Responding to recent concerns about the reliability of the published literature in psychology and other disciplines, we formed the X-Phi Replicability Project to estimate the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Drawing on a representative sample of 40 x-phi studies published between 2003 and 2015, we enlisted 20 research teams across 8 countries to conduct a high-quality replication of each study in order to compare the results to the original published findings. We found that x-phi studies – as represented in our sample (...) – successfully replicated about 70% of the time. We discuss possible reasons for this relatively high replication rate in the field of experimental philosophy and offer suggestions for best research practices going forward. (shrink)

Appendix 1 was incomplete in the initial online publication. The original article has been corrected.

Trata-se de uma tentativa de atualização das premissas da teoria da identidade narrativa de Paul Ricoeur diante do desafio lançado pelo presentismo tal como concebido por François Hartog. Nessa direção, em um primeiro momento serão apresentados elementos que enfatizam a presença da influência da teoria agostiniana do tríplice presente na noção ricoeuriana de experiência viva bem como na teoria da história de Reinhart Koselleck e no existencialismo sartreano. Em um segundo momento, será avaliada a possibilidade de equacionar a experiência viva (...) do tríplice presente e a teoria da identidade narrativa. No terceiro momento, serão apresentadas algumas pistas para um novo modelo de identidade narrativa em sintonia com os desafios lançados pelo presentismo. (shrink)

Cumulative technological culture (CTC) refers to the increase in the efficiency and complexity of tools and techniques in human populations over generations. A fascinating question is to understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon. Because CTC is definitely a social phenomenon, most accounts have suggested a series of cognitive mechanisms oriented toward the social dimension (e.g., teaching, imitation, theory of mind, and metacognition), thereby minimizing the technical dimension and the potential influence of non-social, cognitive skills. What if we have failed (...) to see the elephant in the room? What if social cognitive mechanisms were only catalyzing factors and not thesufficient and necessaryconditions for the emergence of CTC? In this article, we offer an alternative, unified cognitive approach to this phenomenon by assuming that CTC originates in non-social cognitive skills, namely technical-reasoning skills which enable humans to develop the technical potential necessary to constantly acquire and improve technical information. This leads us to discuss how theory of mind and metacognition, in concert with technical reasoning, can help boost CTC. The cognitive approach developed here opens up promising new avenues for reinterpreting classical issues (e.g., innovation, emulation vs. imitation, social vs. asocial learning, cooperation, teaching, and overimitation) in a field that has so far been largely dominated by other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, anthropology, archeology, economics, and philosophy. (shrink)

Research on employees’ responses to corporate social responsibility has recently accelerated and begun appearing in top-tier academic journals. However, existing findings are still largely fragmented, and this stream of research lacks theoretical consolidation. This article integrates the diffuse and multi-disciplinary literature on CSR micro-level influences in a theoretically driven conceptual framework that contributes to explain and predict when, why, and how employees might react to CSR activity in a way that influences organizations’ economic and social performance. Drawing on social identity (...) theory and social exchange theory, we delineate the different but interdependent psychological mechanisms that explain how CSR can strengthen the employee–organization relationship and subsequently foster employee-related, micro-level outcomes. Contributions of our framework to extant literature and potential extensions for future research are then discussed. (shrink)

Vincent Descombes nous a offert une mise au point historique et conceptuelle qu’on peut tenir pour incontournable sur la question de la naturalisation des Humanités. Ce texte vise à restituer certains éléments de cette contribution trop souvent méconnue et à la prolonger sur la question de la naturalisation de l’esthétique du cinéma, entendue au sens large comme philosophie de l’art cinématographique et comme philosophie de l’expérience esthétique.

In developmental lexical–gustatory synesthesia, specific words can trigger taste perceptions and these synesthetic associations are generally stable. We describe a case of multilingual lexical–gustatory synesthesia for whom some synesthesias were bidirectional as some tastes also triggered auditory word associations. Evoked concurrents could be gustatory but also tactile sensations. In addition to words and pseudowords, many voices were effective inducers, suggesting increased connections between cortical taste areas and both voice-selective and language-selective areas. Lasting changes in some evoked tastes occurred during childhood (...) suggesting that some plasticity can be present after the initial learning of associations. Inducers were often linked to taste concurrents phonologically or semantically, but also through identifiable childhood episodes . Several inducers were phonologically linked to episodic inducers suggesting a process of secondary acquisition for many inducers. Implications of these observations are discussed. (shrink)

Left-libertarian theories of justice hold that agents are full self-owners and that natural resources are owned in some egalitarian manner. Unlike most versions of egalitarianism, leftlibertarianism endorses full self-ownership, and thus places specific limits on what others may do to one’s person without one’s permission. Unlike the more familiar right-libertarianism (which also endorses full self-ownership), it holds that natural resources—resources which are not the results of anyone's choices and which are necessary for any form of activity—may be privately appropriated only (...) with the permission of, or with a significant payment to, the members of society. Like right-libertarianism, left-libertarianism holds that the basic rights of individuals are ownership rights. Such rights can endow agents—as liberalism requires—with spheres of personal liberty where they may each pursue their conceptions of “the good life”. Left-libertarianism is promising because it coherently underwrites both some demands of material equality and some limits on the permissible means of promoting this equality. It is promising, that is, because it is a form of liberal egalitarianism. Left-libertarian theories have been propounded for over two centuries. Early exponents of some form of self-ownership combined with some form of egalitarian ownership of natural resources include: Hugo Grotius (1625), Samuel Pufendorf (1672), John Locke (1690), William Ogilvie (1781), Thomas Spence (1793), Thomas Paine (1795), Hippolyte de Colins (1835), François Huet (1853), Patrick E. Dove (1850, 1854), Herbert Spencer (1851), Henry George (1879, 1892), and Léon Walras (1896).1 It is striking how much of the current debate about equality, liberty, and responsibility has already been addressed by these authors. (shrink)

Selon Spinoza, les idées appartiennent à la nature au même titre que les corps. Et pourtant ce ne sont pas des corps : seule une physique spéciale, nullement métaphorique, peut rendre compte de l'étrange univers qu'elles composent.

