Ideas about heredity and evolution are undergoing a revolutionary change. New findings in molecular biology challenge the gene-centered version of Darwinian theory according to which adaptation occurs only through natural selection of chance DNA variations. In Evolution in Four Dimensions, Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb argue that there is more to heredity than genes. They trace four "dimensions" in evolution -- four inheritance systems that play a role in evolution: genetic, epigenetic, behavioral, and symbolic. These systems, they argue, can all (...) provide variations on which natural selection can act. Evolution in Four Dimensions offers a richer, more complex view of evolution than the gene-based, one-dimensional view held by many today. The new synthesis advanced by Jablonka and Lamb makes clear that induced and acquired changes also play a role in evolution.After discussing each of the four inheritance systems in detail, Jablonka and Lamb "put Humpty Dumpty together again" by showing how all of these systems interact. They consider how each may have originated and guided evolutionary history and they discuss the social and philosophical implications of the four-dimensional view of evolution. Each chapter ends with a dialogue in which the authors engage the contrarieties of the fictional "I.M.," or Ifcha Mistabra -- Aramaic for "the opposite conjecture" -- refining their arguments against I.M.'s vigorous counterarguments. The lucid and accessible text is accompanied by artist-physician Anna Zeligowski's lively drawings, which humorously and effectively illustrate the authors' points. (shrink)

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This paper outlines Jesse Prinz’s theory that emotions represent values by registering bodily changes, discusses two objections, and concludes that Prinz’s theory stands in need of modification: while emotions do represent values, they do not do so in the first place by registering bodily changes, but by processing information about how things we care about fare in the world. The function of bodily changes is primarily to motivate and prepare us for action.

The paper deals with the position of a scholar in the society, as articulated in the philosophy of J. G. Fichte. It also offers a brief outline of the philosophies of education of the 18th and 19th centuries and their differences. It shows different interpretations of the concept of Bildung in German philosophy, which in that time became almost a “fashion”. The spirit of that time is reflected also in the idealist views of J. G. Fichte, especially those concerning education, (...) upbringing and personality development. (shrink)

A key feature of facial behavior is its dynamic quality. However, most previous research has been limited to the use of static images of prototypical expressive patterns. This article explores the role of facial dynamics in the perception of emotions, reviewing relevant empirical evidence demonstrating that dynamic information improves coherence in the identification of affect (particularly for degraded and subtle stimuli), leads to higher emotion judgments (i.e., intensity and arousal), and helps to differentiate between genuine and fake expressions. The findings (...) underline that using static expressions not only poses problems of ecological validity, but also limits our understanding of what facial activity does. Implications for future research on facial activity, particularly for social neuroscience and affective computing, are discussed. (shrink)

The paper deals with the question of religious tolerance in Europe’s past and present. Tolerance within Christianity (and within the other so called “Abrahamitic” or “Biblical” Religions) is one of the main points. However, the reader is also invited to take a brief look at Europe’s pre-christian past. To some extent, the religious situation of the Roman Empire in particular rather seems to resemble our own experiences with pluralistic societies in today’s Europe than medieval and early modern circumstances would do. (...) Even the ancient problems with “religious freedom” can be linked with modern counterparts. So this paper will avoid long retrospectives at the well known facts of Europe’s Christian past such as inquisition and European religious wars in order to deal with some more hidden perspectives of European religious his- tory, which were often obscured by the main historiographical narrative. (shrink)

An intensified discussion on the role of normative ideals has re-emerged in several debates in political philosophy. What is often referred to as “ideal theory,” represented by liberal egalitarians such as John Rawls, is under attack from those that stress that political philosophy at large should take much more seriously the nonideal circumstances consisting of relations of domination and power under which normative ideals, principles, and ideas are supposed to be applied. While the debate so far has mainly been preoccupied (...) with defending or rejecting ideal theory through a defense or rejection of a specific ideal theory, this paper instead focuses on a number of general philosophical concerns on which the critique relies. More specifically, it brings up for scrutiny, and ultimately rejects, three charges against ideal theory: the charge that ideal theory is not action-guiding, that ideal theory is impossible, and that ideal theory is distorting. By investigatingthese charges in tandem, the paper shows that the criticism against ideal theory is premised on assumptions about the relationships between thought and action and between concepts and the world for which there is little or no support. (shrink)

In recent years, some political realists have argued that there is a “distinctively political normativity” which should be used when construing and justifying political theories. Among realists focusing on a distinctively political normativity, one can identify two approaches. On the “moral view,” it is explicitly acknowledged that moral norms have a role to play in political normativity. On the “non-moral view,” distinctively political normativity is understood in terms of a non-moral kind of practical normativity. The non-moral view has received severe (...) criticism, not least pertaining to its instrumental versions. Recently, however, Carlo Burelli has attempted to develop a realist account that is faithful to the non-moral view, but which is said to avoid the criticism directed against non-moral accounts in general, and the purely instrumental ones, in particular. Burelli offers a functional account of distinctively political normativity, according to which the function of providing binding collective decisions generates a normative standard that is independent of morality. Despite its many innovative features, however, we argue that it fails with regard to the most pressing concern, which is not whether functional normativity is genuine normativity, but whether it is the right normativity for its assigned role. (shrink)

