In their oft-cited manifesto, the Martinican Creolists exhort Caribbean people to forego their continuing allegiances to the “mythical shores” of various old worlds, and to affirm instead the “alluvial Creoleness” that binds (or that ought to bind) them to each other, and to other communities across the globe with a similar plantation history: “Neither Europeans, nor Africans, nor Asians, we proclaim ourselves Creoles; “[the Creole language] is the initial means of communication of our deep self, or our collective unconscious, of (...) our common genius, and it remains the river of our alluvial Creoleness.” Despite their qualifications – “Creoleness is an open specificity,” for example – they have been chided for simplifying the complicated socio-political histories of the region. Maryse Condé, for example, has noted that the opposition of colonizing French language and resisting Creole language ignores the extent to which plantation heterogeneity and negotiation rendered Creole a language of both “unity and compromise.” On what terms can alluvial relationships that can undercut imperial and diasporic ties be uncovered? What does the idea of a Creole unconscious solidify, restore, revivify, and for whom? In this essay, I am interested in a Jamaican-born novelist’s use of Cuba’s second war of independence in the 1890s to critique Jamaican complacency about British colonialism after the Second World War. Cuba, and a “Creole Latin” world more generally, allows him, on my reading, to proffer hispanophone and francophone plantation histories as a model for anglophone sensibilities in the region. The “Creole Latin” affirmation of nationalism, revolutionary struggle, and strong affective ties to the land and to personal relationships, are uncontaminated by the domineering spirit, legalistic prejudices, bureaucracy and commerce, and negotiated concessions that typify anglophone Protestant modes of life. Since the scene of these ideas in this case is the nineteenth century plantation, then we might ask if the social and political inequities are not reinforced, or whether the pleasures afforded by the romance make such considerations moot. (shrink)

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue S1, Page S3-S11, March‐April 2022.

_Learning Communities_ is a groundbreaking book that shows how learning communities can be a flexible and effective approach to enhancing student learning, promoting curricular coherence, and revitalizing faculty. Written by Barbara Leigh Smith, Jean MacGregor, Roberta S. Matthews, and Faith Gabelnick¾acclaimed national leaders in the learning communities movement¾this important book provides the historical, conceptual, and philosophical context for LCs and clearly demonstrates that they can be a key element in institutional transformation.

Narrative inquiry in a nursing practicum One approach to creating research‐based nursing education is to think and write narratively about the daily life of a BScN program student and her teacher in diverse settings and over time. Gail, as a nurse‐teacher, and Faith, as a nursing student and now Public Health Nurse, reconstruct their teaching–learning experiences in an integrated practicum in maternal–child health services as a narrative inquiry. After presenting this reconstruction of experience at a conference on maternal scholarship, (...) further inquiry into their experiences shows how narrative inquiry matters to construction of nursing praxis and to life‐long learning as a nurse. Teaching–learning relationships are seen as a template for a student's connections to people experiencing nursing care and to other clinicians. Construction of stories to live by that take into account becoming a nurse, constructing knowledge and enacting caring–healing nursing practices is illuminated through narrative inquiry. (shrink)

Recent calls to address racism in bioethics reflect a sense of urgency to mitigate the lethal effects of a lack of action. While the field was catalyzed largely in response to pivotal events deeply rooted in racism and other structures of oppression embedded in research and health care, it has failed to center racial justice in its scholarship, pedagogy, advocacy, and practice, and neglected to integrate anti-racism as a central consideration. Academic bioethics programs play a key role in determining the (...) field’s norms and practices, including methodologies, funding priorities, and professional networks that bear on equity, inclusion, and epistemic justice. This article describes recommendations from the Racial Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion (REDI) Task Force commissioned by the Association of Bioethics Program Directors to prioritize and strengthen anti-racist practices in bioethics programmatic endeavors and to evaluate and develop specific goals to advance REDI. (shrink)

