Recent commentaries on the relation between Deleuze and Foucault often operate with an implicit idea of compatibility or consistency that postulates systematic harmony as the decisive criterion for the affinity between them. Accordingly, the predominant question is whether Deleuze and Foucault are “true” friends philosophically and politically. Although the assessments differ, they share a likewise implicit notion of the friend as familiar that excludes any form of ambivalence in amicable relations and consequently cannot fully account for the dynamics and variability (...) of the relation between Deleuze and Foucault. This article tries to address this problem by suspending the notion of the friend-as-familiar, effectively posing the question of what concept of friendship we would have if the ambivalent relation between Deleuze and Foucault would be the model. For this, the reconstruction begins with the early encounters and follows their relationship until the supposed split in the context of the desire-pleasure-debate. What becomes apparent is the dialogical structure of the philosophical friendship between Deleuze and Foucault that entails convergences as well as divergences, which will eventually be related to their own and fundamentally different concepts of friendship. Deleuze and Foucault, as will be argued, are neither “vrais amis” nor “faux amis” but simply amis that practised a form of philosophical friendship, lasting for more than 15 years. (shrink)

Traduire consiste à faire passer la teneur d’un message exprimé dans une langue, dans une autre, avec la plus grande fidélité. Pour que la traduction soit fidèle au texte de départ il est donc nécessaire de comprendre ledit texte. Lorsque ce dernier est de nature juridique, traduire sous-tend de comparer deux systèmes de droit (tradition civiliste et Common Law pour les textes qui nous intéressent) qui généralement ne coïncident que de manière partielle. On se propose d’analyser la traduction de concepts (...) qui posent problème sur le plan du signifiant et/ou sur celui du signifié, soit parce que la graphie des mots qui les désignent est identique ou très proche en anglais et en français—ce sont des faux amis, parmi lesquels on distinguera les vrais des faux -, soit parce que l’équivalence des mots généralement posés en miroir présente des subtilités qui interdisent parfois de traduire l’un par l’autre : parmi ces «vrais amis» , moins amicaux qu’il n’y paraît, on distinguera, là encore, les vrais, des faux. On tâchera de montrer que parfois, «bien» traduire ce peut être d’opter pour une traduction descriptive; d’autres fois, c’est choisir un équivalent fonctionnel, dès lors qu’on a identifié que l’on ne se trouve pas dans l’espace non partagé par les deux concepts juridiques; d’autres fois encore, mais de manière marginale, c’est décider de ne pas traduire. (shrink)

This article tries to bring to light the mistaken idea that the words the law borrows from plain language, without explicit definition, should keep their original meaning; Although legal language and plain language are obviously close “friends”, they seem to be also “false friends”, because these words belonging to two different languages have, beyond their formal similarities, partially different meanings. For this purpose, this article provides a critical analysis of the reference of the belgian case law to the ordinary meaning (...) of words. This reference is analysed in relation to three different matters: interpretation, legality, and autonomy of criminal law. (shrink)

La définition du mot « génocide » relève d’emblée d’ambiguïtés lexicales et conceptuelles. À l’origine juridique, le terme divise les historiens qui y voient tantôt une spécificité du xxe siècle, tantôt un hapax avec la « solution finale », tantôt un phénomène plus ancien avec le moment fondamental de la colonisation ouverte à l’idée d’extermination. Ainsi, la prudence fera préférer la notion de « massacre de masse ».L’instrumentalisation politique de la référence à l’état de guerre est un parallélisme plutôt qu’une (...) comparaison. Contexte favorable, prétexte, arrière-fond du discours génocidaire, la guerre est faux ami avec le génocide. Huis clos autophage dans une entité politique, le génocide connaît une plus grande proximité avec la guerre civile : la désignation d’ennemis intérieurs, la barrière du corps qui tombe, la « brutalisation » des sociétés favorisent la discrimination d’un ennemi qu’il faut rendre visible pour mieux le faire disparaître. La « bascule » dans le génocide révèle les mécanismes fantasmatiques du politique qui concrétisent l’éventualité destructrice de l’État. Aussi faut-il se demander si le génocide appartient en propre à une terrible modernité du xxe siècle ou à la substance de l’État. La question de la rationalité folle ou de la logique irrationnelle du génocide repose le problème du mal radical et du mal politique : dans la réinvention du politique à travers les pratiques génocidaires, l’existence et l’identité de l’État se redéfinissent hyperconflictuelles. (shrink)