This article examines how corporate social responsibility (CSR) can serve as an external source of rents for governments that depend on foreign financing for state-building and development. The strategic, instrumental use of CSR has been overlooked in previous research on governments and CSR, especially in the Global South. To understand how CSR can serve as a lever for rents, the concept of “extraversion” is introduced to describe the way in which rent-seeking African governments instrumentalize their asymmetric external relations for political (...) and private benefit. The connection between CSR and rent-seeking is analyzed through a case study of large gas investments in Tanzania. The article finds that the government has set up regulation that enables local and central government authorities to appropriate, mediate, reclaim, or possibly trick CSR practices to gain rents. Based on the study, two contributions are made to the literature on CSR and governments. First, the instrumental use of CSR in the Global South is added to the variety of perspectives that can be taken when studying government agency. Second, CSR is conceptualized as a potential stream of rents for governments to exploit. The article ends with discussing that the outcome of CSR in a rent-seeking environment depends on whether the leveraged resources are managed well to support peaceful and locally beneficial economic development or whether they serve private accumulation through corruption. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of authors have defended the coherence and philosophical utility of the notion of metaphysical indeterminacy. Concurrently, the idea that reality can be stratified into more or less fundamental ‘levels’ has gained significant traction in the literature. Here, I examine the relationship between these two notions. Specifically, I consider the question of what metaphysical determinacy at one level of reality tells us about the possibility of metaphysical determinacy at other more or less fundamental levels. Towards this (...) end, I propose a novel conception of the way in which fundamental states of affairs determine derivative states of affairs in the presence of indeterminacy and construct a corresponding formal model of multilevel systems that demonstrates the compatibility of determinacy at the fundamental level with indeterminacy at higher levels, thereby rebutting Barnes' suggestion that indeterminacy at any level of reality implies indeterminacy at the fundamental level. (shrink)

The practice-dependent approach to justice has received a lot of attention in post-millennium political philosophy. It has been developed in different directions and its normative implications have been criticized, but little attention has been directed to the very distinction between practice-dependence and practice-independence and the question of what theoretically differentiates a practice-dependent account from mainstream practice-independent accounts. The core premises of the practice-dependent approach, proponents argue, are meta-normative and methodological. A key feature is the presumption that a concept of justice (...) is dependent on the function or aim of the social practices to which it is supposed to be applied. Closely related to this meta-normative thesis is an interpretive methodology for deriving principles of justice from facts about existing practices, in particular regarding their point and purpose. These two premises, practice-dependent theorists claim, differentiate their account since they are not accepted by practice-independent accounts and they justify different principles of justice than practice-independent accounts. Our aim in this article is to refute both and, demonstrating that practice-independent accounts may indeed accept the meta-normative and methodological premises of the practice-dependent accounts, and that we are given no theoretical reason to think that practice-dependent accounts justify other principles of justice for a practice than do practice-independent accounts. In other words, practice-dependent theorists have not substantiated their claim that practice-dependence is theoretically differentiated from mainstream accounts. When practice-dependent proponents argue for other principles of justice than mainstream theorists, it will be for the usual reason in normative theory: their first-order normative arguments differ. (shrink)

In our target article, “Learning and the evolution of conscious agents” we outlined an evolutionary approach to consciousness, arguing that the evolution of a form of open-ended, representational, and generative learning (unlimited associative learning, UAL) drove the evolution of consciousness. Our view highlights the dynamics and functions of consciousness, delineates its taxonomic distribution and suggests a framework for exploring its developmental and evolutionary modifications. The approach we offer resonates with biosemioticians’ views, but as the responses to our target article show, (...) our proposal also faces challenges and has led to suggestions that extend, develop and qualify it. Our response to the 14 varied and rich commentaries starts with the recurring and deep question raised by many of them – the relation between life and sentience. We explore this question by introducing and expanding on “vivaciousness”, a term we coined to describe the turbulent, flexible exploration-stabilization processes inherent in the living condition, as well as addressing the related concepts of Umwelt and selfhood. We then consider the question of the adequacy of unlimited associative learning (UAL) as an evolutionary transition marker (ETM) of minimal consciousness (rather than as a marker of a complex form of sentience), and the possible precursors of sentience. The engagement with these broad themes is entangled with a discussion of evolutionary transitions, constitutive emergence and the function/s of consciousness. The suggestions of our commentators, urging us to explore new concepts and new avenues of research within the framework of a richer view of evolution are then discussed. We end by briefly considering what we regard as a conceptual lacuna, which is leading to the indiscriminate use of the term “sentience” and which awaits further investigation. (shrink)

