisme Yesus menjadi mencolok karena sikap-sikap Yesus terhadap kaum perempuan berlawanan total dengan kebiasaan dan pandangan budaya Yahudi zaman itu, dan khususnya juga dengan sikap resmi pustaka Rabinistik. Suatu contoh ada di Lukas 36 50 (wanita pendosa yang mencuci kaki Yesus dengan tetes tangisannya): Ada Yesus yang begitu peka terhadap curahan hati perempuan itu dan ada sikap tak mengerti, bahkan tersinggung tamu-tamu lain. Dalam agama Yahudi jelas dan eksplisit perempuan diberi peran sekunder terhadap laki-laki, perempuan harus taat pada suami, ia tidak dapat menjadi saksi, dalam sinagoga ia harus diam. Atas latar belakang itu sikap Yesus terhadap perempuan, dan sikap keempat penginjil terhadap semua perempuan yang muncul, amat kontras.... Tulisan Swidler betul-betul sebuah pembuka mata. Artinya, sesuatu yang selama ini sudah selalu dibaca dalam injil, tetapi tidak diperhatikan, mendadak menjadi mencolok dan ternyata penting. Orang akan membaca Injil dengan mata baru. Ia menyadari suatu dimensi yang dalam seluruh ajaran dan spiritualitas Gereja tidak pernah diberi perhatian. Kesadaran akan patriarkat serta tuntutan agar harkat kemanusiaan perempuan diakui, sesuatu yang sejak pertengahan abad lalu diperjuangkan oleh feminisme, lahir dari luar Gereja. Justru karena itu keyakinan Swidler bahwa pengembalian martabat perempuan merupakan unsur amat penting dalam kabar gembira Yesus adalah begitu penting. Orang tidak perlu sependapat dengan Swidler dalam semua hal, tetapi penegasan bahwa bagi Yesus pengakuan terhadap martabat perempuan yang tak kalah dengan martabat laki-laki merupakan tantangan yang wajib diperhatikan oleh setiap teolog. Sudah waktunya bahwa hampir 2000 tahun kebutaan Gereja terhadap dimensi feminis dalam pewartaan Yesus diakhiri. Sebagai catatan akhir: Swidler tidak memasuki pertanyaan ten-tang apakah Gereja berhak menahbiskan perempuan menjadi imam dan uskup. Tetapi ia menyinggungnya. Menurutnya implikasi dari sikap Yesus terhadap perempuan maupun cerminan sikap itu dalam tulisan empat penginjil adalah bahwa penolakan terhadap penahbisan perem-puan tidak dapat mendasarkan diri pada suatu ajaran Yesus. Alasan mengapa masalah imamat perempuan tidak muncul lebih jelas dalam Perjanjian Baru adalah bahwa tatanan hirarkis pimpinan Gereja menurut slagorde uskup, imam dan diakon baru menjadi baku sejak akhir abad ke-2 dan pada waktu itu nada feminis maklumat Yesus sudah tenggelam dalam prasangka budaya patriarkal umat Kristiani. (Franz Magnis-Suseno, Guru Besar Ilmu Filsafat Emeritus, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Jakarta). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Ethics of Salomon Maimon (1753-1800) DAVID BAUMGARDT* SALOMON MAIMON is now generally considered the most acute mind among the earliest critics of Kant. Kant himself had praised his acumen,1 though later qualifying his regard decisively.2 Johann Gottfried Herder called * We have just learned of the death of the author. David Baumgardt, born in Germany on April 20, 1890, studied in Vienna and in Berlin and taught philosophy (...) at the University of Berlin from 1924 to 1935 as Privatdozent, Extraordinarius and Ordinarius, until he was forced by Germany's racial laws to resign, but after the end of the war the Free University of Berlin appointed him honorary professor. From 1935 to 1939 he taught at the University of Birmingham; after his arrival in the United States he first joined the staff of the Pendle Hill School and, from 1941 to 1954, he served with the Library of Congress as a consultant in the field of philosophy. In 1955-56 he was Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Columbia. After his retirement he continued to publish and at present there are five publications by him in the press. The number of books and articles written by him probably well exceeds two hundred. Just in the last months of his life he was presented with a Festschri[t (Horizons of a Philosopher), indicative of a wide range of friends, students, and fellow-scholars who wanted to express their appreciation of the man and his work. On the continent Baumgardt was perhaps best known for two books: Franz yon Baader (1927) and Der Kampf um den Lebenssinn unter den Vorliiufern der Modernen Ethik (1933). The former threw full light on an important but unduly neglected figure of the German romantic school of philosophy; the latter confronts Kant's rationalistic ethics with the irrationalism of a Herder, Hemsterhuis, and Jacobi. In the United States he published, among others, Bentham and the Ethics of Today (1952) and Great Western Mystics (1961), originally delivered as Matchette Lectures, but enriched, for publication, by voluminous notes containing a wealth of information on mystics, some of whom, especially Jewish ones, are familiar only to the expert. At the time of his death he was working on a book which would probably have become his opus magnum: an attempt to reconcile what he called the ethics of force with the ethics of love. Baumgardt described his own philosophic position as that of a Benthamian hedonist, asserting that only hedonism, when carried to its conclusions, would permit such a reconciliation. Systematic, ethical and religious problems underlay all his historic research; thus his loss will be felt keenly and widely. (PHILIP MERLAN) t See Kant's Gesammelte Schri[ten, ed. K6nig. Preuss. Akad. Wissenschaften, Vol. XI, Abt. II, Kant's Briefwechsel (1900), Vol. II, p. 49, letter to Marcus Herz, May 26, 1789: "Nicht allein" hat "niemand yon meinen Gegnern reich und die Hauptfrage so wohl verstanden, sondern nur wenige... mochten zu dergleichen tiefen Untersuchungen so viel Scharfsinn besitzen... als Hr. Maymon." 2See ibid., p. 476, letter to Carl Leonhard Reinhold, March 28, 1794: "Was aber z. B. ein Maimon mit seiner Nachbesserung der critischen Philosophie... eigentlich wolle," habe ich "nie recht fassen k6nnen." The noticeable change in Kant's judgment of Maimon's work is hardly due to the fact that his praising remarks were addressed to a Jewish friend and the disapproving ones to a gentile disciple. The reason for this shift in his evaluation of Maimon's later writings 099] 200 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Maimon's Versuch iiber die Transzendentalphilosophie "profound" and "comprehensive.''~ Even Goethe and Schiller mentioned him with esteem in their correspondence;~ and Johann Gottlieb Fichte explicitly' warned that coming centuries would ridicule us bitterly for disregarding this "immensely great talent." It may, therefore, not be out of place if, even more than 150 years after Maimon's death, some attention is paid to his generally neglected criticism of Kant's categorical imperative. Maimon's acute critical observations on Kant's ethics may claim to be of interest even to the analysis of some basic issues of contemporary moral philosophy. In an autobiography, culturally of general interest, edited by the psychologist and esthetician Karl... (shrink)

