Why are we interested in history at all? Why do we feel the need to distinguish between past and present? In this book, the author argues that the past originates from an experience of rupture separating past and present. Think of the radical rupture with Europe's past that was effected by the French and the Industrial Revolutions. Sublime Historical Experience investigates how the notion of sublime historical experience complicates and challenges existing conceptions of language, truth, and knowledge. These experiences of (...) rupture are paradoxical since they involve both the separation of past and present and, at the same time, the effort to overcome this separation in terms of historical knowledge. The experience unites feelings of loss/pain with those of love/satisfaction, and thus is in agreement with how sublime experience is ordinarily defined. The experience is also precognitive since it precedes historical knowledge. As such it is a challenge to traditional conceptions of the relationship between experience and truth or language. It compels us to disconnect the notions of experience and truth. (shrink)

Exploring the connection between Bentham and Byron forged by the Greek struggle for independence, this book focuses on the activities of the London Greek Committee, supposedly founded by disciples of Jeremy Bentham, which mounted the expedition on which Lord Byron ultimately met his death in Greece. Rosen's penetrating study provides a new assessment of British philhellenism and examines for the first time the relationship between Bentham's theory of constitutional government and the emerging liberalism of the 1820s. Breaking new ground in (...) the history of political ideas and culture in the early nineteenth century, Rosen advances striking new interpretations based on recently published texts and manuscript sources of the development of constitutional theory from Locke and Montesquieu, the conflicting strands of liberalism in the 1820s, and the response in Britain to strong claims for national self-determination in the Mediterranean basin. He sets out to distinguish between Bentham's theory and the ideological context against which it is usually interpreted. (shrink)

Reviewed Works:G. Priest, R. Routley, Graham Priest, Richard Routley, Jean Norman, First Historical Introduction. A Preliminary History of Paraconsistent and Dialethic Approaches.Ayda I. Arruda, Aspects of the Historical Development of Paraconsistent Logic.G. Priest, R. Routley, Systems of Paraconsistent Logic.G. Priest, R. Routley, Applications of Paraconsistent Logic.G. Priest, R. Routley, The Philosophical Significance and Inevitability of Paraconsistency.

The essays in this collection address different aspects of Dewey's philosophy of logic, from his work at the beginning of the twentieth century to the culmination of his logical thought in the 1938 volume, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This book introduces a new category, in-between, that will have a far-reaching impact on classic ways of thinking. Husserl's description of consciousness and Whitehead's criticism of the prejudice of simple location are two starting points. Relativity theory's radical changes in the conception of space and time also motivate some of the lines of thought.

Here’s a false generalization with manifestly false consequences: all people who differ by one millimeter in height from a short person are themselves short. Why are we inclined to believe it? Boundary-shifters, usually lumped together under the heading “contextualists”, say that we believe the false generalization because when we consider any instance, that instance is true at the time of our consideration. Critics complain that the explanation is no good, for (i) if it were, then fallacious inferences would be rampant; (...) (ii) if it were, then we would always generalize from instances that we knew to be true at the time we considered them. But, they say, fallacious inferences are not rampant and we do not always generalize from the instances. Responses: (i) boundary-shifters require only that weakly fallacious inferences are rampant, and indeed they are; (ii) generalizing from the instances is both natural and explanatory, albeit defeasible. (shrink)