Normal 0 21 false false false ES X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Tabla normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} The main aim of this paper is to argue on behalf of instrumentalism in the philosophy of physics. Following Theo Kuipers’ terminology of domain extension and domain restriction I claim, contradicting him, that the methodology (...) of domain revision can only support an antirealist approach to the theory of physics. The existence of both extensions and restrictions of the application domain of theoretical models and the theoretical incompatibility between successive theories provide respectively with minor and major arguments for instrumentalism in physics. (shrink)

The structuralist theory of truth approximation essen-tially deals with truth approximation by theory revision for a fixed domain. However, variable domains can also be taken into account, where the main changes concern domain extensions and restrictions. In this paper I will present a coherent set of definitions of “more truth-likeness”, “empirical progress” and “truth approximation” due to a revision of the domain of intended applications. This set of definitions seems to be the natural counterpart of the basic (...) definitions of similar notions as far as theory revision is concerned. The formal aspects of theory revision strongly suggest an analogy between truth approximation and design research, for example, drug research. Whereas a new drug may be better for a certain disease than an old one, a certain drug may be better for another disease than for the original target disease, a phenomenon which was nicely captured by the title of a study by Rein Vos [1991]: Drugs Looking for Diseases. Similarly, truth approximation may not only take the shape of theory revision but also of domain revision, naturally suggesting the phenomenon of “Theories looking for domains”. However, whereas Vos documented his title with a number of examples, so far, apart from plausible cases of “truth accumulation by domain extension”, I did not find clear-cut empirical instantiations of the analogy, only, as such, very interesting, non-empirical examples. (shrink)

We argue that a comprehensive theory of reciprocals must rely on a general taxonomy of restrictions on the interpretation of relational expressions. Developing such a taxonomy, we propose a new principle for interpreting reciprocals that relies on the interpretation of the relation in their scope. This principle, the Maximal Interpretation Hypothesis (MIH), analyzes reciprocals as partial polyadic quantifiers. According to the MIH, the partial quantifier denoted by a reciprocal requires the relational expression REL in its scope to denote a (...) maximal relation in REL’s interpretation domain. In this way the MIH avoids a priori assumptions on the available readings of reciprocal expressions, which are necessary in previous accounts. Relying extensively on the work of Dalrymple et al. (Ling Philos 21:159–210, 1998), we show that the MIH also exhibits some observational improvements over Dalrymple et al.’s Strongest Meaning Hypothesis (SMH). In addition to deriving some attested reciprocal interpretations that are not expected by the SMH, the MIH offers a more restrictive account of the way context affects the interpretation of reciprocals through its influence on relational domains. Further, the MIH generates a reciprocal interpretation at the predicate level, which is argued to be advantageous to Dalrymple et al.’s propositional selection of reciprocal meanings. More generally, we argue that by focusing on restrictions on relational domains, the MIH opens the way for a more systematic study of the ways in which lexical meaning, world knowledge and contextual information interact with the interpretation of quantificational expressions. (shrink)

