Attempts to reach an understanding of how to live a Christian life in the contemporary context have never been more necessary. This is the aim of the International Symposium: Beyond Secular Faith, an annual conference held in Granada, Spain. This volume represents the fruits of over seven years of scholarship. The title Beyond Secular Faith suggests we are interested in (re)discovering and reflectively elaborating ways to overcome the limits imposed by the dominant contemporary culture. We are convinced that only a (...) faith liberated from the conceptual restrictions and reductions (put forward by secular philosophy and theology) and centered radically on Christ can flourish in the dimension that is proper to faith; that is, in all spheres of human life. Featuring contributions from internationally recognized philosophers and theologians such as Tracey Rowland, Jarosław Jagiello, Rocco Buttiglione, Alison Milbank, Massimo Borghesi, John Milbank, and others, we will explore a diversity of questions from this common perspective: the light of revelation illuminates how Christians should live in the modern world, leading to a new beginning. (shrink)

This book explores the philosophical, legal, and theological roots of Western multiculturalism, that is, the encounter and coexistence of different cultures within a liberal society. Rather than concerning themselves with the particulars of cultural dialogue, the authors of this volume go deeper and question the very reality of "multiculturalism" itself. As a whole the volume devotes attention to the origins of human nature, arguing that regardless of how different another person or culture seems to be, universal human experience discloses what (...) it means to be human and to relate to others and to God. The contributors represent different cultures and faith traditions but are united in friendship and in the conviction that the Christian faith enables an authentic approach to long-standing debates on multiculturalism. Contributors: Massimo Borghesi Francesco Botturi Marta Cartabia Carmine Di Martino Pierpaolo Donati Costantino Esposito Stanley Hauerwas Antonio Lopez Francisco Javier Martnez Fernandez John Milbank Javier Prades David L. Schindler Angelo Cardinal Scola Lorenza Violini Joseph H. H. Weiler. (shrink)

