Pensar un análisis crítico del discurso desde una perspectiva decolonial significa, ante todo, la puesta en cuestión de la historicidad de la colonialidad/imperialidad/modernidad en términos de rec...

We find a simple counterfactual acceptable, it is argued, to the extent that (i) our probability of the consequent under the thought experiment of counterfactually supposing the antecedent is high, (ii) provided the latter is on-topic with respect to the former. Counterfactual supposition is represented by Lewisian imaging. Topicality, by an algebra of subject matters. A topic-sensitive probabilistic logic is then provided, to reason about the acceptability of simple counterfactuals.

Understanding Institutions proposes a new unified theory of social institutions that combines the best insights of philosophers and social scientists who have written on this topic. Francesco Guala presents a theory that combines the features of three influential views of institutions: as equilibria of strategic games, as regulative rules, and as constitutive rules. -/- Guala explains key institutions like money, private property, and marriage, and develops a much-needed unification of equilibrium- and rules-based approaches. Although he uses game theory concepts, (...) the theory is presented in a simple, clear style that is accessible to a wide audience of scholars working in different fields. Outlining and discussing various implications of the unified theory, Guala addresses venerable issues such as reflexivity, realism, Verstehen, and fallibilism in the social sciences. He also critically analyses the theory of “looping effects” and “interactive kinds” defended by Ian Hacking, and asks whether it is possible to draw a demarcation between social and natural science using the criteria of causal and ontological dependence. Focusing on current debates about the definition of marriage, Guala shows how these abstract philosophical issues have important practical and political consequences. -/- Moving beyond specific cases to general models and principles, Understanding Institutions offers new perspectives on what institutions are, how they work, and what they can do for us. (shrink)

The traditional approach to the analysis of knowledge sees it as a true belief meeting further conditions. I discuss an empirical challenge to this traditional approach, which I call the argument from development. Briefly, the argument is that belief cannot be conceptually prior to knowledge because children acquire the concept of knowledge first. Several prominent scientists and philosophers have argued that this latter claim is supported by many findings with infants and young children. Here, I defend the traditional approach by (...) raising three challenges to the argument from development: the competence-performance challenge, the double-standard challenge, and the underdetermination challenge. I conclude that the developmental data are fully compatible with children acquiring the concept of belief first. In closing, I also argue that further research is needed to investigate when children acquire a concept of knowledge. (shrink)

An erotapòkrisis of the Corpus macarianum presents an exegesis and interpretation of Rm 2,14b as found in an ascetical brotherhood with origins in the fourth century. The lemma forms the beginning of the erotapòkrisis and invites a single response. The Author orients this lemma toward a moral, ascetical and “spiritual” interpretation of the natural law and the divine law written in the conscience, one which is obscure and not entirely comprehendable by moderns. The exegetical and hermeneutical procedure at work in (...) the text may offer a suggestion for further reflection and reconsideration of the environment and identity of the author, as well as of the origins of those writings comprising the Corpus macarianum. (shrink)

The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) asserts that if putative objects x and y share all properties P, then they must be one and the same entity. Since the usual formal rendering of the PII has the same formal structure as the Leibniz Identity, it may be unclear whether it can be used to define identity and objectuality. As identity and objectuality are closely related, this study aims to examine their relationship within the framework of formal ontology. Crucial (...) for the discussion are issues about type and range of quantification and the invariance of the identity predicate coourring in the PII. Ultimately, the analysis reveals that the appeal to PII is insufficient for providing both identity and objectuality. Some further considerations about how the PII sensitively constrains the range of available ontologies or metaphysics are formulated. (shrink)