The study of social, ethical, and political issues from a naturalistic perspective has been pervasive in social sciences and the humanities in the last decades. This articulation of empirical research with philosophical and normative reflection is increasingly getting attention in academic circles and the public spheres, given the prevalence of urgent needs and challenges that society is facing on a global scale. The contemporary world is full of challenges or what some philosophers have called ‘existential risks’ to humanity. Nuclear wars, (...) natural and/or engineered pandemics, climate change, global totalitarianism, and emergent technologies, are some of the challenges mentioned by many authors devoted to the study of long-term potential risks for the survival of the human species. However, while there are many reasons to be a pessimist about the future of humanity, there is also a lot of ink wasted in showing that the world today is far better than we had in the past and also that there have been many instances of social and moral progress in the last centuries. Some authors have even claimed that “we have made more progress over the last 100 years than in the first 100,000”. According to ‘our world in data’, some of the most relevant advances of humanity in the last centuries have to do with the reduction of poverty and/or inequality, better health and security, the decline of violence and war, and the development of democracy and institutional mechanisms to guarantee individual freedom and rights. Yet, there is a more concrete concern that our world faces nowadays, and requires a particularly detailed analysis. In a few words, the advance in information and communication technologies, the huge volume of people migration because of prevalent instances of global inequality, and the reality of an interconnected world that just mirrors an extensive history of massive human intergroup relations open the question about the feasibility of social and moral progress in the contexts of diverse, multicultural, and unequal societies. This makes it crucial to reflect not only on whether human societies may keep advancing on a path of social progress, but how this can be achieved by addressing the challenges of inequality and potential intergroup conflict. This concern closely relates to the further consolidation of democratic values and the achievement of a more generalized consideration of the equal moral value of human individuals far from group, ethnic, or collective distinctions. This vision of progress follows the moral convictions that have been considered right and worthy to be pursued by most ethical theories explored by philosophers and social scientists so far. This work aims to contribute to the study of the mechanisms and feasibility of social and moral progress grounded on the precept of human equality and is guided by the idea that social and moral progress in a plural world requires the accomplishment of a more democratic and tolerant society. These forms of progress have already been defined by philosophers Allen Buchanan and Russel Powell as inclusivist forms of moral progress. According to these authors, inclusivist moral progress is featured by the transformation of moral judgments, motivations, and norms guided by the rejection of “group-based restrictions on moral standing and moral status” (2018). The work of Buchanan and Powell is fundamental for the argumentation developed in this work since they have pioneered a more complex debate in the field of evolutionary social sciences and philosophical anthropology. In brief, these authors have inquired how human nature, conceptualized by the advances in evolutionary thinking and the empirical sciences, is related to our moral convictions and the possibilities that we have to establish certain forms of social and moral progress. The work of Buchanan and Powell contributes to the debate on moral progress by incorporating empirically-informed concepts and arguments. With this objective in mind, they develop their discussion around a generalized tension between exclusivist and inclusivist forms of moral progress. This tension revolves around the question of whether and to what extent human moral concerns, motivations, and norms, are limited or bounded by social identities, group thinking, or collective values. This question is at the center of this work. In other words, I aim to answer whether and to what extent the nature of our social and moral cognition hinders or enables the development of inclusivist forms of morality and moral progress. As I mentioned so far, the distinction between exclusivist and inclusivist forms of morality has a practical implication and facilitates the reflection on the mechanisms and feasibility of concrete forms of progress based on the precept of human equality, which is the road to progress that we should follow according to most ethical theories. The distinction between exclusivist and inclusivist morality is not used here as a form of summarizing highly divergent descriptive approaches to morality, but as a way to address the practical implications of morality research, particularly around the question of the feasibility of social forms of progress based on the precept of equality and tolerance. My objective then has less to do with offering a conceptualization of human morality or with the proposition of a new ethical perspective. Instead, I aim to identify, from an empirically informed perspective, what enables the achievement of egalitarian forms of social progress, to subsequently offer a normative reflection about what we should do if we want to accomplish such inclusivist forms of progress. This task is of great relevance, having in mind that some theoretical proposals on the matter have claimed that human prosocial behavior and morality are constrained by exclusivist fixed tendencies as a product of our evolutionary history. According to these views, human morality is a group-centered cognitive and behavioral expression that has severe limits in its scope and extent, which hinders in the end the emergence of inclusivist forms of moral concerns and behaviors. These claims align with the philosophical intuition about the ‘dissociation of empathy’, or the fact that human individuals tend to express empathy and sympathy preferably for members of their group whereas their empathic and moral concern and recognition for outgroup individuals tend to be reduced or eliminated in real-life social interactions. Multiple theorists have expressed, however, that these assumptions are wrong for empirical and philosophical reasons, which results in a serious challenge to the conception of human morality as exclusivist by nature. Furthermore, simple intuition and practical experience constantly show us that human individuals can develop and endorse a broad spectrum of moral considerations and adopt an arguably inclusivist stance concerning the kind of persons or agents that deserve moral concern. Moreover, and adopting a historical perspective, the expansion of cultural and commercial exchanges, the consolidation of democracy, the development of welfare states, or the emergence of institutions based on the concept of universal human rights, have partially driven human progress based on the impartial concern for the well-being of persons. These historical instances of cultural evolution and institutional design have shown that it is feasible to promote behaviors and attitudes grounded in impersonal prosocial and inclusivist principles. This optimistic perspective, however, still begs the question of the exact relationship between social, cultural, and historical contexts, and the emergence of certain behavioral expressions of inclusivist morality. This is crucial since a great number of human individuals around the world still do not make part of these instances of social progress, and some authors have suggested that such instances of social and moral progress are particularly favored by the contexts of the WEIRD world, that is the world of Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies. Some of these approaches consider moral inclusivity a ‘luxury good’ and follow the ‘dependency thesis’ according to which the expression of moral inclusivity depends on the presence of very concrete material conditions that trigger inclusivist and impersonal prosocial tendencies that human beings are not able to express in threatening contexts without physical security. This thesis is problematic for various reasons and has led to incomplete explanations about the enabling and causal factors of inclusivist moral progress, as well as unsatisfactory suggestions about what we should do to foster the accomplishment of more generalized instances of progress based on inclusivist concerns. In an attempt to contribute to this debate, the main objective of this thesis is to offer an alternative proposal about the nature of human morality and a more detailed reflection on what we should do if we want to further accomplish such instances of progress. More precisely, this work adopts a particular developmental and constructivist vision of human morality to answer the question of how feasible it is to reach generalized forms of social progress based on the precepts of moral inclusivity. Furthermore, it offers some ideas about what are the most adequate and favorable conditions to foster such progress both at the individual and the collective level. At this point, a preliminary clarification of some starting points is necessary. In the first place, and contrary to what other authors have proposed when debating moral progress from an empirically-based approach, my perspective adopts a radical developmental and constructivist perspective, following particularly the conceptual and empirical ideas of the social-domain theory in moral psychology. From this perspective, morality is a domain of normative and social knowledge that develops and emerges in human interactions. Moral concerns, judgments, and norms are not only the result of the expression of innate adaptive intuitions, nor the product of social conformity and a simple process of mirroring the normativity that communities have established to organize their social life. Human individuals, instead, construct moral concerns and judgments during their situated interactions. More specifically, the constructivist tradition claims that we need to research how moral concerns, judgments, and reasons emerge in social interactions and how human beings construct the content of their moral knowledge in the first place. Based on these ideas, morality is defined here as the result of a constructive process through which human individuals, by the means of constant interactions on a background of mutual respect and recognition, develop evaluative concerns about how we ought to treat others, and how to ‘care’ and ‘respect’ others’ well-being, needs, and vulnerabilities. This developmental-constructivist theory of human psychology contributes to an alternative understanding of the origins of moral variability and informs a very particular normative stance about the most desirable contexts needed for the urgent accomplishment of inclusivist forms of morality in contemporary societies. This is so given that the very same definition of morality adopted presupposes the feature of inclusivity. The main objective of this work is then to argue, based on a developmental perspective, what are the most favorable conditions to foster the development of moral inclusivity and what we should do to accomplish concrete instances of moral progress that truly help us to overcome our most urgent moral challenges. The whole thesis is organized as follows. In part I, I show how received visions about human social evolution have informed conceptions of morality as an adaptive function evolved to solve the challenges of cooperative life. Based on these assumptions, some theories argue that human morality is limited by the boundaries of group thinking, and always obeys the mandates of collective interests and the will of the majority. However, this conception has problematic implications from a normative and ethical perspective. The aim of Chapter 1 is to present this introductory debate in detail. In chapter 2, I consider a relevant amount of scientific evidence that helps to consolidate a more optimistic and inclusivist perspective about the starting conditions of human prosocial behavior. Later, I will summarize some ideas offered to explain the possible evolutionary mechanisms that led to the consolidation of these inclusivist capacities. However, I will also show how evolutionary theories that share the same adaptationist foundations but initially seem relevant to explain the feasibility of moral inclusivity, result incomplete when considering the complexity of moral behavior and its ethical implications. Part II is devoted to presenting a developmental alternative to the adaptationist versions around the starting conditions of morality. In this section, I first summarize the epistemological, conceptual, and empirical basis of a constructivist perspective already proposed by several authors in the last decades. This is the goal of chapter 3. More precisely, I adopt the conceptualization of morality established by the social-domain theory school and clarify its conception of the situated development of moral concerns, motivations, and norms. All these ideas are essential for my argumentation on the feasibility of inclusivist moral progress offered later. Chapter 4 provides a more detailed idea of constructivist thinking about moral development, by analyzing one particular dimension: the development of moral concerns for fairness and the sense of justice in distributive dilemmas. In Part III, I assume a constructivist perspective on morality to contribute to the philosophy of moral progress. In particular, I discuss the implications of such a perspective for the conceptualization of human moral nature and discuss what are the most favorable conditions for moral inclusivity to emerge. Answering that question is of enormous relevance since favoring the transition of human societies towards more inclusivist forms of moral concern and behavior supposes a more generalized accomplishment of our most urgent moral convictions. Previous developmental or culturally-sensible attempts to explore this issue are already on the market. As mentioned before, most authors have approached the topic by situating the cultural evolution and development of (inclusivist) moral progress in the WEIRD world. For instance, some of these authors claim that very concrete material conditions (mostly present in the Western World) have been necessary for triggering inclusivist and impersonal prosocial tendencies that human beings are not able to express in threatening contexts without physical security. Despite their interest in explaining inclusivist morality and the feasibility of inclusivist forms of progress following a naturalistic and culturally situated approach, these theories are problematic for two main reasons. In the first place, most of the authors that explain moral progress tend to focus exclusively on the consolidation of liberal values in the Western world and the underlying adoption of laws, social-epistemic practices, and public narratives about tolerance and inclusivity, as unequivocal signs of inclusivist morality. Nevertheless, there is an enormous distance between the institutional and public support of inclusivist moral values or the construction of public images of tolerance and inclusivity, and the real materialization of impersonal moralities in situated social interactions. Secondly, the variability of human moral behavior is far bigger than most of the theories in moral psychology and moral progress tend to assume. Accordingly, inclusivist and exclusivist forms of morality may develop simultaneously in similar or divergent geographical and socio-ecological environments, including those with harsh conditions such as competition for scarce resources, potential intergroup conflict, and risks of disease transmission. In addition, harsh environmental conditions are usually present in almost all societies around the globe, and the presence of socio-ecological conditions such as physical security and prosperity, predominant in highly resourced populations, do not prevent the existence of exclusivist moral tendencies. My model explores a different perspective on the relationships between cultural, institutional, and historical factors, and the situated development of human morality. This supposes a clear distinction from previous approaches to the matter since it offers a different view on what we should do to pursue further instances of inclusivist social progress. In the fifth chapter, I first analyze the proposals of some defenders of the ‘dependency’ theory. The attention is focused on the ‘Evolutionary Developmental Model’ proposed by Buchanan and Powell (2018). Based on a critique of this approach, I will argue that to explain the evolution and development of human morality in its multiple manifestations, it is essential to put focus on social interactions. This also involves a different perspective on human-environment relations that in line with a constructivist worldview makes an innovative contribution to the philosophy of moral behavior and moral progress. Later, in the sixth chapter, I will define my alternative relational view of inclusivist morality and I will offer my view on how to establish favorable conditions that make inclusivist morality possible. Complementing the constructivist approach, my conception is based on the essential role of equality and individuality and on how moral inclusivity is favored if moral concerns do not develop driven by the accomplishment of group-centered, binding, and communitarian concerns and values. In brief, my relational model suggests that the accomplishment of moral inclusivity not only depends on the overall achievement of certain levels of physical security or economic prosperity. Instead, its development is favored by transforming the interactional contexts in which moral concerns towards autonomy and individuality emerge. In arguing so, I will need to start with a critique of contemporary situated and embodied approaches in ethics. Then, I will show how societies guided by the accomplishment of group-centered values of power, dominance, and relational inequality tend to express exclusivist moral behaviors, while individualistic societies tend to be more inclusivist. Starting from this diagnosis, my final attempt is then to reflect on which are the best conditions for the moral valuation of individuality to emerge and what we should do to promote the accomplishment of moral inclusivity at the societal level. (shrink)

The original Specker–Blatter theorem (1983) was formulated for classes of structures $\mathcal {C}$ of one or several binary relations definable in Monadic Second Order Logic MSOL. It states that the number of such structures on the set $[n]$ is modularly C-finite (MC-finite). In previous work we extended this to structures definable in CMSOL, MSOL extended with modular counting quantifiers. The first author also showed that the Specker–Blatter theorem does not hold for one quaternary relation (2003).If the vocabulary allows a constant (...) symbol c, there are n possible interpretations on $[n]$ for c. We say that a constant c is hard-wired if c is always interpreted by the same element $j \in [n]$. In this paper we show: (i)The Specker–Blatter theorem also holds for CMSOL when hard-wired constants are allowed. The proof method of Specker and Blatter does not work in this case.(ii)The Specker–Blatter theorem does not hold already for $\mathcal {C}$ with one ternary relation definable in First Order Logic FOL. This was left open since 1983.Using hard-wired constants allows us to show MC-finiteness of counting functions of various restricted partition functions which were not known to be MC-finite till now. Among them we have the restricted Bell numbers $B_{r,A}$, restricted Stirling numbers of the second kind $S_{r,A}$ or restricted Lah-numbers $L_{r,A}$. Here r is a non-negative integer and A is an ultimately periodic set of non-negative integers. (shrink)

