In this paper I defend the traditional interpretations of Kant’s Formula of a Law of Nature from recent attacks leveled by Faviola Rivera-Castro, James Furner, Ido Geiger, Pauline Kleingeld and Sven Nyholm. After a short introduction, the paper is divided into four main sections. In the first, I set out the basics of the three traditional interpretations, the Logical Contradiction Interpretation, the Practical Contradiction Interpretation and the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation. In the second, I examine the work of Geiger, (...) Kleingeld and Nyholm: these three commentators reject the traditional interpretations entirely, but I argue that this rejection is ill-founded. In the third and fourth, I take a detailed look at Furner’s work, work in which he seeks to revise (rather than reject) the traditional interpretations. I argue that, despite his more modest aims, Furner’s revision is also ill-founded. (shrink)

Many Kantian scholars have debated what normative guidance the formula of the law of nature provides. There are three ways of understanding the role of FLN in Kant’s ethics. The first line of interpretation claims that FLN and FLU are logically equivalent. The second line claims that there are only subjective differences, meaning that FLN is easier to apply than the abstrct method of FUL. The third line of interpretation claims that there are objective differences between FLN and (...) FUL in the sense that each formula has an irreducible role in Kant’s ethics. In this article I will show that the first and second lines of interpretation cannot fully explain Kant’s account of FLN and I will propose a new interpretation which pertains to the third type. I will explore the schematism model to understand the role of FLN and argue that it is an intermediary principle that fills in a practical gap between the moral law and action. In the end, I will consider a possible objection against this understanding which claims that the schematism model is not applicable to practical judgment since nothing is given in experience. (shrink)

This article argues for a revised best system account of laws of nature. David Lewis’s original BSA has two main elements. On the one hand, there is the Humean base, which is the totality of particular matters of fact that obtain in the history of the universe. On the other hand, there is what I call the ‘nomic formula’, which is a particular operation that gets applied to the Humean base in order to output the laws of (...) class='Hi'>nature. My revised account focuses on this latter element of the view. Lewis conceives of the nomic formula as a balance of simplicity and strength, but I argue that this is a mistake. Instead, I motivate and develop a different proposal for the standards that figure into the nomic formula, and I suggest a rationale for why these should be the correct standards. Specifically, I argue that the nomic formula should be conceived as a collection of desiderata designed to generate principles that are predictively useful to creatures like us. The resulting view—which I call the ‘best predictive system’ account of laws—is thus able to explain why scientists are interested in discovering the laws, and it also gives rise to laws with the sorts of features that we find in actual scientific practice 1Introduction2The LOPP3A Problem with Lewis's Formula4A Pragmatic Account of the Nomic Formula 4.1Informative dynamics4.2Wide applicability4.3Spatial locality4.4Temporal locality4.5Spatial, temporal, and rotational symmetries4.6Predictively useful properties4.7Simplicity4.8Recap5 Conclusion. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Critics have charged that there are gaps in the logic of Kant’s derivation of the formula of universal law. Here I defend that derivation against these charges, partly by emphasizing a neglected teleological principle that Kant alluded to in his argument, and partly by clarifying what he meant by actions’ “conformity to universal law.” He meant that actions conform to universal law just when their maxims can belong to a unified system of principles. An analogy with objects’ conformity (...) to universal law in nature helps show how Kant was correct in deriving the formula of universal law from the premises of his argument. RÉSUMÉ: Certains ont critiqué la dérivation de la formule de la loi universelle de Kant parce que la logique en serait lacunaire. Je prends la défense de la dérivation, en mettant d’abord l’accent sur un principe téléologique auquel Kant fait allusion dans son argument et, ensuite, en clarifiant ce que celui-ci entend par la «conformité à la loi universelle» des actions. Kant maintenait que les actions étaient conformes à une loi universelle seulement lorsque leurs maximes appartiennent à un système unifié de principes. Une analogie avec la conformité à la loi universelle des objets dans la nature aide à montrer pourquoi Kant avait raison de dériver la formule de la loi universelle des prémisses de son argument. (shrink)