The article discusses the failure of the current positivistic and materialist business ethics paradigms to adequately deal with the enormity of the contemporary business ethics crisis. Citing behavioural research into the linkage between beliefs, values and behaviour, the author suggests spiritual renewal as a solution based on the ‘fallenness’ of mankind and the reality of human evil. The concept of faith, obedience and the resulting ‘kingdom consciousness’ (May and Whittington 2003) is explored as a basis for spiritual renewal leading (...) to behavioural change. The process of renewal is depicted as a synergistic, mutually supportive relationship between faith and action. (shrink)

Introduction: Foundations of faith described -- Christian history : a brief overview -- The Apostolic Age (ca. A.D. 30-100 -- The Patristic Age (ca. A.D. 100-500) -- The Medieval Age (ca. A.D. 500-1500) -- The Reformation/counter-Reformation Age -- The Modern Age (ca. A.D. 1600-1950) -- The Postmodern Age (ca. A.D. 1950-present) -- Mormon and evangelical theology : a comparison -- Scripture and revelation -- God and humanity -- Church and temple -- Salvation and the afterlife -- Moral and social (...) standards -- Mormonism and Christianity -- Sociological foundations of faith -- Question 9: Who was or is the greatest influence on your religious beliefs? -- Question 10: What were the religious beliefs of your family when you were growing up? -- Question 13: How much do you associate with people that hold to other religious beliefs? -- Question 15: What would be the social consequences for you if you converted to another religion? -- Sociological foundations of faith : conclusion -- Spiritual foundations of faith -- Question 4: To what extent has spiritual or religious -- Question 6: Mormons and Evangelicals claim to have the witness of the Holy Ghost/Holy Spirit in their hearts confirming the Mormons and Evangelicals -- Truth of their faith : how do you know that the assurance you have in your heart is from God? -- Question 8: What do you think of the religious experiences of people outside your religion, especially those which seem to confirm their religious beliefs to them? -- Rational foundations of faith -- Question 16: To what extent do you have faith because you think that Mormonism/Evangelicalism is reasonable? -- Question 18: What do you consider to be the best proof or evidence for Mormonism/Evangelicalism? -- Question 19: Would you believe that Mormonism/Evangelicalism is true even if most of the evidence were against it? -- Question 20: How has your assurance changed over time? -- Question 21: What has caused your faith to become stronger or weaker over time? -- Question 22: To what extent do you ever doubt that Mormonism/Evangelicalism is true? -- Question 23: If you sometimes doubt that your beliefs are true, what causes you to doubt? -- Question 24: How do you respond to or deal -- Conversion stories -- Conclusion: Foundations of faith prescribed. (shrink)

In Why Faith is a Virtue, Philip D. Smith builds on the work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Robert Adams to argue that faith contributes to human excellence. To make the argument, Smith sorts through conflicting possible "faiths" and shows how some of them are not virtues at all. Nevertheless, he argues that faith, properly understood, contributes to crucial human practices: scientific research, social reform, and parenting.

Throughout the 1980s Margaret Thatcher dominated British and global politics. At the same time she maintained an active Christian faith, which she understood as shaping and informing her political choices and policies. In this article I argue that we can construct from Thatcher's key speeches, her memoirs, and her book on public policy a cultural "theo-political" identity which guided her political decisions. Thatcher's identity was as an Anglo-Saxon Nonconformist. This consisted of her belief in values such as thrift and (...) hard work, care for the family and local neighbor, and charitable generosity; her belief in the renewal of the national British Christian spirit; and her notion of morality as the opportunity for free choice. Without a recognition of the centrality of her theo-political identity, it is difficult to understand the values and beliefs which were central to her political life. The methodological issues raised by the construction of this theo-political identity are examined in this article. The aim of the proposed methodology is to develop theological insights into a political phenomenon like Thatcher rather than make policy judgments or recommendations. (shrink)

