Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 6, June 2022.

The creation of increasingly complex artificial intelligence (AI) systems raises urgent questions about their ethical and social impact on society. Since this impact ultimately depends on political decisions about normative issues, political philosophers can make valuable contributions by addressing such questions. Currently, AI development and application are to a large extent regulated through non-binding ethics guidelines penned by transnational entities. Assuming that the global governance of AI should be at least minimally democratic and fair, this paper sets out three desiderata (...) that an account should satisfy when theorizing about what this means. We argue, first, that an analysis of democratic values, political entities and decision-making should be done in a holistic way; second, that fairness is not only about how AI systems treat individuals, but also about how the benefits and burdens of transformative AI are distributed; and finally, that justice requires that governance mechanisms are not limited to AI technology, but are incorporated into a range of basic institutions. Thus, rather than offering a substantive theory of democratic and fair AI governance, our contribution is metatheoretical: we propose a theoretical framework that sets up certain normative boundary conditions for a satisfactory account. (shrink)

From 2010 to 2020, Indonesia’s tax-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio has been declining. A tax-to-GDP ratio trend of this magnitude indicates that the tax authority lacks the capacity to collect taxes. The tax administration system’s modernization utilizing information technology is thus deemed necessary. Artificial intelligence (AI) technology may serve as a solution to this issue. Using the theoretical frameworks of innovations in tax compliance, the cost of taxation, success factors for information technology governance (SFITG), and AI readiness, this study aims (...) to analyze the costs and benefits, the enablers and inhibitors, and the readiness of the government and related parties to apply AI to modernize the tax administration system in Indonesia. This study used qualitative approaches for the data’s collection and analysis. The data were obtained through a literature study and in-depth interviews. The findings show that AI application in the field of taxation can assist tax authorities in enforcing the law, provide taxpayers with convenience in fulfilling their tax obligations, improve justice for all taxpayers, and reduce tax compliance costs. The openness of Indonesia to technological developments, as evidenced by the AI National Strategy, is a supporting factor in the application of AI in Indonesia, particularly for the modernization of the tax administration system. The absence of specific regulations governing AI adoption, as well as a lack of human resources that can help the tax administration process, data, and infrastructure already support, are the impediments to implementing AI for the modernization of the tax administration system in Indonesia. (shrink)

An intensified discussion on the role of normative ideals has re-emerged in several debates in political philosophy. What is often referred to as “ideal theory,” represented by liberal egalitarians such as John Rawls, is under attack from those that stress that political philosophy at large should take much more seriously the nonideal circumstances consisting of relations of domination and power under which normative ideals, principles, and ideas are supposed to be applied. While the debate so far has mainly been preoccupied (...) with defending or rejecting ideal theory through a defense or rejection of a specific ideal theory, this paper instead focuses on a number of general philosophical concerns on which the critique relies. More specifically, it brings up for scrutiny, and ultimately rejects, three charges against ideal theory: the charge that ideal theory is not action-guiding, that ideal theory is impossible, and that ideal theory is distorting. By investigatingthese charges in tandem, the paper shows that the criticism against ideal theory is premised on assumptions about the relationships between thought and action and between concepts and the world for which there is little or no support. (shrink)

During the last couple of decades, concurrently with an increased awareness of the complexity of ethical conflicts, political theorists have directed attention to how constitutional democracy should cope with a fact of incommensurable doctrines. Poststructuralists such as Chantal Mouffe claim that ethical conflicts are fundamentally irreconcilable, which is indeed a view shared by many liberal theorists. The question of whether ethical conflicts are in principle irreconcilable is an important one since the answer has implications for what democratic institutions are desirable. (...) In light of this question the article investigates the notion of conflict in agonistic pluralism and discourse theory. At first glance, Mouffe’s agonism seems apt to accommodate ethical conflict in democratic governance, since it focuses on conflict as the core of politics, whereas Habermasian deliberative democracy seems inappropriate for this task, as it focuses on consensus. However, through an inquiry into the conditions of conflict this article will argue the opposite, namely, that conflict cannot be adequately understood within Mouffe’s agonistic framework. The thesis defended is (1) that discourse theory offers a more accurate account of conflict than agonistic theory because it embraces the idea that deliberation is constitutive of conflict, and (2) that some of Habermas’ assumptions concerning ethical discourse need to be revised in order for his democratic theory to fully accommodate this insight. (shrink)