L'oeuvre d'Alain Boureau, multiple et dense, se deploie sur les quarante dernieres annees en abordant de nombreux domaines de l'histoire du Moyen Age et du christianisme latin. Elle suit les peregrinations personnelles et professionnelles d'un chercheur a travers un monde peuple de silhouettes incertaines : figures de l'hagiographie, faux-semblants de l'Etat moderne, anges, demons, cadavres et somnambules, vagues individus scolastiques qui eux-memes parlent de creatures etranges. Autant de fantomes d'un passe persistant qu'il a suivis avec tenacite tout au long (...) de sa carriere, et qui nous embarquent a leur tour a travers l'histoire. Ce volume entend garder la trace vivante des deux journees qui furent organisees a Paris en mai 2015 autour de l'oeuvre d'Alain Boureau. Ce Liber amicorum d'un genre un peu particulier, production scolastique en quelque sorte, donne a voir les membres d'un studium, ce qu'etait le seminaire d'Alain Boureau : les amis, les collegues, les proches, celles et ceux qui l'ont accompagne au cours de ses annees passees a l'EHESS. Les textes rassembles rendent compte de trajectoires et de realisations, ils en montrent les apports scientifiques et les enjeux intellectuels. Ils racontent, aussi. Ainsi se manifeste la richesse d'une oeuvre singuliere, construite aux croisements de differentes pratiques des sciences sociales dans une demarche souvent collective, toujours originale et novatrice. (shrink)

Pour la première fois, Michel Onfray prend la parole sur son initiative collective, heureuse et spectaculaire : la création, en 2002, de l'Université populaire de Caen. Pourquoi, comment, pour qui, contre quoi : armé de sa plus belle plume, enthousiaste et percutant comme jamais, il explique, défend et revendique ce projet un peu fou, devenu un incroyable succès... populaire. L'Université populaire de Caen en 2002 est avant tout une réponse à la situation politique du moment : la présence d'un candidat (...) d'extrême-droite à l'élection présidentielle. Georges Deherme avait créé les universités populaires pour instruire la classe ouvrière, en réalisant le voeu formulé par Condorcet un siècle plus tôt : développer "une instruction qui rende la raison populaire". Cette ambition suppose qu'on souscrive à deux propositions : l'ignorance enchaîne et le savoir libère. En reprenant le flambeau, Michel Onfray s'inscrit en faux contre les dogmatismes étroits, la moralisation, le formatage intellectuel de l'université française. Il revendique l'exploration de ce qu'il appelle les "marges philosophiques de l'historiographie officielle", sans élitisme ni démagogie. A la demande toujours croissante de philosophie, d'aucuns répondent par la commercialisation du savoir, d'autres par le bavardage collectif (les "cafés philo"...) ou l'infantilisation. A l'extrême opposé, le projet de Caen se fonde sur des valeurs démocratiques et libertaires : il s'agit de rassembler des "amis" (comme Epicure dans son jardin), pour partager et dialoguer avec tous ceux qui ont soif de savoir, dans un but philosophique commun : "se faire libre" (Nietzsche). (shrink)

In recent analytic metaphysics, the view that ‘ordinary inanimate objects such as sticks and stones, tables and chairs, simply do not exist’ has been defended by some noteworthy writers. Thomasson opposes such revisionary ontology in favour of an ontology that is conservative with respect to common sense. The book is written in a straightforward, methodical and down-to-earth style. It is also relatively non-specialized, enabling the author and her readers to approach problems that are often dealt with in isolation in a (...) more unified way.Thomasson's arguments are mainly counter-attacks on six ‘eliminativist’ arguments against ordinary objects. A causal redundancy argument espoused by Trenton Merricks holds that to suppose that there are ordinary objects is to suppose that these objects have distinctive causal powers. However, the casual efficacy of a baseball, for example, is exhausted by that of some suitably arranged …. (shrink)

volume 1. God, self, and family -- volume 2. The Jewish community and beyond.

