This paper offers an account of Susan Haack’s philosophy of law and points out several aspects within the legal pragmatist tradition that deserve further discussion. Firstly, a systematic presentation of legal pragmatism as it is defended by Haack, who follows Justice Oliver W. Holmes here, is given. Secondly, the limits of an evolutionary perspective of law recommended by legal pragmatism are considered. Finally, the paper discusses whether legal pragmatism is able to handle different legal traditions, (...) thereby focusing on Anglo-American common law and European civil law. (shrink)

Much legal research focuses on understanding how judicial decision-makers exercise their discretion. In this paper we examine the notion of legal or judicial discretion, and weaker and stronger forms of discretion. At all times our goal is to build cognitive models of the exercise of discretion, with a view to building computer software to model and primarily support decision-making. We observe that discretionary decision-making can best be modeled using three independent axes: bounded and unbounded, defined and undefined, and (...) binary and continuous. Examples of legal tasks are given from each of the eight ensuing octants and we conclude by saying what this model shows about current legal trends. We should stress that our taxonomy has been based on our observations of how discretionary legal decisions are made. No claim is made that our model is either complete (providing advice in every domain) or exact, but it does help knowledge engineers construct legal decision support systems in discretionary domains. (shrink)

This paper offers an account of Susan Haack’s philosophy of law and points out several aspects within the legal pragmatist tradition that deserve further discussion. Firstly, a systematic presentation of legal pragmatism as it is defended by Haack, who follows Justice Oliver W. Holmes here, is given. Secondly, the limits of an evolutionary perspective of law recommended by legal pragmatism are considered. Finally, the paper discusses whether legal pragmatism is able to handle different legal traditions, (...) thereby focusing on Anglo-American common law and European civil law. (shrink)

This article provides the first-ever comprehensive analysis of how the relationship between the Chinese and Hong Kong legal orders has morphed in nature since China’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. It argues that the relationship has evolved from a form of legal pluralism found in the European Union to a monist but bifurcated system—to a “dual state,” to borrow from Ernst Fraenkel’s theory. Recent events, including Beijing’s imposition of a national security law on Hong Kong (...) and its overhaul of Hong Kong’s election methods, have consolidated that evolution. The analysis herein not only enables us to make sense of the developments in the China-Hong Kong relationship, but has five wider theoretical implications. First, it suggests a way of distinguishing a dual state from a fully liberal legal system. Second, it discerns the similarities and differences between legal pluralism and dual state. Third, it connects the literature on theories of legal order and that on the dual state. Fourth, it clarifies the relationship between theories of legal order and regime types. Finally, Hong Kong’s experience reveals the challenges of and potential mechanisms for maintaining liberal values in an authoritarian regime. (shrink)

Interpretations of the tax law, issued by tax authorities, are a fairly new institution in Poland. They were introduced into the legal system by the Tax Ordinance Act of 29 October 1997. From that time these regulations were deeply changed three times. Now it seems that Polish legislator has finally succeeded in elaborating an appropriate model for binding interpretation of tax law that protects the interests of taxpayers. However, discussed regulations seem to need some other amendments. The objective of (...) this article is to present the evolution of the provisions pertaining to the issuing of the so-called official interpretations of tax law and to point at certain shortcomings of the present regulations. (shrink)

Flack and de Waal's exploration of basic building blocks of moral systems among non-human primates indicates that human legal systems and legal behaviour are not purely the product of the environment. An examination of some of the ways in which capacities for reciprocity, retributive behaviours, moralistic aggression, dispute resolution, sympathy, and empathy play roles in contemporary law and legal behaviour shows that these capacities are both ubiquitous and facilitative of legal systems. No attempt (...) is made to reduce all legal systems or legal behaviour to these building block predispositions. However, the creation of legal systems and the willingness and ability to make and abide by laws emerged from certain human predispositions -- the ‘basic building blocks'. (shrink)

According to most Evolutionary Psychologists, human moral attitudes are rooted in cognitive modules that evolved in the Stone Age to solve problems of social interaction. A crucial component of their view is that such cognitive modules remain unchanged since the Stone Age, and I question that here. I appeal to evolutionary rollback, the phenomenon where an organ becomes non-functional and eventually atrophies or disappears—e.g. cave-dwelling fish losing their eyes. I argue that even if cognitive modules evolved in the Stone Age (...) to solve problems of social interaction, conditions since then have favoured rollback of those modules. This is because there are institutions that solve those problems—e.g. legal systems. Moreover, evidence suggests that where external resources are available to perform cognitive tasks, humans often use them instead of internal ones. In arguing that Stone Age cognitive modules are unchanged, Evolutionary Psychologists say that evolutionary change is necessarily slow, and that there is high genetic similarity between human populations worldwide. I counter-argue that what is necessarily slow is the building-up of complex mechanisms. Undoing this can be much quicker. Moreover, rollback of cognitive mechanisms need not require any genetic change. Finally, I argue that cross-cultural similarity in some trait need not be rooted in genetic similarity. This is not intended as decisive evidence that rollback has occurred. To finish, I suggest ways we might decide whether moral attitudes are likely to be rooted in unchanged Stone Age modules, given that I have argued that cross-cultural similarity is not enough. (shrink)

The article analyses, in a comparative perspective, the phenomenon of the evolution of the protection of surviving spouse’s inheritance rights in France and Lithuania, the two legal systems historically having some points of interaction. The protection of the surviving spouse is one of the major preoccupations of married couples of today, the couple occupying a central role within the contemporary family. Comparative analysis reveals certain points of convergence between these two legal systems inasmuch the surviving (...) spouse is considered by both legislations as an heir ab intestat and whose protection over the years has been considerably strengthened. The surviving spouse is called to inherit alongside with the heirs of the first or second order and is entitled to the proportions in assets that have not ceased to increase. Lithuanian law seems to have been innovative at an earlier stage than French law, as it is only in the beginning of the 21st century that significant reforms were carried out in this area of law in France. Analysis has also revealed apparent differences in the scope of protection of the surviving spouse, both in regards to the protection provided by law (statutory protection), as well as protection organised by the will of the spouses (voluntary protection). In some respects the statutory protection is more extensive in France (for example, complementary statutory rights of the spouse in regards to the dwelling place or the quality of héritier réservataire) and the instruments of this protection seem to be more varied (for example, the possibility for the spouses to organise their matrimonial regime by inserting specific clauses into the nuptial contract, mechanisms outside the nuptial contracts, such as donations, wills or life insurance contracts). However, this protection might appear to be more extensive under Lithuanian law as far as the voluntary protection is concerned taking into account the introduction, by the new Lithuanian Civil Code of 2000, of the joint will of spouses under which the whole property of the deceased spouse shall be inherited by the surviving spouse (except the mandatory share of succession). The article raises some doubts as to the desirability or even feasibility of aligning the two models of protection given the fact that each of the two countries has its own history and traditions. Nevertheless, a proposition resurges from the analysis in regard to the possible improvement of the protection of the rights to the dwelling place of the surviving spouse under Lithuanian law. Some elements from the existing French model could be transposed given that the dwelling place is an essential family element providing some stability for the surviving spouse. (shrink)