The formula of universal law (FUL) is a natural starting point for philosophers interested in a Kantian perspective on the morality of abortion. I argue, however, that FUL does not yield much in the way of promising or substantive conclusions regarding the morality of abortion. I first reveal how two philosophers' (Hare's and Gensler's) attempts to use Kantian considerations of universality and prescriptivity fail to provide analyses of abortion that are either compelling or true to Kant=s understanding of FUL. (...) I then turn to some recent interpretations of Kant=s FUL contradiction in conception (CC) and contradiction in will (CW) tests. I argue that none of the interpretations of the CC testBincluding the practical interpretation favored by KorsgaardBdoes much to reveal moral problems with maxims of abortion. The CW test (as developed by Herman) is more helpful. Nevertheless, I argue that neither by considering abortion maxims as a subset of maxims of convenience killing, nor by considering such maxims as maxims of refusing to aid, can the CW test generate a general prohibition of abortion. At best, the CW test illuminates the abortion issue because by forcing us to think about how killing a fetus differs from killing other human beings, what attitudes we may reasonably have toward a fetus, and whether Kant's moral theory must be amended to do justice to the problem of abortion. But to pursue these questions, we must look beyond FUL; Kant’s formula of humanity and doctrine of virtue may well have more to offer. (shrink)

In two recent articles I offered a solution to an old problem in Kant’s account of the categorical imperative, that of finding a unitary interpretation of all four of the Groundwork’s applications of the Formula of the Law of Nature. In this article I bring out the unity of this solution and defend the principle of suitability interpretation of FLN from objections raised by Samuel Kahn.

This chapter develops a theory of categorical normativity, of those principles that have authority over us regardless of our ends and interests. It argues that there is an intimate connection between these norms and the conditions of agency. In this respect, it offers a version of constitutivism. But the version of constitutivism defended is unique in a few respects. First, it is naturalistic: agency is an emergent property, like the properties of biology and economics. Second, it is social: agency is (...) something constructed by the complex interaction of agents. And third, it supports the normativity of a particular contractualist procedure: adhering to Kant’s Formula of the Realm of Ends is a condition on agency, and so a categorical requirement. (shrink)

I criticize the widely accepted “practical” interpretation of the universality test contained in Kant’s first formula of the categorical imperative in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals – the formula of the universal law of nature. I argue that this interpretation does not work for contradictions in conception because it wrongly takes contradictions in the will as the model for them and, as a consequence, cannot establish a clear distinction between the two kinds of contradiction. This (...) interpretation also assumes an understanding of universality that departs from Kant’s own and, cannot, for this reason, capture the kind of contradiction that he explicitly claims to establish. I provide an alternative interpretation, which I call revised logical interpretation, that allows us to account for contradictions in conception, including those examples that the practical interpretation cannot handle, as well as to establish a clear distinction between the two kinds of contradiction. (shrink)

The present book takes the discovery that quantum-like behaviour is not solely reserved to atomic particles one step further. If electrons are modelled as vibrating droplets instead of the usually assumed point objects, and if the classical laws of nature are applied, then exactly the same behaviour as in quantum theory is found, quantitatively correct! The world of atoms is strange and quantum mechanics, the theory of this world, is almost magic. Or is it? Tiny droplets of oil bouncing (...) round on a fluid surface can also mimic the world of quantum mechanics. For the layman - for whom the main part of this book is written - this is good news. If the everyday laws of nature can conspire to show up quantum-like phenomena, there is hope to form mental pictures how the atomic world works. The book is almost formula-free, and explains everything by using many sketches and diagrams. The mathematical derivations underlying the main text are kept separate in a -peer reviewed - appendix. The author, a retired professor of Flight Mechanics and Propulsion at the Delft University of Technology, chose to publish his findings in this mixed popular and scientific form, because he found that interested laymen more often than professional physicists feel the need to form visualisations of quantum phenomena. (shrink)

Kant offers the following argument for the formula of humanity (FH): Each rational agent necessarily conceives of her own rational nature as an end in itself and does so on the same grounds as every other rational agent, so all rational agents must conceive of one another's rational nature as an end in itself. As it stands, the argument appears to be question-begging and fallacious. Drawing on resources from the formula of universal law (FUL) and Kant's (...) claims about the primacy of duties to oneself, I propose a contractualist reconstruction of this puzzling line of reasoning. (shrink)

First published in 1985, D. M. Armstrong's original work on what laws of nature are has continued to be influential in the areas of metaphysics and philosophy of science. Presenting a definitive attack on the sceptical Humean view, that laws are no more than a regularity of coincidence between stances of properties, Armstrong establishes his own theory and defends it concisely and systematically against objections. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by (...) Marc Lange, illuminating its continuing importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this influential work is available for a new generation of readers. (shrink)