Introduction : the politics of our selves -- Foucault, subjectivity, and the enlightenment : a critical reappraisal -- The impurity of practical reason : power and autonomy in Foucault -- Dependency, subordination, and recognition : Butler on subjection -- Empowering the lifeworld? autonomy and power in Habermas -- Contextualizing critical theory -- Engendering critical theory.

The authors offer ways to encourage and educate Americans to participate in the public deliberations that make democracy work and lay out the principles of..

This book invites a conversation among stakeholders of public education and conveys the need for a common vision for America’s public schools. Amy Fast argues that we have never had a clear purpose for our schools and that now, more than ever, educators in America ache for a more inspiring purpose than simply improving results on standardized assessments.

Intuitions about the transparency of experience have recently begun to play a key role in the debate about qualia. Specifically, such intuitions have been used by representationalists to support their view that the phenomenal character of our experience can be wholly explained in terms of its intentional content.[i] But what exactly does it mean to say that experience is transparent? In my view, recent discussions of transparency leave matters considerably murkier than one would like. As I will suggest, there is (...) reason to believe that experience is not transparent in the way that representationalism requires. Although there is a sense in which experience can be said to be transparent, transparency in this sense does not give us any particular motivation for representationalism—or at least, not the pure or strong representationalism that it is usually invoked to support. (shrink)

God Is Hope provides young children with the comfort of knowing God brings hope into the world, no matter the day, time, season, or year, in this charming, sweet, and heartfelt book. With warm, rhyming verse, bestselling author Amy Parker reassures young hearts by introducing them to the awesome characteristics of an Almighty God.With a focus on spring and Easter, Parker's book offers reminders of how God's hope is infectious during this very special season. Part of a series, God Is (...) Hope is sure to be read and cherished all year long. --amazon.com. (shrink)

This essay examines three competing views of technological change, developed at the beginning of the millennium, and their impact on our lives. The discussion will lead to three conclusions. First, we must be involved in decisions about how technology is regulated and used. Second, we should be wary not to consider all technologies as having the same effects. The cell phone is neither the personal computer nor the television, and there is no reason to consider each as having the same (...) potential social consequences. Third, new methodologies must be developed to account for any changes in social relations that come about as a result of our adoption of these technologies. In the final section of the essay, the consequences of contemporary technologies on what it means to be human are briefly discussed. Rather than substitute technology for democracy or big data for the ability to find significant information, we must take democratic control of these technologies and affirm our humanity. Indeed, I argue along with noted commentators on technology that what makes us human is our ability to sort and find relevant information, reflect on our actions and take risks in associating with other humans. These are things that we must always bear in mind if we are to flourish in the information age. (shrink)

While post- and decolonial theorists have thoroughly debunked the idea of historical progress as a Eurocentric, imperialist, and neocolonialist fallacy, many of the most prominent contemporary thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School--Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth, and Rainer Forst--have persistently defended ideas of progress, development, and modernity and have even made such ideas central to their normative claims. Can the Frankfurt School's goal of radical social change survive this critique? And what would a decolonized critical theory look like? Amy Allen fractures (...) critical theory from within by dispensing with its progressive reading of history while retaining its notion of progress as a political imperative, so eloquently defended by Adorno. Critical theory, according to Allen, is the best resouce we have for achieving emancipatory social goals. In reimagining a decolonized critical theory after the end of progress, she rescues it from oblivion and gives it a future. (shrink)

This challenging study places fiction squarely at the centre of the discussion of metaphysics. Philosophers have traditionally treated fiction as involving a set of narrow problems in logic or the philosophy of language. By contrast Amie Thomasson argues that fiction has far-reaching implications for central problems of metaphysics. The book develops an 'artifactual' theory of fiction, whereby fictional characters are abstract artifacts as ordinary as laws or symphonies or works of literature. By understanding fictional characters we come to understand how (...) other cultural and social objects are established on the basis of the independent physical world and the mental states of human beings. (shrink)