In this paper we offer a critical assessment of the politics of the Christian Right and question the degree to which the religious values of the Christian Right are compatible with a democratic political culture. If religious values are equally political values making the separation of religious belief and political action a fraught exercise, then a number of issues arise. Political action inspired by religious faith should not prevent critical scrutiny of the underlying values, or more importantly, their influence (...) in shaping public debate and public policy. If religious values are indeed political values, then do protections of freedom of religious expression privilege forms of faith-based politics over secular forms? And if so, to what end? We argue that a more nuanced analysis of the intersection of religion and politics is required to ensure that public politics is not threatened by particular forms of religious political activism that exhibit totalitarian tendencies. At the very least, close attention needs to be focused on particular policy advocates and the agenda they seek to advance with little accountability or transparency despite claims to represent the public interest. It is to these ends that this paper makes a contribution. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of EnlightenmentJohn E. SmithAvihu Zakai. Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. Pp. xvii + 348. Cloth, $49.95.Edwards's History of Redemption is the focus of this study by Avihu Zakai—Professor of History at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The History is a (...) series of thirty sermons Edwards preached on Isaiah 51:8 "... my righteousness shall be forever... my salvation from generation to generation." For him, it was a "new method in divinity... thrown into the form of a history"—a narrative showing God's sovereignty in redemption "from the fall of man to the end of the world."Zakai gives a comprehensive account of Edwards's view of history meant to highlight his struggle against modern beliefs threatening Christian faith (308; passim). The discussion is not limited to history, but includes most of Edwards's writing from 1720-1750 with emphasis on his opposition to the Enlightenment. Zakai cannot interpret so many works with the accuracy needed; he repeats old errors such as opposing the "head" and "heart" in the Affections and minimizing Edwards's respect for "common morality" in the ethical writings. Zakai is right in saying that Edwards insisted on God's authority over the world and history, but he puts it in such absolutistic terms that he often seems to abandon historical analysis in favor of exhortation.Zakai's best contribution is in his search for the general framework of God's redemption of the "engine" driving history (120ff.; 213ff.). He finds the answer in "seasons" of revival such as the Great Awakening. This is true, but Edwards notes other special events like the Reformation that "promoted the work of redemption" (Works, 9. 272), but are not revivals in the usual sense. For Edwards, special events are of many kinds and are identified by interpretation based on God's Providence. As Miller claimed, interpretation is essential; without it we may have a chronicle of events, but no history. Zakai seems to underestimate this point and the many problems it poses.The book strikes me as one more attempt—George Marsden's recent book, Jonathan Edwards: A Life (New Haven, 2003), is another—to rescue Edwards from "profane" interpreters like Miller who saw that Edwards learned from the Enlightenment even though he challenged many of its ideas. In my view, Edwards can well take care of himself.John E. SmithYale UniversityCopyright © 2004 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)

A series of important papers over the topics raised by Pope John Paul II in Fides et Ratio.

The man or woman of faith living in today's pluralist world must have a theology that will do justice to his or her own faith, and also to the neighbours' - and to the differences between them. Similarly, humanists must have a theory that does justice to their own vision and also to the fact that for most of their fellows on earth the proper way of being human has been one or another of various `religious' ways. Any (...) interpretation of human history, both past and present, must take into serious account the self-consciousness of each major part, as well as the diversity and the dynamic of the whole. This exciting book, first published in 1981 and now also available in paperback, is perhaps our world's first serious endeavour towards a theology in global perspective. Here is a wrestling with the demands of an authentic theology of the comparative history of religion. (shrink)

Smith traces a major line in the history of theology and the philosophy of religion down the "slippery slope" of secularization—from Luther and Erasmus, through Idealism, to Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, Habermas, Vattimo, and Asad.

It is well known that informational theories of representation have trouble accounting for error. Informational semantics is a family of theories attempting a naturalistic, unashamedly reductive explanation of the semantic and intentional properties of thought and language. Most simply, the informational approach explains truth-conditional content in terms of causal, nomic, or simply regular correlation between a representation and a state of affairs. The central work is Dretske, and the theory was largely developed at the University of Wisconsin by Fred Dretske, (...) Dennis Stampe, and Berent Enc. Recently, informational semantics has roamed far beyond its Wisconsin home, and built a sizeable collection of followers. Converts include Jerry Fodor, Robert Stalnaker and, less faithfully, Paul and Patricia Churchland and Hartry Field. But for some years informational semantics has been hounded by a problem with error – the classic presentation is Fodor – and no other problem has hounded the theory so persistently. (shrink)

While central to the Christian religion, the act of faith has been notoriously difficult to define. This essay is an attempt to illuminate, with the aid of insights from cognitive science and process philosophy, what it means for a Christian to have faith, specifically in God. In doing so, the apriori and aposteriori aspects of faith are explored, along with its connections to science and empirical evidence, revelation, knowledge, doubt, morality, and additional Christian beliefs.