The contribution of Jesuits to the different fields of knowledge, including philosophy, is historically well known. In fact, since the foundation of the Society of Jesus, in the 16th century, Jesuits from different generations and cultures have taken part in the philosophical debates of their time and their different contexts. Since the foundation of the Society of Jesus, in 1540, the Jesuits, individually and as a body, have engaged in a fruitful dialogue between the Christian tradition and different dimensions of (...) human culture. During almost five centuries, numerous Jesuits taught philosophy in academic institutions all over the world. Some of them have their names recorded in the history of philosophy. Of course, the majority of them is not anymore remembered, despite their valuable contribution to the development of the Jesuit intellectual tradition up to our times. In fact, as an heir of the Roman College, the first academic institution founded by the Society of Jesus, in 1551, the Pontifical Gregorian University, in Rome, is a witness to this tradition, which has been kept alive thanks to the discrete work of both Jesuits and lay intellectuals. Known as the University of the Nations, this institution corroborates not only the capacity of the Jesuit tradition to put faith in dialogue with reason, but also the option to take the concrete reality of each human culture and its historical context as its point of departure. The Jesuits’ willingness to engage in dialogue with different intellectual perspectives is underpinned by one of the most defining traits of the Jesuit charism, namely, the conviction that God can be found and served in all things. Accordingly, Jesuits have adopted, from the beginning, an amenable stance towards the world with its different cultures and intellectual trends. As such, Jesuits have, since the beginning, inhabited the frontiers of human thought. According to the contemporary philosopher Paul Gilbert, SJ, within the institutions under the leadership of the Society of Jesus, it was always possible to maintain an equilibrium between two principles: “intellectual unity” and “openness to the world.” Without detriment to the Jesuit identity, the companions of Ignatius have been willing to dwell in the various dimensions of human reality, in their multiplicity and plurality. Either in the renewal of Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ metaphysics, or in the dialogue with modern philosophers such as Descartes, Kant, or Hegel, and even in the inculturation in non-European contexts, the Jesuits have been able to preserve the Christian tradition through an original development of human culture in all its richness and diversity. With respect to the last century, it has to be acknowledged that a significant number of Jesuits made significant contributions, with recognized competence, to philosophy. Certainly, the 20th century was particularly complex in many respects. It would be enough to recall that this period, which brought with it unprecedented social, scientific, and technological developments, was also the stage for the two World Wars. With the emergence or consolidation of philosophical currents such as Marxism, Phenomenology, Existentialism, Structuralism, and Post-Modernism, the past century was, without any doubt, fascinating from the intellectual point of view. Jesuits such as Karl Rahner, Frederick Copleston, Bernard Lonergan, William Norris Clarke, John F. Kavanaugh, Teilhard de Chardin, Gaston Fessard, Jean Daniélou, Henri de Lubac, Michel de Certeau, Xavier Tilliette, Paul Valadier, Paweł Siwek, Ignacio Ellacuría, Francisco Taborda, Henrique de Lima Vaz and, in the Portuguese context, Diamantino Martins or Júlio Fragata, among many others, were able to engage different philosophical currents, problems and controversies of their times. Faithful to their long tradition of being present in the frontiers of thought, those Jesuits have engaged in a fruitful dialogue with these intellectual trends, offering relevant contributions to different ongoing debates. Within this context, the present volume recalls and discusses the philosophical contribution of some of the most prominent Jesuit protagonists of the intellectual interchange that took place in the 20th century. This volume also intends to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, which happens just before the inauguration of the Ignatian Year. Decreed by Father Arturo Sosa, the Superior General of the Society of Jesus, this celebratory Year will start on May 20, 2021, precisely 500 years after Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit Order, was wounded at the battle of Pamplona. We are happy that this volume could bring together outstanding specialists in the thought of some of the most prominent Jesuits philosophers of the last century, namely Paul Valadier, Paul Gilbert, Józef Bremer, Jacek Poznański, Alexander Maar, Patrick H. Byrne, M. Ross Romero, Carlos Alvarez, Hélio Pereira Lima, José Gama, Domingos Terra, Gabriel Flynn, Marie-Gabrielle Lemaire, José Sols Lucia, Lorena Zuchel Lovera, Pedro Pablo Achondo Moya, Enzo Solari, Massimo Borghesi, Mendo Castro Henriques, João Barbosa, and Dominique Lambert. In addition, in the celebration of the 100th anniversary of Júlio Fragata’s birth, Maria Teresa Fragata presents a memory of his life and thought. We hope that this volume may be useful to all those interested in the Jesuit philosophical tradition. Hopefully, it will stimulate scholars to pursue a fruitful and creative dialogue with contemporary philosophy, in the footsteps of the Jesuit philosophers featured here. We would like to thank all the authors and all those who, in different ways, made this volume possible. (shrink)

Can Artificial Intelligence be more effective than human instruction for the moral enhancement of people? The author argues that it only would be if the use of this technology were aimed at increasing the individual's capacity to reflectively decide for themselves, rather than at directly influencing behaviour. To support this, it is shown how a disregard for personal autonomy, in particular, invalidates the main proposals for applying new technologies, both biomedical and AI-based, to moral enhancement. As an alternative to these (...) proposals, this article proposes a virtual assistant that, through dialogue, neutrality and virtual reality technologies, can teach users to make better moral decisions on their own. The author concludes that, as long as certain precautions are taken in its design, such an assistant could do this better than a human instructor adopting the same educational methodology. (shrink)

This paper considers, firstly, to what extent the administration of oxytocin can augment the capacity of empathy in human beings; and secondly, whether or not such practice ought to be allowed. In relation to the latter, the author develops an argument in favour of this intervention by virtue of its consistency with the belief that, if a therapeutic treatment is to be considered acceptable, it is essential that it maximizes the well-being of those affected and that it does not compromise (...) the autonomy of the patient. Having rejected several objections related to the nature of this intervention, the author finally questions its morality on the basis of a concern with its universalizability. (shrink)

Bernard Suits’ account of play as an autotelic activity has been greatly influential in the philosophy of sport. Suits borrows the notion of ‘autotelicity’ from Aristotle’s ethics, formulating diff...