Extensive measurement is the standard measurement-theoretic approach for constructing a ratio scale. It involves the comparison of objects that can be concatenated in an additively representable way. This paper studies the implications of extensively measurable welfare for social choice theory. We do this in two frameworks: an Arrovian framework with a fixed population and no interpersonal comparisons, and a generalized framework with variable populations and full interpersonal comparability. In each framework we use extensive measurement to introduce novel domain restrictions, (...) independence conditions, and constraints on social evaluation. We prove a welfarism theorem for these domains and characterize the social welfare functions that satisfy the axioms of extensive measurement at both the individual and social levels. The main results are simple axiomatizations of strong dictatorship in the Arrovian framework and classical utilitarianism in the generalized framework. (shrink)

We first show that the projection image of a discrete definable set is again discrete for an arbitrary definably complete locally o‐minimal structure. This fact together with the results in a previous paper implies a tame dimension theory and a decomposition theorem into good‐shaped definable subsets called quasi‐special submanifolds. Using this fact, we investigate definably complete locally o‐minimal expansions of ordered groups when the restriction of multiplication to an arbitrary bounded open box is definable. Similarly to o‐minimal expansions (...) of ordered fields, Łojasiewicz's inequality, Tietze's extension theorem and affiness of pseudo‐definable spaces hold true for such structures under the extra assumption that the domains of definition and the pseudo‐definable spaces are definably compact. Here, a pseudo‐definable space is a topological space having finite definable atlases. We also demonstrate Michael's selection theorem for definable set‐valued functions with definably compact domains of definition. (shrink)

This dissertation investigates the ways in which natural language restricts the domains of quantifiers. Adverbs of quantification are analyzed as quantifying over situations. The domain of quantifiers is pragmatically constrained: apparent processes of "semantic partition" are treated as pragmatic epiphenomena. The introductory Chapter 1 sketches some of the background of work on natural language quantification and begins the analysis of adverbial quantification over situations. Chapter 2 develops the central picture of "semantic partition" as a side-effect of pragmatic processes of (...) anaphora resolution. I argue that the apparent effects of topic/focus articulation and presuppositional information on the interpretation of quantifiers are not the result of a direct and local mechanism of sentence grammar. Instead, I develop an analysis where the link is established via the anaphoric dependence of quantifier domains on the discourse context. Chapter 3 discusses the analysis of conditional clauses as quantifier restrictors, concentrating on the question whether conditional clauses restrict quantifiers directly or indirectly. A treatment is explored which has if-clauses constrain the value of the hidden domain variable of the restricted quantifier. Chapter 4, on unless-clauses, and Chapter 5, on only if- and even if-clauses, present some issues in the compositional analysis of complex conditional clauses. These chapters significantly expand the data coverage of the theory of A-quantification. Building on previous work of mine on exceptives, I analyze unless-clauses as exceptive operators on A-quantifiers. The analysis of only if-clauses, treated as conditional clauses that combine if with the focus adverb only, unearthes some interesting new properties. Chapter 6, finally, examines the phenomenon of donkey-anaphora in the light of the results of the previous chapters. I show that a solution to the proportion problem may become possible once we combine the situation-semantic approach to adverbial quantification with the pragmatic theory developed in Chapter 2 and further elaborated in the analysis of donkey anaphora in complex conditionals. (shrink)

It has been argued within some philosophy of quantum gravity circles that endorsing Lewisian modal metaphysics is incompatible with endorsing the fundamental physical ontology of any quantum gravity theory. Speaking concisely, the unsolvable tension would be between Lewis' metaphysical commitment to the fundamentality of space and time, and the physical lesson of quantum gravity about the disappearance of space and time from the fundamental structure of the world. In this essay I argue against the idea that the tension is (...) unsolvable. The analysis does not apply to quantum gravity in general, but only to the specific perspective delivered by quantum string theory. In the first two sections I describe what I think is the general formal payoff of Lewisian possible worlds semantics, and more importantly the general metaphysical payoff generated by some Lewisian metaphysical applications of that formal framework. Lewisian possible worlds semantics is not among the topics of this essay, still a concise presentation of its basic features is required for a more accurate description of the type of modal metaphysics Lewis delivers by applying that formal machinery. The moral of the story in the first two sections is that an attempt of preserving crucial features of Lewisian modal metaphysics, although endorsing the quantum string theory lesson on spacetime non fundamentality, would be not only possible, but also philosophically worthy in a general sense. Then, section three is divided in three parts. In the first part I summarize some formal tools of the methodology used elsewhere - (Vistarini, Routledge, 2019, chapter 6)- to argue for string theory background independence. More precisely, I briefly re-describe some crucial features of a topological-vector bundle structure there defined on a "space" associated to the theory. Such structure is there shown to carry physical and dynamical information about quantum strings systems supporting the thesis of background independence of quantum strings laws (string theory background independence is not a topic of this essay, and the construction of the full formal structure as well as the full argumentative line can be found in the work cited above). The rationale behind the choice of including these formal tools is explained in the second and third parts of section three: that very same topological-fiber bundle structure associated to string theory, if read differently, is shown to also carry structural properties of the Lewisian metaphysical scheme. More precisely, in the second part of section three I attempt to show that such topological-fiber bundle structure owns a topology which qualifies as a plausible accessibility structure extending the Lewisian similarity accessibility. To avoid confusion, I will denote the extended similarity order with S*, or S*-similarity. The latter has some interesting properties. It is quantitatively describable, and even more interestingly its spectrum of variation is a countable one. Then, insofar Lewisian similarity order can be regained from the S*-similarity, one might say that the latter is a metaphysical accessibility relation underlying the former because "more fundamental". As we will see, the explanation of what "more fundamental" means in this metaphysical context mainly involves the idea that the formal nature of S*-similarity, in particular its property of having a countable spectrum of variation, calibrates a metaphysical similarity that reflects the discreteness of the fundamental quantum nature of reality. The extended modal metaphysics with accessibility structure S*-similarity is informed by quantum string physics. Within the extended scheme, the Lewisian claim "things could have been different in countless ways" (Lewis 1973) is an approximate one because only permitted by ordinary language. As soon as one refines the accessibility structure by using the formal language of quantum string theory, it appears things could have been different in countable ways. But the Lewisian variety of alternative states of affairs can be regained from the underlying countable variety via a specific interpretation of the Humean supervenience thesis, one that changes the metaphysical status of the thesis' content and restricts the thesis' domain of application. Finally, in the third part of section three I attempt to show that the same topological-fiber bundle structure used to extend Lewisian similarity has a bundle component producing the formal scheme for a tentative extension of Lewisian nomological accessibility through the lens of string dualities. This will prove to be a non trivial task, and the Lewisian accessibility structure will be regained from the extended one only partially. Finally, the essay contains two short appendices summarizing two argumentative lines outside the main topic of the essay. They briefly describe different ways in which the non fundamentality of spatiotemporal structures can be found in quantum string theory. These sections can be skipped. Nevertheless, they might contribute to understand more robustly the general view endorsed by this essay, i.e. that there isn't any unsolvable tension between Lewis' commitment to the fundamentality of spatiotemporal relations and quantum gravity's lesson about their non fundamentality. -/- . (shrink)

According to physicalism, everything is physical, namely there are no entities (or no more restricted sorts of entities) that are not physical. In this paper, I shall examine the truth of this thesis by presenting a triviality objection against physicalism that is somehow similar to the one advanced against presentism. Firstly, I shall distinguish between two different definitions of the physical (roughly, every entity is physical-1 iff it has some feature F, such as impenetrability or exact spatio-temporal location, while every (...) entity is physical-2 iff it is accepted by some ideal, true and complete physical theory) and between unrestricted and restricted versions of physicalism (according to the former ones, physicalism is true for every entity while, according to the latter ones, it is true only with regard to some restricted domain of entities). Secondly, I shall argue that physicalists have to deal with six different problems: the triviality of some versions of physicalism, the content-indeterminacy of the physical and the justification of the “faith” according to which we will formulate some ideal, true and complete physical theory (given the definition of the physical-2), the restricted domain problem (so that restricted versions of physicalism seem not to exclude the existence of seemingly non-physical entities), the (possible and plausible) incompatibility between the two different definitions of the physical, the extension of the physical investigation problem. (shrink)