ABSTRACTErnest Weinrib claims that the purpose of private law is to correct injustices between private parties and the use of private laws for consequentialist ends is a distortion. Weinrib’s primary argument highlights the distinctiveness of corrective justice and distributive justice. Weinrib claims to have an Aristotelian proof for their distinctiveness, but formalisation of and commentary on this aspect of his argument are lacking. This piece fills that gap in the literature. It provides purposely and strategically simple formal models of the (...) structure of corrective and distributive justice, and demonstrates that they are not reducible to one another and cannot be placed under a larger, non-trivial mathematical formula that generalises for even a large number of private law cases. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Out of the Order of Number”: Benjamin and Irigaray Toward a Politics of Pure MeansPeter Fenves* (bio)At the heart of the legal orders that arose in conjunction with the Enlightenment idea of law as rules of conduct universally applicable to all those who belong to a properly instituted political body lies a formula for the justification of the violence on which the law depends in order for it (...) to be an actual, effective, and therefore “living” law—and not merely an idea: violence is justified insofar as it is a means for the control of those violent acts that are not themselves means for the control of immediate threats of violence. As Walter Benjamin indicates in the opening paragraphs of his most explicit exposition of legal and political theory, “Toward the Critique of Violence” (1921), the justification of violence as a means is the point of contention around which arguments over the origin, nature, and purpose of the modern state endlessly circle. Justified violence is supposed to be of a different order than unjustified violence, and so in the context of legal reasoning it is no longer called “violence” but “coercion” or “punishment.” Yet as the formula for the justification of violence indicates, the violence of the legal order is not in general sanctioned for the purpose of subduing immediate threats to one’s own life—this is the justification for the extralegal violence of “private persons”—but for the purpose of preserving the law itself: the law is inviolable. As long as the legal order makes the law effective and thus gives it life, it, too, is inviolable, and all violence other than its own can henceforth be interpreted as an immediate threat not to life itself—however this may be understood—but to the legal order. The end of legally sanctioned violence, its purpose and function, is not to put an end to violence as such but, instead, to thwart all threats to the law in the name of which violence can be sanctioned. Everything that enters into the space over which the legal order imposes its sentence is therefore implicated in the disquieting—or, as Benjamin says, “rotten” [GS 2: 188; SW 242]—ambiguity of legal violence understood as a means whose justification lies in the application of the law: the legal order can justify its own violence only insofar as this violence is a means to an end, but the end it serves can never be separated from itself as means, for the law, by virtue of its universality, is at bottom unconcerned with the life of those upon whom the violence it justifies is exercised or with the life of those whom this violence is supposed to protect. The violence of the legal order is concerned solely with itself, with its own majesty—without, however, ceasing to present itself as a means and reverting to what all legal violence once was: immediate manifestation.Nothing that enters into the space of the legal order can escape the ambiguity of the violence through which the law comes to life. Or at least nothing can escape this ambiguity as long as the space on which the legal order founds itself runs counter to the sole space that accords with the strict universality of the law: a universally accessible, indivisible, and undivided space that is nevertheless capable of the greatest degree of discreteness, differentiation, and individuation. In place of this space the legal orders that arose in Europe over the course of the last five centuries set out something like its parody: [End Page 43] homogeneous and yet fully divided domains whose divisions from one another are momenta of the extralegal violence to which each legal order owes its origin. At least one species of being has always been seen to move outside the space of the legal order—a species whose specificity, speciesness, and spatiality have thus given rise to interminable analysis: the angels. The space that angels traverse—and, in particular, the ones who enter into Luce Irigaray’s writings—does not suffer division into homogeneous domains but does not therefore amount to an undifferentiated expanse, a yawning abyss, or a formless chaos; it is... (shrink)

This paper provides a methodologically original construction of Kant’s “Formula of Universal Law” . A formal structure consisting of possible worlds and games—a “game frame”—is used to implement Kant’s concept of a maxim and to define the two tests FUL comprises: the “contradiction in conception” and “contradiction in the will” tests. The paper makes two contributions. Firstly, the model provides a formal account of the variables that are built into FUL: agents, maxims, intentions, actions, and outcomes. This establishes a (...) clear benchmark for understanding how the mechanics of FUL actually work. Secondly, the analysis of the resulting framework sheds new light on discussions about the implications of FUL. On the basis of this, we suggest a move to “comprehensive Kantianism’, which is the application of FUL to systems of maxims rather than to isolated maxims. (shrink)

We show that in the setting of fair-coin measure on the power set of the natural numbers, each sufficiently random set has an infinite subset that computes no random set. That is, there is an almost sure event [Formula: see text] such that if [Formula: see text] then X has an infinite subset Y such that no element of [Formula: see text] is Turing computable from Y.