After a brief sketch of the history of philosophical pragmatism generally, and of legal pragmatism specifically (section 1), this paper develops a new, neo-classical legal pragmatism: a theory of law drawing in part on Holmes, but also on ideas from the classical pragmatist tradition in philosophy. Main themes are the "pluralistic universe" of law (section 2); the evolution of legal systems (section 3); the place of logic in the law (section 4); and the relation of (...) law and morality (section 5). (shrink)

The article describes the evolution of problems in the Lithuanian labour law and labour law science since the re-establishment of independence in 1990. Three periods of evolution are presented: the Soviet period (lasted until 1990), the transitional period (1990- 2004) and the period of the Labour Code (2003 and onwards). During the Soviet period, the Code of Labour Laws regulated employment relationship in strict detail as the main employer was the state itself. Good reflections of that period can (...) be pointed out: active (but forced) collective bargaining, single tariff system that implemented equal treatment in the field of remuneration for work and fluent performance of enforcement of labour laws (legal clarity). During the transitional period, new labour laws were introduced and tuned-up with international labour standards (ILO), but in general there were no essential changes in practice. During all that period, the Lithuanian Labour Code was drafted and came in force in 2003. The period of the new Labour Code started together with the European integration and had to bring new trends of the European labour market into Lithuanian practice. The government and academics brought few initiatives for the liberalisation of labour laws but most of them were stuck in the stage of consulting with social partners (Tripartite Council). Nevertheless, 22 years after the collapse of command economy labour laws incompatible with free labour market still dominate. It is obvious that the Lithuanian Labour Code is outdated and needs general reconstruction. Scientific researches and the EU Council recommendations call for the introduction of flexibility, implementation of flexicurity aiming for full integration into the single European labour market. Some strict labour code rules are prevented from functioning in practice. The courts are forced to derogate from disproportionate and improper articles of the Labour Code. The author brings some of the existing problems of labour law into light and proposes their possible solutions. The existing crisis of labour law could be solved by drafting a new Labour Code with the help of academic researchers and by introducing it directly to the Parliament for adoption. (shrink)

This article attempts to analyze the deconstruction of the linear organization of legal systems into a plurality of organized networks conform a circular systemic organization. As we know, the process of systematization runs parallel to the evolution of the modern State and, in this sense, the structure constitutes a single and well defined corps. However, at present, the emergence of multiple legal networks has been seen to turn Law into a structure that translates into a plethora (...) of information that is hard to nuance. Finally, with respect to the emergence of reflexive law, such reflexivity is feasible only when the processes of democratization create discursive structures in social subsystems, so the main problem is to deal with is their identity within a dynamic process of inter-legalities. (shrink)

This Essay presents law’s evolution as a paradoxical union of the finite and the infinite. At any given point in time, law is a finite body of norms, which can be identified. At the same time, law’s evolution is infinite because rule-mutations that alter those norms are indeterminable. In modern legal systems, law’s evolution occurs under the constraining influence of master texts, which provide normative durability by enshrining the fundamental norms of a legal system (...) and fortifying them against change. Despite this stabilizing role, however, master texts are themselves open to mutations. Therefore, law’s evolution under the constraints of a master text mediates the paradoxical union of law’s finite and infinite nature. (shrink)

The US-Australia strategic relationship has evolved from more or less an adversarial position in the 19th century to an Australia largely dependent on the US during the Cold War to the interdependent partnership we see today. Strategic interdependence means that the US-Australia relationship is not merely a one-sided affair; that Australia has something of substance to offer the strategic relationship. Part of the reason that the relationship is strong is because of a shared language, similar social values, and compatible political- (...) class='Hi'>legal systems. Moreover, the relationship has been thoroughly institutionalised via intelligence cooperation, defence science collaboration, and extensive personal relationships. But what the US really seems to value is Australia’s reliability as an ally. I argue that Australia best demonstrates its reliability as an ally, however, when it follows US strategic decision-making for the right reasons. This sense of reliability is more akin to trustworthiness than it is to loyalty. History demonstrates that Australia has not always agreed with the US. But agreeing doesn’t matter so much when Australia has established a track record of consistently applying sound reasoning to its strategic decisions and it has made substantive contributions to jointly sought after strategic outcomes. (shrink)

In this article I show that rabbinic reasoning, in its mature Talmudic form, rests on a foundation of five presuppositions, or axioms, including the comprehensiveness and non-redundancy of Scripture, and is guided by two formulas. The first formula is the formula of bijection, A∼B, which establishes a one-to-one correspondence between A, the textual elements of the Torah and B, the propositions of law comprising the system of halakhah; the second is the formula of adequate justification, ∃fx ( fx ⊃L ), (...) which states that there is a feature fx that serves as adequate justification for the application of a law L. The ‘Thirteen Rules of Rabbi Yišma’el (Ishmael)’ are analysed in terms of these formulas. An outline of stages in the evolution of rabbinic interpretation and reasoning in the Talmudic period sets the Thirteen Rules in their historical context as a third-century attempt, subsequently refined, to systematise rabbinic scriptural interpretation and legal reasoning. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibility of a standard legal language (e.g. English) for a principled evolution of law in line with technological development. In doing so, reference is made to blockchain networks and smart contracts to emphasise the discontinuity with the liberal legal tradition when it comes to decentralisation and binary code language. Methodologically, the argument is built on the underlying relation between law, semiotics and new forms of media adding to natural language; namely: code and symbols. (...) In what follows, I will concentrate on the study of factors that explain why such approach can be fruitful for the future of law and innovation. I have three reasons for selecting this topic. The first is a more pragmatic reason, based on my current research of law as a linguistic phenomenon. Secondly, the topic does also touch the matter on binary code language, rivalrous to legal alphabetic language. Lastly, the study aims at emphasizing the pivotal role of the jurist as an interpreter in a changing society accommodating diverging realms of reality. The study is structured as follows. Firstly, a quick exam of the traits of blockchain networks would provide the contextual link to establish the arguments in support of the need of a standard legal language. Secondly, a comparison between liberal legal institutions and theory of semiotics is set to perceive their functioning and ascertain their limits in the light of todays unprecedented changes. Thirdly, a summary on blockchain networks’ legal features would constitute the thrust behind the idea of a uniform legal language. Methodologically, the argument does also establish some relations with classical laws of physics and philosophy of media. Its aim is to demonstrate how the suggested legal interpretation and semiotic-based approach can contribute to overcome existing stumbling blocks including, but not limited to, the lack of cooperation at the international level as well as the gap in State norms when it comes to innovation. In this sense, the proposed strategies do not intend to replace current advances in the legal thought. In contrast, it seeks to harmonise their results providing a methodical approach that can concur to inform a new technique to address new controversial issues. In practice, the proposed method regarding the adoption of a uniform legal language would lower transactive costs in terms of normative coordination in the matter of international cooperation and in the definition of applicable law among different legal systems. Alternatively, it might contribute to the convergence of legal systems and/or their underlying concepts. Differently put, article’s contribution can be envisaged in fostering juridical consistency with regards to different forms of languages’ coexistence. (shrink)