Classical generalized quantifier (GQ) theory posits that quantificational determiners (Q-dets) combine with a nominal argument of type et, a first order predicate, to form a GQ. In a recent paper, Matthewson (2001) challenges this position by arguing that the domain of a Q-det is not of type et, but e, an entity. In this paper, I defend the classical GQ view, and argue that the data that motivated Matthewson’s revision actually suggest that the domain set can, and indeed in (...) certain languages must, be contextually restricted overtly. (shrink)

The study of pairs of modules (over a Dedekind domain) arises from two different perspectives, as a starting step in the analysis of tuples of submodules of a given module, or also as a particular case in the analysis of Abelian structures made by two modules and a morphism between them. We discuss how these two perspectives converge to pairs of modules, and we follow the latter one to obtain an alternative approach to the classification of pairs of torsionfree objects. (...) Then we restrict our attention to pairs of free modules. Our main results are that the theory of pairs of free Abelian groups is co-recursively enumerable, and that a few remarkable extensions of this theory are decidable. (shrink)

This paper presents an extended version of the Quantified Argument Calculus (Quarc). Quarc is a logic comparable to the first-order predicate calculus. It employs several nonstandard syntactic and semantic devices, which bring it closer to natural language in several respects. Most notably, quantifiers in this logic are attached to one-place predicates; the resulting quantified constructions are then allowed to occupy the argument places of predicates. The version presented here is capable of straightforwardly translating natural-language sentences involving defining clauses. A three-valued, (...) model-theoretic semantics for Quarc is presented. Interpretations in this semantics are not equipped with domains of quantification: they are just interpretation functions. This reflects the analysis of natural-language quantification on which Quarc is based. A proof system is presented, and a completeness result is obtained. The logic presented here is capable of straightforward translation of the classical first-order predicate calculus, the translation preserving truth values as well as entailment. The first-order predicate calculus and its devices of quantification can be seen as resulting from Quarc on certain semantic and syntactic restrictions, akin to simplifying assumptions. An analogous, straightforward translation of Quarc into the first-order predicate calculus is impossible. (shrink)

There is increasing speculation within military and policy circles that the future of armed conflict is likely to include extensive deployment of robots designed to identify targets and destroy them without the direct oversight of a human operator. My aim in this paper is twofold. First, I will argue that the ethical case for allowing autonomous targeting, at least in specific restricted domains, is stronger than critics have acknowledged. Second, I will attempt to uncover, explicate, and defend the intuition (...) that even in this context there would be something ethically problematic about such targeting. I argue that an account of the non-consequentialist foundations of the principle of distinction suggests that the use of autonomous weapon systems is unethical by virtue of failing to show appropriate respect for the humanity of our enemies. However, the success of the strongest form of this argument depends upon understanding the robot itself as doing the killing. To the extent that we believe that, on the contrary, AWS are only the means whereby those who order them into action kill, the idea that the use of AWS fails to respect the humanity of our enemy will turn upon an account of what is required by respect that is essentially conventional. Thus, while the theoretical foundations of the idea that AWS are weapons that are “evil in themselves” are weaker than critics have sometimes maintained, they are nonetheless sufficient to the task of demanding a prohibition of the development and deployment of such weapons. (shrink)

During the COVID-19 pandemic, focused protection strategies including selective lockdowns of the elderly were proposed as alternatives to general lockdowns. These selective restrictions would consist of isolating only those most at risk of COVID-19 hospitalization and subsequent use of healthcare resources. The proposal seems to have troubling implications, including the permissibility of selective lockdown on the basis of characteristics such as ethnicity, sex, disability, or BMI. Like age, these factors also correlated with an increased risk of hospitalization from COVID-19. In (...) this paper, we argue that age has meaningful differences as a morally relevant characteristic in the justification for selective restrictions of liberty. Thus, it might justify selective freedom restrictions in a way in which other factors might not. We offer four moral domains that separate age from other proxies: empiricism, operationality, discrimination, and disparity. (shrink)

It is often possible to know what a speaker intends to communicate without knowing what they intend to say. In such cases, speakers need not intend to say anything at all. Stanley and Szabó's influential survey of possible analysis of quantifier domain restriction is, therefore, incomplete and the arguments made by Clapp and Buchanan against Truth Conditional Compositionality and propositional speaker-meaning are flawed. Two theories should not always be viewed as incompatible when they associate the same utterance with different (...) propositions, as there may be many ways to interpret speakers that are compatible with their intentions. (shrink)

One of the strongest objections to the development and use of substantially life-extending interventions is that they would exacerbate existing unjust disparities of healthy lifespans between rich and poor members of society. In both popular opinion and ethical theory, this consequence is sometimes thought to justify a ban on life-prolonging technologies. However, the practical and ethical drawbacks of banning receive little attention, and the viability of alternative policies is seldom considered. Moreover, where ethicists do propose alternatives, there is scant (...) effort to consider their merits in light of developing world priorities. In response to these shortcomings, I distinguish four policy options and, on the basis of a plausible intuition about fairness, evaluate their implications for a fair distribution of healthy lifespans. I claim that even in developing nations it would be fairest to favor policies that promote equal access to at least one promising category of substantially life-extending intervention: calorie restriction mimetics. (shrink)

Two theories of implicit domain restriction have gained considerable prominence over the last two decades. According to von Fintel (Restrictions on quantifier domaines, Ph.D. thesis, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1994), quantifiers come with covert restrictors and, as a result of this, induce domain restriction; according to Stanley [in Gerhard and Peter (eds) Logical form and language, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002; Stanley and Szabó (Mind Lang 15(2–3):2192–2161, 2000)], by contrast, nouns, as opposed to quantifiers, come with covert restrictors. (...) In this article, I do three things. First, I assess the arguments that have been given for and against these two accounts and show that none of them is conclusive. Second, I advance a novel empirical argument based on the observed pragmatic behaviour of bare nouns, an argument that falsifies Stanley’s theory while providing clear evidence in support of von Fintel’s (1994). Finally, I discuss the relevance of the bare noun data in the context of another important debate—namely, whether domain restriction is a local mechanism only, or whether it can also be achieved by global means. (shrink)

Moral foundations theory chastises cognitive developmental theory for having foisted on moral psychology a restrictive conception of the moral domain which involves arbitrarily elevating the values of justice and caring. The account of this negative influence on moral psychology, referred to in the moral foundations theory literature as the ?great narrowing?, involves several interrelated claims concerning the scope of the moral domain construct in cognitive moral developmentalism, the procedure by which it was initially elaborated, its empirical grounds (...) and the influence of this conception of the moral domain on research in moral psychology. Examining these claims in light of key theoretical writings on the moral domain concept in cognitive moral developmentalism, the paper shows that the ?great narrowing? narrative is misinformed, superficial and historically inaccurate. On the basis of this critical analysis, we conclude that the primary heuristic value of the ?great narrowing narrative? is as a case lesson in the deep specificity of competing conceptions of the moral domain to the theoretical frameworks in which they are devised. (shrink)

Both syntactic and semantic solutions are given for the entailment problem of duality theory. The test algebra theorem provides both a syntactic solution to the entailment problem in terms of primitive positive formulae and a new derivation of the corresponding result in clone theory, viz. the syntactic description of $\operatorname{Inv(Pol}(R))$ for a given set R of finitary relations on a finite set. The semantic solution to the entailment problem follows from the syntactic one, or can be given in (...) the form of an algorithm. It shows, in the special case of a purely relational type, that duality-theoretic entailment is describable in terms of five constructs, namely trivial relations, intersection, repetition removal, product, and retractive projection. All except the last are concrete, in the sense that they are described by a quantifier-free formula. It is proved that if the finite algebra $\underline{M}$ generates a congruence-distributive variety and all subalgebras of $\underline{M}$ are subdirectly irreducible, then concrete constructs suffice to describe entailment. The concept of entailment appropriate to strong dualities is also introduced, and described in terms of coordinate projections, restriction of domains, and composition of partial functions. (shrink)

