Los _Sermones _de Cromacio de Aquilea nos ofrecen evidencia directa de su experiencia episcopal y literaria, que se divide entre la exégesis más destacada y el objetivo pastoral. La simplicidad estructural y lingüística, y la referencia a algunos autores contemporáneos, características de la tercera de estas composiciones homiléticas, nos ofrecen la oportunidad para analizar los propósitos más íntimos y prácticos de este texto. De hecho, la estrecha relación con su audiencia y el intento de guiarla por el justo camino cristiano (...) son los evidentes protagonistas en todo el discurrir del sermón. Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo se observa también la exégesis escritural de Cromacio y su profundización doctrinal: el Obispo trata de ofrecer un pequeño pero útil bagaje para el camino de quien lo escucha, en una poderosa valorización de la acción humana. La _vita activa _que se suma a la _lex naturae _inherente al alma humana constituye, de hecho, el tema más evidente de la homilía íntegra, que expone el de Aquilea sobre todo con el objetivo de fortalecer la unidad y la identidad de quienes escuchan cuando enfrentan presiones externas. La referencia escritural es fuerte y está presente en todo el sermón: el pasaje, seguramente leído justo antes de la exposición, se expone casi en su totalidad a los fieles, para fijarlo mejor en la memoria de aquellos que asisten a la lectura. (shrink)