In his account of legal revolutions, Hauke Brunkhorst applies a dual perspective encompassing the approaches both of systems and discourse theory to social evolution: functional adaptation and group-based normative learning coexist as two mechanisms of societal change, the latter being conceptualized as occasional interruptions to an overall systemic process of societal evolution. This article argues that Brunkhorst’s ‘systems theory first’ perspective undermines his claim to be delivering critical theory and that while it is both possible (...) and necessary to incorporate a systems-theoretical perspective into discourse-theoretical social theory when devising a critical theory of law and democracy, the reverse does not apply. The building blocks of Habermas’ reconstructive approach to social evolution are presented as a conceptual framework that constitutes an alternative to Brunkhorst’s ‘systems theory first’ perspective but remains compatible with the basic premises of his account. A discourse-theoretical view that sees societal development in terms of a social learning process chimes with Brunkhorst’s dual perspective on the dialectics of legal evolution but at the same time upholds the aims of critical theory. (shrink)

This paper adopts an economic interpretation of the legal process, explaining legal change as the outcome of the complex interplay of entrepreneurial forces operating inside, as well as outside the legal system. The question of concern is whether the concept of entrepreneur as elaborated by Kirzner in a theory of the market process can be extended to understand the legal process as well. The focus on the alertness of legal decision-makers, their capacity to learn from (...) experience and the multitude of legal and nonlegal sources they are referring to, seems to provide a possible methodology for an economic approach to law that avoids the exaggerated belief in the objectivity, determinacy and cogency of legal reasoning typical for mainstream law-and-economics, and at the same time the opposite exaggeration of law’s radical subjectivity and indeterminacy characterizing most of contemporary critical legal literature.Cet article adopte une interprétation économique du processus juridique en expliquant l’évolution du droit comme le résultat de l’interaction complexe de forces entrepreneuriales opérant à l’ intérieur et à l’extérieur du système juridique. Il s’agit de montrer que le concept d’entrepreneur élaboré par Kirzner pour expliquer le fonctionnement du processus de marché peut offrir une méthodologie également pour comprendre les processus de production du droit. En mettant l’accent sur la vigilance des décideurs, leur capacité d’apprendre par l’expérience, ainsi que la multitude des sources juridiques et extrajuridiques auxquelles ils se réfèrent, une approche économique du droit qui renvoie à cette théorie de l’entrepreneur, peut éviter d’un côté l’hypothèse irréaliste d’omniscience de l’autorité juridique qui sous-tend l’analyse économique traditionnelle du droit et de l’autre côté, l’hypothèse opposée non moins exagérée de la subjectivité et de l’indétermination radicales de l’évolution juridique qui caractérise une partie dominante de la littérature juridique critique contemporaine. (shrink)

The Dialectical Forge identifies dialectical disputation as a primary formative dynamic in the evolution of pre-modern Islamic legal systems, promoting dialectic from relative obscurity to a more appropriate position at the forefront of Islamic legal studies. The author introduces and develops a dialectics-based analytical method for the study of pre-modern Islamic legal argumentation, examines parallels and divergences between Aristotelian dialectic and early juridical jadal-theory, and proposes a multi-component paradigm—the Dialectical Forge Model—to account for the power (...) of jadal in shaping Islamic law and legal theory.In addition to overviews of current evolutionary narratives for Islamic legal theory and dialectic, and expositions on key texts, this work shines an analytical light upon the considerably sophisticated “proto-system” of juridical dialectical teaching and practice evident in Islam’s second century, several generations before the first “full-system” treatises of legal and dialectical theory were composed. This proto-system is revealed from analyses of dialectical sequences in the 2nd/8th century Kitāb Ikhtilāf al-ʿIrāqiyyīn / ʿIrāqiyyayn through a lens molded from 5th/11th century jadal-theory treatises. Specific features thus uncovered inform the elaboration of a Dialectical Forge Model, whose more general components and functions are explored in closing chapters. (shrink)

Adopting an evolutionary perspective, this Research Handbook presents novel and cutting-edge insights into the interdisciplinary field of legal evolution. Engaging with various scientific approaches, it provides a versatile analysis of legal evolution, examining the field as a whole as well as in the context of specific branches of law. Featuring meritorious contributions from eminent scholars, the Research Handbook navigates the two different yet interconnected currents of legal evolution. Chapters first offer a reflective study of (...) the history of legal systems, concepts and doctrines which sets out the regularities, mechanisms, and patterns in the process of transformations that such systems, concepts and doctrines undergo. It moves on to explore various legal problems through the prism of evolutionary anthropology which rests on the assumption that evolutionary biology and psychology provide valuable insights into human nature. Both stimulating and authoritative, the Research Handbook on Legal Evolution is an indispensable read for researchers, academics and students in law, legal philosophy and theory, and political philosophy. (shrink)

Sports management is a fundamental subject for anyone interested in the world of sport. This article addresses the systemic evolution of sports management as a discipline that integrates several aspects, from the organization of sports events to the management of teams and athletes. The methodology consists of a three-stage procedure: bibliometric analysis, identification of key words, critical analysis of the books, which includes the Prisma search engine used in the Scopus database and analyzed by the Bibliometrix Software. The initial (...) sample was n=450 studies included in the review, only Scopus, in Spanish and English. Among the main results, it is important to highlight how sports management allows sports teams and organizations to function effectively and efficiently. In conclusion, it was possible to establish as important variables the impact of sports management in specific contexts, organizational culture, quality, level of satisfaction of the processes, training and professional profile, communication management in sports events and perception of sports managers, being fundamental for success in sport. Furthermore, knowing how its theoretical, legal and ethical conception has evolved, transcends anti-doping regulations and athlete safety, towards the transformation of traditional sport into digital sport. Currently, sports management is experiencing a series of significant changes that are transforming the way in which this discipline is studied and applied. (shrink)

This work studies the issue of political representation from the perspective of a specific legal culture, the exercise of political rights in the context of the occidental democratic system, a concept that has undergone a profound evolution to the present day. The essential aspects for an analysis of this progression are voting, decision making, and the relationship between representatives and their constituents. Overall, the phenomena making up the crisis of representation have been explained as a result of changes (...) that have affected the operation and structure of modern states constituted as representative democracies. The idea is that a well-functioning representative system comes primarily from the form of government and electoral system in which it develops. (shrink)