This paper uses two recentworks as a springboard for discussing theproper contours of intellectual propertyprotection. Professor Lessig devotes much ofThe Future of Ideas to demonstrating howthe expanding scope of intellectual propertyprotection threatens the Internet as aninnovation commons. Similarly, ProfessorLitman''s message in Digital Copyright isthat copyright law is both too complicated andtoo restrictive. Both authors contend that asa result of overprotecting individual rights,creativity is stifled and the vitality of theintellectual commons is in jeopardy. It isdifficult to evaluate the claims and policyprescriptions (...) of these books without someappreciation for the moral foundations ofintellectual property. The utility and labordesert theories remain the two most prominentin the Anglo-American tradition. Afterexploring those theories, we argue for a secureregime of protection based on the Lockeanvision that property rights are justly deservedas a reward for labor that creates value. However, as Locke''s famous proviso implies,even a natural property right is not absoluteand must be balanced by regard for the publicdomain. But a natural right cannot besacrificed simply to advance technologicalinnovation or to achieve marginal social andeconomic gains. While we agree with Lessig andLitman that recent legislation goes too far weconclude the essay by attempting to illustratethat some of their policy recommendations errin the opposite direction by underprotectingvalid property rights. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a theory of interaction between definiteness and quantifier structure, where the definite determiner (D) performs the function of contextually restricting the domain of quantificational determiners (Qs). Our motivating data come from Greek and Basque, where D appears to compose with the Q itself. Similar compositions are found in Hungarian and Bulgarian. Following earlier work (Giannakidou 2004, Etxeberria 2005, Etxeberria and Giannakidou 2009) we define a domain restricting function DDR, in which D modifies the Q (...) and supplies the contextual variable C to intersect with Q’s domain. DDR can also modify the NP in which case it works like an intersective modfier— and we suggest that this is the case in St’át’imcets Salish (drawing on data from Matthewson’s work). The result of DDR will be restricting the domain of Q by C, a weakly familiar property (in the sense of Roberts 2003, 2010), i.e. it is entailed in the common ground of the context. As a result of intersecting with this property, the Q that undergoes DDR becomes presuppositional, and we hypothesize that all presuppositional Qs (each-like Qs) have an underlying derivation of the domain restriction via D that we see in Greek and Basque overtly. Our analysis provides support for the program that domain restriction is grammatically represented, but we propose an important refinement: domain restriction can affect the Q itself (in agreement with von Fintel 1998, Martí 2003, Giannakidou 2004; pace Stanley 2002), and in fact quite systematically. We also show that the Q that is affected by DDR is a strong one, and explain the inability of weak Qs to undergo DDR as following from their status as adjectival. (shrink)

That Kuhn is mistaken in drawing a sharp line between normal and revolutionary phases of science is shown by re-examining the role of models in extending theories to new phenomenal domains. In the light of this revision of the role of models, theory extension, which Kuhn includes in normal science, is shown to be continuous with theory replacement, which Kuhn includes in revolutionary science. Both involve language changes and the 'gestalt switches' associated with revolutionary science. These (...) characteristics cannot be used to demarcate the two phases as Kuhn seems to think. (shrink)

Cumulative technological culture can be defined as the progressive diversification, complexification, and enhancement of technological traits through generations. An outstanding issue is to specify the cognitive bases of this phenomenon. Based on the literature, we identified four potential cognitive factors: namely, theory-of-mind, technical-reasoning, creativity, and fluid-cognitive skills. The goal of the present study was to test which of these factors—or a combination thereof—best predicted the cumulative performance in two experimental, micro-society conditions differing in the nature of the interaction allowed (...) between participants. The task was to build the highest possible tower. Participants were also assessed on the four aforementioned cognitive factors in order to predict cumulative performance and attractiveness. Our findings indicate that technical-reasoning skills are the best predictor of cumulative performance, even if their role may be restricted to the specific technological domain. Theory-of-mind skills may have a facilitator role, particularly in the Communication condition. Creativity can also help in the generation of novel ideas, but it is not sufficient to support innovation. Finally, fluid cognition is not involved in cumulative technological culture. Taken together, these findings suggest that domain-specific knowledge remains critical for explaining cumulative technological culture. (shrink)

Although theoretical results for several algorithms in many application domains were presented during the last decades, not all algorithms can be analyzed fully theoretically. Experimentation is necessary. The analysis of algorithms should follow the same principles and standards of other empirical sciences. This article focuses on stochastic search algorithms, such as evolutionary algorithms or particle swarm optimization. Stochastic search algorithms tackle hard real-world optimization problems, e.g., problems from chemical engineering, airfoil optimization, or bioinformatics, where classical methods from mathematical optimization (...) fail. Nowadays statistical tools that are able to cope with problems like small sample sizes, non-normal distributions, noisy results, etc. are developed for the analysis of algorithms. Although there are adequate tools to discuss the statistical significance of experimental data, statistical significance is not scientifically meaningful per se. It is necessary to bridge the gap between the statistical significance of an experimental result and its scientific meaning. We will propose some ideas on how to accomplish this task based on Mayo's learning model. (shrink)

Computer-supported collaborative learning has a history of being interdisciplinary from its conception. Its beginnings have included computer scientists, psychologists, cognitive scientists, and educational researchers. These collaborations have been fruitful but have also posed challenges. This article builds on the authors’ extensive review of the CSCL literature to examine the nature of interdisciplinary collaboration in CSCL research as well as an interdisciplinary CSCL workshop. Using a corpus of more than 700 CSCL articles, we reported an updated analysis for the theories and (...) methods used in CSCL research. In addition, bibliometric analyses examined journals that publish CSCL research and are cited by CSCL research. CSCL research is published in journals that are aligned with interdisciplinary research with large contributions from educational research followed by technology related fields and social sciences. The contributions from domain knowledge journals are relatively weak. These analyses revealed disciplinary influences and uptakes of CSCL research and how they might differ across CSCL research clusters. Lastly, we provide a case example of a CSCL workshop to further demonstrate the interdisciplinary nature of the field. Through these analyses we aim to characterize the benefits and challenges of interdisciplinary collaboration in CSCL research. Interdisciplinarity has helped CSCL research to adopt multiple theories and methods to understand CSCL. While cultivating diversity, we also need to be mindful that research outcomes are exchanged and appropriated actively across participating disciplines so that our understanding of CSCL rises above individual disciplines. (shrink)

Each science has its own domain of investigation, but one and the same science can be formalized in different languages with different universes of discourse. The concept of the domain of a science and the concept of the universe of discourse of a formalization of a science are distinct, although they often coincide in extension. In order to analyse the presuppositions and implications of choices of domain and universe, this article discusses the treatment of omega arguments in three very (...) different formalizations of arithmetic. In Peano's formalization the domain is a restricted class of individuals, while the universe of discourse is the unrestricted class of all individuals. In Gödel's formalization the domain is a restricted class of individuals as in Peano's formalization, but the universe of discourse coincides with the domain. In Whitehead-Russell's formalization the domain is a class of logical notions in Tarski's sense, that are necessarily not individuals, whereas the universe of discourse is the unrestricted class of individuals as in Peano's formalization. The present approach emphasizes the viewpoint that the universe of discourse of a given discourse is important in determining which propositions are expressed by which sentences. (shrink)

This paper develops an idea of saving ordinary uses of vague predicates from the Sorites by means of domain restriction. A tolerance level for a predicate, along a dimension, is a difference with respect to which the predicate is semantically insensitive. A central gap for the predicate+dimension in a domain is a segment of an associated scale, larger than this difference, where no object in the domain has a measure, and such that the extension of the predicate has (...) measures on one side of the gap and the anti-extension on the other. The domain restriction imposes a central gap. (shrink)