Chapter 1 First Person Access to Mental States. Mind Science and Subjective Qualities -/- Abstract. The philosophy of mind as we know it today starts with Ryle. What defines and at the same time differentiates it from the previous tradition of study on mind is the persuasion that any rigorous approach to mental phenomena must conform to the criteria of scientificity applied by the natural sciences, i.e. its investigations and results must be intersubjectively and publicly controllable. In Ryle’s view, philosophy (...) of mind needs to adopt an antimentalist stance to achieve this aim. Antimentalism not only definitively rejects the idea that mind is a substance separated from the body, it also denies that mental phenomena radically differ from physical phenomena by virtue of several unique features. Most problematically, mental phenomena have a conscious character (mental states are related to specific qualitative feelings) and are accessible only to the first-person (only the subject knows directly what s/he is experiencing inside his/her mind). Ryle takes a strong stance on antimentalism going so far as to maintain that an approach to mind which aims to meet the criteria of scientificity set by the natural sciences must avoid any reference to internal, unobservable mental states. In his view (which is considered a specifically philosophical version of psychological behaviorism and also addresses questions put forward in psychological research), mental states can be redescribed in terms of behavioral dispositions. In this chapter, we address the historical roots of the antimentalist view and analyze its relation to the later tradition of research on mind. We show that, compared to the antimentalist stance, functionalism and cognitivism take a step back when they maintain that direct reference to mental states is necessary since mental states cause and therefore explain human behavior. This step backwards is often interpreted as a return to mentalism. However, this is only partially true. Indeed, we suggest that these later traditions retain one important element of Ryle’s antimentalism, i.e. the idea that mental states must be uniquely identified using external and publicly observable criteria, while excluding any reference to introspection and those qualitative dimensions of a mental state, which are accessible only to the first-person. According to the perspective we put forward, this epistemological stance has continued to influence contemporary research on mind and current philosophical and psychological theories which both tend to exclude the subjective qualities of human experience from their accounts of how the mind works. The issue we raise here is whether this is legitimate or whether subjective qualities do play a role with respect to the way our mind works. The conclusion of this chapter anticipates the argument the book makes in in favor of this latter position, starting from a particular angle, i.e. the problem of how we categorize concepts related to our internal states. -/- Chapter 2 The Misleading Aspects of the Mind/Computer Analogy. The Grounding Problem and the Thorny Issue of Propriosensitive Information -/- Abstract. After the crisis of behaviorism, cognitivism and functionalism became the predominant models in the field of psychology and of philosophy, respectively. Their success is mainly due to the new key they use for interpreting mental processes: the mind/computer analogy. On the basis of this analogy, mental operations are seen as cognitive processes based on computations, i.e. on manipulations of abstract symbols which are in turn understood as informational unities (representations). This chapter identifies two main problems with this model. The first is how these symbols can relate to and communicate with perception and thus allow us to identify and classify what we perceive through the senses. Here we limit ourselves to presenting this issue in relation to the classical symbol grounding problem originally put forward by Harnad on the basis of Searle’s Chinese room argument. An attempt to address the problem raised here will be made in chap. 3. The second point we discuss in relation to the mind/computer analogy concerns the idea of information it fosters. Indeed, following this analogy, information is something available in the external world which can be captured by the senses and transmitted to the central system without being influenced or modified by the procedures of transmission. This perspective does not take into account that – unlike computers – in living beings information is acquired by means of the body. As Ulric Neisser has already pointed out, the body is itself an informational source that provides us with additional sensory experience that influences (modifies or complements) the information extracted from the external world by the senses. To develop this line of analysis and to determine exactly what information is provided by the body and how this might influence cognition, we examine Sherrington’s and Gibson’s positions. Moving on from their views, we qualify bodily information in terms of ‘proprioception’. We use ‘proprioception’ in a broad sense to describe any kind of experience we have of our internal states (including postural information as well as sensations related to the general state of the body and its parts). Following Damasio’s and Craig’s studies, we further elaborate this position, arguing that living beings are equipped with an internal propriosensitive monitoring system which maps all the changes that constantly occur in our body and that give us perceptual (‘proprioceptive’ or propriosensitive) information about what happens inside us. Moreover, relying on Goldie’s and Ratcliffe’s view, we show that emotional information can also be considered as a form of ‘proprioception’ which contributes to determining everything we perceive. This analysis leads us to the second main thesis of this book: ‘proprioception’ is a form of internal perception and it is an essential component of the sensory information we can access and use for all cognitive purposes. -/- Chapter 3 Semantic Competence from the Inside: Conceptual Architecture and Composition -/- Abstract. Concepts are essential constituents of thought: they are the instruments we use to categorize our experience, i.e. to classify things and group them together in homogeneous sets. Here we define concepts as the internal mental information (representations) that allows us, among other things, to master words in natural language. By analyzing the way in which individuals master word meanings we explore a number of hypotheses regarding the nature of concepts. Following Diego Marconi’s research, we differentiate between two kind of abilities that underpin lexical competence – so-called ‘referential’ and ‘inferential competence’ – and we suggest that, in order to support these abilities, concepts must also include two corresponding kinds of information, i.e. inferential and referential information. We point out that the most widely used and acknowledged theories of concepts do not make this distinction, instead broadly characterizing the information used for categorization in terms of propositionally described feature lists. However, we show that while feature lists can explain inferential competence, they do not account for referential competence. To address the issue of referential competence we examine Ray Jackendoff’s hypothesis that to account for the possibility of linking perceptual and conceptual information we need to assume the existence of a (visual) representation that encodes the geometric and topological properties of objects and bridges the gap between the percept and the concept. Furthermore, we analyze the extension of this work by Jesse Prinz who introduced the notion of a proxytype, a perceptual representation of a class of objects that incorporates structural and parametric information related to their appearance. However, as we point out, proxytypes can only explain the relationship between perception and concepts with respect to instances that can be perceived through the senses and that belong to the same class by virtue of their physical similarity. We suggest that this notion be extended to include larger conceptual classes. To accomplish this, we further develop Mark Johnson, George Lakoff and Jean Mandler’s idea of a schematic image and argue that conceptual representations include a perceptual schema. Perceptual schemata are non-linguistic, structured experiential gestalts (patterns or maps) that make use of information taken from all sensory modalities, including body perception. They accomplish a quasi-conceptual function: they allow us to recognize and to classify different instances. In this work, we hypothesize that perceptual schemata are an essential component of concepts, but not identical to them. Instead, we suggest that concepts include both perceptual and propositional information with perceptual schemata providing the ‘perceptual core concept’ that grounds related propositional information. -/- Chapter 4 In the Beginning There Were Categories. The Bodily Origin of Prelinguistic Categorical Organization: The Example of Folkbiological Taxonomies -/- Abstract. Studies of categorization in psychology and the cognitive sciences have made use of the notions of ‘category’ and ‘concept’ without precisely defining what is meant by either; in fact, often these terms have been used as synonyms, making it difficult to address specific issues related to conceptual development. This chapter begins by discussing the definitions of, as well as the distinctions between, ‘categories’ and ‘concepts’ in the classical philosophical tradition (Aristotle, Kant and Husserl). We introduce our view of categories with reference to Husserl. Categorization is defined as the way in which our experience is originally (pre-linguistically) organized in a passive and fully unconscious manner on the basis of universal structuring principles. Conceptualization is explained as a later process in which the earlier categorical macro-classes are further subdivided into more specific and detailed sets; this later process also relies on linguistic learning and exposure to culture. On the basis of Ray Jackendoff, Jean Mandler, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work, we hypothesize that categorization is a two-step process that begins with the formation of homogeneous sets of entities partitioned into regions that describe the ontological boundaries of the objects that humans perceive (categories) and continues at a later stage with the development of more specific classifications (concepts). In this chapter, we mainly address three related issues: Why should we assume that there is categorical organization which precedes the development of a conceptual system? How do categories and concepts relate to each other? Shall we hypothesize that categories are innate or that they are formed before concepts on the basis of information and organizational structure available at a very early developmental stage? We show that categorical partitions are necessary for categorization and, following Mandler, that the general categories we form at an early age do not match our adult superordinate concepts. As for the third issue, we argue that there might be no need to assume that categories are innately present in the human mind, since their formation can be explained – at least in certain cases – by basic mechanisms that work on body (propriosensitive) information. This hypothesis will not be discussed in general, but in relation to a particularly relevant example of categorical partition, i.e. the folk-biological dichotomy between ANIMATE/INANIMATE. This is compared with other dichotomies that derive from it, but are not directly categorical such as LIVING/NON-LIVING and BIOLOGICAL/NON-BIOLOGICAL. -/- Chapter 5 Internal States: From Headache to Anger. Conceptualization and Semantic Mastery -/- Abstract. Here we ask if we can also apply the distinction between referential and inferential competence we introduced in Chapter 3 to words that do not refer to things that are perceived using the external senses, especially to words/concepts that denote bodily experiences (such as pain, thirst, hunger, etc.) or emotions. We introduce and discuss the hypothesis that – even though such words/concepts do not refer to intersubjectively identifiable entities in the external world – they do have a kind of referent that can be accessed via direct perception, more specifically ‘proprioception’, as we have defined it in terms of all propriosensitive information we can consciously access. In the first part of the chapter, we specifically consider terms denoting bodily experiences such as ‘pain’ or ‘hunger’ and argue that their referents are identified and classified from a first-personal point of view on the basis of four main characteristics: their specific intensity, their localization in the body, their co-occurrence with other signals and above all their specific qualitative sensations. Emotions are addressed in the second part of the chapter. We suggest that there is a continuity between bodily experiences and emotions. In particular, we argue for a perceptual theory of emotions in line with that proposed by James and Lange at the end of the 19th century and developed more recently by authors such as Damasio (see also chap. 2§5, §6). The hypothesis we put forward is that the referential information that supports the categorization of emotions and therefore also our mastery of terms referring to emotions consists in the perception (i.e. the ‘proprioception’) of those bodily states and changes in bodily states which constitute our emotional experience. In the context of this discussion we examine some objections to this line of reasoning that arise from a cognitivist perspective and following authors such as Oatley, Johnson-Laird and Frijda, we distinguish between basic emotions that can be identified and classified solely on the basis on how they feel and complex emotions whose identification and classification additionally depends on cognitive factors. To describe how emotions are identified and classified on the basis of how they feel, we rely on Marcel and Lambie’s distinction between an ‘emotion state’ and an ‘emotion experience’. Both notions indicate kinds of feelings that we consciously experience. However, they describe first-order and second order emotion awareness respectively. The emotion state is the feeling we have of the bodily states and changes that occur when we are experiencing an emotion, while the emotion experience is the fully developed and integrated emotion we both experience and are, with reflection, aware of experiencing. On the basis of this differentiation, we also show that the same characteristics that aid in the identification and classification of bodily experiences (specific qualitative sensations; somatic localization; specific intensity; presence/absence of specific concomitant sensations) can also be used for the identification and classification of emotions – at least basic emotions. In the last two sections of the chapter we present some clinical evidence on the semantic competence of people who suffer from Alexithymia and Autism Spectrum Disorder which supports the conclusions of our preceding analyses. -/- Chapter 6 The ‘Proprioceptive’ Component of Abstract Concepts -/- Abstract. In this chapter, we address the issue of whether the mastery of abstract words requires only inferential knowledge and thus, if the concepts that support the mastery of abstract words include only linguistic information. We start by differentiating the notions of ‘abstract’ and ‘general’ which are often erroneously confused. We then identify a strict definition of abstract, as contrasted with ‘concrete’, that applies to words or concepts whose referent cannot be experienced by the senses. We argue that abstract words/concepts would be better described as theoretical, because they are usually conceived as structured sets of inferential knowledge expressed linguistically; that is, as small theories. Pointing out parallels with Carnap’s analysis of this issue in philosophy of science, we hypothesize that words/concepts denoting non-observable entities are not all ‘equally theoretical’, because their link to sensory experience can be stronger or weaker. We revive the distinction, inspired by Quine, between theoretical and intertheoretical concepts/words. This distinction relies on the fact that the former – unlike the latter – retains a strong, although indirect, connection with perception. In Quine’s discussion, perception is understood uniquely in terms of observability, i.e. of external sensory experience. Here we argue, however, that bodily, ‘proprioceptive’ (i.e. propriosensitive) experience can also serve to referentially ground theoretical (i.e. abstract) concepts/words. We frame this issue using the example of the theoretical concept ‘freedom’ and Lakoff’s hypothesis that this concept is developed on the basis of bodily information. We contrast this with the example of ‘democracy’ which more closely resembles an intertheoretical concept/word. Furthermore, we show that one of the classical views put forward in psycholinguistic research to explain how abstract concepts are mentally represented – i.e. Paivio’s Dual Coding Theory – points in the same direction as our analysis. The same is true of Barsalou’s work suggesting that we use internal information to understand at least some abstract words. To sustain this position, we put forward two lines of evidence: the first comes from psycholinguistic studies while the second examines deficits of semantic competence exhibited by people with Autism Spectrum Disorder. On the basis of our analysis, we put forward a classification that distinguishes between different kinds of concreteness and different degrees of abstraction: concepts/words referring to body experiences and basic emotions are described as analogous to concrete concepts/words because they are grounded in perceptual (i.e. propriosensitive) experience, while abstract concepts/words are considered more or less abstract depending on whether they are intratheoretical (and rely entirely on inferential information) or theoretical (and are partially grounded in perceptual – or more often in propriosensitive perceptual – information). In the last section of the chapter we consider two scales that have been used in psycholinguistic research to measure the degree of concreteness vs. abstractness of words and we show that – used conjointly – they can provide a measure of the internal vs. external grounding of specific words. (shrink)

