This paper presents an account of intuitions, and a defense of their epistemic efficacy in general, and more specifically in philosophy, followed by replies in response to various objections.

"Philosophical anthropology on the grandest scale....Gellner has produced a sharp challenge to his colleagues and a thrilling book for the non-specialist. Deductive history on this scale cannot be proved right or wrong, but this is Gellner writing, incisive, iconoclastic, witty and expert. His scenario compels our attention."—Adam Kuper, _New Statesman_ "A thoughtful and lively meditation upon probably the greatest transformation in human history, upon the difficult problems it poses and the scant resources it has left us to solve them."—Charles Larmore, (...) _New Republic_. (shrink)

Baptism is a sacrament that Christ established before His ascension. It symbolizes His death and resurrection, representing the unity of the baptized person with Christ and their acceptance into the body of Christ. This paper explores baptism in the New Testament (NT) by focusing on some specific personalities. The study shows that water baptism, as an outward act, serves as a reminder and symbol of God’s redeeming work through Jesus Christ for the salvation of humanity. Consequently, baptism unites us with (...) Christ and invites us to be part of the Christian community. The study concludes that baptism is not an optional extra, but a command from our Lord Jesus Christ to all generations of believers, regardless of denomination, tribe, race, culture, or ethnicity. The study uses published textbooks, electronic books, and journal articles as secondary sources to examine baptism in the NT. (shrink)

The author reviews the history of the science of man in relation to contemporary problems and offers proposals for a true merger of science and philosophy.

The concept of infinity has a long and troubled history. Thus it is a promising concept with which to explore rejection, disagreement, controversy and acceptance in mathematical practice. This paper briefly considers four cases from the history of infinity, drawing on social constructionism as the background social theory. The unit of analysis of social constructionism is conversation. This is the social mechanism whereby new mathematical claims are proposed, scrutinised and critiqued. Minimally, conversation is based on the two roles of proponent (...) and critic. The proponent puts forward a proposal, which is reacted to and evaluated by those in the role of critic. There is a continuum of contexts in which such conversations take place from inner conversations the mathematician has within themselves, and casual face-to face interactions between mathematicians at the chalkboard, all the way to the formal responses of referees and editors to submitted journal papers. Such responses vary from unconditional acceptance, partial acceptance through to outright rejection. There may be disagreements between proponents and critics, among those in the joint role of critic, and broader, community-wide disagreements and controversies, according to specific mathematical proposal and the critical judgements of it. (shrink)

2 Corinthians 5:20 belongs to a long chain of verses beginning from 5:11 to 6:13. These verses at large deal with the subject of reconciliation. A concept that emerges from Paul’s teaching is that God through the redemptive work of Christ on the cross is restoring the whole world to himself and has given us also this ministry of reconciliation. However, this paper focuses on three Greek words extracted from the text: Christou, presbeoumen, and katallasso. The study is done mainly (...) through literary activities from existing materials such as Biblical and Akan literature. It first examines, in brief, the background data on Paul’s Second Epistle to the Corinthians to provide a historical milieu for understanding the issues Paul raises. It then continues to discuss the above-mentioned Greek words. It will also be seen that the explanation of the text has been looked at from Akan (Asante Twi) reading of the same text and then engages them within the Akan context. The paper concludes with an invitation to see ourselves as key players in what God is doing in the world. (shrink)

Large-scale land acquisitions (LaSLA), otherwise ‘land grabbing’ in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), raise difficult normative questions the current literature does not sufficiently explore. LaSLA is associated with development opportunities; however, it also threatens the well-being of local people because of displacement and dispossession. To investigate the processes and outcomes for LaSLA to be considered as ‘just and fair,’ we evaluate the impacts of a LaSLA project on local livelihoods in Tanzania. Specifically, we apply John Rawls’ Theory of Justice to the project (...) and compare the results with empirical insights gained from our fieldwork. We find that LaSLA has the potential to improve the living standards of local people, we cannot consider LaSLA as just and fair because it contradicts Rawls’s principles of justice and deteriorates the livelihoods of local people. Our findings suggest that it is critical to scrutinize LaSLA investments, involve local people in decision-making, and build the capacity of host governments to negotiate better LaSLA deals. (shrink)