The most widely debated conception of democracy in recent years is deliberative democracy--the idea that citizens or their representatives owe each other mutually acceptable reasons for the laws they enact. Two prominent voices in the ongoing discussion are Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. In Why Deliberative Democracy?, they move the debate forward beyond their influential book, Democracy and Disagreement.What exactly is deliberative democracy? Why is it more defensible than its rivals? By offering clear answers to these timely questions, Gutmann and (...) Thompson illuminate the theory and practice of justifying public policies in contemporary democracies. They not only develop their theory of deliberative democracy in new directions but also apply it to new practical problems. They discuss bioethics, health care, truth commissions, educational policy, and decisions to declare war. In "What Deliberative Democracy Means," which opens this collection of essays, they provide the most accessible exposition of deliberative democracy to date. They show how deliberative democracy should play an important role even in the debates about military intervention abroad.Why Deliberative Democracy? contributes to our understanding of how democratic citizens and their representatives can make justifiable decisions for their society in the face of the fundamental disagreements that are inevitable in diverse societies. Gutmann and Thompson provide a balanced and fair-minded approach that will benefit anyone intent on giving reason and reciprocity a more prominent place in politics than power and special interests. (shrink)

While fights about ontology rage on in the ring, there’s long been a suspicion whispered in certain corners of the stadium that some of the fights aren’t real. Granted the disputants all think they are really disagreeing—it’s not the sincerity of the serious ontologists that’s in question, but rather their judgment that they are engaged in a real debate about genuine issues of substance.

As Hume famously claimed, we are nowhere more free than in our imagination. While this feature of imagination suggests that imagination has a crucial role to play in modal epistemology, it also suggests that imagining cannot provide us with any non-modal knowledge about the world in which we live. This chapter rejects this latter suggestion. Instead it offers an account of “imagining under constraints,” providing a framework for showing when and how an imaginative project can play a justificatory role with (...) respect to our beliefs about the world. That we can be free in our imaginings does not show that they must proceed unfettered; as is argued, our ability to constrain our imaginings in light of facts about the world enables us to learn from them. The important upshot is that imagination has considerably more epistemic significance than previously thought. (shrink)

A vision of a living code of ethics is proposed to counter the emphasis on negative phenomena in the study of organizational ethics. The living code results from the harmonious interaction of authentic leadership, five key organizational processes (attraction–selection–attrition, socialization, reward systems, decision-making and organizational learning), and an ethical organizational culture (characterized by heightened levels of ethical awareness and a positive climate regarding ethics). The living code is the cognitive, affective, and behavioral manifestation of an ethical organizational identity. We draw (...) on business ethics literature, positive organizational scholarship, and management literature to outline the elements of positive ethical organizations as those exemplary organizations consistently practicing the highest levels of organizational ethics. In a positive ethical organization, the right thing to do is the only thing to do. (shrink)

I argue that the ontological status of fictional characters is determined by the beliefs and practices of those who competently deal with works of literature, and draw out three important consequences of this. First, heavily revisionary theories cannot be considered as ‘discoveries’ about the ‘true nature’ of fictional characters; any acceptable realist theory of fiction must preserve all or most of the common conception of fictional characters. Second, once we note that the existence conditions for fictional characters are extremely minimal, (...) it makes little sense to deny the existence of fictional characters, leaving anti-realist views of fiction unmotivated. Finally, the role of ordinary beliefs and practices in determining facts about the ontology of fictional characters explains why non-revisionary theories of fiction are bound to yield no determinate or precise answer to certain questions about fictional characters, demonstrating the limits of a theory of fiction. (shrink)

In “The Standing to Blame: A Critique” (2013), Macalester Bell challenges theories that claim that ‘standing’ plays a central role in blaming practices. These standard accounts posit that it is not enough for the target of blame to be blameworthy; the blamer also must have the proper standing to blame the wrongdoer. Bell identifies and criticizes four different standing conditions, (1) the Business Condition, (2) the Contemporary Condition, (3) the Nonhypocricy Condition, and (4) the Noncomplicity Condition. According to standard accounts, (...) these conditions must be met in order for a would-be blamer to properly blame a wrongdoer. In this paper, I defend the Business Condition against Bell’s critique. My argument, then, is that some version of the standard account survives and ‘standing’ should be part of our theory of properly-wielded blame. I conclude by raising two additional concerns regarding the agency of blamers and the possibility that, without proper standing, a blamer could make things worse. (shrink)