In the early modern period, laws of nature underwent two re markable changes: first, their role in science and philosophy was greatly expanded as they became central to investigation and explanation; and second, ontology (are the laws “real” or not?) and induction emerged as far and away the most important problems of interpretation. The dramatic expansion in the variety of the laws and their range of application, together with the emergence of ontology and induction as (the) paramount problems of (...) interpretation, so revolutionized thinking about such laws that it is hard for us, nowadays, to conceive of them in any other terms. For both historical and philosophical reasons, however, it is important that we try: historical, because as a matter of fact philosophers and scientists did not always conceive of laws of nature as we do today; philosophical, because there are ways of conceiving of the laws, different from the dominant conception nowadays, which, if properly attended to, might prove instructive. (shrink)

The title of David Armstrong’s book on the topic asks “What is a Law of Nature?” [1] The answer I will develop and motivate in this paper is that causal laws are analyses of dispositions. We describe dispositions in terms of subjunctive conditionals. For sugar to be soluble in water, for instance, is just for it to be such that if it were submerged in water (under appropriate conditions), it would dissolve. In general, we can say that for a (...) thing to have a disposition is for it to be such that were certain precipitating conditions to obtain, then a certain manifestation of the disposition would occur. [2] In the case of solubility, being submerged in water (under appropriate conditions) is the precipitating condition for the manifestation of going into solution. A careful account of the conditions under which sugar would go into solution in water, that is, an account of the specific nature of its solubility, would be a statement of law. That statement of law would tell us something about the nature of sugar in terms of the dispositions it grounds. (shrink)

A new account of the of the laws of nature based upon Algorithmic Information Theory.

The goal of this thesis to defend the philosophical view of the new ante rem substantivism against its supposed alternatives. To achieve such goal, we will present four views about the nature of laws, two kinds of realism and two kinds of anti-realism, and evaluate them critically. The disadvantages from those theories are going to be presented for us to show that they are insufficient to provide a metaphysics that is able to explain the world's counterfactuality, universality, and regularity, (...) and that just one form of realism, the new ante rem substantivism, can. This goal is important because the concept of laws of nature is widely used in many areas of science and philosophy, and because according to the view we accept, the laws may fulfill some theoretical roles, and not others. We intent to show that the new ante rem substantivism's laws are able to fulfill the roles that scientists would hope the natural laws to fulfill. (shrink)

When we mathematically model natural phenomena, there is an assumption concerning how the mathematics relates to the actual phenomenon in question. This assumption is that mathematics represents the world by “mapping on” to it. I argue that this assumption of mapping, or correspondence between mathematics and natural phenomena, breaks down when we ignore the fine grain of our physical concepts. I show that this is a source of trouble for the mapping account of applied mathematics, using the case of Prandtl’s (...) Boundary Layer solution to the Navier-Stokes equations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ministers of the Law: A Natural Law Theory of Legal AuthorityThomas J. BushlackMinisters of the Law: A Natural Law Theory of Legal Authority Jean Porter Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2010. 368 pp. $30.00Jean Porter’s most recent book is the fruit of her participation with the Emory Center for the Study of Law and Religion since 2005. In this project she undertakes two interrelated tasks. First, she provides compelling (...) reasons for Christian ethicists to engage in questions internal to the discipline of jurisprudence. Second, she demonstrates how a natural law theory grounded in the work of the medieval scholastics can address some of the questions of contemporary jurisprudence. Readers familiar with her previous work will be delighted that she has extended her constructive account of natural law into the realms of jurisprudence and in the process also engages cultural psychology, rhetoric, political philosophy, and international law.Porter begins her engagement with jurisprudence in chapter 1 by noting a paradox recognized by many legal philosophers in the Anglophone world. Legal systems, as they have developed in the West, are characterized by a high degree of autonomy and independence vis-à-vis other social dynamics such as politics or morality. At the same time, however, no legal system can function in complete isolation from considerations of politics and morality. How can we account for the paradoxical autonomy of legal authority? Porter suggests that a scholastic account of natural law can provide a rationally defensible solution to this paradox by developing an account of natural authority (in chapter 2).The force of Porter’s argument rests on the capacity of her account to justify political and legal authority as a natural expression of the authority that any community exercises vis-à-vis its individual members. A community’s authority over its members is justified on the grounds that in prescribing or prohibiting particular acts, it must appeal to claims that could potentially be recognized as justifiable by any rational member of that community. The concept that creates this important hinge between an individual’s good and the good of the community is, of course, the common good. Scholars interested in the concept of the common good will find that her reflection upon it is both rooted deeply in the Christian tradition and applied with fresh insight to the realm of politics (chapter 3) and law (chapter 4). [End Page 210]One potential objection to Porter’s account of natural law could arise in response to her insistence that natural inclinations “underdetermine” the normative content of a natural law morality, leaving her account open to charges of cultural relativism or of being merely descriptive as opposed to normative. However, in this work she is able to turn these criticisms into assets for her account of natural law. She shows (successfully, I believe) how her theory of natural law is able to account for the plurality of moral, political, and legal systems that exist in our world today while still providing normative grounds for critiquing existing social systems. And in chapter 5 she demonstrates how nonderogable, jus cogens principles can be developed from her account of natural law and applied to the field of international law and human rights. In fact, the final section left me hungry for further development of her insights regarding the relationship between natural and international law.This book is written with the same rigorous logic and careful research that has made Porter one of the leading scholars of natural law theory in the field today. As such, this book would be suitable for academics in a wide variety of fields, such as law, political theory, and of course Christian ethics, or for advanced graduate students. It is most certainly a groundbreaking work for demonstrating how a theological account of natural law can engage in constructive dialogue with legal theory and politics at both a theoretical and a practical level.Thomas J. BushlackUniversity of St. ThomasCopyright © 2012 The Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Discusses the Laws of Nature from the ecclesiastical view that, ultimately, Mankind must answer to a higher Being. In the Preface, the author refers to Philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, & Tully, as "Heathens".