This paper uses Avron’s algebraic semantics for the logic RMI to model some ideas in the philosophy of science. Avron’s relevant disjunctive structures are each partitioned into relevance domains. Each relevance domain is a boolean algebra. I employ this semantics to act as a formal framework to represent what Nancy Cartwright calls the “dappled world”. On the dappled world hypothesis, local scientific theories each represent restricted aspects and regions of the universe. I use relevance domains to represent the (...) domains of each of these local theories and I provide a formalisation of the salient relationships between so-called fundamental theories and local theories. I also examine ways in which the paraconsistent nature of RMI can be used to deal with inconsistencies within and between theories adopted by scientists. The paper ends with some suggestions about updating RDS given changes in the theories that science adopts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Destruction of the Seven Nations in Deuteronomy and the Mimetic Theory Norbert Lohfink Hochschule Sankt Georgen, Frankfort The book of Deuteronomy is a narrative with two narrative voices which do not necessarily present the same perspective, the one of the narrator, the other ofMoses. By employing the technique of showing rather than telling, the narrator allows his Moses to articulate a new design of the world in (...) the Deuteronomic law. Although mimetic theory may be important to our understanding of both perspectives, I will focus here solely on that world presented by Moses' speeches.1 A brief summary of my essay "Opfer und Säkularisierung im Deuteronomium" (Sacrifice and Secularization in Deuteronomy), in whose final section I found it necessary to tum to René Girard's mimetic model for clarification of the evidence, provides the basis for the revision and expansion of that study which follows. Deuteronomy—a new conception of the sacred My essay was in the form of a debate with the secularization thesis of Moshe Weinfeld, whose point ofdeparture is the Deuteronomic centralization of sacrifice in Jerusalem.2 In Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, Weinfeld argues that all sacrifice as well as everything sacral was abolished throughout the land, that the sacred was restricted to the central cultus and all else became the profane. I sought to demonstrate that the historical assump1 With regard to the narrator's perspective a central question which arises, for example, is whether Moses is a sacrificial victim or a scapegoat. 2 For an early criticism of Weinfeld's work, see Jacob Milgrom (1973). 104Norbert Lohfink tions of his thesis are based on an erroneous interpretation of the evidence. Although I cannot review those assumptions here, it is important to point out that the evidence is more complicated than Weinfeld seems to admit. In the book of Deuteronomy, we see that sacrifice indeed is abolished throughout the land. Less apparent is the fact that that restriction extends also to the rituals of sacrifice practiced by the central cultus. There is no mention of such rituals in Deuteronomy. A close study of the text reveals that they in fact have undergone a subtle transformation. The 14 centralization laws which describe the pilgrimage to the central sanctuary are presented in a literary form that resembles a ritual (see the tables in Lohfink 1992, 25-31). The high point of that pilgrimage is not the slaughter and offering of animals but the joy of a common meal. The killing of the animals is relatively insignificant in the light of the celebration of Israel's existence "before the countenance of YHWH." The Israel that celebrates this festival is moreover a society where there are neither poor nor needy. This ideal society constitutes in Deuteronomy the true sacred. By comparison with the older, archaic-cultic, understanding of this sacred the transferrai of the world-reality of the society 'Israel' into the sacred appears to imply its disintegration. But this is not the case. Deuteronomy embodies an extension of the sacred, not its demise. It presents a new interpretation of the phenomenon. The process of transforming the meaning of the sacred is mirrored in designation of Israel, indeed all of Israel, as qadosh 'holy'. It is no longer the priests alone who are considered holy but the entire population. Deuteronomic law is framed by statements that name Israel as "a people holy to the LORD your God" (7:6; 26:19) and that promise the holiness of Israel as a future blessing (28:9).3 Now 'holiness' always means the marking of a partial realm out of a greater realm which becomes thereby the 'profane'. This is what is meant in Deuteronomy. The nation of Israel is 'holy' in contrast to the other 'nations;' it is, according to 7:6, the "people for his own possession out of all the peoples that are on the face of the earth." In 26: 18ff. this rhetorical formula splits into two discrete references, the one stating that Israel wül be "a people for His own possession," the other that "He will set you high above all the nations He has made." Both texts depict a system of holy-profane... (shrink)

Theory of Mind (ToM) is one of the most relevant concepts in the field of social cognition, particularly in the case of Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Literature showing that individuals with ASD display deficits in ToM is extensive and robust. However, some related issues deserve more research: the heterogeneous profile of ToM abilities in children with ASD and the association between different levels of ToM development and social, pragmatic, and adaptive behaviors in everyday life. The first objective of this (...) study was to identify profiles of children with ASD without intellectual disability (ID), based on explicit and applied ToM knowledge, and compare these profiles with a group of children with typical development (TD). A second objective was to determine differences in symptom severity, adaptive/social behavior, and pragmatic abilities between the profiles identified. Fifty-two children with a clinical diagnosis of ASD without ID and 37 children with TD performed neuropsychological ToM tasks and two vocabulary and memory tests. In addition, all of their mothers completed different questionnaires about applied ToM abilities, severity of ASD symptoms, adaptive/social skills, and pragmatic competence. Two subgroups were identified in the cluster analysis carried out with explicit and applied ToM indicators. The “Lower ToM abilities” profile obtained significantly lower scores than the “Higher ToM abilities” profile on all the ToM measures. Furthermore, the analysis of covariance, controlling for vocabulary and working memory (ANCOVAs), showed statistically significant differences in applied ToM abilities between the two groups of children with ASD without ID and the group with TD. However, only the group with “Higher ToM abilities” achieved similar performance to the TD group on the verbal task of explicit ToM knowledge. Finally, the “Lower ToM abilities” cluster obtained significantly higher scores on autism symptoms (social and communication domains) and lower scores on adaptive behavior and pragmatic skills than the cluster with “Higher ToM abilities”. Taken together, these findings have implications for understanding the heterogeneity in ToM skills in children with ASD without ID, and their differential impact on social, communicative, and adaptive behaviors. (shrink)

This article describes what the earliest concepts are like and presents a theory of the spatial primitives from which they are formed. The earliest concepts tend to be global, like animal and container, and it is hypothesized that they consist of simplified redescriptions of innately salient spatial information. These redescriptions become associated with sensory and other bodily experiences that are not themselves redescribed, but that enrich conceptual thought. The initial conceptual base becomes expanded through subdivision, sometimes aided by language (...) that points up these divisions or suggests new spatial analyses, and by the analogical extension of spatially derived concepts to nonspatial domains. This formulation is contrasted with Fodor's (1998) metaphysical theory of concept formation. (shrink)

We define and study a new restricted consistency notion RCon ∗ for bounded arithmetic theories T 2 j . It is the strongest ∀ Π 1 b -statement over S 2 1 provable in T 2 j , similar to Con in Krajíček and Pudlák, 29) or RCon in Krajı́ček and Takeuti 107). The advantage of our notion over the others is that RCon ∗ can directly be used to construct models of T 2 j . We apply this by (...) proving preservation theorems for theories of bounded arithmetic of the following well-known kind: The ∀ Π 1 b -separation of bounded arithmetic theories S 2 i from T 2 j is equivalent to the existence of a model of S 2 i which does not have a Δ 0 b -elementary extension to a model of T 2 j . More specific, let M ⊨ Ω 1 nst denote that there is a nonstandard element c in M such that the function n ↦ 2 log c is total in M . Let BLΣ 1 b be the bounded collection schema for Σ 1 b -formulas. We obtain the following preservation results: the ∀ Π 1 b -separation of S 2 i from T 2 j is equivalent to the existence of 1. a model of S 2 i +Ω 1 nst which is 1 b -closed w.r.t. T 2 j , 2. a countable model of S 2 i + BLΣ 1 b without weak end extensions to models of T 2 j. (shrink)

The paper builds on both a simply typed term system ${\cal PR}^\omega$ and a computation model on Scott domains via so-called parallel typed while programs (PTWP). The former provides a notion of partial primitive recursive functional on Scott domains $D_\rho$ supporting a suitable concept of parallelism. Computability on Scott domains seems to entail that Kleene's schema of higher type simultaneous course-of-values recursion (scvr) is not reducible to partial primitive recursion. So extensions ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$ and PTWP $^e$ (...) are studied that are closed under scvr. The twist are certain type 1 Gödel recursors ${\cal R}_k$ for simultaneous partial primitive recursion. Formally, ${\cal R}_k\vec{g}\vec{H}xi$ denotes a function $f_i \in D_{\iota\to\iota}$ , however, ${\cal R}_k$ is modelled such that $f_i$ is finite, or in other words, a partial sequence. As for PTWP $^e$ , the concept of type $\iota\to\iota$ writable variables is introduced, providing the possibility of creating and manipulating partial sequences. It is shown that the PTWP $^e$ -computable functionals coincide with those definable in ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$ plus a constant for sequential minimisation. In particular, the functionals definable in ${\cal PR}^{\omega e}$ denoted ${\cal R}^{\omega e}$ can be characterised by a subclass of PTWP $^e$ -computable functionals denoted ${\rm PPR}^{\omega e}$ . Moreover, hierarchies of strictly increasing classes ${\cal R}^{\omega e}_n$ in the style of Heinermann and complexity classes ${\rm PPR}^{\omega e}_n$ are introduced such that $\forall n\ge 0. {\cal R}^{\omega e}_n ={\rm PPR}^{\omega e}_n$ . These results extend those for ${\cal PR}^\omega$ and PTWP [Nig94]. Finally, scvr is employed to define for each type $\sigma$ the enumeration functional $E^\sigma$ of all finite elements of $D_\sigma$. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the extent to which allowing for individuals to be indifferent among alternatives may alter the qualitative results that are obtained in social choice theory when domain restrictions are defined on profiles of linear orders. The general message is that indifferences require attention and careful treatment, because the translation of results from a world without indifferences to another where agents may be indifferent among some alternatives is not always a straightforward exercise. But (...) the warning is not one-directional: sometimes indifferences complicate the statement of results, but preserve their essential message. Sometimes, they help to create domains where some rules work better than in the presence of linear orders. In other cases, however, their presence destroys the positive results that would apply in their absence. I provide examples of these three situations. (shrink)