In mainstream analytic epistemology, Reformed theology has made its presence prominently felt in Reformed epistemology, the view of religious belief according to which religious beliefs can be properly basic and warranted when formed by the proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis, an inborn capacity or faculty for belief in God that can be prompted to generate certain religious beliefs when presented with things (e.g., certain majestic aspects of creation). A major competitor to Reformed epistemology is Wittgensteinian quasi-fideism, a position drawn (...) from the epistemology of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, according to which some foundational religious commitments are not properly basic beliefs but some kind of apodictic, unshakeable certainties that form part of the structure of one’s rationality and worldview. I argue that the Reformed tradition has contained elements of quasi-fideism at least as far back as Calvin’s account of faith from the Institutes of the Christian Religion, book 3, chapter 2. (shrink)

This paper examines the impact religious affiliation and faith commitment exerts on the political life of one inner-London borough. It gives a historical sketch of the interaction of faith and politics in the period from about 1975-2006 and attempts some explanation of the patterns of voting in local elections and political involvement by members of the many faith communities which are found in the borough. The key to this is seen in the changing urban ecology of the (...) area and the communal interests of particular ethno-religious groups who have striven and, to a measure, succeeded in gaining representation in local politics over this period. Drawing on many years participation observation, an analysis of the religious and community affiliations of elected members, and a series of interviews with Councillors and faith leaders, it reflects political issues and conflicts involving faith communities. Evidence will be presented which suggests that while many Christians involved in politics are primarily motivated individually by beliefs and values which centre on service to the whole community, politicians from other faith communities are more likely to be cast in a role as communal representatives and advocates of particular sections of the community. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of EnlightenmentJohn E. SmithAvihu Zakai. Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. Pp. xvii + 348. Cloth, $49.95.Edwards's History of Redemption is the focus of this study by Avihu Zakai—Professor of History at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The History is a (...) series of thirty sermons Edwards preached on Isaiah 51:8 "... my righteousness shall be forever... my salvation from generation to generation." For him, it was a "new method in divinity... thrown into the form of a history"—a narrative showing God's sovereignty in redemption "from the fall of man to the end of the world."Zakai gives a comprehensive account of Edwards's view of history meant to highlight his struggle against modern beliefs threatening Christian faith (308; passim). The discussion is not limited to history, but includes most of Edwards's writing from 1720-1750 with emphasis on his opposition to the Enlightenment. Zakai cannot interpret so many works with the accuracy needed; he repeats old errors such as opposing the "head" and "heart" in the Affections and minimizing Edwards's respect for "common morality" in the ethical writings. Zakai is right in saying that Edwards insisted on God's authority over the world and history, but he puts it in such absolutistic terms that he often seems to abandon historical analysis in favor of exhortation.Zakai's best contribution is in his search for the general framework of God's redemption of the "engine" driving history (120ff.; 213ff.). He finds the answer in "seasons" of revival such as the Great Awakening. This is true, but Edwards notes other special events like the Reformation that "promoted the work of redemption" (Works, 9. 272), but are not revivals in the usual sense. For Edwards, special events are of many kinds and are identified by interpretation based on God's Providence. As Miller claimed, interpretation is essential; without it we may have a chronicle of events, but no history. Zakai seems to underestimate this point and the many problems it poses.The book strikes me as one more attempt—George Marsden's recent book, Jonathan Edwards: A Life (New Haven, 2003), is another—to rescue Edwards from "profane" interpreters like Miller who saw that Edwards learned from the Enlightenment even though he challenged many of its ideas. In my view, Edwards can well take care of himself.John E. SmithYale UniversityCopyright © 2004 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)

Transcript of an Interview on the podcast: Irreverend: Faith and Current Affairs.