At the Donald Berman Laboratory for Information Technology and Law, La TrobeUniversity Australia, we have been building legal decision support systems for a dozenyears. Whilst most of our energy has been devoted to conducting research in ArtificialIntelligence and Law, over the past few years we have increasingly focused uponbuilding legal decision support systems that have a commercial focus.In this paper we discuss the evolution of our systems. We begin with a discussion ofrule-based systems (...) and discuss the transition to hybrid rule-based/case-based systems.We next discuss how we have used machine learning in building legal decision supportsystems. Our focus on using machine learning led us to investigate the domains ofexplanation and argumentation. We conclude by discussing our current work onbuilding negotiation support systems and tools for constructing web-based legaldecision support systems. (shrink)

Among the different approaches to comparative tax law the one adopted here views comparative taxation as a descriptive tool conducive to tax design, a tax policy approach grounded in an evolutionary concept of tax change. Comparative taxation should be based on the functions of tax rules, with the goal of identifying similarities and differences between domestic tax systems, and should indicate potential alternative solutions to common policy issues by looking at how the basic elements of tax law-in-action interact. The (...) Article develops a theoretical framework for comparative tax research and uses examples drawn from a comparative study on the General Anti-Avoidance Rule in Canada and China, thus endeavouring to provide a crosscultural inquiry into tax transplants across the divide of Western and non-Western legal traditions. It is claimed here that a common model of tax systems should be adopted for the purpose of comparing them, and that legal theory is needed to pursue this task. The use of legal theory as a critique of municipal tax ideas is discussed in Part I, while Parts II and III deal with how legal theory can be used to describe the structure and evolution of tax systems by relying on concepts of legal hierarchies and chains of productions of tax rules. Part IV concludes with practical applications of legal theory in comparative tax research in respect to tax transplants and tax design issues by providing an explanatory framework of General Anti-Avoidance Rules in Canada and China. (shrink)

. The author analyses the concept of legal security from its historical evolution to its main structural aspects. In the first part he argues that legal security is a historical and cultural concept of the modern world. He considers a series of factors which lead from the general concept of security generated by an ideological monism and the social rigidity characterizing the Middle Ages to the concept of legal security protected by the legal monism of (...) the modern state, where legal security, understood as formal or procedural justice, has become a principle inspiring the entire legal system. Then he considers legal security in the social state as the expression of the relationship between man and his social needs. In the second part the author makes a structural analysis of the concept of legal security in a modern legal order, identifying the different spheres in which it can be found: state,—focusing on procedural guarantees as limits to power—, law—considering the internal functioning of the legal system—, society—stressing the effects of the action of the social state on the idea of legal security. (shrink)

Abstract. It is commonplace that economic globalization poses new challenges to legal theory. But instead of responding to these challenges, legal scholars often get caught up in heated yet purely abstract discussions of positivist and legal pluralist conceptions of the law. Meanwhile, economics-based theories such as "Law and Social Norms" have much less difficulty in analysing the newly arising forms of private and hybrid "governance without government" from a functional perspective. While legal theory has much to (...) learn from these approaches, we argue that they fail in one crucial point: They cannot uphold the analytical distinction between law and non-law. The reasons for this shortcoming are theory-immanent in that the economic theories' focus on efficiency and their actor-based perspective are necessarily blind to "law's own rationality." We therefore propose to further develop those functional approaches to the study of global governance by complementing them with elements from Niklas Luhmann's systems theory of law. This will provide us with a conceptual framework for analyzing the workings of global governance regimes without ignoring their potential for "legalisation" and "constitutionalisation." As we will show in three concrete examples (Corporate Social Responsibility, lex mercatoria , and internet regulation) we can thus describe the evolution of new forms of legal regulation beyond the nation-state. This will also allow us to draw some preliminary conclusions on the role of law in the context of globalization and, at the same time, show the direction for further empirical research. (shrink)

The theoretical underpinnings of public international law have taken the sovereign status of the nation-state for granted since the beginning of the modern era. After centuries of evolution in legal and political thought, the state's definition as a bounded territorial unit has been strictly codified. The legal development of the nation-state was an ideological project informed by extra-legal considerations. Additionally, the ever-narrowing scope of the juridical idea of sovereignty functioned as a boundary mechanism instrumental in colonising (...) Africa and other regions. While international law claims universal liberalism today, the current system based on sovereign nation-states represents not social inclusion but fierce and dangerous exclusion. -/- The central thesis of this book is that the development of legal sovereignty was, rather than part of the modernist progress narrative, a historically contingent evolutionary regression. While other social systems such as economics and science became globalised, politics and law counterintuitively became more territorialised. It is argued that the nation-state today is not only anachronistic but is dangerously ill-equipped for facing international problems such as the climate crisis or global pandemics. Finally, it also leaves African states and many other formerly-colonised territories at a particular disadvantage by regulating their political practices into a predefined mould. (shrink)

The article deals with diversity of language signs in legal terminology. The aim of the article is to show the influence of both linguistic and extra-linguistic factors on the specificity of various linguistic units in the legal terminology. Though all terminological systems possess some similar features, there may be certain traits characteristic only for some of them. As specific systems of signs, legal terminologies show some peculiarities that are discussed in the article from the point (...) of view of oppositions to highlight the semiotic specifics of language units used by lawyers and also the organization of the terminological system under consideration. The oppositions under consideration emerge due to both linguistic and extra-linguistic factors. Extra-linguistic factors determine such oppositions as terminology of law: terminology of jurisprudence, modern terminology: historical terminology, terms: nomenclature signs. Linguistic factors stipulate the opposition of primary and derived terms. A combination of linguistic and extra-linguistic factors determines the following oppositions: native terms: borrowed terms, terms of the basic terminological system: terms attracted from other spheres of knowledge. Within these types of oppositions a number of more specific ones were elicited. The interaction of synchronic and diachronic approaches the article is based on allowed the authors to focus on the permanent semantic properties of the language signs pertaining to tribal customary and modern law, and on those emerging in the course of the evolution of law. (shrink)

Purpose. The study is aimed at a philosophical analysis of the state of humanity’s readiness for technological singularity, the definition of the concept of postbiology and the investigation of ways to bring the population to a new, qualitatively higher level of existence. Theoretical basis. The author analyzes the level of public consciousness and the features of its cooperation with technological world. Due to the inability of most modern people to cope with changes effectively, the author questions humanity’s readiness for the (...) postbiological stage of evolution of our species. Based on the analysis of the ideas of authoritative futurists of our time, the author explores the prospects of Ukrainian society in the postbiological future. Originality. The author not only analyzes the challenges that humanity faces during its transition to a new type of civilization, but also explores the obstacles that hinder this process directly in the Ukrainian society. The author proves that the ideas of transhumanism and going beyond the human biology should not be postulated without a moral context. In addition, the scientific study proposes a number of projects designed to improve the educational institutions that are responsible for the intellectual and spiritual development of the individual. Conclusions. Postbiology can become both, a new qualitatively higher stage of the human species evolution and the collapse of humaneness. Along with overcoming human biology, there will be the destruction of moral guidelines, social and legal systems. In order to prevent total chaos and catastrophe, technological development must be complemented by appropriate developments of new norms that can balance society. (shrink)