R.M. Hare had an ambitious scheme of providing a unified account of meta-ethics and normative ethics by combining expressivism with Kantianism and utilitarianism. The project of this thesis is to defend Hare’s theory in its most ambitious form. This means not just showing how the expressivist, Kantian and utilitarian elements are consistent, or that the three are each correct, but also that they are interdependent. The only defensible form of expressivism is Kantian; the only defensible Kantian theory is both expressivist (...) and utilitarian; the only defensible utilitarianism is Kantian. The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 aims to show how expressivism can provide a coherent account of moral judgement and discourse. The argument for expressivism draws on Hare’s thought that the main error of moral realism is to think of moral objectivity as requiring objects, moral properties which are really there in the world. It is shown, using an argument based on the Euthyphro and the Open Question Argument that realism is untenable because it makes this mistake, and this clears the path to expressivism. Chapter 2 is a full account of the issues surrounding the Frege-Geach problem (often pressed against Hare), showing how it can be solved and how exactly the expressivist’s embrace of minimalism about truth interacts with the solution to the Frege-Geach Problem. I include an explanation of how the expressivist is able to solve the most threatening version of the problem: Schroeder’s discussion of negation. Chapter 3 argues for the connection between expressivism and Kantianism. The argument (roughly following Korsgaard) is that Humean versions of expressivism run into a sceptical challenge of normative regress. Kant employed a transcendental argument to resolve this regress, deriving his Formula of Universal Law from the Categorical Imperative. This argument defended with expressivism playing a crucial role. This chapter thus explains how Hare is entitled to universalizability in a way that avoids the shmoralising objection: it is not justified merely by being derived from our moral concepts but rather from our inescapable nature as agents. Chapter 4 illuminates the other connection, between Kantianism and utilitarianism. The largest part of the chapter is spent defending Hare’s argument from universalizability to utilitarianism. Doing so shows how Hare’s utilitarianism depends on his Kantianism, and so also how it indirectly depends on his utilitarianism. I then go on to defend Hare’s distinctive two-level version of utilitarianism, especially against the objections of Bernard Williams. It is also argued that various difficulties for utilitarianism – utility monsters, interpersonal comparison, Korsgaard’s objections – can be met by a form of utilitarianism like Hare’s, which is Kantian, and thus that such a form of utilitarianism is indeed the most defensible. (shrink)

Scientific behavior is used as a benchmark to examine the truth status of computationalism (COMP) as a law of nature. A COMP-based artificial scientist is examined from three simple perspectives to see if they shed light on the truth or falsehood of COMP through its ability or otherwise, to deliver authentic original science on the a priori unknown like humans do. The first perspective (A) looks at the handling of ignorance and supports a claim that COMP is "trivially true" (...) or "pragmatically false" in the sense that you can simulate a scientist if you already know everything, which is a state that renders the simulation possible but pointless. The second scenario (B) is more conclusive and unusual in that it reveals that the COMP scientist can never propose/debate that COMP is a law of nature. This marked difference between the human and the artificial scientist in this single, very specific circumstance, means that COMP cannot be true as a general claim. The third scenario (C) examines the artificial scientist's ability to do science on itself/humans to uncover the "law of nature" which results in itself. This scenario reveals that a successful test for scientific behavior by a COMP-based artificial scientist supports a claim that COMP is true. Such a test is quite practical and can be applied to an artificial scientist based on any design principle, not merely COMP. Scenario (C) also reveals a practical example of the COMP scientist's inability to handle informal systems (in the form of liars), which further undermines COMP. Overall, the result is that COMP is false, with certainty in one very specific, critical place. This lends support to the claims (i) that artificial general intelligence will not succeed based on COMP principles, and (ii) computationally enacted abstract models of human cognition will never create a mind. (shrink)