According to Davidson, a theory of meaning for a language L should specify information such that if someone had this information he would be in a position to understand L. He claims that a theory of truth for L fits this description. Many critics have argued that a truth theory is too weak to be a theory of meaning. We argue that these critics and Davidson's response to them have been misguided. Many critics have been misguided because they have not (...) been clear aboutwhat a theory of meaning is supposed to do. These critics and Davidson himself, though, have also been misguided because they thought that by adding further conditions on a truth theory we can come up with an adequate theory of meaning. We will show that Davidson has available to him, though he apparently failed to see so, a reply to his critics in his own paratactic account of the semantics for indirect discourse reports. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Project of Formalism The Nature of Justification The Structures of Justification The Ground of Justification The Immanent Intelligibility of Law Conclusion References.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This paper compares the relative merits of perceptual beliefs and introspective beliefs in the context of dream arguments for skepticism. It is argued that introspective beliefs are not epistemically privileged over perceptual beliefs.

In a short article called “Mid-Term Examination: Compare and Contrast” that epitomizes and concludes his book The Intentional Stance, D. C. Dennett (1987) provides a sketch of what he views as an emerging Interpretivist consensus in the philosophy of mind. The gist is that Brentano’s thesis is true (the intentional is irreducible to the physical) and that it follows from the truth of Brentano’s thesis that: strictly speaking, ontologically speaking, there are no such things as beliefs, desires, or other intentional (...) phenomena. But the intentional idioms are “practically indispensable,” and we should see what we can do to make sense of their employment in what Quine called an “essentially dramatic” idiom…. Not just brute facts , then but an element of interpretation…must be recognized in any use of the intentional vocabulary. (Dennett, 1987, p. 342)12 In this context, “making sense of” the prevalence of the intentional idiom is not explaining why it should be indispensable if there are no beliefs or desires for it to refer to. Nor is it specifying the truth conditions of intentional attribution inevitably involves “an element of interpretation.” The discussion that follows treats these two papers together. (shrink)

William of Auvergne and His Treatise De Anima I. Introduction William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris from until his death in, is of interest to us chiefly ...

In Volume Two of Ernest Fortin: Collected Essays, Fortin deals with the relationship between religion and civil society in a Christian context: that of an essentially nonpolitical but by no means entirely otherwordly religion, many of whose teachings were thought to be fundamentally at odds with the duties of citizenship. Sections focus upon Augustine and Aquinas, on Christianity and politics; natural law, natural rights, and social justice; and Leo Strauss and the revival of classical political philosophy. Fortin's treatment of (...) these and related themes betrays a keen awareness of one of the significant intellectual events of our time: the recovery of political philosophy as a legitimate academic discipline. (shrink)

We present a question about Suslin trees and the weak square hierarchy which was contributed to the list of open problems of the BIRS workshop.

The author discusses the "knowing how--Knowing that dichotomy" utilized by ryle in "concept of mind". In this article he attempts to show that intuitions do not exist. He critiques an article by toulmin on the subject and concludes that knowing how cannot be used to "solve discussions of validity," and is no substitute for "proof, Evidence or grounds." (staff).

According to Tarski, a theory of truth for a language L is a theory which logically implies for each sentence S of L a sentence of the form:S is true-in-L if and only if p,where rS1 is replaced by a canonical description of a sentence of L and rp1 is replaced by that sentence if L is contained in the metalanguage or by a translation of S if it is not so contained. Tarski constructed consistent and finitely axiomatized theories of (...) truth for various formal languages and showed how to explicitly define ‘is true in L’ within these theories. We all agree that Tarski's theories of truth have enormous philosophical significance, but there is much less agreement on precisely what that significance consists in. (shrink)