Ein Beispiel für die Rezeption und Fortführung der schopenhauerschen Logik findet man in den Mathematiklehrbüchern Friedrich Adolph Wilhelm Diesterwegs (1790–1866), In diesem Aufsatz werden die historische und systematische Dimension dieser Anwendung von Logikdiagramme auf die Mathematik skizziert. In Kapitel 2 wird zunächst die frühe Rezeption der schopenhauerschen Logik und Philosophie der Mathematik vorgestellt. Dabei werden einige oftmals tradierte Vorurteile, die das Werk Schopenhauers betreffen, in Frage gestellt oder sogar ausgeräumt. In Kapitel 3 wird dann die Philosophie der Mathematik und der (...) Logik Schopenhauers vorgestellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass Schopenhauers Logikdiagramme auf Ideen der Mathematiker Leonhard Euler (1707–1783), Bernhard Friedrich Thibaut (1775–1832) und Franz Ferdinand Schweins (1780–1856) zurückgehen und dass Schopenhauer diese Logikdiagramme auch bereits zur Analyse mathematischer Begriffe verwendet. Kapitel 4 beschäftigt sich mit der Schopenhauer-Rezeption Diesterwegs. Es wird die Frage behandelt, inwieweit Diesterweg in der Mathematik von Schopenhauer beeinflusst war und welche Rolle dieser Einfluss auf sein Verständnis von Logik und Mathematik hatte. In Kapitel 5 wird schließlich gezeigt, dass Diesterweg die schopenhauersche Begriffsanalyse der Mathematik mit Hilfe von Logikdiagrammen aufgreift und weiterführt. Da Diesterweg einer der einflussreichsten Pädagogen und Mathematikdidaktiker des 20. Jahrhunderts war, ist anzunehmen, dass sich Spuren dieser Methode noch heute finden lassen. Inwiefern dies wahrscheinlich ist, wird in der Zusammenfassung (Kapitel 6) thematisiert. (shrink)

Long awaited and eagerly anticipated, this remarkable volume allows English-speaking readers to experience a profound dialogue between the German philosopher Martin Heidegger and the Swiss psychiatrist Medard Boss. A product of their warm friendship, _Zollikon Seminars_ chronicles an extraordinary exchange of ideas. Heidegger strove to transcend the bounds of philosophy while Boss and his colleagues in the scientific community sought to understand their patients and their world. The result: the best and clearest introduction to Heidegger's philosophy available. Boss approached Heidegger (...) asking for help in reflective thinking on the nature of Heidegger's work. Soon they were holding annual two-week meetings in Boss's home in Zollikon, Switzerland. The protocols from these seminars, recorded by Boss and reviewed, corrected, and supplemented by Heidegger himself, make up one part of this volume. They are augmented by Boss's record of the conversations he had with Heidegger in the days between seminars and by excerpts from the hundreds of letters the philosopher wrote to Boss between 1947 and 1971. (shrink)