The central ideas coming out of the so-called pragmatic turn in philosophy have set in motion what may be described as a pragmatic turn in normative political theory. It has become commonplace among political theorists to draw on theories of language and meaning in theorising democracy, pluralism, justice, etc. The aim of this paper is to explore attempts by political theorists to use theories of language and meaning for such normative purposes. Focusing on Wittgenstein's account, it is argued that these (...) attempts are unsuccessful. It is shown that pragmatically influenced political theorists draw faulty epistemological, ontological and semantic conclusions from Wittgenstein's view in their normative theorising, and it is argued that pragmatically influenced theories of language and meaning, however full of insight, cannot be put to substantial normative use in political theory. The general scope of the thesis is motivated by pointing to the general form of the argument and by moving beyond Wittgenstein to other philosophers of mind and language, illustrating how similar overextensions are made with regard to Robert Brandom's theory of language and meaning. (shrink)

Empathy as “Feelingly Grasping” Perhaps the central question concerning empathy is if and if so how it combines aspects of thinking and feeling. Indeed, the intellectual tradition of the past centuries has been marked by a dualism. Roughly speaking, there have been two pathways when it comes to understanding each other: 1) thinking or mind reading and 2) feeling or empathy. Nonetheless, one of the ongoing debates in psychology and philosophy concerns the question whether these two abilities, namely, understanding what (...) the other is thinking and “understanding” what the other is feeling, are separate or not. Most of the authors in this volume consider the cognitive and affective dimensions at work within empathy. Each author does this within and beyond their own field. Coming from the humanities, we propose the following definition for empathy: Empathy is a social feeling that consists in feelingly grasping or retracing the present, future, or past emotional state of the other; thus empathy is also called a vicarious emotion. We would like to highlight two aspects of this definition in particular: 1.) the peculiar position of “grasping” which involves a cognitive dimension and 2.) the social dimensions of relating to the emotions of another human being. (shrink)

The debate on abortion has tended to avoid the psychological significance of an unwanted pregnancy, dominated istead by the strong emotions the subject excites. Eva Pattis Zoja examines the thoughts that surround a woman's decision to end a pregnancy, and presents the challenging thesis that voluntary abortion can often be a violent and unconscious act of self-realisation. Treating a theme which is central to our existence, the author makes no attempt to argue for or against, or to deny the painful (...) nature of the subject which she tackles, but instead looks at the way in which a decision to abort can affect a woman's inner life. (shrink)

The goal of this dissertation is to demonstrate that construals of our emotional responses to fictions as irrational or merely pseudo-emotional are not the only explanations available to us, and that necessary and sufficient conditions for an emotional response to a fiction can be established without abandoning either its intentionality or the assignment of a causal role to our beliefs. ;Colin Radford's claim that our emotional responses to fictions are irrational and inconsistent is challenged in two ways. First, distinctions can (...) be drawn between our reactions to fiction and indisputably irrational emotional reactions which preclude arriving at Radford's conclusion via an argument from analogy. Further, the conditions for rationality put forward in several analyses of emotion, ranging from that of David Hume to that of Ronald de Sousa, are not violated by our emotional responses to fictions. ;Kendall Walton's contention that such affective reactions are merely quasi-emotions is contested on the ground that the absence of the existentially committed beliefs which Walton allies with all genuine emotional responses does not demonstrate an absence of cognitive content. Existentially uncommitted evaluative beliefs, thoughts, and even beliefs about the world can be linked to our emotional experience of fictions, and can serve a function necessary to the identification of the emotion, a function which Walton assigns to the existentially committed belief. ;In our experience of fictions, the objects of our emotion are various. However, a direct response to a fictional entity or event is characterized in terms of Peter Lamarque's account: as a response to the content of a thought, a response to what has been thought or imagined rather than to the thought itself. The roles played both by evaluative beliefs and beliefs about what can occur in the world are investigated and found to constitute necessary conditions for an emotional response to a fiction. An account of the role of the imagination, which borrows from Boruah, David Novitz, and Susan Feagin, provides another condition which, together with the two preceding, appears sufficient for such a response. (shrink)

Honesty is essential for the care of seriously ill and dying patients. The current study aimed to describe how nurses experience honesty in their work with patients receiving palliative care at home. The interviews in this phenomenological study were conducted with 16 nurses working with children and adults in palliative home-based care. Three categories emerged from analyses of the interviews: the meaning of honesty, the reason for being honest and, finally, moral conflict when dealing with honesty. The essence of these (...) descriptions was that honesty is seen as a virtue, a good quality that a nurse should have. The nurses’ ethical standpoint was shown in the moral character they show in their work and in their intention to do good. This study could help nurses to identify different ways of looking at honesty to promote more consciousness and openness in ethical discussions between colleagues and other staff members. (shrink)