Over the last few decades, corrective justice has established itself as central to serious academic discussion of the normative dimension of tort liability. This article describes the consensus about corrective justice that is presently emerging, as is evident from work of the author and from recent work of other tort theorists. The framework for discussing this emerging consensus is what the article calls "the juridical conception of corrective justice." The juridical conception seeks to explicate the most general ideas implicit in (...) liability as a normative practice in which the plaintiff makes a claim against the defendant. Under the juridical conception, corrective justice is the synthesis of two complementary abstractions: correlativity and personality. Correlativity articulates at the most general level the relationship between the interacting parties as doer and sufferer of the same injustice. Personality, i.e., the idea of purposiveness regardless of one's particular purposes, similarly articulates at the most general level the conception of the interacting parties that is presupposed in a regime of rights and their correlative duties. The leitmotif of the emerging consensus is the idea of correlativity, which is now effectively accepted by all of the theorists mentioned, even by those who initially rejected it. Personality, on the other hand, has gained less support, because of the apprehension that it implies that rational agency, as elaborated by Kant or Hegel, is a philosophical truth from which tort theory can be derived. This reason for dismissing personality is insufficient. Corrective justice comes into view not by being derived from a notion of rational agency but by reflection on the most general ideas implicit in liability as a normative practice. Personality is merely the abstraction that represents the parties as the bearers of rights and their correlative duties. Like correlativity, it owes its status within corrective justice to its being implicit in the law's doctrines and institutions. Consequently, whether the Kantian or Hegelian notion of rational agency is plausible is a philosophical question that lies beyond tort theory and that does not affect the place of personality within a corrective justice approach to liability. Moreover, if correlativity and personality are indeed complementary, acceptance of the former should lead to acceptance of the latter. Such acceptance would provide the theorists who now reject it with a concept that would be serviceable for their own formulations. In any case, the consensus about the highly structured notion of correlativity indicates that the main lines of the corrective justice approach to tort law are now firmly established. Although refinements inevitably remain to be made, radical revisions are unlikely to result from further reworking the standard material of corrective justice tort theory. Scholarly attention should instead turn to the examination of the place of corrective justice within the legal order as a whole and to the expansion of the corrective justice analysis from tort law to other bases of liability. (shrink)

One of the marks of our times is a new eruption of the personal. Systems and institutions of politics are clouded over. The impersonal principles on which these systems and institutions depend are still more deeply obscured. Men turn for their inspiration to the living flow of personality. Some leader who has burst from hidden and elemental depths commands a passion of personal loyalty. Leadership has always been a great factor in the history of human communities. The deification of the (...) ruler was the cement of the Hellenistic monarchies and of the Roman Empire which inherited their tradition. It may seem a strange atavism that we should now be apparently recurring, in the twentieth century, to a similar practice. But there are exigencies of contemporary life which explain the new vogue of leadership, and there is a tide of contemporary thought which leads on to the current doctrine of the emergent leader. (shrink)

This book reads major philosophers from the Western philosophical canon and beyond for the spirituality implicit in their metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and logic. Ernest Rubinstein revives for the modern reader the spiritual import of philosophy as an area of inquiry and study.

The conflict of ideologies.--The breakdown of democracy.--The social background of recent political changes.--The corporative state.--Philosophy and politics.--The teaching of politics.--Maitland as a sociologist.

Si l'on en croit Marcel Proust il faut admettre qu'on n'écrit qu'une seule œuvre. Mais alors on doit également accepter comme vraie l'inverse de cette proposition, notamment, si les préoccupations d'un auteur ne se suivent pas, si l'écrivain ou le philosophe voltige d'une fleur à l'autre, s'il se laisse tenter par mille aventures de l'esprit il peut à la rigueur mériter le titre peu flatteur de dilettante. La grandeur de toute œuvre de vie consiste dans sa profonde unité, unité qui (...) se forme derrière, ou si l'on veut au-delà des systèmes ou des théories. Heidegger nomme l'impenśe de l'auteur ce que Gide appelle la part du Dieu ou la part du diable. Mais l'impensé n'est le caché, le voilé que par rapport à ce qui est dévoilé, à ce qui est pensé. Il n'est donc autre que l'infra-structure. C'est à cette structuration alors que l'impensé doit son importance dans l'édifice de nos pensées. Autrement dit, les pensées claires ont leur racine dans le clair-obscur. Il y a toutefois un clair-obscur qui n'en est un que pour le lecteur. L'auteur y est plus à l'aise. C'est le domaine des confessions. Les confessions peuvent prendre des formes différentes, toutefois leur caractéristique générate permet de les distinguer des autres œuvres. Ainsi, quand un philosophe décide de publier son œuvre de jeunesse, dirions-nous, cela tombe dans la catégorie des confessions, tout comme les entretiens avec… et les testaments philosophiques. (shrink)