The question of what role social and political practices should play in the justification of normative principles has received renewed attention in post-millennium political philosophy. Several current debates express dissatisfaction with the methodology adopted in mainstream political theory, taking the form of a criticism of so-called ‘ideal theory’ from ‘non-ideal’ theory, of ‘practice-independent’ theory from ‘practice-dependent’ theory, and of ‘political moralism’ from ‘political realism’. While the problem of action-guidance lies at the heart of these concerns, the critics also share a (...) number of methodological assumptions. Above all, their methodology is practice-dependent in the sense that an existing practice is assumed to put substantial limitations on the appropriate normative principles for regulating it. In other words, we cannot formulate and justify an appropriate principle without first understanding the practice this principle is supposed to govern. The aim of this paper is to map out and analyze the common denominators of these debates with regard to methodological commitments. We will investigate how this practice-dependent method may be understood and motivated. In particular, we point to challenges that must be met in order for the position to remain both distinct and attractive. (shrink)

There is an underlying idea of symmetry involved in most notions of rationality. From a dialogical philosophical standpoint, however, the symmetry implied by social contract theories and so-called Golden Rule thinking is anchored to a Cartesian subject–object world and is therefore not equipped to address recognition – at least not if recognition is to be understood as something happening between subjects. For this purpose, the dialogical symmetry implied by Habermas' communicative action does a much better job. Still, it is insufficient (...) to embrace those kinds of recognition that are dependent on asymmetry and concrete difference. This article explores how communicative action could meet the demand of recognition by investigating a complementary source of validity in communicative rationality, apart from Habermas' validity claims, in which ‘inter’ is better characterized as mutuality than as symmetry. By recognizing both sources of validity, communicative action can open the door more fully to all aspects of recognition without giving up its universal pragmatic core. Key Words: communicative action • communicative rationality • discourse ethics • Jürgen Habermas • Axel Honneth • recognition • universal pragmatics. (shrink)

Lacan ayna deneyiminin bizi cogito merkezli düşünme modelleriyle karşı karşıya getireceğini bildirir. Lacanyen kuramda öznenin varlık düzeni, kendini dolaysız kavrayabilen Kartezyen bilinç üzerinden değil, yanılsamalı bir benlik imgesiyle özdeşleşen bebeğin simgesel düzene kaydolma kapasitesi üzerinden temellendirilir. Bu çalışmada, ayna deneyimindeki sahte varlık imgesinin narsisistik sonuçları ile cogito’nun tekbenci sonuçları arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir. Lacan’a göre Kartezyen argüman boyunca cisimsel dünyanın kavranışı, aslen doğru bilgiyi koşulsuz aktaran -aldatıcı olmayan- bir Tanrı’nın var olduğunun gösterilmesiyle mümkündür. Buna karşın Lacan’ın imgeselin ötesinde gerçekliğin kurucusu olarak (...) işaret ettiği simgesel Öteki, dış gerçekliğin garantörü olarak “bildiği varsayılan Tanrı’dan” kategorik olarak ayrılır. Lacan, yalnızca imgesel ben yanılsamasını narsisistik bir tuzak olarak görmez; aynı zamanda imgesel bene kendi öznelliğini verme iddiası taşıyan bir bildiği varsayılan özne fikrini de en az onun kadar tehlikeli bulur. Lacan’ın cogito’ya yönelik bu yeni yaklaşımı, aynadaki imgesel kısa devrenin, Kartezyen cogito’da bilincin kısa devresi olarak yeniden değerlendirilmesini mümkün kılmaktadır. (shrink)