By systematically biasing our beliefs, self-deception can endanger our ability to successfully convey our messages. It can also lead lies to degenerate into more severe damages in relationships. Accordingly, I suggest that the biases reviewed in the target article do not aim at self-deception but instead are the by-products of several other mechanisms: our natural tendency to self-enhance, the confirmation bias inherent in reasoning, and the lack of access to our unconscious minds.

The text that we publish here for the first time was originally conceived as a presentation for the international congress Deleuze: una imagen del pensamiento, held in Bogota, Colombia, in August 2005.

Are we gullible? Can we be easily influenced by what others tell us, even if they do not deserve our trust? Many strands of research, from social psychology to cultural evolution suggest that humans are by nature conformist and eager to follow prestigious leaders. By contrast, an evolutionary perspective suggests that humans should be vigilant towards communicated information, so as not to be misled too often. Work in experimental psychology shows that humans are equipped with sophisticated mechanisms that allow them (...) to carefully evaluate communicated information. These open vigilance mechanisms lead us to reject messages that clash with our prior beliefs, unless the source of the message has earned our trust, or provides good arguments, in which case we can adaptively change our minds. These mechanisms make us largely immune to mass persuasion, explaining why propaganda, political campaigns, advertising, and other attempts at persuading large groups nearly always fall in deaf ears. However, some false beliefs manage to spread through communication. I argue that most popular false beliefs are held reflectively, which means that they have little effect on our thoughts and behaviors, and that many false beliefs can be socially beneficial. Accepting such beliefs thus reflects a much weaker failure in our evaluation of communicated information than might at first appear. (shrink)

Goethes Ästhetik.--Wahrheit, Freiheit und Liebe in der griechischen Tragödie.--Plato und Kant, ein Dialog.--Der Tyrann in Platos Werk.--Die Autonomie der Ästhetik.--Wissen und religiöser Glaube in Platos Werk.

Because reasoning allows us to justify our beliefs and evaluate these justifications it is central to folk epistemology. Following Sperber, and contrary to classical views, it will be argued that reasoning evolved not to complement individual cognition but as an argumentative device. This hypothesis is more consistent with the prevalence of the confirmation and disconfirmation biases. It will be suggested that these biases render the individual use of reasoning hazardous, but that when reasoning is used in its natural, argumentative, context (...) they can represent a smart way to divide labor without loosing epistemic value. (shrink)

Parmi les travaux contemporains en sémantique du langage ordinaire, le "programme de Davidson " se distingue par sa portée philosophique : la théorie de la vérité que propose Davidson à titre de cadre sémantique s'épanouit en effet en une véritable philosophie du langage, connue sous le nom d'interprétation radicale. Cet ouvrage tente une évaluation critique du programme de Davidson, à partir d'une question à la fois historique et conceptuelle : quels ont les rapports entre le projet d'une théorie de la (...) vérité "à la Tarski ", et celui d'une sémantique formelle du langage ordinaire? (shrink)

This paper — a sequel to my 'Open Quotation' (Mind 2001) — is my reaction to the articles discussing open quotation in the special issue of the Belgian Journal of Linguistics edited by P. De Brabanter in 2005.

Heidegger’s critique addressed to philosophical anthropology often leads readers to forget the importance of the question of human beings in his writings. The recent publication of the Black Notebooks and some unpublished lectures shed new light on these philosophical problems and help us define more clearly what it would mean to develop the foundation of anthropological knowledge ontologically. This paper argues that while dealing with mythical existence and with the difference between animals and human beings, Heidegger seized the opportunity to (...) speculate on the ontological origins of ethical life. The paper concludes by showing how Sloterdijk’s attempt to “anthropologize” Heidegger fails to follow the demands of fundamental ontology. (shrink)

Leibniz differs from Descartes insofar as he submits the search for mechanical explanations to regulatory norms. This is the case, for instance, in dioptrics: provided the law of sines is shown to conform to a sufficient reason of functionality, a relevant mechanical hypothesis is found acceptable. Explaining by means of hypotheses implies a twofold process of connections between an analytic model defining such an order of the elements as may fit the norm of a mathesis, and a presupposed mechanical disposition (...) of the elements such as may produce the constant effects revealed through experience. (shrink)

" L ABCDaire consiste à disperser volontairement une certaine philosophie, afin de la rendre plus lisible ou plus visible. Les mots ouvrent ; de vives discussions. Nous avancerons à chaque fois une réponse qui ne sera pas toujours partagée. Nous ne nous en plaignons pas. La philosophie, en général, ne répugne pas à cette situation. " Dans la diversité des analyses de François Dagognet un fil conducteur rend sa démarche particulièrement originale : alors que dominent chez bon nombre de penseurs (...) la condamnation de la technique et le ressentiment envers l'époque, ce philosophe ne cesse de souligner les aspects positifs, libérateurs et créatifs du monde actuel y compris dans les domaines qui passent pour les plus redoutables, même s'il n'a de cesse aussi d'en déceler les dysfonctionnements. (shrink)