We tested the plausibility of a cognitive-emotional model to understand the effects of messages framed in terms of gain, non-loss, non-gain, and loss, and related to the health consequences of red/processed meat consumption. A total of 544 Italian participants reported their attitude toward reduced red/processed meat consumption and intention to eat red/processed meat. One week later, participants were randomly assigned to four different message conditions: gain messages focused on the positive health outcomes associated with low meat consumption; non-loss messages focused (...) on the avoided negative health outcomes associated with low meat consumption; non-gain messages focused on the missed positive health outcomes associated with high meat consumption; loss messages focused on the negative health outcomes associated with high meat consumption. After reading the messages, participants answered a series of questions regarding their emotional and cognitive reactions to the messages, their evaluation of the messages, and again their attitude and intention toward red/processed meat consumption. Comparing different multivariate linear models under the Bayesian approach, we selected the model with the highest plausibility conditioned to observed data. In this model, message-induced fear influenced systematic processing, which in turn positively influenced message evaluation and attitude, leading to reduced intention to consume red/processed meat. Vice versa, message-induced anger reduced systematic processing, which in turn negatively influenced message evaluation, and led to no effect on attitude and intention. The comparison among message conditions showed that gain and non-loss messages activated integrated emotional and cognitive processing of the health recommendation, while loss and non-gain messages mainly activated emotional shortcuts toward attitude and intention. Overall, these results advance our comprehension of the effects of message framing on receivers' attitudes and intentions. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate ignorance in relation to our capacity to justify our beliefs. To achieve this aim we specifically address scientific misconceptions, i.e. beliefs that are considered to be false in light of accepted scientific knowledge. The hypothesis we put forward is that misconceptions are not isolated false beliefs, but rather form part of a system of inferences—an explanation—which does not match current scientific theory. We further argue that, because misconceptions are embedded in a system, they cannot be (...) rectified simply by replacing false beliefs with true ones. To address our misconceptions, we must rather act on the system of beliefs that supports them. In the first step of our analysis, we distinguish between misconceptions that are easy to dispel because they represent simple errors that occur against the background of a correct explanatory apparatus and misconceptions that are, on the contrary, very difficult to dispel because they are the product of pseudo explanations. We show that, in the latter case, misconceptions constitute an integral part of an incorrect explanation and the reasons that support such misconceptions are deeply misleading. In the second step, we discuss various approaches that have been adopted to address the problem of misconceptions. Challenging the notion that directly addressing and criticizing specific misconceptions is an effective approach, we propose that critical thinking is the most fruitful means to deal with misconceptions. We define the core competences and knowledge relevant for the practice of critical thinking and discuss how they help us avoid misconceptions that arise from accepting beliefs that form part of a mistaken explanation. (shrink)