On the fortieth anniversary of its first broadcast in 1984, this article will consider the main themes of the BBC TV series The Sea of Faith, written and presented by the Cambridge philosopher and theologian Don Cupitt. It will attempt to evaluate its significance, then and now. We argue that Cupitt’s ‘radical’ reputation for his advancement of a broadly ‘non-realist’ understanding of God may have overshadowed other equally significant features, not least his central argument that unless Christianity responded constructively (...) to modern thought it would be doomed to irrelevance. The article will close with some reflections on what Cupitt’s manifesto for religion might mean for those who continue to identify with his critiques of traditional theology today. (shrink)

Responses and clarifications are given to the three respondents to my recent book, Why Religion Matters, in which I discuss what I see as the drawbacks and inconsistencies of Darwinism. While certain of their criticisms are understandable, others are based on a misreading of my work. Finally, my critics fail to show that my book is mistaken in its central claim that the modern loss of faith in transcendence, basic to the traditional/religious worldview, is unwarranted, because science has not (...) been able to disprove the metaphysical claim that transcendence exists. (shrink)

In this article, we are exploring a methodological approach to research on faith and religious expressions in urban Africa. We are committed to trans-disciplinary work that pursues research methods mutually liberating for researchers, co-researchers and community participants and that results in long-term benefits and strengthened agency on the part of the host communities. Our reflections in this article are based on a collaborative research project1 in two regions of Pretoria, Tshwane2 – Pretoria Central and Mamelodi East – in which (...) we explore how religious innovation and competition in and amongst churches contribute to the healing or perpetuation of urban fractures. (shrink)

This essay argues that important critical and political perspective can be gained on Deleuze's famous essay, ‘Bartleby; or, The Formula’ by viewing it as an attempt to move beyond the Sartrean framework of ‘bad faith’. The argument comprises four sections. In section one, I contextualise Deleuze's essay in terms of contrasting readings of Bartleby, from a prior account by Georges Perec, to contemporary accounts indebted to Deleuze, from Hardt and Negri's Empire to Gisèle Berkman's recent L'Effet Bartleby. The argument (...) of this section is that a problematically reductive image of Bartleby has emerged in the wake of Deleuze's essay, but that this can be challenged in favour of a more nuanced and politically significant reading by contextualising the essay as an attempt to overcome bad faith. In section two, I develop this by drawing out the nature and relevance of the threat posed by bad faith through a focus on Sartrean, Deleuzian and Badioucan critiques of Bartleby, before arguing, in section three, that attention to the concept of a ‘logic of presuppositions’ developed in Deleuze's essay shows how bad faith can be overcome. These sections all build towards the fourth and longest section, which draws out the wider political significance of what it means to overcome bad faith. To do so, I pay attention to how logics of presupposition function in Bartleby's story, and consider Deleuze's essay in relation to his work on ‘control societies’ and ‘collective assemblages of enunciation’. (shrink)

Paul’s Tillich’s formal definition of faith constituted a brilliantly creative attempt to clarify the meaning of a word that tradition heavily burdened with theological baggage. The question of course concerns the extent, if any, to which his definition of the term was compelling and helpful. The first major contention of this essay is that his analysis did not necessitate faith being defined as ultimate concern. The second principal argument is that the treatment he gave to doubt failed to (...) demonstrate its dynamic role in the life of faith. The concluding point is that the truth of faith cannot and should not be separated and shielded from the truths of science, psychology, history, philosophy, as well as from the other disciplines of human endeavor, by conceiving faith to be, as he suggested, in another dimension of meaning. (shrink)