The discussion will begin with a narrative introduction, which will fo¬cus on the first occurrence in literature of testimony of a cyber-rape. From this introduction, the main philosophical issues involved in these phenom¬ena will emerge. This introduction will be followed by a brief discussion of the different forms of cyber-rape, which will refer, in particular, to feminist literature on the subject. Subsequently, the chapter will enter the heart of the philosophical dis¬cussion, addressing the first of the topics to which it (...) is dedicated: the nature of acts of sexual and gender-based online violence. Three sections will be devoted to dismantling those arguments that, even accepting that The Dangerous Liaison cyber-rape is a moral wrong, it cannot be considered on the same level as rape. Then, having established that the seriousness of a “virtual” rape is com¬parable to that of a physical rape, it will show how the former occurs more frequently (but is not conceptualised as “real”) than the latter. This will be attributed to an asymmetry between the seriousness of the act and its common perception. Finally, the chapter will go on to question the reasons for this asymme¬try, first exploring the hypothesis—long held by many scholars—of ano¬nymity as a catalyst for violence, only to partially discard it in the face of more recent evidence and replace it with a more convincing explanatory hypothesis. In general, the aim of this chapter is to make a feminist contribution from the perspective of philosophy of technology to the issue of cyber-rape. Tools provided by philosophy of technology will be tested in order to, on the one hand, dismantle the idea that there can be such a thing as a virtual agency that is “less serious” than the real one, and, on the other hand, explore the ways in which digital technologies affect the perception of personal responsibility. (shrink)

Can artificial agents act? Conceptual constellation for a de-humanised theory of action This paper embarks on an exploration of the concept of agency, traditionally ascribed to humans, in the context of artificial intelligence (AI). In the first two sections, it challenges the conventional dichotomy of human agency and non- human instrumentality, arguing that advancements in technology have blurred these boundaries. In the third section, the paper introduces the reader to the philosophical perspective of new materialism, which assigns causal power to (...) matter itself. This perspective suggests that agency is an emergent property of material configurations, prompting a re-evaluation of nonhuman agency. The fourth and fifth section revisit the legacy of cybernetics to understand systemic properties and feedback mechanisms, while re-admitting in the discourse also linear conditioning (discarded by new materialism) and assigning it a role in system dynamics. In the sixth section, in the light of the conceptual background examined so far, the paper proposes a revision of determinism (again partly in opposition to the new materialism and its indeterministic view) that can include both linear conditioning and circular interactions. The seventh section is devoted to propose a novel theory of action that includes AI systems – and artificial entities in general – as agents that can impact their environment and human systems. The exploration concludes with a discussion on the implications of this perspective for our understanding of action and responsibility in the age of AI. (shrink)

The essays collected in this special issue address a common concern related to the translatability of cultures and, in particular, the translatability of Chinese culture into the European culture....

In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and has (...) the means to avoid the wrong kind of reasons problem. Further, I counter the common suspicion that a Moorean account cannot make sense of deontological views such as Ross’s, and that it generally leaves no room for agent-relative reasons. In order to do this, I appeal to the idea that a Moorean account does not dictate the substantive view that values have to be maximized. In some cases, expressing them might be a better response. Finally I lay out and reply to a potentially devastating argument to the effect that a Moorean account makes oughts and reasons non-normative. I also criticize Scanlon’s attempt to favour his own buck-passing account via consideration of the open question argument. MBP thus emerges as a live option in the buck-passing debate. (shrink)

A complex brain network, centered on the hippocampus, supports episodic memories throughout their lifetimes. Classically, upon memory encoding during active behavior, hippocampal activity is dominated by theta oscillations (6-10Hz). During inactivity, hippocampal neurons burst synchronously, constituting sharp waves, which can propagate to other structures, theoretically supporting memory consolidation. This 'two-stage' model has been updated by new data from high-density electrophysiological recordings in animals that shed light on how information is encoded and exchanged between hippocampus, neocortex and subcortical structures such as (...) the striatum. Cell assemblies (tightly related groups of cells) discharge together and synchronize across brain structures orchestrated by theta, sharp waves and slow oscillations, to encode information. This evolving dynamical schema is key to extending our understanding of memory processes. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The current analytical debate on time is full of attempts to adjudicate from a purely theoretical standpoint among competing temporal ontologies. Little attention has instead been devoted to the existential attitudes -- emotional or ethical -- that may lurk behind, or ensue from, the endorsement of one of them. Some interesting opinions have however been voiced regarding the two most prominent views in the arena, namely eternalism and presentism; it has been said that the former is nourished by a (...) fear of death, or more generally by a desire of preservation for whatever we find precious and valuable, and that the latter is fuelled by a propensity to reap whatever fruits the present brings, as enshrined in the carpe diem motto. This paper explores such a territory by focusing on the reality of past sentience, whether joyful or painful, and on the open future. The first part contrasts the reality of past sentience that comes with eternalism with the denial of this reality that follows from presentism, and argues that from an emotional, or perhaps even moral, standpoint the latter is preferable to the former. The second part clarifies why the eternalist must renounce the open future, whereas presentism is consistent with it, and considers how its rejection or acceptance, as the case may be, could be emotionally, or even morally, significant for our conception of ourselves as free agents. The conclusion offers a tentative proposal regarding which temporal ontology is superior from an existential perspective and some ruminations on the impact that all this may have on the theoretical side of the issue. (shrink)