Este artículo busca realizar una contribución específica a la agenda global de “inclusión educativa” a partir de la recuperación y discusión de distintas problematizaciones realizadas en la academia argentina en diálogo con aportes de la filosofía (política), la historiografía y la sociología de la educación. Luego de repasar algunas definiciones postuladas en el discurso académico y político global y de esbozar algunas coordenadas contextuales que sitúan las problematizaciones argentinas proponemos centrar la discusión en torno a tres ejes: 1) la crítica (...) etimológica o radical al concepto de “inclusión educativa”; 2) algunos principios y dilemas de justicia implicados en la agenda de reforma; y 3) las (im)posibilidades de la forma escolar ante el mandato inclusivo. Finalmente sugerimos la importancia de continuar avanzado en problematizaciones alternativas que habiliten la producción de políticas y sistemas educativos más justos. (shrink)

Este artículo aborda la cuestión relativa a la crisis de la efectividad de los derechos humanos y fundamentales. Se trata de un desafío que requiere compromiso, vigilancia, responsabilidad compartida. Los derechos son una herramienta indispensable para expresar el valor de la dignidad que está ligada a la vulnerabilidad como condición humana común. Los derechos son un tipo de práctica social encaminada a su implementación y concreción. Está formada por principios, reglas, instituciones, procedimientos, actitudes, actos de interpretación. Esta práctica juega un (...) papel importante para contrarrestar y eliminar las situaciones que producen violaciones de los sujetos en sus múltiples diferencias y existencias específicas. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper examines the American sojourn of the Enlightenment philosopher and theologian George Berkeley. While living in coastal Rhode Island between 1729 and 1731, Berkeley penned his longest philosophical tract, Alciphron: Or, the Minute Philosopher (1732), which criticized “freethinking,” mechanical conceptions of nature in favor of those that emphasized God's providence. To illustrate these two ways of knowing nature, Berkeley, a careful prose stylist, evoked nearby coastal landscapes for contrast. Accordingly, his work broke down dichotomies between ideas and matter and, (...) by extension, culture and nature, which could, this paper argues, inform an environmental ethic for a “hybrid” world. (shrink)

This volume delves into the question of how, in an Iberian world apparently far removed from the battlegrounds of modernity and secularisation, doubt and unbelief found fertile soil, stimulated by social and religious developments. Adopting a multidisciplinary perspective, the contributors show how the crisis of identity produced by forced mass conversion touched off inner crises about the nature of Truth. By tracing the path from medieval Spain to the Spanish Inquisition, and from the great literary and artistic works of the (...) Spanish Baroque to Sephardic Marranism, this volume fills a historiographical gap in European social and intellectual history, demonstrating the importance of the Iberian world in the evolution of European scepticism. Mercedes García-Arenal is Research Professor at CSIC, Madrid, and Stefania Pastore is Associate Professor at the Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa. They work on tolerance and dissent in Early Modern Iberia: on forced conversion, on the violent world of the Inquisition and the debates and protests that it sparked, and on the complex interplay of minorities. They have recently collaborated on After Conversion. Iberia and the Emergence of Modernity (Brill, 2016) and, as editors, Visiones imperiales y profecía. Roma, España, Nuevo Mundo (Abada, 2018). (shrink)

Este artigo propõe uma reflexão crítica sobre a relação entre a noção de dever em Kant e a concepção de desejo na ética psicanalítica freudo-lacaniana. Kant fundamenta o dever moral na ideia de boa vontade, e na universalização da razão. Em contraste, na psicanálise freudolacaniana o senso de dever é moldado pela interação complexa entre desejos inconscientes, socialização e a busca pelo equilíbrio entre pulsões individuais e normas sociais. Concluímos que esta tensão intrínseca ao ser humano destaca a necessidade de (...) compreender a ética humana considerando não apenas a racionalidade, mas também a complexidade e a variedade dos desejos inconscientes. (shrink)

Il concetto di "libertà" descrive uno dei valori fondamentali della società occidentale contemporanea. Tuttavia, sebbene tutti concordino circa la necessità di difendere la libertà, persone che incarnano convinzioni politiche, morali e sociali diverse interpretano la libertà in maniere differenti, se non perfino contrapposte. Nonostante queste evidenti divergenze, è opinione diffusa che questo concetto si caratterizzi alla sua base per una sorta di denominatore comune, a proposito del quale sussiste un’unanimità pervasiva e che delinea l’orizzonte di una comune battaglia. Questo studio (...) investiga questa opinione da un punto di vista cognitivo allo scopo di determinare come sia costituito e di quale informazione si componga il concetto astratto di “libertà”. La ricerca – che si rifà in parte alla teoria di G. Lakoff – identifica un nucleo cognitivo comune concreto del concetto e chiarisce come questo si contamini ideologicamente nel corso del suo sviluppo da concetto concreto a concetto astratto. Le conclusioni di questo studio evidenziano tuttavia come il nucleo universale del concetto sia eccessivamente indeterminato per costituire un denominatore comune politicamente rilevante che fornisca una base di accordo a proposito di un valore condiviso ed evidenzia alcuni limiti dell'impostazione data da Lakoff al problema, avanzando delle ipotesi per futuri sviluppi della ricerca su questi temi. (shrink)