John Carroll undertakes a careful philosophical examination of laws of nature, causation, and other related topics. He argues that laws of nature are not susceptible to the sort of philosophical treatment preferred by empiricists. Indeed he shows that emperically pure matters of fact need not even determine what the laws are. Similar, even stronger, conclusions are drawn about causation. Replacing the traditional view of laws and causation requiring some kind of foundational legitimacy, the author argues that these phenomena (...) are inextricably intertwined with everything else. This distinctively clear and detailed discussion of what it is to be a law will be valuable to a broad swathe of philosophers in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Kantians are increasingly deserting the universal law formula in favor of the humanity formula. The former, they argue, is open to various decisive objections; the two are not equivalent; and it is only by appealing to the humanity formula that Kant can reliably generate substantive implications from his theory of an acceptable sort. These assessments of the universal law formula, which clash starkly with Kant's own assessment of it, are based on various widely accepted interpretative assumptions. (...) These assumptions, it is argued in this article, depend on misleading translations of key terms; selective attention to Kant's concrete examples; not taking seriously Kant's theoretical claims about the relations among his various ideas; and a failure to take into account Kant's idiosyncratic definitions of key concepts. The article seeks to right these interpretative wrongs, and finds that the universal law formula is not open to many of the standard objections. (shrink)

This book deals with an internal theme of metaphysics, which is the metaphysics of the laws of nature. The author presents traditional contemporary theories, as well as his own original theory, and evaluates each one at a time. He also addresses the problem of the modality of the laws of nature and makes some criticism of the standard view of necessity as truth in all possible worlds, and shows an application of his discussion to the metaphysics of physics. (...) / Este livro trata de um tema interno à metafísica, que é a metafísica das leis da natureza. O autor apresenta as teorias tradicionais contemporâneas, tal como também a sua própria teoria original, e avalia cada uma delas por vez. Ele também aborda o problema da modalidade das leis da natureza e apresenta uma certa crítica à visão padrão da necessidade como verdade em todos os mundos possíveis, e mostra uma aplicação da sua discussão à metafísica da Física. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Tuomas Tahko has argued for a hybrid view of the laws of nature, according to which some physical laws are metaphysically necessary, while others are metaphysically contingent. In this paper, we show that his criterion for distinguishing between these two kinds of laws — which crucially relies on the essences of natural kinds — is on its own unsatisfactory. We then propose an alternative way of drawing the metaphysically necessary/contingent distinction for laws of physics based (...) on the central kinematical/dynamical distinction used in physical theorising, and argue that the criterion can be used to amend Tahko’s own account, but also that it can be combined with different metaphysical views about the source of necessity. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe predication of the eternal law served as premise and and foundation for the existence of the law of nature in the classical/medieval intellectual inheritance of Thomas Hobbes and his contemporaries. Unlike them, he makes no mention of the eternal law in his early writings, The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, and On the Citizen. His triple use of the expression eternal law of God in Leviathan is ambiguous and misleading. Instead, he is one of the first writers (...) in English to assert the eternity of the law of nature. He does that by invoking a biblical-based expression, verbum aeternum. In On the Citizen, and its exegetical, theological identification with Christ, to establish that claim. In Leviathan he repeats his declaration that the law of nature is eternal nine times, spread across more than five Chapters and twelve hundred pages. Four of them are equivalently excised from the Latin Leviathan and the others remain brief assertions, unanalyzed and undefended, rendering their effect incidental and perfunctory. He also abandons the expression verbum aeternum. (shrink)

Kant’s Formula of Universal Law (FUL) is generally believed to require you to act only on the basis of maxims that you can will without contradiction to become universal laws. In “Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law” (2017), I have proposed to read the FUL instead as requiring that, for any maxim on which you act, you can will two things simultaneously, without volitional self-contradiction: (1) willing the maxim as your own action principle and (2) willing that (...) it become a universal law. In the present essay, I reply to comments by Mark Timmons, Michael Walschots, Paola Romero, and Stefano Lo Re. In response to their comments concerning the application of the FUL, I expand the interpretive framework of the Volitional Self-Contradiction Interpretation. I argue that Kant also constructs the diagnostic volitional self-contradiction as a contradiction between (1) willing a tested maxim to become a universal law and (2) willing what humans, qua finite rational beings, necessarily will, namely the means to their actual and possible future ends. I also clarify how the two ways in which Kant specifies the test are related. Furthermore, I clarify the relation between the Volitional Self-Contradiction interpretation and other interpretations of the FUL, in particular the ‘Practical Contradiction’ and ‘Logical Contradiction’ interpretations, as well as its difference from the Golden Rule. I also address the objection that the volitional self-contradiction is superfluous, clarify the relation between the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of the Law of Nature, and explain why the will of an immoral agent does not contain a volitional self-contradiction of the type at issue. (shrink)