Goethe belongs to the phenomenological tradition for a number of reasons: He shared Husserl's deep mistrust of the mathematization of the natural world and the ensuing loss of the qualitative dimension of human existence; he understood that the phenomenological observer must free him/herself from sedimented cultural prejudices, a process which Husserl called the epoche; he experienced and articulated the new and surprising fullness of the world as it reveals itself to the patient and participatory phenomenological observer. Goethe's phenomenological sensibilities and (...) insights become more apparent when his work is brought into dialogue with Husserl's thinking. In turn Goethe challenges Husserlian phenomenology to a more careful investigation of the natural world and human participation within its order. Both Goethe and Husserl are searching for a science of the qualitative dimension of being. (shrink)

In unserem Beitrag möchten wir zunächst auf die kategoriale Einordnung des philosophischen Begriffs “Respekt” eingehen und danach zeigen, wie Kinder in der philosophischen Community of Inquiry mit Problemen umgehen, die mit dem Begriffsfeld „Respekt“ verbunden sind. Aus dem breiten Angebot der dabei entwickelten Kategorie möchten wir auf der einen Seite die Kategorie „eine epistemische und moralische Tugend“ herausgreifen und auf der anderen Seite die Kategorie „ein Gefühl“ und zeigen, dass der philosophische Begriff “Respekt” als „Respekt vor jemand oder etwas“, sich (...) in seinem Anforderungsprofil mit der Nähe zum Gegenstand wandelt. Dadurch ergeben sich folgende Fragen: Müssen Personen immer respektiert werden? Kannst du jeden respektieren? Wer verdient Respekt? Kann man sich Respekt verdienen? Welche Handlungen sollten nicht respektiert werden? Kann man Respekt verlieren? Kann man Respekt kaufen? Gibt es falschen Respekt? Hierzu analysieren wir die Kinderdialoge eines philosophischen Gesprächs mit 6 -14 jährigen Kindern sowie ihre Kinderzeichnungen. In unserem Beitrag deuten wir Kinderzeichnungen und Kinderdialoge aus dem von der DAAD geförderten Forschungsprojekt „Kinder philosophieren über das Konstrukt ‚Respekt’“. Die 8 -15 Jahre alten Probanden sind Studierende der Kinderuniversität Bretten. (shrink)

We develop a notion of cell decomposition suitable for studying weak p-adic structures definable). As an example, we consider a structure with restricted addition.

With its provocative title, Blumenthal-Barby’s (2024) Target Article is an important addition to the critical work on using ‘personhood’ in bioethics. I suggest it bears on any philosophical discus...

Nielsen and Stewart (2024) introduced a novel intra-group criterion of algorithmic fairness called ‘spanning’. Here, I propose an alternative intra-group criterion and argue that is has some salient advantages over spanning.

In this article, we analyse the global consensus on the UN’s partnership approach to businesses through an agonistic lens. In doing so, we seek to understand the positioning of states, particularly those in the Global South, towards the partnership approach. We draw on Mouffe’s conceptualisation of ‘the political’, in which the appearance of consensus is always an expression of hegemony accompanied by exclusion and dissensus. First, we show that the partnership approach was initially promoted by the Global North, in particular (...) European states together with UN leadership, against fears and criticism raised by Global South states. Second, we show that Global South states have not fundamentally challenged the idea of engaging in partnerships with businesses, but they have questioned how these partnerships should be designed to shape a more equally beneficial global economy. With this article, we contribute to the literature on the UN and business ethics by identifying how the evolution of the consensus on business partnerships has been a hegemonic arrangement since the 2000s. Furthermore, we illustrate the role that states have had in forming this consensus. We also contribute to business ethics studies engaging with dissensus by problematising the potential of ‘agonistic deliberation’ at the UN level in supporting the interests of the Global South. (shrink)

This study describes the theoretical assumptions and the application for health‐promoting conversations, as a communication tool for nurses when talking to patients and their families. The conversations can be used on a promotional, preventive and healing level when working with family‐focused nursing. They are based on a multiverse, salutogenetic, relational and reflecting approach, and acknowledge each person's experience as equally valid, and focus on families’ resources, and the relationship between the family and its environment. By posing reflective questions, reflection is (...) made possible for both the family and the nurses. Family members are invited to tell their story, and they can listen to and learn from each other. Nurses are challenged to build a co‐creating partnership with families in order to acknowledge them as experts on how to lead their lives and to use their own expert knowledge in order to facilitate new meanings to surface. In this way, family health can be enhanced. (shrink)