Abstract -/- Quantifier domain restriction (QDR) and two versions of nominal restriction (NR) are implemented as restrictions that depend on a previously introduced interpreter and interpretation time in a two-dimensional semantic framework on the basis of simple type theory and categorial grammar. Against Stanley (2002) it is argued that a suitable version of QDR can deal with superlatives like tallest. However, it is shown that NR is needed to account for utterances when the speaker intends to convey (...) different restrictions for multiple uses of the same quantifying determiner. We argue that NR generally fares better with such examples but also observe that examples like Every sailor waves at every sailor might be pragmatically anomalous. An account of contextual domain restriction is proposed that (i) excludes these anomalous readings (but it is shown how they could be included), (ii) makes it possible to express different contextual domain restrictions as long-range dependencies on an interpreter and an interpretation time, and (iii) additionally models restrictions based on locative constructions as general mereological constraints introduced by shifting the index. (shrink)

The still unsettled decision problem for the restricted purely universal formulae 0-formulae) of the first order set-theoretic language based over =, ∈ is discussed in relation with the adoption or rejection of the axiom of foundation. Assuming the axiom of foundation, the related finite set-satisfiability problem for the very significant subclass of the 0-formulae consisting of the formulae involving only nested variables of level 1 is proved to be semidecidable on the ground of a reflection property over the hereditarily finite (...) sets, and various extensions of this result are obtained. When variables are restricted to range only over sets, in universes with infinitely many urelements the set-satisfiability problem is shown to be solvable provided the axiom of foundation is assumed; if it is not, then the decidability of a related derivability problem still holds. That, in turn, suggests the alternative adoption of an antifoundation axiom under which the set-satisfiability problem is also solvable . Turning to set theory without urelements, assuming a form of Boffa's antifoundation axiom, the complement of the set-satisfiability problem for the full class of Δ0-formulae is shown to be semidecidable; a result that is known not to hold, for the set-satisfiability problem itself, even for a very restricted subclass of the Δ0-formulae. (shrink)

We study the arithmetical schema asserting that every eventually decreasing elementary recursive function has a limit. Some other related principles are also formulated. We establish their relationship with restricted parameter-free induction schemata. We also prove that the same principle, formulated as an inference rule, provides an axiomatization of the Σ2-consequences of IΣ1.Using these results we show that ILM is the logic of Π1-conservativity of any reasonable extension of parameter-free Π1-induction schema. This result, however, cannot be much improved: by adapting (...) a theorem of D. Zambella and G. Mints we show that the logic of Π1-conservativity of primitive recursive arithmetic properly extends ILM.In the third part of the paper we give an ordinal classification of -consequences of the standard fragments of Peano arithmetic in terms of reflection principles. This is interesting in view of the general program of ordinal analysis of theories, which in the most standard cases classifies Π-classes of sentences. (shrink)

The property of being the implementation of a computational structure has been argued to be vacuously instantiated. This claim provides the basis for most antirealist arguments in the field of the philosophy of computation. Standard manoeuvres for combating these antirealist arguments treat the problem as endogenous to computational theories. The contrastive analysis of computational and other mathematical representations put forward here reveals that the problem should instead be treated within the more general framework of the Newman problem in structuralist accounts (...) of mathematical representation. It is argued that purely structuralist and purely functionalist accounts of implementation are inadequate to tackle the problem. An extensive evaluation of semantic accounts is provided, arguing that semantic properties are, unlike structural and functional ones, suitable to restrict the intended domain of implementation of computational properties in such a way as to block the Newman problem. The semantic hypothesis is defended from a number of recent objections. (shrink)

I will give a broad overview of what has become the standard paradigm in cosmology. I will describe the relational notion of time that is often used in cosmological calculations and discuss how the local nature of Einstein's equations allows us to translate this notion into statements about `initial' data. Classically this relates our local definition of time to a quasi-local region of a particular spatial slice, however incorporating quantum theory comes at the expense of losing this locality entirely. (...) This occurs due to the presence of two, apparently distinct, issues: Seemingly classical issues to do with the infinite spatial volume of the universe and Quantum field theory issues, which revolve around trying to apply renormalization in cosmology. Following the ‘cosmological principle’ - an extension of the ‘Copernicus principle’ - that physics at every point in our universe should look the same, we are lead to the modern view of cosmology. This procedure is reasonably well understood for an exactly homogeneous universe, however the inclusions of small perturbations over this homogeneity leads to many interpretational/ conceptual difficulties. For example, in an infinite universe perturbations can be arbitrarily close to homogeneous. To any observer, such a perturbation would appear to be a simple rescaling of the homogenous background and hence, physically, would not be considered an inhomogeneous perturbation at all. However, any attempt to choose the physically relevant scale at which perturbations should be considered homogeneous will break the cosmological principle i.e. it will make the resulting physics observer dependent. It amounts to `putting the perturbations in a box' and a delicate practical issue is that the universe is not static, hence the scale of the box will be time dependent. Thus what appears ‘physically homogeneous’ to an observer at one time will not appear so at another. This issue is brought to the forefront by considering the canonical version of the theory. The phase space formulation of General Relativity, just as for any other theory, contains the shadow of the underlying quantum theory. This means that, although the formulation is still classical, many of the subtleties that are present in the quantum theory are already apparent. In the cosmological context the infinite spatial volume renders almost all expressions formal or ill-defined. In order to proceed, we must restrict our attention to a cosmology that has some finite spatial extent, on which our relational notion of time is everywhere definable. In particular, this would constrain the permissible data outside our `observable universe'. This difficulty is an IR or large scale issues in cosmology, however in addition there are UV or short scale problems that need to be tackled. There are the usual problems of renormalization, which are further complicated by the fact that the universe is not static. In the cosmological setting this leads to new IR problems which again prevent one from taking the spatial extent of the universe to infinity. The physical relevance of this problem, the consequence for defining a time variable, and the distinction of homogeneous and inhomogeneous IR issues will be discussed. (shrink)

After leading to a new axiomatic derivation of quantum theory, the new informational paradigm is entering the domain of quantum field theory, suggesting a quantum automata framework that can be regarded as an extension of quantum field theory to including an hypothetical Planck scale, and with the usual quantum field theory recovered in the relativistic limit of small wave-vectors. Being derived from simple principles, the automata theory is quantum ab-initio, and does not assume Lorentz (...) covariance and mechanical notions. Being discrete it can describe localized states and measurements, solving all the issues plaguing field theory originated from the continuum. These features make the theory an ideal framework for quantum gravity, with relativistic covariance and space-time emergent solely from the interactions, and not assumed a priori. The paper presents a synthetic derivation of the automata theory, showing how the principles lead to a description in terms of a quantum automaton over a Cayley graph of a group. Restricting to Abelian groups we show how the automata recover the Weyl, Dirac and Maxwell dynamics in the relativistic limit. We conclude with some new routes about the more general scenario of non-Abelian Cayley graphs. The phenomenology arising from the automata theory in the ultra-relativistic domain and the analysis of corresponding distorted Lorentz covariance is reviewed in Bisio et al. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to assess the prospects for a neo‐logicist development of set theory based on a restriction of Frege's Basic Law V, which we call (RV): ∀P∀Q[Ext(P) = Ext(Q) ≡ [(BAD(P) & BAD(Q)) ∨ ∀x(Px ≡ Qx)]] BAD is taken as a primitive property of properties. We explore the features it must have for (RV) to sanction the various strong axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. The primary interpretation is where ‘BAD’ is Dummett's ‘indefinitely (...) extensible’.1 Background: what and why?2 Framework3 GOOD candidates, indefinite extensibility4 The framework of (RV) alone, or almost alone5 The axioms6 Brief closing. (shrink)

Findlay and Lumsden have proposed a model of creative potential which accounts for divergent thinking but not for convergent thinking. This limitation impedes the applicability of the model to scientific creativity, where competence and thus convergent thinking play a fundamental role since the early stages of creation. This limitation is a natural consequence of the fact that Findlay and Lumsden's model is purely intrapsychic. This paper proposes a model of scientists' creative potential which accounts for both divergent and convergent processes. (...) First, drawing from Csikszentmihalyi's and Kuhn's theories, scientists' creative potential is defined as a matching between the cognitive structure and the epistemic and social structure of the domain. Second, based on this sociopsychological definition, an extension of Findlay and Lumsden's model is proposed. The model states that the highest creative potential is achieved by those scientists who deeply understand the core of the domain and still have cognitive power to access, and experiment on many ideas that are not presently included in the domain. The new model is shown to have greater explanatory power than Findlay and Lumsden's model and to include the latter as a limiting case. (shrink)