This article discusses some of the claims of the earlier and later versions of the Contemporary Theory of Metaphor (CTM) and addresses some of the criticism that has been leveled against it. It is argued that much of this criticism arises from common misconceptions as to the real claims made by the theory. However, CTM is still in need of further exploration and empirical support. In this connection, we identify some areas where research is still needed and supply our own (...) developments. We argue for a more complex classification of metaphor types, which takes into account various complementary taxonomic perspectives, including the nature of source and target and the genericity and complexity of the metaphoric operation. We also explore metaphor in relation to cognitive prominence and conceptual interaction issues. Finally, we deal with the problem of constraints on metaphor and make a proposal for three complementary kinds of constraint. (shrink)

According to Ramsey (Representation reconsidered, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007 ), only classical cognitive science, with the related notions of input–output and structural representations, meets the job description challenge (the challenge to show that a certain structure or process serves a representational role at the subpersonal level). By contrast, connectionism and other nonclassical models, insofar as they exploit receptor and tacit notions of representation, are not genuinely representational. As a result, Ramsey submits, cognitive science is taking a U-turn from (...) representationalism back to behaviourism, thus presupposing that (1) the emergence of cognitivism capitalized on the concept of representation, and that (2) the materialization of nonclassical cognitive science involves a return to some form of pre-cognitivist behaviourism. We argue against both (1) and (2), by questioning Ramsey’s divide between classical and representational, versus nonclassical and nonrepresentational, cognitive models. For, firstly, connectionist and other nonclassical accounts have the resources to exploit the notion of a structural isomorphism, like classical accounts (the beefing-up strategy); and, secondly, insofar as input–output and structural representations refer to a cognitive agent, classical explanations fail to meet the job description challenge (the deflationary strategy). Both strategies work independently of each other: if the deflationary strategy succeeds, contra (1), cognitivism has failed to capitalize on the relevant concept of representation; if the beefing-up strategy is sound, contra (2), the return to a pre-cognitivist era cancels out. (shrink)

Erick J. Ramirez, Miles Elliott and Per‑Erik Milam (2021) have recently claimed that using Virtual Reality (VR) as an educational nudge to promote empathy is unethical. These authors argue that the influence exerted on the participant through virtual simulation is based on the deception of making them believe that they are someone else when this is impossible. This makes the use of VR for empathy enhancement a manipulative strategy in itself. In this article, we show that Ramirez et al.’s ethical (...) rejection of empathy enhancement through VR is based on confusion. First, we show that this misunderstanding stems from the conception of empathy-enhancing simulations solely as failed attempts at “being someone else,” along with ignoring the crucial difference between the psychological perspective-taking processes of imagine-other and imagine-self. Then, having overcome that misconception, we argue that the ethical misgivings about the use of VR to promote empathy should disappear and that these projects have greater potential for behavioural change than purely sympathy-focused interventions. (shrink)

a central thesis of martin heidegger's first reading of a Platonic dialogue, the 1924/25 course on the Sophist, was that, "for the Greeks, being means precisely to be present, to be in the present [Anwesend-sein, Gegenwärtig-sein]."1 Heidegger saw this Greek interpretation of being as leading to Plato's specific interpretation of being as eidos or idea. Heidegger makes this clear in the following passage from another Plato course, the 1931–32 course On the Essence of Truth: "'Idea' is the look [der Anblick] (...) of what something offers itself as being. These looks [Anblicke] are that in which the individual thing presents itself as this or that, that in which it is present and presencing [präsent und anwesend].... (shrink)

