No consensus yet exists on how to handle incidental fnd-ings in human subjects research. Yet empirical studies document IFs in a wide range of research studies, where IFs are fndings beyond the aims of the study that are of potential health or reproductive importance to the individual research participant. This paper reports recommendations of a two-year project group funded by NIH to study how to manage IFs in genetic and genomic research, as well as imaging research. We conclude that researchers (...) have an obligation to address the possibility of discovering IFs in their protocol and communications with the IRB, and in their consent forms and communications with research participants. Researchers should establish a pathway for handling IFs and communicate that to the IRB and research participants. We recommend a pathway and categorize IFs into those that must be disclosed to research participants, those that may be disclosed, and those that should not be disclosed. (shrink)

Our primary focus is on analysis of the concept of voluntariness, with a secondary focus on the implications of our analysis for the concept and the requirements of voluntary informed consent. We propose that two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions must be satisfied for an action to be voluntary: intentionality, and substantial freedom from controlling influences. We reject authenticity as a necessary condition of voluntary action, and we note that constraining situations may or may not undermine voluntariness, depending on the (...) circumstances and the psychological capacities of agents. We compare and evaluate several accounts of voluntariness and argue that our view, unlike other treatments in bioethics, is not a value-laden theory. We also discuss the empirical assessment of individuals? perceptions of the degrees of noncontrol and self-control. We propose use of a particular Decision Making Control Instrument. Empirical research using this instrument can provide data that will help establish appropriate policies and procedures for obtaining voluntary consent to research. (shrink)

Nanomedicine is yielding new and improved treatments and diagnostics for a range of diseases and disorders. Nanomedicine applications incorporate materials and components with nanoscale dimensions where novel physiochemical properties emerge as a result of size-dependent phenomena and high surface-to-mass ratio. Nanotherapeutics and in vivo nanodiagnostics are a subset of nanomedicine products that enter the human body. These include drugs, biological products, implantable medical devices, and combination products that are designed to function in the body in ways unachievable at larger scales. (...) Nanotherapeutics andin vivonanodiagnostics incorporate materials that are engineered at the nanoscale to express novel properties that are medicinally useful. These nanomedicine applications can also contain nanomaterials that are biologically active, producing interactions that depend on biological triggers. Examples include nanoscale formulations of insoluble drugs to improve bioavailability and pharmacokinetics, drugs encapsulated in hollow nanoparticles with the ability to target and cross cellular and tissue membranes and to release their payload at a specific time or location, imaging agents that demonstrate novel optical properties to aid in locating micrometastases, and antimicrobial and drug-eluting components or coatings of implantable medical devices such as stents. (shrink)

Anhedonia, or a deficit in the liking, wanting, and seeking of rewards, is typically assessed via self-reported “in-the-moment” emotional and motivational responses to reward stimuli and activities. Given that mental imagery is known to evoke emotion and motivational responses, we conducted two studies to investigate the relationship between mental imagery use and self-reported anhedonia. Using a novel Reward Response Scale (adapted from the Dimensional Anhedonia Rating Scale, DARS; Rizvi et al., 2015) modified to assess deliberate and spontaneous mental imagery use, (...) Study 1 (N = 394) compared uninstructed and instructed mental imagery use, and Study 2 (N = 586) conducted a test of replication of uninstructed mental imagery use. Results showed that greater mental imagery use was associated with higher reward response scores (Study 1 & 2), and this relationship was not moderated by whether imagery use was uninstructed or instructed (Study 1). Importantly, mental imagery use moderated the convergence between reward response and depression scale measures of anhedonia, with lower convergence for those reporting higher mental imagery use (Study 1 & 2). Results suggest that higher spontaneous mental imagery use may increase self-reported reward response and reduce the convergence between reward response scale and depression questionnaire measures of anhedonia. [199 / 200 words]. (shrink)

This volume continues the examination of issues of life and death which F.M. Kamm began in Morality, Mortality, Volume I. Kamm continues her development of a non-consequentialist ethical theory and its application to practical ethical problems. She looks at the distinction between killing and letting die, and between intending and foreseeing, and also at the concepts of rights, prerogatives, and supererogation. She shows that a sophisticated non-consequentialist theory can be modelled which copes convincingly with practical ethical issues, and throws considerable (...) light on some of the key distinctions and concepts of ethical discourse. (shrink)

L'Europe est en malaise de ne plus savoir que faire, aujourd'hui, du christianisme. Or, si nous évitons la question du christianisme, c'est, je crois, que le clivage entre "celui qui croyait au ciel" et "celui qui n'y croyait pas" n'est plus pertinent. Aussi aborderai-je le christianisme à titre de ressources. Celles-ci sont, disponibles, à qui les explore et les exploite. A titre de ressources : l'écart des langues et des Evangiles ouvrant un entre réflexif ; qu'un événement soit possible et (...) qu'il soit la vie même ; qu'il faille désadhérer du vital pour accéder à l'originairement vivant ; que Dieu Père dé-coïncide en son Fils pour s'activer en Dieu ; ou qu'il faille se tenir hors du monde pour rencontrer l'Autre... Une reconfiguration radicale de la vérité. Sans y entrer par la foi, on suivra, dans Jean, des filons féconds d'une pensée de l'existence. Pourquoi s'en priver? F.J. (shrink)

Terstenjak, A. Franz Webers philosophisches Gedankengut im Umriss.--Wolf, K. Franz Veber und Graz.--Ilc, M. Näheres zur Verdinglichung und Veranschaulichung in Webers Wirtlichkeitsfrage.--Pirjevec, D. Franz Webers ästhetisches Denken.--Urbančič, I. Philosophische Grundanschauungen bei Franz Weber.--Trofenik, R. Franz Weber.--Weber, F. Meine Beziehungen zu Meinong.--Weber, F. Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Persönlichkeit.--Weber, F. Die Frage der Wirklichkeit.