Attitude is an important criterion and cause of religiousness, though it is commonly mishandled in religious reflection by (1) skewing the anthropologically central variable of attitude toward “feeling,” on the side of affect, or toward “disposition,” on the side of will, and (2) obscuring different basic forms and validities of religious attitude by insisting on one overly narrow or misleadingly rounded-out conception of devoutness (most often, “faith”). This paper develops a more adequate conception of attitude in general and of (...) the generic religious attitude of devoutness as branching into three principal, sometimes divergent religious attitudes: faith, oriented to the realizable; piety, oriented to the realized; and submission, oriented to realizing. (shrink)

The article discusses the failure of the current positivistic and materialist business ethics paradigms to adequately deal with the enormity of the contemporary business ethics crisis. Citing behavioural research into the linkage between beliefs, values and behaviour, the author suggests spiritual renewal as a solution based on the ‘fallenness’ of mankind and the reality of human evil. The concept of faith, obedience and the resulting ‘kingdom consciousness’ (May and Whittington 2003) is explored as a basis for spiritual renewal leading (...) to behavioural change. The process of renewal is depicted as a synergistic, mutually supportive relationship between faith and action. (shrink)

Georg Simmel wamed in 1900 that capitalism creates not only a market economy but also a market culture in which money becomes the central and absolute value.' Some cultural critics seem to take the root of all evil claim seriously, asserting with rhetorical flourishes filled with normative hyperbole that commodification is the primary cause of all social problems. Our anxieties about money, however, are often vague and tempered by our sense that it appears to be more or less the best (...) way to organize life and measure value in such a complex and pluralistic world. Somewhere between demonization of the market and blind faith in it lies a clear analysis of precisely what is wrong with the commodification of life. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe purpose of this study is to investigate the ways in which religious students manage the dual identities of student and member of faith. If an “identity clash” occurs, how is it managed?...

The aim of this paper is to consider how well equipped philosophy is to meet the logical and epistemologicaldemands of religious belief. That this belief is a response to questions both practical and urgent – the nature ofone’s existence, the reality of salvation – frequently seems quite unimportant in a field dominated by rationalismand theistical realism. To properly understand both the response and the questions that give rise to it, I want toreturn to the foundations of religious thought. These foundations, (...) I suggest, are not found in pure intuitions ofdivine reality, or in objective perceptions of divine handiwork. Religious thought begins with religiouseducation. That is where we will find the conceptual tools to make sense of talk about God. More importantly,perhaps, that is where we will find a criterion of knowledge.Education embodies the creative involvement of one mind in the development of another. The philosophicalimport of this is two-fold. First, it provides a model for conceiving Creation and the Agent of Creation. Thisresolves the conflict between classical and neo-classical ontologies, offers instead a chastened transcendence:otherness without isolation, involvement without equiprimordiality. Second, it instantiates providence in action,God at work in the believer’s life. Our criterion of knowledge, then, is a matter of impact: the ‘experiencabledifference’ providence makes to the believer’s life. Together, model and instance underpin a realignment ofpraxis and theoria. Religious praxis stands upon its claim to truth; without praxis embodied by the connection ofdeveloping minds, truth cannot be ascertained. (shrink)

Modern Moral Problems addresses moral quandaries that can beguile and confuse faithful Catholics. Written in a question-and-answer format, the book covers questions regarding sexuality, medical ethics, business practices, civic responsibilities, and the sacramental life of the Church. The extraordinary assortment of issuesforming a single, organized collectionis a valuable reference for anyone seeking clear and concise answers to tough moral questions. Written in a conversational tone often spliced with humor, this work by a highly respected moral theologian will be read with (...) fascination for its clarity of argument and fundamental good sense. Originally published as a monthly question-and-answer column in a magazine for priests, these selections by Msgr. William B. Smith retain a striking current topicality. Msgr. Smith often tackled matters of controversy in the Catholic Church, ones which continue to draw conflicting opinions. Interesting, informative, and eminently practical, this book conveys an overall impression that sound thinking about morality is rooted in a tradition within the Catholic Church, even when the answers to particular moral questions cannot be found in catechisms or Vatican documents. Msgr. Smith offers a clear-headed approach to the quandaries of our time precisely because of his training in traditional moral principles and his fidelity to the Catholic magisterium. This book should be in the possession of all seminarians and priests, who are bound to confront moral matters that are not so easily decided at first glance. But lay people, too, will find here rich responses to the challenging and sometimes unresolved moral questions they encounter in their own lives. (shrink)