Sunnah is an issue that Muslims pay special attention to it, since it is the second source of the religion of Islam. After the Prophet’s passing away, both the companions (al-saḥāba) and the successors (tābiʻūn) and tabaʻu al-tābiʻūn made extraordinary efforts to understand and interpret the Sunnah correctly. In fact, since the science of hadith is the common denominator in all fields of basic Islamic sciences, all scholars have tried to explain the transmission of hadith, the way it was narrated, (...) whether the narrators were competent to narrate, the explanation of unknown words in the hadith, etc. Although it is possible to find this activity during the Prophet’s time, it continued in a semi-systematic manner over time, especially after the third century. After the fourth century of hijri, the hadith commentary (sharḥ) process took on a completely systematic character and the science of hadith commentary became a sub-discipline of the hadith department. The process of writing commentaries, which started in the Islamic world and became a tradition over time, concentrated on the books that established the dominance on Muslim society. In this framework, serious contributions were made to the commentary literature in the following periods of time and an enormous commentary literature was formed. However, in the formation of the hadith commentary literature, the sectarian affiliation of the commentator was one of the most influential factors in determining the content of the commentary. In this context, Imām Mālik’s study named al-Muwaṭṭaʼ and al-Kutub al-Sitta took the lead in the development of the hadith commentary literature. In particular, al-Imām Mālik’s al-Muwaṭṭaʼ attracted the attention of the scholars of Andalusia who were interested in the science of hadith, and scholarly trips were made to Medina, one of the eastern Islamic countries, for the education and training of hadith, and as a result of these trips, the people of Andalusia adopted the Mālikī sect. Therefore Imām Mālik’s study named al-Muwaṭṭaʼ became one of the most important books. In Andalusia, serious commentaries were written on the aforementioned study in almost every century starting from the third century of hijri. One of these commentaries is Abū al-Muṭarrif al-Qanāziʻī’s study named Tafsīr al-Muwaṭṭaʼ, which is the subject of our research paper. There is no detached study on this study. For this reason, this study is important in terms of obtaining information about Andalusian hadith commentary. Likewise, it is expected that this study will also be a source of literature for comprehensive studies such as Maliki hadith commentarism and hadith methodology. (shrink)

In this critique of Michael Goodhart's "Human Rights and Global Democracy," Eva Erman argues that Goodhart has reconceptualized democracy and therefore does not offer a better understanding of the relationship between human rights and global democracy.

A shared presumption among practice-dependent theorists is that a principle of justice is dependent on the function or aim of the practice to which it is supposed to be applied. In recent contributions to this debate, the condition of epistemic uncertainty plays a significant role for motivating and justifying a practice-dependent view. This paper analyses the role of epistemic uncertainty in justifying a practice-dependent approach. We see two kinds of epistemic uncertainty allegedly playing this justificatory role. What we call ‘normative (...) epistemic uncertainty’ emerges from dealing with the problem of value uncertainty in justifying applied principles when our higher-level principles are open-textured, that is, when their content is too vague or unclear to generate determinate prescriptions. What we call ‘descriptive epistemic uncertainty’ emerges from dealing with uncertainty about empirical facts, such as the problem of moral assurance, that is, the problem that the requirements of justice cannot go beyond arrangements that we can know with reasonable confidence that we can jointly establish and maintain. In both cases, practice-dependent theorists conclude that the condition of epistemic uncertainty justifies a practice-dependent approach, which puts certain restrictions on theorizing regulative principles and has wide-ranging practical implications for the scope of justice. Our claim in this paper is that neither kind of epistemic uncertainty justifies a practice-dependent approach. (shrink)

Lacan wrote and generated ideas at the intersection of structuralism and poststructuralism, and the question of where he stands in this intersection is crucial to understand his conception of the subject. This essay takes the multiplicity of views on Lacan as a structuralist and a poststructuralist as its starting point and aims to weigh these labels against the background of his specific theories and views. We suggest that in his early phase when he was categorised as a structuralist, he had (...) the seeds of his later poststructuralist phase, and when he was generating his poststructuralist ideas, he was building them on his structuralist legacy. This evolution is similar to that of Roland Barthes in that he establishes an ongoing dialog between structuralism and poststructuralism: he is both a threshold figure suggesting an amalgam of these movements, but he is also a dividing figure as his evolution points at the unbridgeable rupture between structuralism and poststructuralism. (shrink)