In this article the paradoxical role of legal science in legal practice is discussed. On the one hand, legal scientists do not agree on the criterions of the scientific character of legal science. On the other hand, even in the legal cases that are especially complicated it is possible to arrive at theoretically unquestionable decisions. The author of the article concludes that legal practice is based on fundamental theoretical insights; however, in legal practice (...) these insights are used more intuitively than reflectively. Therefore, the aim of the article is to rationally reconstruct these theoretical insights with reference to the ideas of modern schools of legal philosophy. For this purpose the ideas of the theory of natural law are discussed. It is concluded that in legal practice two provisions of natural law are applied: legal decisions ought to be reasonable and must include existential ends (basic values). The evolution of the legal positivism is discussed in the article and it is concluded that legal positivism offers the criterions of the scientific character of legal science by framing the procedural rules of the democratic process of lawmaking. These rules anticipate such conditions: consensus concerning decision making; equal participation of all members of legal discourse confirming normative decisions; the acceptability of consequences after the realisation of normative decisions; the possibility to reaffirm normative decisions, if necessary. The ideas of virtue jurisprudence are discussed and it is claimed that virtue jurisprudence as a criterion of the scientific character of law proposes such theoretical position: the decisions concerning human rights must supply the value system (hierarchy) and the virtues which are formed and justified in the long legal tradition. The article represents the use of these criterions of the scientific character of legal science by Jurgen Habermas to debate about legal prohibition of the improvement of the human genome by using modern technologies of genome engineering in the Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo, 1997). (shrink)

To coordinate action, information must be transmitted, processed, and utilized to make decisions. Transmission of information requires the existence of a signaling system in which the signals that are exchanged are coordinated with the appropriate content. Signaling systems in nature range from quorum signaling in bacteria [Schauder and Bassler, Kaiser ], through the dance of the bees [Dyer and Seeley ], birdcalls [Hailman, Ficken, and Ficken, Gyger, Marler and Pickert, Evans, Evans, and Marler, Charrier and Sturdy ], and alarm (...) calls in many species [Seyfarth and Cheney, Green and Maegner,Manser, Seyfarth and Cheney ], up to human language. Information processing includes filtering – that is discarding irrelevant information and passing along what is important – and integration of multiple pieces of information. Integration includes logical inference and voting. Finally, the information must be used to make decisions with consequences for payoffs that drive evolution or learning. (shrink)

African jurisprudence, like African philosophy, continues to be hotly debated. This article contends that the debate straddles the uniqueness claim which either emphasises the existence or possibility of a peculiar legal framework on the continent, and a historical co-extensional position reiterating that African jurisprudence is a continuum of other legal traditions. The article argues that there is no uniquely African jurisprudence, and that what obtains within the structures of jurisprudence on the continent also exists within various legal (...) traditions elsewhere, and as such can at best be described as ‘jurisprudence in Africa’ rather than ‘African jurisprudence’. It defends this thesis through analytic and comparative explications of the content of natural law theory and legal positivism as experienced on the continent. It concedes that relics of the colonial legal experience create contestations that inform scholars’ calls for a return to traditional legal systems. It concludes that a reconstructive jurisprudence in Africa must take cognisance of the continent’s historical and evolutionary legal experiences, but that a unified or monolithic theory may not be sufficient to address the choice of functional jurisprudence. Keywords African jurisprudence, jurisprudence in Africa, African legal evolution, diffused legal theories. (shrink)

This study investigates how diverse European legal systems and financial structures influence corporate social and environmental responsibility. The argument is developed by means of a framework that integrates legal systems and financial structures. Hypotheses relating to environmental responsibility have been tested using Innovest data gathered between 2002 and 2007 from 645 companies in 16 countries; and hypotheses relating to social responsibility have been tested using Innovest data gathered between 2004 and 2007 from 600 companies. The findings (...) demonstrate that legal systems influence corporate responsibility (CR) in both social and environmental spheres. They also support the claim that corporations are more likely to act in environmentally responsible ways when there are strong and well-enforced state regulations in place to ensure such behavior. Company size is shown to have a greater impact on CR than either excess cash or performance. Large companies tend to be more visible than small ones do, and society expects them to behave in a more socially and environmentally responsible manner regardless of their financial performance or available cash. Finally, these findings support the hypothesis that capital structure significantly influences CR: companies with a high number of publicly held shares and a low percentage of debt are more likely than others to commit themselves to social and environmental activities. (shrink)

There is a hard relationship between law and techno-science; two powers that shape reality. In principle, these powers shape reality by acting as two poles of a battery, i.e., endowed with opposite charges: techno-science is a mechanism for overcoming the limits that human beings encounter in their relationship with nature; law, on the other hand, reveals its face by imposing limits on human action, which, by nature, is free of certain bonds. From a general point of view, certain unavoidable normative (...) requirements seem clear in the effort to regulate new technological applications. Artificial intelligence poses new questions for legal theory and tests both the responsiveness of the system and the traditional and current conceptual categories. The challenge stems from the need to adapt the law, through normative or hermeneutic evolution, to a reality that is changing at a frenetic pace and with unpredictable mutations. All attempts to regulate AI to date have declared that scientific innovation must be brought within the framework of human rights. However, there is a question, rather a more general, I would even say preliminary, challenge to be faced without epistemic prejudice: do the applications of AI in any way affect the very meaning of the human? AI has a huge potential to improve the human condition (provided we can clarify what ’improve’ means) but, at the same time, increases, in terms of rights, unforeseen and unforeseeable challenges for existing treaties. This is due not only to the crisis of the legal dimension but also to the fact that its impact influences the notion of what we have hitherto conventionally considered as human beings. (shrink)

This essay analyses the Historical Evolution of Hong Kong, from the colonial period to the return to China sovereignty in 1997, according to the political philosophy of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, and the principle “one country, two systems”, which means that Hong Kong is part of China and enjoys a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence policy, as stipulated by the Basic Law of The Hong Kong Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. The (...) political system implemented in HKSAR corresponds to the matrix of the People’s Republic of China, but its economic base and legal system remained untouched in essence; an extreme model of liberal capitalism, deregulated and functioning on the margins of international law, with deep social inequalities, millions of new poor (workers and students in a situation of necessity) and a serious problem of access to housing. This essay analyses the political nature of the conflict around the extraction laws, distinguishing internal causes, and external interferences. At least, this essay analyses the system of political representation of HKSAR, the government program to overcome crisis and the new legislation after crisis. Keywords: history, one country, two systems, paradox, HKSAR, fallacies. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic laid bare systemic inequities shaped by social determinants of health (SDoH). Public health agencies, legislators, health systems, and community organizations took notice, and there is currently unprecedented interest in identifying and implementing programs to address SDoH. This special issue focuses on the role of medical-legal partnerships (MLPs) in addressing SDoH and racial and social inequities, as well as the need to support these efforts with evidence-based research, data, and meaningful partnerships and funding.