_Abstract_: In this introduction to the thematic issue on _the future of the cognitive science(s)_, we examine how challenges and uncertainties surrounding the past and present of this discipline make it difficult to chart its future. We focus on two main questions. The first is whether cognitive science is a single unified field or inherently pluralistic. This question can be asked at various levels: First, with respect to the disciplines that should be included in the cognitive hexagon and their reciprocal (...) relationships: should we speak of cognitive science or of the cognitive sciences? Second, with regard to the conceptual and methodological changes (turns or revolutions) that have taken place within the cognitive project from its inception to the present day. Third, it pertains to cognitive psychology as a discipline. Before the emergence of cognitive science psychology was a fragmented discipline characterized by different traditions and approaches: has cognitive science been able to stem this fragmentation? Finally, we can question the unity of the cognitive architecture itself: is cognition produced by homogeneous or heterogenous mechanisms for information processing? We show that the issue of unity is addressed by several of the papers included in this thematic issue. In the second part of this introduction, we query the role that each component discipline should play in the cognitive project and in particular which should lead the project going forward, and why. Again, we show how this issue has been tackled by several articles featured in this collection. _Keywords_: Future of Cognitive Science; Cognitive Psychology; Pluralism and Cognitive Science; Philosophy and Cognitive Science; Fragmentation of Psychology _Quale futuro per la scienza cognitiva?_ _Riassunto_: In questa introduzione al fascicolo tematico dedicato al _futuro della scienza cognitiva_ prendiamo in considerazione sfide e incertezze che caratterizzano il passato e il presente di questa disciplina, rendendo difficile prevedere il suo futuro. Due le questioni principali su cui concentriamo l’attenzione. La prima: la scienza cognitiva è un ambito unitario o intrinsecamente pluralistico? Questo problema si manifesta a diversi livelli. In primo luogo, riguarda le discipline che dovrebbero comporre l’esagono cognitivo e le loro relazioni reciproche: dovremmo parlare di scienza cognitiva o di scienze cognitive? In secondo luogo, riguarda le trasformazioni (svolte o rivoluzioni) concettuali e metodologiche avvenute all’interno di questo progetto dalla sua nascita fino ai giorni nostri. In terzo luogo, riguarda la psicologia cognitiva. Prima della nascita della scienza cognitiva la psicologia era una disciplina frammentaria caratterizzata da diverse tradizioni e approcci: possiamo dire che la scienza cognitiva abbia posto rimedio a tale frammentazione? Infine, il problema dell’unità sorge anche in relazione all’architettura cognitiva stessa, considerando che la cognizione potrebbe o potrebbe non essere prodotta da meccanismi omogenei di elaborazione delle informazioni. Nella presentazione che segue si cerca di mostrare come l’unità, in tutte queste varianti, sia una questione affrontata da diversi articoli presenti in questo fascicolo tematico. Nella seconda parte di questa introduzione prendiamo in considerazione il problema del ruolo che ciascuna disciplina componente dovrebbe svolgere nel progetto cognitivo e, in particolare, quale dovrebbe guidare il progetto e perché, ponendo in evidenza come anche questa sia una questione centrale, tematizzata da diversi lavori presentati in questo fascicolo. _Parole chiave_: Futuro della scienza cognitiva; Psicologia cognitiva; Pluralismo e scienza cognitiva; Filosofia e scienza cognitiva; Frammentazione della psicologia. (shrink)