According to the Encoding Model, speakers communicate by encoding the propositions they want to communicate into sentences, in accordance with the conventions of a language L. By uttering a sentence that encodes p, the speaker says that p. Communication is successful only if the audience identifies the proposition that the speaker intends to communicate, which is achieved by decoding the uttered sentence in accordance with the conventions of L. A consequence of the Encoding Model has been the proliferation of underdetermination (...) arguments, each of which concludes against some linguistic theory T, on the grounds that, were T true, audiences would be unable to know what was said by utterances of some particular linguistic form, and therefore unable to know what speakers intended to communicate by these utterance. The result, if we accept the conclusion of these arguments, is radical restriction of the domain of viable linguistic theory. This Thesis defends an alternative model according to which there need be nothing encoded in an uttered sentence – nothing that is said by its utterance – for the audience to retrieve. Rather, there are indefinitely many ways to interpret uttered sentences – indefinitely many routes to the propositions that speaker intend to communicate – which proceed through different interpretations of what is said. (shrink)

Alfred Schütz is often credited with providing sociology with a firm ground derived from phenomenology of science and justifying it as a science operating within natural attitude. Although his project of social science draws extensively on Edmund Husserl’s theory of attitudes, it would be incorrect to assume that Schütz shares with the founder of phenomenology his conception of science. This paper compares Husserl’s and Schütz’s views on the structure and meaning of science and traces the roots of their radical (...) divergence. Whereas Husserl increasingly emphasises the importance of phenomenological reduction for the genuine human science, Schütz eventually rejects reduction and restricts the social science to a specific system of relevancies within the reality of the lifeworld. This paper presents the argument that Schütz’s conception eliminates the possibility of a phenomenological justification of social science, as it implies that there are no rationally justifiable grounds to pursue science. In this way, Schütz’s views substantially differ from the phenomenological theory of science and become open to the phenomenological critique of naivety. (shrink)

The current issue of Ethical Perspectives is a double issue reflecting significant discussions of ethical issues that occurred in Leuven in the very recent past. The volume is composed in the main of two seminars, one led by Michael Walzer, the other by Bernard Williams. These well-known and highly respected thinkers were guests at Leuven in the past year. Michael Walzer was the holder of the Multatuli Chair, while Bernard Williams was the holder of the Mercier Chair at the Institute (...) of Philosophy. In addition to the responsibilities of offering a public lecture or lectures, both were generous with their time, and open to critical discussion of their work. The results are to be found in the intellectually stimulating seminars published here.Michael Walzer's contribution is threefold. First, we publish here the lecture he delivered to a wide public, as the holder of the Multatuli Chair. This was entitled: International Society: What is the Best We Can Do? The lecture was delivered on May 1, at a time when the whole issue of the international community and its moral and political responsibilities was widely discussed, with reference to the war in Kosovo. That war, and other considerations, might suggest something too optimistic about such discussions of the international community. Walzer is no stranger to the topic of war, as those familiar with an earlier work, Just and Unjust Wars, will know. Walzer's title, on the present occasion, indicates the modesty of his proposal: what is the best we can do? With a theme that might seem to include too much, his discussion offers a sober and ordered approach, which works towards its goal by strategic steps from the left and right extremes of a continuum of possibilities. Second, in addition to this Multatuli lecture, a workshop was convened on the theme of The Power and Impotence of Multilateral Organizations. Marc Hooghe and Bart Pattyn had prepared in advance papers bearing on the work of Walzer. Marc Hooghe wrote of: “The Notion of Complex Equality and the Beauty of Alcibiades”. Bart Pattyn offered: “Two Questions about the Meaning of Meaning.”Subsequent to his response to these, the discussion was again wide-ranging, touching on the themes of the Multatuli lecture, as well as Walzer's other works. This seminar was held at the Institute of Philosophy, but Walzer's third contribution was a further seminar on the themes of his work, this time in the Faculty of Theology, and among the participants were students and teachers who had just spent time carefully studying his work. Among other things, the issues discussed here reflected Walzer's own interest in biblical themes, with repercussions in religion, but also beyond.The seminar with Williams was ordered around the questions of a number of participants who had prepared some questions on the basis of their study of his work. Williams responded impromptu, and as the reader will see the terrain covered is extensive. Williams has been an influential philosopher in the Anglo-American world, notably with reference to his explorations in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.The seminar reflected some of the themes of that work. Williams raises questions about the obsession with theory in ethics, and seeks to explore a domain more ecumenical, so to say, than morality, understood in a more restricted sense, such as we find in forms of utilitarianism and Kantianism. The neutral universal is not enough. Or as he says pithily here: “I'm not living my life in order to exemplify a mathematical theory.” Ethics points to something more inclusive, and moreattentive to the nuances of concrete details and situations.This is not entirely unlike forms of thinking we find in Greek culture, whether among the philosophers, such as Aristotle, or among the poets and tragedians. Something of the latter is explored in Williams's Shame and Necessity. Among the many issues touched on in this discussion was the issue of universality, and as the reader will notice the seminar closed with an exchange with Jaap van Brakel over the nature of the `we.' The reader will find an extensive discussion of `we' in the paper that follows, indicating perhaps also that the `we' of the seminar itself had a post-seminar life.All in all, these different contributions provide us with lively and thought-provoking dialogue, from a diversity of ethical perspectives. (shrink)

We defend hylomorphism against Maegan Fairchild’s purported proof of its inconsistency. We provide a deduction of a contradiction from SH+, which is the combination of “simple hylomorphism” and an innocuous premise. We show that the deduction, reminiscent of Russell’s Paradox, is proof-theoretically valid in classical higher-order logic and invokes an impredicatively defined property. We provide a proof that SH+ is nevertheless consistent in a free higher-order logic. It is shown that the unrestricted comprehension principle of property abstraction on which the (...) purported proof of inconsistency relies is analogous to naïve unrestricted set-theoretic comprehension. We conclude that logic imposes a restriction on property comprehension, a restriction that is satisfied by the ramified theory of types. By extension, our observations constitute defenses of theories that are structurally similar to SH+, such as the theory of singular propositions, against similar purported disproofs. (shrink)

Dietary restriction (DR) is the most consistent environmental manipulation to extend lifespan. Originally thought to be caused by a reduction in caloric intake, recent evidence suggests that macronutrient intake underpins the effect of DR. The prevailing evolutionary explanations for the DR response are conceptualized under the caloric restriction paradigm, necessitating reconsideration of how or whether these evolutionary explanations fit this macronutrient perspective. In the authors’ opinion, none of the current evolutionary explanations of DR adequately explain the intricacies of (...) observed results; instead a context‐dependent combination of these theories is suggested which is likely to reflect reality. In reviewing the field, it is proposed that the ability to track the destination of different macronutrients within the body will be key to establishing the relative roles of the competing theories. Understanding the evolution of the DR response and its ecological relevance is critical to understanding variation in DR responses and their relevance outside laboratory environments. (shrink)

Over the past decade, institutional theory has been extensively utilized in the field of social entrepreneurship (SE). However, an encompassing overview of the wide-ranging applications of institutional theory to SE is lacking, potentially hampering academic advances in this domain. To fill this gap, we conduct a systematic review and supplementary bibliometric analysis of 148 papers published between 2008 and 2022 to comprehensively understand the nexus of SE and institutional theory while also outlining the integration of ethics herein. (...) Our analysis shows that the existing research is divided into three clusters, reflecting three unique conversations between SE and institutional theory: institutional and societal change through SE, institutional complexity and hybrid organizations, and the institutional context of SE. We find that ethics is only integrated into these conversations to a limited degree. Based on our analysis, we zoom in on each conversation to identify the existing research gaps and point to new opportunities for future research. We also encourage SE scholars to zoom out on the abovementioned conversations to enrich this promising field by critically examining ethics and incorporating relevant insights from other research fields (i.e., social movement theory, category, and emotions). (shrink)

Andrzej Kisielewicz has proposed three systems of double extension set theory of which we have shown two to be inconsistent in an earlier paper. Kisielewicz presented an argument that the remaining system interprets ZF, which is defective: it actually shows that the surviving possibly consistent system of double extension set theory interprets ZF with Separation and Comprehension restricted to 0 formulas. We show that this system does interpret ZF, using an analysis of the structure of the (...) ordinals. (shrink)