Doctoral students are a group that is prone to experiencing mental health problems during their study period which provides an overview of their psychological well-being. Generally, the psychological problems that arise in this group are anxiety, depression, and some physical problems. This study basically aims to understand the psychological well-being of doctoral students through an analysis of the concepts related to psychological well-being, how it is measured, and what factors are often connected and influence it. The method used is scoping (...) review with PRISMA-Scr 2020. Articles were obtained from 4 databases namely Scopus, EBSCO, Web of Science, and ScienceDirect. There were 9 articles that were filtered based on certain inclusion and exclusion criteria. The results of this study found that the most frequently used concept to describe the psychological well-being of doctoral students is the subjective well-being of Diener (1984) and Ryff (1989). In addition, the presence/absence of psychological problems is also used as a basis for describing their psychological well-being. Psychological health measurement usually uses SWLS and SPANE from Diener and a psychological health questionnaire from Ryff. Some of the factors identified as related to psychological well-being are relationships with supervisors, research self-efficacy, perfectionism, achievement orientation, and family support. In addition, impostor syndrome and psychology capital (PsyCap) function as mediator variables. (shrink)

Klasik Yunan düşüncesinde felsefi birer mefhum biçiminde yerleşik hale gelmeden önce ananevi değerlere işaret eden kimi kelimeler zamanla cesamet kazanmış, çok boyutlu bir görünüme kavuşmuştur. Nitekim Yunan düşüncesinde pek çok mefhum bir “rekabet” (agōn) ortamı içinde rakibi olan farklı mefhum namzetleriyle giriştiği başa baş bir mücadelenin sonucunda nihai makamlarına oturmuştur. Bu süreçte yoldaşı olan mefhumlarla zamanı geldiğinde yolunu ayırarak Yunan insanının sahip olması gereken temel “meziyetler” (aretai) olarak Klasik Yunan düşüncesindeki hâkim konumlarına yerleşmişlerdir. Bu sürecin bir neticesi olarak, sōphrosynē’nin tam (...) olarak hangi meziyeti, hangi duyulara hitap eden hazların denetlenmesini, bilgeliğin filizlenme zemini olarak hangi türden bir ahengi ifade ettiği Klasik Yunan düşüncesinin temel sorunlarından biri olarak Antik Çağ’da dahi tartışma konusu edilmiştir. Bu nedenle sōphrosynē’nin farklı bağlamlarda ifade ettiği meziyetin yerinde bir şekilde karşılanması hususu bir tercüme probleminden öte düşünce ve yaşama kültürü tarihine ilişkin bir muğlaklık sorunu oluşturuyor. Bu makalede, sōphrosynē’yi tarihi süreç içinde takip ederek genelde onun gibi atıf alanı geniş mefhumların tek bir bağlamdan anlaşılamayacağını, bu tip mefhumları anlamak üzere bağlamlar üstü bütüncül bir bakışa ihtiyacımız olduğunu, ancak bu takibatı özelde de Platon’un Kharmidēs diyaloğuna uygulayarak bir kelimeye felsefi bir kimlik kazandırma yolundaki mefhumlaştırma stratejilerininin bir iskeletini idrak etmemizi mümkün kılacağını ortaya koymaya çalışacağım. (shrink)

Both Heraclitus and Democritus, as the philosophers of historia peri phuseôs, consider nature and human character, habit, law and soul as interrelated emphasizing the links between phusis, kinesis, ethos, logos, kresis, nomos and daimon. On the one hand, Heraclitus’s principle of change (panta rhei) and his emphasis on the element of fire and cosmic motion ultimately dominate his ethics reinforcing his ideas of change, moderation, balance and justice, on the other, Democritus’s atomist description of phusis and motion underlies his principle (...) of moderation and his ideas of health and measured life. In this series, particularly referring to the main principles of motion, moderation and justice, I attempt to describe a coherent pre-Socratic ethical perspective based on the Heraclitean and Democritean fragments. I explore the connections between their physics and ethics also borrowing from Nietzsche’s lectures and writings on the Pre-Socratics. I redefine such Heraclitean and Democritean concepts as harmony, order, perfection, health, self-control, contentment, cheerfulness, concord, sound judgment, wisdom, measure and balance and discuss them under the principles of motion (phusis), moderation (sophrosyne) and justice. In doing so, I also expose the relevance of the Heraclitean notion of logos (interpreting it as the underlying categorical principle of transition between phusis and ethos) in bringing together these ideas and principles. Finally, based on this pre-Socratic Weltanschauung, I assess the possibility of a coherent picture of humanity, its nature and conduct as extending from or fitting into or extending-from-when-fitting-into the cosmos of moving forces and atoms. (shrink)

This volume explores the relationship between human rights and democracy within both the theoretical and empirical field. It is an innovative study that offers tools for democratizing existing global political institutions.