The aim of this paper is to present a logical framework in which the concepts of trust and reputation can be formally characterized and their properties studied. We start from the definition of trust proposed by Castelfranchi & Falcone . We formalize this definition in a logic of time, action, beliefs and choices. Then, we provide a refinement of C&F’s definition by distinguishing two general types of trust: occurrent trust and dispositional trust. In the second part of the paper we (...) present a definition of reputation that is structurally similar to the definition of trust but moves the basic concept of belief to a collective dimension of group belief. (shrink)

Saul Kripke's puzzle about belief demonstrates the lack of soundness of the traditional argument for the Fregean fundamental principle that the sentences 'S believes that a is F' and 'S believes that b is F' can differ in truth value even if a = b. This principle is a crucial premise in the traditional Fregean argument for the existence of semantically relevant senses, individuative elements of beliefs that are sensitive to our varying conceptions of what the beliefs are about. Joseph (...) Owens has offered a new argument for this fundamental principle, one that is not subject to Kripke's criticisms. I argue that even though Owens' argument avoids Kripke's criticisms, it has other flaws. (shrink)

Of all the explanations of this line the most sensible seems to be that first proposed by Beroaldus: ‘Conqueritur Cynthia sibi defunctae tegulam fractam mutilatamque sub capite fuisse suppositam, quum debuerit amator puluinos molles delicatosque subiicere.’ That Cynthia is talking about the performance of funeral rites is confirmed by Shackleton Bailey's discussion of 1.25 , 28 f.). In default of ancient parallels, I offer a modern one. In the last wishes of the Princess Teresa Uzeda in the novel I viceré (...) by Federico De Roberto, first published in 1894, is included the provision. (shrink)

Cet article présente le Corpus FRAN, premier corpus panfrancophone en ligne sur les variétés de français nord-américaines, élaboré dans le cadre du projet international Le français à la mesure d’un continent (dir. F. Martineau). Il présente d’abord les grandes questions théoriques qui sous-tendent le projet et l’élaboration du Corpus FRAN, puis discute de l’architecture du Corpus FRAN ainsi que de l’interface élaborée pour son interrogation et du protocole de transcription. La configuration du Corpus FRAN, couvrant plusieurs siècles et plusieurs communautés, (...) permet des recherches croisées qui sont susceptibles de mettre en évidence les convergences et divergences entre ces communautés et d’examiner le parcours particulier des locuteurs et scripteurs. Nous illustrons les perspectives qu’ouvre le Corpus FRAN sur la variation et le changement linguistiques par l’étude de deux traits typiques du français nord-américain : la variante m’as (et les variantes associées je vas et je vais) et les variantes de la conséquence ça fait que et so (et les variantes associées alors et donc). (shrink)

Entre ces deux grands termes rivaux, l'être et le vivre, exister est le verbe moderne qui fait lever un nouveau possible. Mais comment décrire l'existence sans plus construire - comme la philosophie l'a fait de l'Etre - en s'en tenant au ras du vécu? Je cherche ici des concepts qui décolleraient le moins de l'expérience : on reste dans l'adhérence au vital ou on en désadhère. Car exister, c'est d'abord résister. Sinon ma vie s'enlise ; ou bien elle peut basculer. (...) Elle s'amorce et se résorbe. Elle reste prise dans le " dur désir de durer " ou bien je peux en émerger. Car si vivre, c'est déjà dé-coïncider d'avec soi (sinon c'est la mort), exister est ce verbe nouveau qui, détaché de l'Etre, se promeut en ressource. " Ex-ister ", c'est en effet, littéralement, " se tenir hors " - il faudra dire de quoi. Ou comment émerger du monde, mais dans le monde, sans verser dans l'au-delà de la métaphysique? De là se dégage une nouvelle éthique qui ne prêche pas : vivre en existant. F. J. (shrink)

These days the two most popular approaches to belief ascription are Millianism and Contextualism. The former approach is inconsistent with the existence of ordinary Frege cases, such as Lois believing that Superman flies while failing to believe that Clark Kent flies. The Millian holds that the only truth-conditionally relevant aspect of a proper name is its referent or extension. Contextualism, as I will define it for the purposes of this essay, includes all theories according to which ascriptions of the form (...) ‘S believes that a is F’ and ‘S believes that b is F’, where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are coreferential proper names, may, depending on the context, differ in truth-value even though in those very contexts each ascription relates the same believer to the very same proposition. What the two theories have in common is the claim that names are Millian. What separates the two theories is what they say about belief contexts. In this essay I prove that Millianism is true, Contextualism is true, or our intuitions regarding belief ascriptions are hopelessly inaccurate. As a consequence, my argument is a proof that either names and many general terms are Millian or our intuitions regarding belief ascriptions are hopelessly inaccurate. (shrink)

In this book, F.M. Cornford explains why the life and work of Socrates stand out as marking a turning-point in the history of thought. He shows how Socrates revolutionized the concept of philosophy, converting it from the study of Nature to the study of the human soul, the meaning of right and wrong, and the ends for which we ought to live. This is, in fact, the story of the whole creative period of Greek philosophy - the Ionian nature of (...) science before Socrates, Socrates himself, and his chief followers, Plato and his pupil Aristotle. It tells of the different contributions each made, and shows how within three centuries the Greek tradition grew to maturity and the fullness of intellectual power. (shrink)