In his latest book, Marshall Gregory begins with the premise that our lives are saturated with stories, ranging from magazines, books, films, television, and blogs to the words spoken by politicians, pastors, and teachers. He then explores the ethical implication of this nearly universal human obsession with narratives. Through careful readings of Katherine Anne Porter's "The Grave," Thurber's "The Catbird Seat," as well as _David Copperfield_ and _Wuthering Heights_, Gregory asks the question: How do the stories we absorb in our (...) daily lives influence the kinds of persons we turn out to be? "__Shaped by Stories___ _weaves its own compelling story about the pervasive ethical effects of reading narrative, with Marshall Gregory serving as a highly engaging and ethically admirable narrator--a very model of good company." --_James Phelan, Distinguished University Professor of English, Ohio State University_ "Marshall Gregory's __Shaped by Stories_ _brings ethical criticism to the level of felt experience. Witty and passionate, full of personal reflections and sharp examples, this book will help anyone who has been drawn to the mysterious power of stories to think more carefully about the connections between narrative art and human ethos. Gregory reminds us that the urgency of our need for stories is tied permanently to the need to exercise judgment, belief, and empathy in the process of becoming who we are." --_Annette Federico, James Madison University _ "From a lifetime of reflecting on the ethics of fiction, Marshall Gregory has given us an elegant analysis of the power of stories to instruct and delight. No one interested in storytelling will want to be without this incisive guide to both the myriad ways that stories shape our lives and the strategies writers use to affect our responses. Both the theoretical and practical halves of __Shaped by Stories __have clarity and eloquence." --_Robert D. Denham, Fishwick Professor of English, Emeritus, Roanoke College_. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in investigating science communication. Some studies that address this issue attempt to develop a model to determine the level of confidence that an author or a scientific community has at a given time towards a theory or a group of theories. A well-established approach suggests that, in order to determine the level of certainty authors have with regard to the statements they make, one can identify specific lexical and morphosyntactical markers which indicate (...) their epistemic attitudes. This method is considered particularly appealing because it permits the development of an algorithmic model based on the quantitative analysis of the occurrence of these markers to assess automatically and objectively the opinion of an author or the predominant opinion of a scientific community on a topic at a given time. In this contribution we show that this line of research presents many kinds of problems especially when it is applied to research articles. To this aim, we propose two main lines of reasoning. The first one relies generally on the argumentative structure of scientific articles and shows that certainty/uncertainty markers are used differently in different argument forms and that therefore their number/frequency of use does not offer reliable indications for determining whether the topic at issue is considered by the authors to be more or less factual/speculative. The second one is based on the analysis of a sample of psychiatric research articles on homosexuality written over a long time span and taken from The British Journal of Psychiatry. Since the psychiatric perspective on homosexuality changed radically during the decades in which these articles were published, they offer an inventory of various kinds of argumentative strategies directed both at defending and confuting dominant as well as marginal positions. We focus especially on uncertainty markers and show that frequently the positions stated using expressions indicating uncertainty are actually not considered as conjectural or speculative by their authors, but that the use of uncertainty markers is motivated by a number of different and often incongruent rhetorical strategies. (shrink)

Comment on Joseph Raz, From Normativity to Responsibility.

In this article I explore some topics of the philosophy of law of Julius Binder. More specifically, I explore the relation and compatibility of his ideas with national-socialism. In the first part of the article I analyze the neo- Kantian approach underlying to his philosophy. Subsequently I analyze his turn towards neo- Hegelianism. In the last sections I address the philosophical concept of nation that this author defended and I search for its links with both national- socialism and Hegelian philosophy. (...) My final conclusion is that Hegel is not responsible for the use of his theories made by some Nazi authors such as Julius Binder. (shrink)

La propuesta de una democracia radical condice con una concepción en la que el poder aparece como un «lugar vacío». Esto significa, que el lugar de la universalidad, que ocupaba la clase obrera en la teoría de Marx, es sustituido por una práctica articulatoria política, la cual se convierte en la encargada de brindar una unidad momentánea y parcial a los elementos fragmentarios de una estructura social abierta y dislocada (plural).

Con este artículo se pretende rememorar los viajes efectuados a Turquía (1907) y años después al país del Nilo (1924) por el famoso novelista Vicente Blasco Ibáñez (1867-1928). Sus impresiones, la historia de los países visitados, la descripción de sus ciudades y paisajes tomaron cuerpo en las obras tituladas Oriente y La vuelta al mundo de un novelista. Blasco Ibáñez supo resumir la historia de Constantinopla así como la de Egipto -especialmente su antigüedad- con sencillas palabras, sin tecnicismos, haciendo llegar (...) al lector el impacto que le causaron monumentos y ambientes de la ciudad turca en un caso, y las pirámides, tumbas y el paisaje nilotico en otro, además de introducirlo en el alma de sus gentes.…. (shrink)