The article analyzes the phenomenon of national self-determination in terms of evolution and functioning. The authors aim to determine the general characteristics and evolution of this phenomenon in both conceptual and applied versions. In the evolution’s context of national self-determination as a theoretical concept and a political and legal principle, several stages were identified and considered. According to the authors, each stage of the phenomenon’s evolution was inevitably accompanied by its qualitative transformations, both in political (...) and legal terms. The first stage (from the end of the XVIII c. till the First World War), according to the authors, is characterized by the emergence of the idea and the formation of the socio-political concept of national self-determination, and the applied aspect of the phenomenon of national self-determination is filled with concrete content based on the ever-expanding political practice of its application. The second stage (from the First World War and the post-war reconstruction) is characterized by the transformation of self-determination from a concept into a political principle. The authors associate the third stage of the evolution of the phenomenon of national self-determination (the period after the Second World War) with the development of international relations and the formation of a global bipolar system. National self-determination turned into a principle of positive international law and laid the foundations for the future political instability of the newly independent states. Finally, the last period (the early 90s to this day) is characterized by the search and crystallization of new approaches to the principle of national self-determination and the emergence of new theories, the authors of which are trying from a political and legal point of view to substantiate the legitimacy of an expansive interpretation of this principle. The analysis allowed us to conclude that the qualitative transformations of the principle of national self-determination presented in the article did not lead to the formation of the phenomenon of national self-determination as an integral, complete, and universally recognized international political and legal norm. (shrink)

This paper is a critical and comparative legal historical study, which offers a global vision of the U.S. Legal System, according to the religious factor impact and its complex dimensions (e.g. religious liberty, Church-State relations, welfare state & solidarity). The principal goal is the deconstruction of the fake official History, elaborated after the Second World War (e.g. inferences, impostures, fallacies). At the same time, it shows the social development (and the kind of commitment in each period), and how (...) it happens the consolidation of the system thanks to the regulation. In this way, it is possible to pay attention to the American experimental evolution (not lineal or exceptional –as many U.S.hand-books pretend): from colonial Blue Laws (or Sunday regulation), up to the current regulation on freedom of religion and non-discrimination. Also, this paper offers a systematic set of diverse legal sources (e.g. Executive orders & rules, Legislative statutes, Judicial cases & resolutions). Another goal of this paper is the evaluation of the allegedly paradoxical policies and regulations in this field, during the last two Administrations (Clinton and W. Bush); both of them, from extreme views (linked at the end), they used incorrectly the religious factor, and they confused the institutions. The result seems to be a landed in the Postmodernity (less realistic and more speech based). (shrink)

This essay explicates a structural theory of the historical evolution of world-systems. Rather than using societies as the unit of analysis the authors use intersocietal interaction networks (world-systems). This enables them to take theoretical account of the systemic development processes that are regional and inter-regional in scope and to formulate a more powerful theory that explains how thousands of egalitarian small-scale world-systems evolved, expanded and merged to become the hierarchical and global world-system of today.

The European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) is a groundbreaking regulatory framework that integrates technical concepts and terminology from the rapidly evolving ecosystems of AI research and innovation into the legal domain. Precise definitions accessible to both AI experts and lawyers are crucial for the legislation to be effective. This paper provides an interdisciplinary analysis of the concepts of AI system, general purpose AI system, foundation model and generative AI across the different versions of the legal text (...) (Commission proposal, Parliament position and Council General Approach) before the final political agreement. The goal is to help bridge the understanding of these key terms between the technical and legal communities and contribute to a proper implementation of the AI Act. We provide an analysis of the concept of AI system considering its scientific foundation and the crucial role that it plays in the regulation, which requires a sound definition both from legal and technical standpoints. We connect the outcomes of this discussion with the analysis of the concept of general purpose AI system and its evolution during the negotiations. We also address the distinct conceptual meanings of AI system vs AI model and explore the technical nuances of the term foundation model. We conclude that rooting the definition of foundation model to its general purpose capabilities following standardised evaluation methodologies appears to be most appropriate approach. Lastly, we tackle the concept of generative AI, arguing that definitions of AI system that include “content” as one of the system’s outputs already captures it, and concluding that not all generative AI is based on foundation models. (shrink)