Public reason as a political ideal aims to reconcile reasonable disagreement; however, is public reason itself the object of reasonable disagreement? Jonathan Quong, David Estlund, Andrew Lister, and some other philosophers maintain that public reason is beyond reasonable disagreement. I argue this view is untenable. In addition, I consider briefly whether or not two main versions of the public reason principle, namely, the consensus version and the convergence version, need to satisfy their own requirements. My discussion has several important implications (...) for the debate on public reason. (shrink)

First published in English in1966, _The True and The Evident_ is a translation of Franz Brentano’s posthumous _Wahrheit und Evidenz_, edited by Oscsar Kraus. The book includes Brentano’s influential lecture "On the Concept of Truth", read before the Vienna Philosophical Society, a variety of essays, drawn from the immense wealth of Brentano’s unpublished material, and letters written by him to Marty, Kraus Hillebrand, and Husserl. Brentano rejects the familiar versions of the "correspondence theory of truth" and proposes to define (...) the true in terms of the evident. In criticising the metaphysical assumptions presupposed by the correspondence theory, he sets forth a conception of language and reality that has subsequently become known as "reism". (shrink)

The problem addressed in this paper is “the main epistemic problem concerning science”, viz. “the explication of how we compare and evaluate theories [...] in the light of the available evidence” (van Fraassen, BC, 1983, Theory comparison and relevant Evidence. In J. Earman (Ed.), Testing scientific theories (pp. 27–42). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). Sections 1– 3 contain the general plausibility-informativeness theory of theory assessment. In a nutshell, the message is (1) that there are two values a theory should exhibit: (...) truth and informativeness—measured respectively by a truth indicator and a strength indicator; (2) that these two values are conflicting in the sense that the former is a decreasing and the latter an increasing function of the logical strength of the theory to be assessed; and (3) that in assessing a given theory by the available data one should weigh between these two conflicting aspects in such a way that any surplus in informativeness succeeds, if the shortfall in plausibility is small enough. Particular accounts of this general theory arise by inserting particular strength indicators and truth indicators. In Section 4 the theory is spelt out for the Bayesian paradigm of subjective probabilities. It is then compared to incremental Bayesian confirmation theory. Section 4 closes by asking whether it is likely to be lovely. Section 5 discusses a few problems of confirmation theory in the light of the present approach. In particular, it is briefly indicated how the present account gives rise to a new analysis of Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel, CG, 1945, Studies in the logic of comfirmation. Mind, 54, 1–26, 97–121.), differing from the one Carnap gave in § 87 of his Logical foundations of probability (1962, Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Section 6 adresses the question of justification any theory of theory assessment has to face: why should one stick to theories given high assessment values rather than to any other theories? The answer given by the Bayesian version of the account presented in section 4 is that one should accept theories given high assessment values, because, in the medium run, theory assessment almost surely takes one to the most informative among all true theories when presented separating data. The concluding section 7 continues the comparison between the present account and incremental Bayesian confirmation theory. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps, and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may (...) freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The essays in this collection are the outgrowth of a workshop, held in June 1976, on formal approaches to the semantics and pragmatics of natural languages. They document in an astoundingly uniform way the develop ments in the formal analysis of natural languages since the late sixties. The avowed aim of the' workshop was in fact to assess the progress made in the application of formal methods to semantics, to confront different approaches to essentially the same problems on the one (...) hand, and, on the other, to show the way in relating semantic and pragmatic explanations of linguistic phenomena. Several of these papers can in fact be regarded as attempts to close the 'semiotic circle' by bringing together the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties of certain constructions in an explanatory framework thereby making it more than obvious that these three components of an integrated linguistic theory cannot be as neatly separated as one would have liked to believe. In other words, not only can we not elaborate a syntactic description of (a fragment of) a language and then proceed to the semantics (as Montague pointed out already forcefully in 1968), we cannot hope to achieve an adequate integrated syntax and semantics without paying heed to the pragmatic aspects of the constructions involved. The behavior of polarity items, 'quantifiers' like any, conditionals or even logical particles like and and or in non-indicative sentences is clear-cut evidence for the need to let each component of the grammar inform the other. (shrink)

CHAPTER I SETTING Hegel, perhaps the most self-questioning of all philosophers, was well aware that his thought was a response to intense social dislocation ...

This paper presents a new analysis of C.G. Hempel’s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation [Hempel C. G. (1945). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press, pp. 3–51.], differing from the one Carnap gave in §87 of his [1962. Logical foundations of probability (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.]. Hempel, it is argued, felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at true hypotheses and another (...) aiming at informative hypotheses. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative hypotheses. I then show that one can have Hempel’s cake and eat it too. There is a logic that takes into account both of these two conflicting aspects. According to this logic, a sentence H is an acceptable hypothesis for evidence E if and only if H is both sufficiently plausible given E and sufficiently informative about E. Finally, the logic sheds new light on Carnap’s analysis. (shrink)