In the recently published 1924 course, Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, Martin Heidegger offers a detailed interpretation of Aristotle's definition of kinesis in the Physics. This interpretation identifies entelecheia with what is finished and present‐at‐an‐end and energeia with being‐at‐work toward this end. In arguing against this interpretation, the present paper attempts to show that Aristotle interpreted being from the perspective of praxis rather than poiesis and therefore did not identify it with static presence. The paper also challenges later variations of Heidegger's (...) interpretation, in particular his account of dunamis in the 1931 course on Metaphysics Theta, which insists that its mode of being is presence‐at‐hand. By arguing that this reading too is untenable, the paper concludes that Aristotle's metaphysics is not a metaphysics of presence and that his texts instead point toward a possibility of metaphysics ignored by the attempts of Heidegger and others to overcome it. (shrink)

The “destructive” appropriation of the Aristotelian concepts of δύναµις and ἐνέργεια played a central role in Martin Heidegger’s own reflection on the meaning of being. While this has been generally known for some time, it is only now that we can understand the full scope, complexity and evolving character of this appropriation. One reason is the fairly recent publication of notes and protocols for seminars Heidegger led on Aristotle as late as the 1940s and 1950s. Another is the existence of (...) student transcripts in the Special Collections Department of Stanford University for a number of unpublished seminars on Aristotle that Heidegger led during the 1920s. Considering all of this material enables us to see both the significance of Heidegger’s interpretation of the δύναµις/ἐνέργιεα pair as well as how this interpretation evolved along with his own “Kehre”: from a “pandynamic” conception of being to being as “Ereignis.”. (shrink)

Pendant l’ete de 1928 Heidegger a offert un seminaire sur le troisieme livre de la Physique d’Aristote et donc sur l’explication aristotelicienne de la nature du mouvement. La derniere seance de ce cours, qui eut lieu le 25 juillet, est d’une grande importance parce que c’est a cette occasion que Heidegger va au livre neuf de la Metaphysique pour essayer de comprendre la notion ontologique qui est a la base de l’interpretation aristotelicienne du mouvement : l’energeia. Mais dans les protocoles (...) de ce seminaire qui se trouvent parmi les papiers de Heidegger et qui ont ete publies recemment dans le volume 83 de la Gesamtausgabe, la seance du 25 juillet se trouve absente. Ce fait a conduit l’editeur a conclure que le seminaire avait pris fin le 23 juillet, sans s’apercevoir donc que la conclusion du seminaire manquait. Il existe heureusement une transcription preservee parmi les papiers de l’etudiante de Heidegger, Helene Weiss, et accessible aujourd’hui dans les archives de l’universite de Stanford. Cette transcription montre que la derniere session eut bien lieu le 25 juillet et nous offre la lecture heideggerienne de Metaphysique IX qui ne se trouve pas dans la version de la Gesamtausgabe. C’est dans le contexte de cette lecture que Heidegger fait la declaration etonnante qui nous concerne ici : ≪Dans la derniere instance, la Metaphysique Θ revient a Platon ; la priorite de l’energeia est fondamentalement la meme chose que l’epekeina des Idees. ≫La première tâche que je me propose ici sera d’expliquer cette déclaration qui suggère une relation tres etroite, ou meme une identite, entre la notion aristotelicienne de l’energeia comme ayant une priorite vis‑a‑vis de la dunamis et la notion platonicienne de l’Idee du Bien comme etant epekeina de l’ousia. Pour cette explication je ferai appel non seulement au contexte du seminaire de 1928, mais aussi aux textes plus tardifs comme les Beitrage et les cours sur Nietzsche dans lesquels Heidegger semble presupposer et développer sa déclaration de 1928. Ma seconde tâche sera de comparer cette thèse heideggerienne a la tentative de Gadamer de surmonter l’opposition traditionnelle entre les ontologies de Platon et d’Aristote en faisant appel a l’idee du bien chez les deux. Cette tentative se trouve dans le texte Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles. La comparaison que j’entreprends ici va montrer certaines affinites entre les interpretations de l’Idee du Bien chez Heidegger et Gadamer, mais aussi de profondes differences qui vont determiner leurs differents projets philosophiques. (shrink)