According to the positive duties objection, it is not possible to derive positive duties from Kant’s Formula of Universal Law (FUL). However, in his recent “Deriving Positive Duties from Kant’s Formula of Universal Law”, Guus Duindam tries to answer this objection. More specifically, Duindam tries to show how both a duty of benevolence and a duty of self-perfection can be derived from the FUL. I critically examine Duindam’s arguments. I maintain that Duindam’s argument for the positive duty of (...) benevolence is ambiguous and that this ambiguity exposes him to a fatal dilemma: on one horn, Duindam faces the same objection that he concedes to be effective against other attempts to answer the positive duties objection; on the other horn, the procedure he recommends cannot be based on the FUL (because it does not evaluate actions on the basis of their corresponding maxims). In addition, I maintain that Duindam’s benevolence argument rests on a procedure that is, in general, intractable and, in this particular case, foredoomed (because it can be shown that there are no positive duties of the kind he tries to derive). From there, I turn to Duindam’s argument for the positive duty of self-perfection. I explain that Duindam’s derivation of the duty of self-perfection, even if successful, does not answer the positive duties objection. This is because Duindam never appeals to the FUL in his derivation of the duty of self-perfection (the derivation is based, rather, on instrumental reasoning from the second-order end to accomplish our first-order ends). I elaborate on this by comparing and contrasting Duindam’s argument with Oliver Sensen’s interpretation of how to apply the FUL in the latter’s recent “Universal Law and Poverty Relief”. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 105 Heft: 4 Seiten: 471-490.

이 논문은 근대 자연법사상에서 자기보존의 이기적 욕망을 추구하는 자유와 이를 실현하고 평화를 확보할 수 있는 윤리적 공동체 구현이 가능한지를 연구하는 목적에서 작성되었다. 이 목적을 위해서 논문은 먼저 홉스의 자연법사상에 나타난 인간의 욕망 추구의 자유와 욕망의 체계 그리고 이를 수용하는 윤리적 공동체 이론을 먼저 살펴보고 이를 비판하는 헤겔의 이론을 통해서 헤겔이 말하는 욕망의 자유와 인륜 공동체의 이론을 비교 서술하였다. 홉스는 자기를 보존하고자 하는 이기적 욕망의 본성을 인정하고 이러한 본성에서 자연법을 논하고 있다. 홉스의 자연법에서 이론의 토대가 되는 욕망의 체계는 사회 형성의 바탕이 (...) 되지만, 이렇게 형성된 사회에서 인간의 욕망 체계는 최악의 전쟁상태가 될 수 있다. 따라서 이 최악의 상태를 피하고자 인간의 무제한의 자기 욕망 추구의 자유는 제한되어야 하고 평화를 확보하는 시민국가로 이행하여야 한다. 그래서 시민국가는 자연법사상을 현실화하는 시민법을 통하여 형성된 윤리적 공동체이다. 반면 헤겔은 홉스의 자연법에 따른 근대 영국 시민사회를 비판하면서 경험주의적 오류를 범하고 있는 시민사회를 넘어서 완전하고도 이상적인 인륜공동체를 주장한다. 인간의 본성에 근거한 경험주의적 자연법을 기초로 성립한 시민사회는 욕망의 갈등과 분열로 오히려 인간의 자유가 강제적으로 제한되고 개인은 욕망의 노예로 살게 된다. 따라서 욕망의 자유와 국가의 이상적 이념이 합일되는 인륜국가는 욕망의 대립과 갈등이 사라진 총체적 통일로서 인륜공동체가 된다. 그러나 연구 결과, 헤겔이 욕망의 체계와 자유가 강력한 정부의 역할을 통해서 전체적으로 조화를 이루는 인륜국가의 이론을 말했음에도 불구하고 국가의 현실적 기능에서 헤겔의 국가 역할은 홉스의 그것과 크게 다르지 않다. 오히려 현대의 강력한 정부의 역할에서 나타난 현상과 비교하면 인륜공동체 이론은 현실에서 실현될 수 없는 이상적 이념이다. 역사적 경험과 개인과 사회의 현실적 관계에서 고려하면 사회적 공동선을 위해서 개인이 욕망의 자유권을 협의하고 제한하여 평화적인 공동체를 형성하는 홉스의 윤리적 공동체 이론이 실현 가능성이 큰 윤리공동체 이론이라고 할 수 있다. (shrink)