Preface The status of sovereignty as a highly ambiguous concept is well established. Pointing out or deploring, the ambiguity of the idea has itself become a recurring motif in the literature on sovereignty. As the legal theorist and international lawyer Alf Ross put it, “there is hardly any domain in which the obscurity and confusion is as great as here.” 1 The concept of sovereignty is often seen as a downright obstacle to fruitful conceptual analysis, carried over from its (...) proper setting in history to “plague and befog contemporary thought.” 2 . . . So contested is the concept that, rather than pursuing the contestation, many political theorists think we should give up so protean a notion. Granting that the debate on the relevance of sovereignty frustratingly oscillates between claims that it will either continue to exist or that it is about to disappear, forgetting it altogether, and thereby escaping this seemingly endless argument, can easily appear as the most urgent task for political theory . The following argument makes a case that the “urgent task” is not the abandonment of the concept of sovereignty, but an understanding of its essential philosophical nature as an integrated and evolving expression of practical reason. Sovereignty is neither ambiguous nor obscure once its fundamental presuppositions are laid bare and its many philosophical and historical manifestations shown to be the product, in actuality, of a single, dialectally dynamic but integrated set of metaphysical elements. This is the first of three arguments describing the evolution of international law as a manifestation of practical reason through an application of philosophical method to the source , locus , and scope of the concept of sovereignty. It moves from a dialectic balance favoring utility to a balance dominated by legal right to a dialectic of duty to humanity and nature. All three arguments are meant to be a contribution to the new field of International Legal Philosophy as defined by Phillip Allott. 4 This field combines a sensitivity to legal practice with an effort to understand the underlying philosophical determinants of empirical choice and behavior. One purpose of international legal philosophy is to “remove” from the minds of those who study the law what Diderot defined as “the sophism of the ephemeral,” and what Allott calls “the disempowering idea that what xii Preface happens to exist now is inevitable and permanent.” 5 A core imperative is to “reunderstand what it is to be a thinking being” 6 and to rediscover the dialectic between the private and the public as it determines, and is redetermined by, legal practice. This requires a “revolution in the human mind” 7 so that we may transcend the current dependence on positivist methods and empirical fact as an end-in-itself, and try to understand the underlying and more constant and essential ideas and inherent dialectics that constitute the substructure or “metaphysics” of international law. I will approach this “revolution” with the use of R. G. Collingwood’s philosophical method 8 and the philosophy of David Hume, applied to international law as an expression of practical reason. The goal of philosophical method is the construction of a comprehensive policy argument (CPA) for a public policy or legal issue. In addition to the conventional use of empirical models and their logic of investigation in the study of policy and law, CPA requires that an underlying philosophical logic of concepts be deciphered to identify the ideas within the issue, and their definition, overlap, and systematic interdependence. Philosophical method is a means with which to interpret and understand competing systematic and complete conceptual logics, existing at the core of an issue and pertinent to policy change. Philosophical method is therefore not meant to be a replacement for the empirical investigation of a policy or legal issue, or the use of scientific method in social studies. Rather, it is a complimentary and prerequisite method that seeks to transcend the limitations of positivism and present a more complete understanding of the philosophical presuppositions of positivist ideas like power, interest, or strategic rationality. Philosophical method is meant to be used with the facts of the policy or legal issue to match an illuminating logic of concepts with a pertinent logic of investigation . Within the CPA, the use of philosophical method and the metaphysics of a policy or legal issue is assumed to be critical to the full understanding of the overlapping concepts, dialectics, and scale of forms that determine, and are determined by, the empirical context of the policy or legal topic. Specifically, instead of utilizing bits and pieces of various theoretical arguments to address narrowly focused empirical questions, as positivism prescribes, I will address the evolution of international law as practical reason in three phases. Each will be approached through a single integrated logic of philosophical concepts from a particular philosopher (i.e., David Hume, G. W. F. Hegel, Immanuel Kant). This philosophically holistic approach to the law is based on the assumption that only through the use of a single integrated argument in legal analysis can sovereignty, or any concept, be understood as a truly systematic and logical whole. A complete philosophical paradigm has a dialectic integrity and systematic logic that can more adequately describe the evolving essence of a concept like sovereignty. This approach also has the advantage of generating a number of distinct holistic descriptions of the law through the application of different philosophical systems, one at a time, to its factual structure. 9 Positivism does not seek Preface xiii holism, and rejects the idea that “theory” has such a characteristic. The essential or comprehensive substructure of any idea is therefore ignored in a method that recommends the observation of empirical problems through the use of whatever hodgepodge of theoretical elements is seen fit to frame its superstructure. This failure to deal with metaphysics has retarded both an essential understanding of international law as a species of legal system, and any holistic and dialectical conceptualization of its inherent concepts, like sovereignty. A second positivist convention expects modern theorists to create new theory rather than to refine and apply that of existing philosophy. This predisposition is driven by the positivist goal of discovery that ignores refinement as a possible purpose of philosophical analysis. Collingwood argues that philosophy must take that set of ideas already known and utilize existing systematic philosophical arguments to refine them so that they evolve closer to their essence as concepts. Considering this imperative, the idea of sovereignty can be assumed to have had valid usage for hundreds of years, over which time, the concept has evolved to mean different things, each a refinement of the definition that preceded it. Transcending positivism means that the scholar’s search is not for “new” material, but to decipher the metaphysical essence of a concept as it has been made manifest over time and context. These manifestations are rooted, and refined from, the known terms of that concept’s inherent idea(s). Rather than depending exclusively on positivism and its conventions, my work utilizes, in addition to Collingwood, the intact philosophical systems of Hume, Hegel, and Kant to trace the refinement of international law as a product of human practical reason. These paradigms, or integrated systems of logical concepts, will be applied to legal practice individually, so that each CPA can be deciphered separately. This provides a set of integrated and logically intact paradigms for the evolutionary stages of practical reason in international law. Because each argument is applied systematically, a deeper understanding of the source, locus, and scope in the development of law in general, and international law in particular, is possible where it is not with the application of various disconnected components of many theories. Each CPA based on Hume, Hegel, or Kant can then be used to describe a distinct context that its logic of concepts best illuminates; specifically, the (1) genesis, (2) contemporary dilemmas, and (3) future of the international legal system. By widening the perspective of international lawyers and policymakers, they can more easily perceive the dialectic of ideas that has created, and is refined by, the legal practice in which they participate. We also move toward Allott’s goal of “human self-perfecting.” 10 And, in addition, by providing a more complete knowledge of the origins of legal practice and its evolution, we illuminate the practical possibilities for what we might “choose to be” 11 in the future. To achieve this, the essential metaphysical elements of state sovereignty and its inherent evolutionary scale of forms will be deciphered and described. This will transform what appears to be a multitude of definitions and xiv Preface practical realizations of the concept of sovereignty into a set of interdependent manifestations of a single substructure, made of a single set of dialectic elements. The interpretation of international law through practical reason sorts and integrates a diverse and discordant literature and defines state sovereignty as a single concept evolving on a scale of forms that allows it to exhibit diverse character traits, all arising from different combinations of common and essential metaphysical elements. This approach, compared to positivist methods and legal realism, allows one to transcend current agreement that sovereignty is, at best, a narrowly focused set of empirical characteristics or, at worst, “organized hypocrisy.” 12 This method also encourages the scholar and practitioner to understand the predispositions and pitfalls of the concept of sovereignty, as well as its potential future paths, more effectively. The use of philosophical method to create policy paradigms out of preexisting philosophical systems and apply these to international law will be called Philosophical-Policy & Legal Design . This approach allows the use of preexisting and complete philosophical arguments that provide an adequate logic of concepts to chart the evolution of the idea of sovereignty along its scale of forms. An examination of the source of practical reason in human social convention with the employment of a philosophical-policy drawn from Hume’s logic of concepts about human nature will demonstrate this new approach. Why Hume? Because, up to now, without an adequate substructure we have arguments, like Brunne é’ s and Troope’s, 13 that may correctly identify international law as an “interactional” system, but cannot present any argument as to why it is, where this empirical reality comes from, or what its implications are for the future. Comparatively, Hume provides a logic of philosophical concepts that answers these concerns. First, he fulfills the requirements for a fuller understanding of the origin and evolution of law from social convention and the dependence of social convention on the human imperative for society. Second, he offers a more adequate delineation of the overlapping concepts of the law in terms of the ideas and institutions that deal with norms and justice (e.g., principle, process, practice, rule, power, interest). Third, he provides a fundamental understanding of the essential dialectics at the core of a conceptualization of the law with both unconscious and conscious human participation (i.e., passion. (shrink)