En este trabajo consideraremos la relación entre el monismo de la sustancia divina y el pluralismo de las partes del continuo en sus escritos metafísicos de 1675-76. Este es otro punto de vista de la relación general entre monismo-pluralismo considerada por Andreas Blank, aunque compatible con el suyo. Para mostrar esta relación, primero consideraremos el tratamiento acerca de lo máximo en el continuo, distinguiendo dos tipos y mostrando que uno de ellos no fue tratado con anterioridad. Segundo, analizaremos el estatus (...) ontológico de la materia, como una cosa existente actualmente –aunque no sustancial. Tercero, consideraremos la teoría acerca de las partes del continuo como infinitas y resultantes de una división sin fin. (shrink)

El título de mi contribución a este número de la revista Arbor, «Los Servicios de inteligencia ante los retos de la comunidad internacional", posiblemente debería completarse con la frase, para las que aquéllos deben tener respuesta. Me explico. Es obvio que la comunidad internacional tiene que afrontar retos como el hambre, la pobreza, el cambio climático, que no menciono en mi artículo ya que no entran dentro del ámbito de actuación de los servicios de inteligencia, aunque ningún analista cualificado los (...) ignoraría. No obstante, he creído conveniente centrar mi descripción, necesariamente sucinta, del panorama actual de las relaciones internacionales en aquellos factores que entiendo afectan directamente a la seguridad internacional y, por tanto, a la tarea de los servicios de inteligencia. (shrink)

Resumen: El supuesto de la constitución del yo a partir de la relación intersubjetiva que surge con el reconocimiento del otro hace emerger el problema del fundamento ontológico del yo. Por una parte, el yo no puede existir de manera aislada, pero por otra, subordinar su constitución a la relación con el otro puede debilitar el yo al hacerlo dependiente, para su constitución, en algo distinto de él. Hacer que la constitución del yo dependa de la relación intersubjetiva plantea la (...) cuestión del inicio: ¿Qué son, antes de relacionarse, aquellos que entran en relación? ¿Si el yo se reconoce a sí mismo reconociendo a otro, qué es aquello que reconoce? Estas preguntas apuntan a la búsqueda de un fundamento ontológico o metafísico para la antropología fenomenológica: el uno no puede depender del otro y a su vez este del primero. La antropología filosófica de Paul Ricoeur, con su énfasis en la corporalidad e historicidad del hombre, además de su diálogo con Aristóteles, ofrece respuesta a estas preguntas. Ricoeur estudia al hombre desde dentro, pero no olvida aquello propio del hombre que hace que el ser humano pueda ser reconocido y capaz de reconocer.: The proposition of the constitution of the self as starting from the intersubjective relationship that emerges from the recognition of the other, presents the problem of the ontological foundation of the self. On one hand, the self cannot exist in isolation, but on the other, making its constitution subordinate to the relation with the other can debilitate the self as it is made dependent, for its constitution, on something different from the self. If the constitution of the self is dependent on the intersubjective relation the question of its origin arises: What are those who enter a relation before relating? If the self only recognizes itself recognizing another, what is it that it recognizes? These questions are directed towards the search for an ontological or metaphysical foundation for the study of phenomenological anthropology. The self cannot depend on the other, and this one, in turn, on the self. Paul Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology, with its emphasis on the corporeal and historical nature of man, and its dialogue with Aristotle, offers answers to these questions. Ricoeur studies man from his inner life but does not forget that which makes it possible for a human being to recognize and to be recognized. (shrink)

Although acoustic frequency is not a spatial property of physical objects, in common language, pitch, i.e., the psychological correlated of frequency, is often labeled spatially (i.e., “high in pitch” or “low in pitch”). Pitch-height is known to modulate (and interact with) the response of participants when they are asked to judge spatial properties of non-auditory stimuli (e.g., visual) in a variety of behavioral tasks. In the current study we investigated whether the modulatory action of pitch-height extended to the haptic estimation (...) of height of a virtual step. We implemented a HW/SW setup which is able to render virtual 3D objects (stair-steps) haptically through a PHANTOM device, and to provide real-time continuous auditory feedback depending on the user interaction with the object. The haptic exploration was associated with a sinusoidal tone whose pitch varied as a function of the interaction point’s height within (i) a narrower and (ii) a wider pitch range, or (iii) a random pitch variation acting as a control audio condition. Explorations were also performed with no sound (haptic only). Participants were instructed to explore the virtual step freely, and to communicate height estimation by opening their thumb and index finger to mimic the step riser height, or verbally by reporting the height in centimeters of the step riser. We analyzed the role of musical expertise by dividing participants into non musicians and musicians. Results showed no effects of musical pitch on high-realistic haptic feedback. Overall there is no difference between the two groups in the proposed multimodal conditions. Additionally, we observed a different haptic response distribution between musicians and non musicians when estimations of the auditory conditions are matched with estimations in the no sound condition. (shrink)