We often talk of people as being more or less imaginative than one another – as being better or worse at imagining – and we also compare various feats of imagination to one another in terms of how easy or hard they are. Facts such as these might be taken to suggest that imagination is often implicitly understood as a skill. This implicit understanding, however, has rarely (if ever) been made explicit in the philosophical literature. Such is the task of (...) this chapter. I first attempt to flesh out several conditions for an activity to count as a skill. I then attempt to show how imagination can meet such conditions. The chapter concludes with an attempt to answer various worries that might be raised to the claim that imagination should be thought of as a skill. (shrink)

This highly original book argues for increased recognition of pregnancy, birthing and childrearing as social activities demanding simultaneously physical, intellectual, emotional and moral work from those who undertake them. Amy Mullin considers both parenting and paid childcare, and examines the impact of disability on this work. The first chapters contest misconceptions about pregnancy and birth such as the idea that pregnancy is only valued for its end result, and not also for the process. Following chapters focus on childcare provided in (...) different circumstances and on the needs of both providers and receivers of care. The book challenges the assumption that isolated self-sacrifice should be the norm in either pregnancy or childcare. Instead reproductive labor requires greater social support. Written from the perspective of a feminist philosopher, the book draws on the work of, and seeks to increase dialogue between, philosophers and childcare professionals, disability theorists, nurses and sociologists. (shrink)

Despite their intuitive appeal and a long philosophical history, imagery-based accounts of the imagination have fallen into disfavor in contemporary discussions. The philosophical pressure to reject such accounts seems to derive from two distinct sources. First, the fact that mental images have proved difficult to accommodate within a scientific conception of mind has led to numerous attempts to explain away their existence, and this in turn has led to attempts to explain the phenomenon of imagining without reference to such ontologically (...) dubious entities as mental images. Second, even those philosophers who accept mental images in their ontology have worried about what seem to be fairly obvious examples of imaginings that occur without imagery. In this paper, I aim to relieve both these points of philosophical pressure and, in the process, develop a new imagery-based account of the imagination: the imagery model. (shrink)

In Chapter One, I define two problems inherent in Spinoza's theory of sense perception. I call them "the Proposition Twelve problem" and "the sameness of perceptual experience problem," and I describe them as follows. The Proposition Twelve problem. According to Proposition Twelve of Book Two of the Ethics, human minds perceive all events in the bodies with which they are identified. Furthermore, according to Propositions Sixteen, Seventeen, and Nineteen, human minds also perceive the causes of such events. Introspection belies these (...) claims. The sameness of perceptual experience problem. By the Scholium to Proposition Thirteen of Book Two of the Ethics, all beings have minds which perceive events in their bodies, and by Propositions Sixteen, Seventeen, and Nineteen, all beings also perceive the causes of their bodily events. If all beings perceive events in their bodies and the causes of these events, then all have the same kind of perceptual experience. But philosophical intuition denies that this is so. ;After characterizing the two difficulties, I discuss various scholarly replies to them, placing my work within the context of the critical tradition. In Chapter Two, I offer resolutions of the problems I see as available to Spinoza: that the duration of the perception of a bodily modification varies with the complexity of the modification, and that the duration, associability, frequency, and coherence of perceptions of causes of bodily modifications vary in the same way; that the associability, frequency, coherence, and distinctness of perceptions of causes of bodily modifications vary with the number of modifications a host body sustains, where the number of modifications sustained is a function of the complexity of the host body; that, given the correlations based on duration, perceptions of complex modifications and their causes are more present to the human mind than perceptions of simple modifications and their causes; that, given the correlations based on duration and number, perceptions by minds of complex organisms are longer, more associable, more frequent, and more coherent than perceptions by minds of simple organisms. In Chapter Three, I comment on issues in interpretation related to the resolutions. (shrink)