This paper explores the implications of tokens in the legal discourse when it comes to blockchain networks and the Fourth Industrial Revolution. In doing so, reference is made to the functioning and requirements of blockchain networks opposite to that of Statehood. Methodologically, the argument is built on the semiotic relationship between signifier and signified as outlined in De Saussure (1916) as further developed in the comprehensive work done by Lacan (Écrits (trans. Alan Sheridan), Routledge, 1977). Apparently, the factors that (...) influence this choice are considered to be of a non-legal nature. More properly, current gaps in regulation and the lack of cooperation at international level require resorting to extra-legal approaches. In contrast, the fact that economic and strategic motives play a role, does not in itself make the legal discourse devoid of any meaning. In what follows, I will concentrate on the study of factors that explain why such approach can be fruitful to establish new strategies to adjust the legal discourse to advances in technology and society. I have three reasons for selecting this topic. The first is a more pragmatic reason, based on my current research of law as a linguistic and societal phenomenon. Secondly, the topic does also touch the existing entanglement between law and economy whereby results intersect with the protection of rights inherent to members of blockchain communities. Lastly, this article relies on a dynamic concept of legal validity as a continuous process of constructing, negotiating, and reconstructing the array of blockchain communities’ interactions and transactions. Overall, these suggested methodological approaches aim at providing non-mutually exclusive reading keys to a prospective evolution of legal thought as of the Fourth Industrial Revolution changes. In contrast, they concur to provide new frames of enquiry instead of approaching these topics as objects of analysis from a sole exegetic standpoint. As a matter of fact, textualism lacks the capabilities to achieve consistent and categorial selections along with methodological exclusions that certain variants of its theories claim to accomplish. When understood against the background of a careful delineation of the choices that legal studies require, their purpose helps to give shape to a fundamental question; given the functioning of legal studies to direct choices among otherwise plausible significance of legal meaning, should they make use of an exclusively legal, or a cross-disciplinary approach? This study advocates the latter method. In this context, reference is made to the relational and representational components of property, contracts, and tokens to frame the contextual rather than the strict textual meaning of tokenisation. In this context, the above elements concur to bridge the gap among _referents_ pertaining to separate realms. Differently put, the recourse to these extra-legal categories corresponds to levels of abstraction (Tanenbaum, 1976) functioning. They refer to the structured representation of information, ranging from detailed specifics to broader concepts. Abstraction aids in comprehending complex phenomena by allowing analysis at varying granularities. Employing multiple levels facilitates a systematic understanding, enabling individuals to delve into intricate systems, discern patterns, and derive insights, thereby fostering a comprehensive grasp of multi-layered phenomena. (shrink)

The tendencies of the development of the Lithuanian criminal procedure within the recent twenty years, after Lithuania has regained its independence, are analyzed in the present article. The main factors which influence lawmaking in the sphere of criminal procedure as well as in the application of the criminal procedure norms are discussed. The constitutional imperatives and the human rights, fixed in international and the European Union agreements as the main factors determining the evolution of the law of criminal procedure (...) are reviewed. It is stated that earlier, while amending or supplementing the Code of Criminal Procedure, the utmost attention used to the drawn to the legal tradition of the state, whereas the legal norms of the modern criminal procedure must be subordinated to the principles fixed in the Constitution. After having briefly reviewed the main tendencies of the development of criminal procedure, i.e. the constitutionalization and internationalizationeuropeization, the following conclusion is drawn: the mentioned tendencies have been producing a significant impact on the evolution of the Lithuanian criminal procedure after the restoration of independence and accession to the international treaties. However, the systemic and critical viewpoint towards the impact of the European Union law on the national law of criminal procedure is still missing. (shrink)

This paper adopts a legal perspective to counter some exaggerations of today’s debate on the social understanding of robotics. According to a long and well-established tradition, there is in fact a relative strong consensus among lawyers about some key notions as, say, agency and liability in the current use of robots. However, dealing with a field in rapid evolution, we need to rethink some basic tenets of the contemporary legal framework. In particular, time has come for lawyers (...) to acknowledge that some acts of robots should be considered as a new source of legal responsibility for others’ behaviour. (shrink)

The evolution of criminal law in Western legal systems is often portrayed as a path leading from objective to subjective notions of criminal responsibility. By examining the historical development of the notions of subjective responsibility, this article suggests that the function of a wrongdoer’s subjective mental state, in both its substantive and procedural aspect, as an element in the process of attributing criminal responsibility, remains much the same today as it was in antiquity. This is indicated by (...) what subjectivity, as an essential condition of culpability, is said to imply: the distinction between intentional and unintentional acts. Although the notions of intent and malice aforethought are attested to in various sources on ancient Athenian law, there are several kinds of cases in which the role played by these aspects—traditionally referred to as mens rea —remain unsolved in contemporary jurisprudence and legal practice. Yet despite the difficulties of establishing facts in particularly complex criminal cases, setting the boundary between “intentional” and “unintentional” remains crucially important in determining criminal responsibility and thus in distinguishing the “licit” from the “illicit,” which is the very foundation of the rule of law. (shrink)

The condition of liberty which Sen used in his famous theorem on the impossibility of the Paretian liberal was defined in terms of individual preferences. The preference-based approach has been the subject of much criticism, which led to the evolution of the game-theoretic analysis of rights. In this approach no references to individual preferences are made. Two questions are examined in this paper: how can different types of right be distinguished within a game-theoretic setting, and how do rights come (...) into existence? These questions are addressed on the basis of ideas originating from legal theory The discussion shows that an analysis of rights should take account of the whole legal system of which a legal norm forms part. Furthermore, it reveals that preferences should be re-introduced into the formal study of individual rights. (shrink)

This article presents the genesis of Evolutionary Systems Design (ESD) as a praxis that draws on General Evolution Theory and Social Systems Design methodology, in addition to Critical Systems Theory, to engage in lifelong learning and human development in partnership with the Earth. The contributions of Bela H. Banathy to the creation of ESD are portrayed as bridging evolutionary consciousness and evolutionary action. Following a brief description of the inspiration and mentorship provided by Bela in this (...) regard, the roots of ESD are traced back to General Evolution Theory. It is described how notions of evolutionary stewardship grew out of encounters with Bela and his work at the International Systems Institute, and were given operational viability through the methodology of Social Systems Design he developed. The fundamental tenets of ESD are presented and discussed by way of a four-stage evolutionary learning framework. Finally, the vehicle of Evolutionary Learning Community through which ESD operates is shown to embody the potential for individuals and groups to think, live, and act in harmony with the dynamics of which they are a part as a means to guide the conscious creation of sustainability. (shrink)

Technological developments increasingly enable monitoring and steering the behavior of individuals. Enforcement of the law by means of technology can be much more effective and pervasive than enforcement by humans, such as law enforcement officers. However, it can also bypass legislators and courts and minimize any room for civil disobedience. This significantly reduces the options to challenge legal rules. This, in turn, can impede the development of legal systems. In this paper, an analogy is made with evolutionary (...) biology to illustrate that the possibility to deviate from legal rules and existing norms is sometimes necessary for the further development of legal systems. Some room to break the law, for instance, through civil disobedience or imperfect enforcement of the law, will ensure sufficient variation. This allows for properly evolving legal systems that can continue to provide fair solutions, even when society and concepts of fairness further develop. (shrink)