O objetivo do artigo é apresentar a discussão entre Fichte e Schelling em torno do conflito entre o idealismo transcendental da doutrina-da-ciência e a filosofia-da-natureza do Identitätssystem. Buscamos compreender, de um ponto de vista fichteano, se e em que medida é possível afirmar que a doutrina-da-ciência é uma filosofia da reflexão, tal como entendida por Schelling. Para tanto, em um primeiro momento, serão expostas as críticas de Schelling a Fichte, como ele progressivamente se afasta em relação à filosofia transcendental e (...) busca consolidar a filosofia-da-natureza. Em um segundo momento, daremos a palavra a Fichte e a seus apontamentos críticos em relação ao projeto filosófico de uma filosofia-da-natureza. Nossa análise limitar-se-á à correspondência entre os dois filósofos e aos textos escritos em torno do período de ruptura entre eles. No caso de Fichte, indo até 1804. The aim of this paper is to present the discussion between Fichte and Schelling around the conflict between the transcendental idealism of the doctrine of science and the philosophy of nature of the Identitätssystem. We seek to understand, under a Fichtean point of view, if and how far it is possible to state that the doctrine of science consists in a philosophy of reflection, such as Schelling states. For this, at first, will be exposed the Schelling’s critiques to Fichte, as the former progressively detaches himself from transcendental philosophy and consolidates a philosophy of nature. In a second moment, we will give the floor to Fichte’s critical notes related to the philosophical project of a philosophy of nature. Our analysis will be restraint to the correspondence between those two philosophers and to the texts written around this period of rupture between them. In the case of Fichte, this goes until 1804. (shrink)

Consideramos que uno de los principios basales de las democracias representativas, es el que determina “Una persona, un voto”, debe ser reformulado, debido a que mediante el mismo hemos edificado un sistema socio-político, que estableció, precisamente lo contrario, tanto en términos teóricos como prácticos, de lo que se ufana como definición y que por ende se propuso como finalidad. La frase fetiche que pretendemos erradicar, podríamos circunscribirla en una falacia de “finalidad”, es decir plantea un estado de situación potencial, ideal, (...) de posibilidad hacia; de ninguna manera, puede ser considerado un principio respetable, legítimo o hasta formalmente correcto. El planteo que trazamos parte de la realidad de que todos, no sólo somos, sino que significamos, o poseemos un valor distinto para ese estado que nos promete aquello imposible, incumplible y utópico. La variable determinante es la presencia que el estado ha tenido o no, en el desarrollo de las vidas de los ciudadanos aptos para votar. Utilizaremos el límite de la consideración de pobreza, de acuerdo a las estipulaciones de organismos internacionales, que será el báculo para sostener porque el concepto de compensación se torna central, sí es que pretendemos una democracia que se precie de ser representativa de la voluntad del pueblo. Dentro del contexto o insertos en lo que se da en llamar “filosofía latinoamericana”, que sostiene como uno de sus principios la opción del pobre, creemos que el voto de estos tiene un valor diferente, de cinco, a diferencia de los que no están en tal situación. (shrink)

In this essay, we respond to Angelo Corlett’s criticism of our paper ‘Ethics, Brain Injuries, and Sports: Prohibition, Reform, and Prudence’. To do so, first, we revisit certain assumptions and arg...

This article summarizes the recent evidence on global poverty and inequality, including both developed and developing countries. Section 1 discusses poverty and inequality data and presents evidence on levels and recent trends in poverty and inequality around the world. Section 2 turns to the issues involved in aggregating inequality indices across countries, in order to construct a meaningful measure of global inequality. Section 3 discusses the empirical relationship between economic growth, poverty, and inequality dynamics. Section 4 turns to the likely (...) economic determinants of poverty and inequality changes. Section 5 offers some conclusions, and points to some promising research themes within this general topic. (shrink)