The most widely repeated retributivist argument against the utilitarian theory of punishment is that utilitarianism permits punishment of the innocent. While defenders of utilitarianism have shown that a publicly announced policy of punishing the innocent is unlikely to serve utility, critics have insisted that utilitarianism morally obliges officials to deceive the public by framing the innocent. Yet philosophers and legal scholars have heretofore failed to test this claim against the writings of the theory's originators. We directly examine the writings of (...) Jeremy Bentham and other eighteenth and nineteenth century utilitarians and demonstrate that the originators of utilitarian penology clearly opposed both punishment of the innocent and deception of the public. We argue that utilitarianism originated as a legal theory that emphasized several institutional conditions for the public pursuit of utility, including security of person and property, legality, legislative supremacy, democratic accountability, publicity and transparency. These institutional conditions would preclude both systematic and ad hoc framing of the innocent. We show that the original utilitarians considered individuals incompetent to determine and pursue the public welfare, and that the contemporary conception of utilitarianism as an ethical standard governing individuals is a modern innovation. Bentham's theory of punishment did not derive from any general ethical theory. Bentham, like his chief forebears Hume, Helvetius and Beccaria, thought of public utility as a standard of value for public action, such as legislation. He assumed that private action was ruled by self-interest (i.e. private utility) so that there was little point in directing arguments about the general welfare to individual ethical actors. In assessing public action, Bentham was far less concerned about consequences than has generally been supposed and far more concerned about process. He identified utility with security of expectations and the rule of law. As a consequence, he endorsed public actions that could be seen to have emerged from a rational and well-informed debate about their consequences for the public welfare. Utility was not a definition of the good or a guide to conscience, but a standard designed for use in public, deliberative debate. Utilitarianism was not so much a philosophical theory as a rhetorical practice, understood as a transparent language of analysis and argument for use in political deliberation.We elaborate the procedural conditions presupposed by utilitarian discourse, beginning with Bentham's commitment to a conception of legality involving legislative promulgation of formal rules faithfully applied by rigidly constrained bureaucrats and judges. Next, we demonstrate Bentham's commitment to democratic representation of the public in devising legislation. Finally, we emphasize Bentham's commitment to publicity in government decisionmaking. Utilitarian policy required public scrutiny of all decisions and the information and reasons considered in making them. In sum, Bentham's utilitarianism was primarily concerned with the problem of how to design government so that it could accurately identify and faithfully pursue the public good while being openly seen to do so. It follows that Bentham's utility principle does not require him to endorse deceiving the public and framing an innocent person. (shrink)

In his collection of essays, Law as a Leap of Faith, John Gardner lucidly develops a powerful account of legal positivism, primarily via a careful interrogation of H. L. A. Hart’s work, with a particular focus on Hart’s most important text, The Concept of Law. In this essay, I raise a question regarding the significance of legal subjects’ understanding of themselves as legal subjects. I claim that as Gardner fills out the picture of what it takes to have an (...) ideal legal system, we will find that there is no requirement that subjects have any understanding of themselves as legal subjects, much less an understanding either of what the law requires of them or of the legal status with respect to officials that the law gives them. In particular, I argue that Gardner’s account of the law is too focused on the perspective of officials, and leaves out the perspective of legal subjects. This manifests what I call a unidirectional legal optic: the view of the law is the view from a single perspective, namely the perspective of the official. This is not an accurate picture of the law and so should not be presented as the paradigmatic account of law. (shrink)