According to the standard Humean account of laws of nature, laws are selected partly as a result of an optimal trade-off between the scientific virtues of simplicity and strength. Roberts and Woodward have recently objected that such trade-offs play no role in how laws are chosen in science. In this paper, we first discuss an example from the field of automated scientific discovery which provides concrete support for Roberts and Woodward’s point that scientific theories are chosen based on a (...) single-virtue threshold. However, we then use this very same example as a starting point to argue that i) by insisting on a single best theory, Humeans rely on an overly simplistic conception of trade-offs, that ii) this conception should give way to one which allows for a Pareto front of equally optimal theories, and iii) that given this new conception, threshold behaviour for a virtue like strength is a) compatible with the existence of a genuine trade-off and b) can even play the positive role of a selection criterion. (shrink)

The Great Divide in metaphysical debates about laws of nature is between Humeans, who think that laws merely describe the distribution of matter, and non-Humeans, who think that laws govern it. The metaphysics can place demands on the proper formulations of physical theories. It is sometimes assumed that the governing view requires a fundamental / intrinsic direction of time: to govern, laws must be dynamical, producing later states of the world from earlier ones, in accord with the fundamental direction (...) of time in the universe. In this paper, we propose a minimal primitivism about laws of nature (MinP) according to which there is no such requirement. On our view, laws govern by constraining the physical possibilities. Our view captures the essence of the governing view without taking on extraneous commitments about the direction of time or dynamic production. Moreover, as a version of primitivism, our view requires no reduction / analysis of laws in terms of universals, powers, or dispositions. Our view accommodates several potential candidates for fundamental laws, including the principle of least action, the Past Hypothesis, the Einstein equation of general relativity, and even controversial examples found in the Wheeler-Feynman theory of electrodynamics and retrocausal theories of quantum mechanics. By understanding governing as constraining, non-Humeans who accept MinP have the same freedom to contemplate a wide variety of candidate fundamental laws as Humeans do. (shrink)

Kant’s formula of universal law (FUL) is standardly understood as a test of the moral permissibility of an agent’s maxim: maxims which pass the test are morally neutral, and so permissible, while those which do not are morally impermissible. In contrast, I argue that the FUL tests whether a maxim is the cause or determining ground of an action at all. According to Kant’s general account of causality, nothing can be a cause of some effect unless there is a (...) law-like relation between the putative cause and effect. Applied to the case of action, no maxim can be the cause of an agent’s action unless there is a law-like relation between maxims of that kind and actions of that kind. The special capacity to act according to maxims as law-like causes is what Kant calls a will; the basic constitutive principle of the will is a non-normative principle I call the categorical declarative. While the actions of a perfectly good will would be described by the categorical declarative alone, human action is determined not only by the causality of the will, but also by competing causes, namely those stemming from inclination. There is thus need for a causal test for putative maxims. The test contained in the FUL is meant to determine whether an action could be grounded solely on the agent’s maxim, or whether it requires a cause external to the will. This account permits one to build eventual distinctions concerning the morality of actions on prior and independent distinctions concerning their causality. (shrink)

In this book, S. A. Lloyd provides a radical interpretation of Hobbes' laws of nature, revealing them to be not egoistic precepts of personal prudence but rather moral instructions for obtaining the common good. This account of Hobbes' moral philosophy stands in contrast to both divine command and rational choice interpretations. Drawing from the core notion of reciprocity, Lloyd explains Hobbes' system of 'cases in the law of nature' and situates Hobbes' moral philosophy in the broader context of (...) his political philosophy and views on religion. Offering ingenious new arguments, Lloyd defends a reciprocity interpretation of the laws of nature through which humanity's common good is secured. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: * 1 The Universe Is Weirdly Fine-Tuned for Life * 2 The Cosmic Code * 3 The Concept of Laws * 4 Are the Laws Real? * 5 Does a Multiverse Explain the Goldilocks Enigma? * 6 Many Scientists Hate the Multiverse Idea * 7 Who Designed the Multiverse? * 8 If There Were a Unique Final Theory, God Would Be Redundant * 9 What Exists and What Doesn’t: Who or What Gets to Decide? * (...) 10 The Origin of the Rule That Separates What Exists From What Doesn’t * 11 Why Mind Matters * 12 The Universe as a Finite Computer Exposes the Fiction of Idealized Laws * 13 Quantum Mechanics Could Permit the Feedback Loop Between Mind and the Laws Of Physics * Notes. (shrink)