Einstein’s 1935 derivation of mass—energy equivalence is philosophically important because it contains both a criticism of purported demonstrations that proceed by analogy and strong motivations for the definitions of the ‘new’ dynamical quantities. In this paper, I argue that Einstein’s criticism and insights are still relevant today by showing how his derivation goes beyond Friedman’s demonstration of this result in his Foundations of Spacetime ¹heories. Along the way, I isolate three distinct physical claims associated with Einstein’s famous equation that are (...) sometimes not clearly distinguished in philosophical discussions of spacetime theory. (shrink)

Do moods have intentional objects? If so, what kinds of intentional objects might they have? Some theorists hold that moods are objectless affective states, not ‘about’ anything. Others argue that moods are directed toward a maximally general object like ‘the world’, and so they are about everything, in some sense. In this article, I advance a new theoretical account of the intentional object of moods. According to what I call the ‘present-situation view’, moods are directed toward, or about, the present (...) situation. In other words, a mood is essentially an interpretation of one’s current situational context. As such, our moods change over time in a way that tracks our changing sense of how things are going, here and now. This article aims to make the case that the present-situation view, so understood, offers unique theoretical resources to describe and explain how we experience moods and how they change over time, while also suggesting a helpful way to think about the functional role moods play in our broader cognitive architecture, and pointing toward promising directions for future research into the ways that moods can be experienced, managed, and shared. (shrink)

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No agreement exists among ethical theories on what cancount as a right moral motivation. This hampers us from knowingwhether an intervention in motivation biology can be considered positivefor human morality. To overcome this difficulty, this paper identifiesminimal requirements for moral enhancement that could be accepted bythe major moral theories. Subsequently four possible scenarios are presentedwhere the most promising neural interventions on moral motivationare implemented, by means of drugs, electromagnetic stimulation ofbrain, or biotechnological brain implants. The ultimate goal of this paperis (...) to evaluate the results of each one of these interventions according totheir capacity to fulfill the identified requirements. (shrink)

Procura-se identificar algumas das origens históricas do negacionismo, dando ênfase aos seus aspectos filosóficos. Apresenta-se uma revisão de alguns conceitos basilares como os de verdade e episteme, destacando o quanto foram importantes na História das Ideias e na Filosofia Ocidental. Analisa-se, ainda que de forma resumida, o aspecto social da questão, por meio da compreensão da mudança do sujeito e suas relações de trabalho ao longo da História, principalmente no período pós-industrial. Por fim, discute-se a práxis negacionista, destacando suas principais (...) influências filosóficas e consequências. (shrink)

Este trabajo pretende analizar críticamente la interpretación llevada a cabo por Étienne Balibar en relación con las tres antinomias de la igualibertad descritas en su obra, así como con las definiciones balibarianas de «ciudadanía social», «Constitución material» y «co-ciudadanía». Para ello, se hará un recorrido por el pensamiento del filósofo a través de su obra La igualibertad. A continuación, se confrontarán algunas de sus tesis con el propósito de mostrar sus límites internos a través de la filosofía del derecho mediante (...) la obra de Luigi Ferrajoli. Para terminar, se propone la propuesta de constitucionalismo garantista de Ferrajoli como posible superación de las antinomias planteadas por Balibar acerca de la igualibertad. (shrink)

El presente trabajo contrapone dos formas de legitimar los sistemas políticos: la apelación a la historia y a la identidad nacional y el destacar los mecanismos institucionales. Para ello se centra en la Holanda del siglo XVII donde se enfrentan el mito bátavo y el mito de Venecia; el primero reconstruye una historia mítica que retrotrae el amor de los holandeses a la libertad al tiempo de la sublevación de los bátavos contra el imperio romano; el segundo hace hincapié en (...) los mecanismos institucionales que aseguraron a la república de Venecia su perduración en el tiempo: una balanza adecuada de poderes, sistemas de votación secreta; etc. Se concluye argumentando a favor del segundo procedimiento, por su mayor racionalidad y capacidad de adaptación frente a las justificaciones histórico-míticas de difícil control y escasa flexibilidad para la negociación. (shrink)