The Epilogue reviews the findings presented by indirect ontology. First, indirect ontology discovers a consistency to The Visible and the Invisible which has been overlooked. Secondly, it provides a resolution to problems which are first uncovered in his Phenomenology of Perception, notably the connection between tacit and spoken cogitos, as well as the relationship of silence to speech. Thirdly, indirect ontology serves as a useful tool in understanding the development of Merleau-Ponty's thought from its beginning in The Structure of Behavior (...) through his ontological phase. Finally, indirect ontology brings to clarity the uniqueness of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy which is often overlooked; this uniqueness points to the fact that Merleau-Ponty's thought seems to move in a direction different from many of his successors and interpreters. ;Chapter four of the dissertation begins a positive delineation of Being by means of the indirect ontology examined in the first three chapters. This chapter situates philosophy within the hyperdialectic, thus showing how philosophy can investigate the world from which thought emerges. Chapter five unites the sequential analyses of the first four chapters in order to provide a detailed account of how the natural world serves as the basis of all human expression. Chapter six builds upon the description of nature provided by indirect ontology; in this chapter the working notes of The Visible and the Invisible are examined in order to discuss the philosophy of history and of culture provided by indirect ontology. ;The first three chapters of the dissertation examine the ontology of Being provided by perception. Chapter one concerns itself with our radical dependence upon perception, our "perceptual faith" in the world. By examining Merleau-Ponty's discussion of traditional ontology the dissertation develops the differences between ontology and the perceptual process. In chapter two the gap between ontology and perception is eliminated by providing an ontology which conforms to the manner in which perception presents itself to the body. This union of perception and human expression is made possible by Merleau-Ponty's implementation of hyper-reflection, the theory that perception is itself a form of originary reflection. Hyper-reflection is used to explain the existence of myself, others, and thinking within a shared visible world. Chapter three investigates the natural dialectic or hyper-dialectic which holds between the perceived world and throught; the result is a view of the dialectic which insists that thought remains attached to the perceived world. ;The goal of this dissertation is to present a sustained examination of The Visible and the Invisible. In contrast to the critical literature on Merleau-Ponty which maintains that the work is fragmentary, the position taken in the dissertation is that The Visible and the Invisible is a consistent and cohesive work. The key to unlocking the inner format of The Visible and the Invisible lies in abandoning the popular assumption that the first three chapters of the work are primarily critiques of other philosophers' positions. The dissertation attempts to replace this assumption by seeking, within the resources of the text itself, a new meaning and order. ;In the working notes accompanying The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty provides the necessary interpretive tool for understanding the work in the form of an "indirect ontology." Indirect ontology is Merleau-Ponty's effort to explain how our perceptual contact with the world is itself the ontological format of all Being. The Visible and the Invisible attempts to account for all phases of human expression through this model. (shrink)

_Education Policy_ sees 12 philosophers of education critique current and recent UK educational policies relating to higher education and faith-based education, assessment, the teaching of reading, vocational and civic education, teacher education, the influence of Europe and the idea of the ‘Big Society’. Twelve philosophers of education subject elements of current and recent UK educational policy to critique Forthright and critical, the contributors are unafraid to challenge current orthodoxies Offers thought-provoking insights into modern education policy Wide-ranging topics cover higher (...) education and faith-based education, assessment, the teaching of reading, vocational and civic education, teacher education, the influence of Europe and the idea of the ‘Big Society’. (shrink)

Since the mid 1960s, scientifically informed theists have been ecstatic because of Big bang cosmology. Theists believe the best scientific evidence that God exists is the evidence that the universe began to exist in an explosion about fifteen billion years ago. It began in an explosion called the Big Bang. Theists think it obvious that the universe could not have begun to exist uncaused. They argue that the most reasonable hypothesis is that the cause of the universe is God. This (...) theory hinges on the assumption that it is obviously true that whatever begins to exist has a cause. The most recent statement of this theist theory is in William Lane Craig's 1994 book Reasonable Faith 1]. Now there is a very interesting quote from this book which I will read to you at length because, at the end of this quote, Craig mentions me as one of the perverse atheists who deny the obviousness of the theistic principle. So let me quote to you how Craig states his argument 2]: The argument may be formulated in three simple steps: 1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause. 2. The universe began to exist. 3. Therefore, the universe has a cause. (shrink)