This paper intends to offer a new assessment of the “Ontological Difference”, one of Martin Heidegger’s mainstays, in the light of the metaphysical view called “dialetheism”. In the first paragraph I briefly summarize the main argument of Heidegger’s contradiction of Being, where OD is present as a premise. In the second paragraph I introduce dialetheism, indicate two kinds of dialetheic solutions to the paradox and explain why they face comeback troubles from OD. The third paragraph is devoted to a review (...) of Heidegger’s uses of OD and underlines the crucial role of negation in it. In the fourth paragraph I investigate the philosopher’s account of negation and show similarities with the account provided by the paraconsistent logic called “Logic of Paradox”. The fifth paragraph puts forward two possible readings of OD, the first based on the classical notion of negation and the second on the notion of negation pointed out in the previous paragraph. The second reading is proved suitable for dialetheists and in accordance with the exegesis of some textual passages from Heidegger’s late works. (shrink)

Two Festivals Celebrated by a Hittite Prince : New Light on Local Cults in North-Central Anatolia in the Second Millennium BC. By Piotr Taracha. Studien zu den Boğazköy-Texten, vol. 61. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2017. Pp. xix + 222, pls. €68.

Bu çalışma İslam’da i‘adetü’l-ma‘dûm (var olmayanın yeniden yaratılması) üzerine olan tartışmaların gelişimini, i‘adetü’l-ma‘dûm fikrini, bu fikrin reddedilmesi ve kabul edilmesinin arkasında yatan sebepleri ve mümkün olup olmadığı hakkındaki delilleri sunar. İade, yok edilmiş bir varlığı kimliğini koruyarak yeni- den yaratma eylemine dayanmaktadır. İbn Sînâ öncesi kelâmcıların çoğu iadenin imkânını kabul eder fakat bir aslî (ma‘dûmun sübûtu) ve bir de ferî meselede (belli varlık sınıflarının iade edilebilmesi) ihtilaf ederler. İadeyi kabul etmek kelâmcıların cismânî bir antropoloji ile yeniden dirilmenin imkânını uzlaştırmalarını sağlamıştır. (...) İbn Sînâ, iadenin imkânına karşı üç ana delilden oluşan etkili bir delil ortaya koymuştur: bu delil, (ma‘dûmun sâbit olmaması göz önüne alınacak olursa) sezgiden, iade edilen varlığın eşdeğer kopya- sından ayırt edilemezliğinden ve zamanın iadesinin yol açtığı çelişkilerden oluşur. İbn Sînâ öncesi düşünce ekollerinden sadece Eş‘arîler iadenin imkânını savunmuştur. Klasik sonrası dönemin tartışmaları İbn Sînâ ve mütekaddimûn kelâmcılar tarafından ana hatları çizilen cedelî bir asıl üzerine inşa edilmiş daha karmaşık formülasyonları (modal değişmezlik argümanı), itirazları, cevapları ve aynı zamanda hem iadeyi destekleyen (tasavvurî parçaların imkânı, hatırlama, varsayımsal imkân) hem de iadeye karşı olan (ara boşluk, illetlerin iadesi) bütünüyle yeni bazı argümanları öne sürer. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is gaining momentum in the business world, but several issues continue to challenge managers in charge of sustainability. Supply chain management is one area in which CSR-related activities could potentially drive the process of sustainability within firms. This case presents the way that illycaffè, an Italian coffee producer, has approached CSR. Since 1991, the company has focused on developing a new relationship with Brazilian coffee producers based on networking translated into knowledge transfer—Brazilian producers became responsible for (...) their operations all along the supply line—and innovation translated into quality—one supplier talks about how illycaffè persuaded him he was capable of producing a Ferrari among coffees instead of a Fiat. These two factors not only drive the supplier relationship, but also serve as the drivers of illycaffè’s sustainability strategy. Lessons for managers relate to benefits for the business, for society and for stakeholders, and questions arise about how to replicate illycaffè’s success and create value through values. (shrink)

Dans cet article je propose un examen de la lecture traditionnelle du fr. B3 de Parménide (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι), qui suppose une « identité » forte entre penser et être, pour lui préférer l’hypothèse d’une « correspondance » de ce qui est pensable et de ce qui est. Ces considérations me conduisent a défendre une traduction du fr. B3, qui me paraît la moins anachronique: « c’est en effet une seule et même chose que l’on (...) pense et qui est ». Je m’interroge ensuite sur le sens du verbe νοεῖν et des termes apparentés dans le Poème de Parménide (particulièrement dans le fr. B4). Je présente trois options d’interprétation du νοεῖν : 1. comme connaissance purement intellectuelle de l’être vrai (c’est à dire de l’intelligible) ; 2. comme connaissance discursive ou « véritative » qui concerne donc la vérité ou la fausseté d’une proposition ; 3. comme capacité de « réaliser une situation », de « reconnaître » quelque chose ou quelqu’un, en supposant un sens d’« être » qui vise la simple constatation de l’être des choses et du monde sensible. (shrink)

This paper outlines a version of instantaneous presentism, according to which the present is a point-like instant, and defends it from two prominent objections. The first one has to do with the difficulty of accounting, from the point of view of instantaneous presentism, for the existence of events that take time, dynamic events, which cannot be confined to a single instant. The second objection is of a Zenonian nature and arises once time is viewed as a continuum that can be (...) subdivided ad infinitum. In response to the first problem, it is argued that the presentist can appeal to past and future instants as long as it is not assumed that there are events that occur at them. Once they are granted, one can then appeal to "past-oriented" and "future-oriented" properties such as *was P at t* (or *will be P at t*), where t is a past or future instant, in order to view dynamic events as occurring at the present instant. In response to the second problem, one must accept the idea that, as a new instant becomes present, there is no preceding instant which is immediately past. There can only be infinitely many past instants with increasingly lower degrees of pastness. (shrink)

This paper critically examines Richard Kraut’s attack on the notion of absolute value, and lays out some of the conceptual work required to defend such a notion. The view under attack claims that absolute goodness is a property that provides a reason to value what has it. Kraut’s overall challenge is that absolute goodness cannot play this role. Kraut’s own view is that goodness-for, instead, plays the reason-providing role. My targets are Kraut’s double-counting objection, and his ethical objection against absolute (...) value. After explaining the double-counting objection, and discussing the idea of non-additive reasons, I examine and reject Kraut’s reasons for holding that nonadditivity can rescue relative value but not absolute value. I proceed then to explore a different reply to the double-counting objection by introducing a distinction between normative reasons for action and reasons that explain why a certain consideration is a reason for action. Such a distinction (hinted at by Kraut) would either help both Kraut and the friend of absolute value, or neither of them. I defend the distinction from the objection that it would make absolute value just a ‘shadow’. Finally, I reply to Kraut’s ethical objection that being motivated by absolute value is depersonalizing, on two grounds: 1) if thinking in terms of absolute value depersonalizes relationships, then we have absolute-value-given reasons not to think in those terms; 2) the distinction between normative and explanatory reasons explains why even a motivation centred on absolute value need not be depersonalizing. (shrink)

La experiencia de la pobreza llama a la economía a humanizarse y a la filosofía a pensar etimológicamente desde las “normas de la casa”. Se descubre, entonces, el sentido de las épocas y de las generaciones filosóficas, la razón de su fecundidad y de su pobreza, así como la relación entre estas y la justicia.

On peut trouver dans l’œuvre de Lévy-Bruhl des traces de la présence de Spinoza, en particulier de sa conception de la connaissance du troisième genre, ou « science intuitive ». Il apparaît que Lévy-Bruhl a travaillé à une « new science of metaphysics », aussi bien dans ses œuvres d’histoire de la philosophie que dans ses ouvrages ethnologiques.One may find in Lévy-Bruhl’s works traces of Spinoza’s presence, in particular of his conception of « knowledge of the third kind », i.e. (...) « intuitive science ». It thus appears that Lévy-Bruhl worked on a « new science of metaphysics » both in his historical researches and in his ethnological works. (shrink)

v. 1. Opere teoretiche.--v. 2. Opere morali.