In a previous article, we unpacked the so-called “ethics first premise”—the idea that ethics is “prior” to politics when theorizing political legitimacy— that is denied by political realists. We defended a “justificatory” reading of this premise, according to which political justification is irreducibly moral in the sense that moral values are among the values that ground political legitimacy. We called this the “necessity thesis.” In this paper we respond to two challenges that Robert Jubb and Enzo Rossi raise against our (...) proposal. Their first claim is that our argument for the necessity thesis is question begging, since we assume rather than show that freedom and equality are moral values. The second claim is that Bernard Williams’s Basic Legitimacy Demand demonstrates the possibility of giving political legitimacy a non-moral foundation, since it allows for a distinction to be made between politics and sheer domination. We refute both claims. (shrink)

Although the discussion about feasibility in political theory is still in its infancy, some important progress has been made in the last years to advance our understanding. In this paper, we intend to make a contribution to this growing literature by investigating the proper place of feasibility considerations in political theory. A motivating force behind this study is a suspicion that many presumptions made about feasibility in several current debates—such as that between practice-independence and practice-dependence, ideal and non-ideal theory, and (...) political moralism and political realism—are too rigid and underestimate the numerous different ways in which feasibility concerns may enter into our theorizing. To chisel out this feasibility space, our aim is to suggest two metatheoretical constraints on normative political principles as intuitively plausible, the so-called ‘fitness constraint’ and the ‘functional constraint’, through which we elucidate five central aspects for determining proper feasibility constraints of an account in political theory. (shrink)

On most accounts of global democracy, human rights are ascribed a central function. Still, their conceptual role in global democracy is often unclear. Two recent attempts to remedy this deficiency have been made by James Bohman and Michael Goodhart. What is interesting about their proposals is that they make the case that under the present circumstances of politics, global democracy is best conceptualized in terms of human rights. Although the article is sympathetic to this ‘human rights approach’, it defends the (...) thesis that human rights are not enough for global democracy. It argues that insofar as we hold on to the general idea of democracy as a normative ideal of self-determination (self-rule) that is, of people determining their own lives and ruling over themselves, the concept of democracy accommodates two necessary conditions, namely, political bindingness and political equality. Further, it argues that neither Bohman's nor Goodhart's accounts fulfills these conditions and that one explanation for this could be traced to a lack of clarity concerning the distinction between democracy as normative ideal and democracy as decision method or rules (for example, institutions, laws and norms) for regulating social interactions. This ambiguity has implications for both Goodhart and Bohman. In Goodhart's work it manifests itself as a vagueness concerning the difference between political agency and democratic agency; in Bohman's work it becomes unclear whether he contributes a normative democratic theory or a theory of democratization. Although this article develops both a conceptual and a normative argument against their proposals, the aim is not to find fault with them but to point to questions that are in need of further elaboration to make them more convincing. (shrink)

In recent years, some political realists have argued that there is a “distinctively political normativity” which should be used when construing and justifying political theories. Among realists focusing on a distinctively political normativity, one can identify two approaches. On the “moral view,” it is explicitly acknowledged that moral norms have a role to play in political normativity. On the “non-moral view,” distinctively political normativity is understood in terms of a non-moral kind of practical normativity. The non-moral view has received severe (...) criticism, not least pertaining to its instrumental versions. Recently, however, Carlo Burelli has attempted to develop a realist account that is faithful to the non-moral view, but which is said to avoid the criticism directed against non-moral accounts in general, and the purely instrumental ones, in particular. Burelli offers a functional account of distinctively political normativity, according to which the function of providing binding collective decisions generates a normative standard that is independent of morality. Despite its many innovative features, however, we argue that it fails with regard to the most pressing concern, which is not whether functional normativity is genuine normativity, but whether it is the right normativity for its assigned role. (shrink)

Masjids, which are the center of collective worship in the religion of Islam, besides being a temple, it used to be school, hospital, public kitchen, guestroom, headquarters, court and meeting room and so on in the first centuries of hijri, and furthermore they became the center many religious, political and social functions. Prophet Mohammad's (peace be upon him) encouragements on the importance and virtue of performing prayers collectively enabled Muslims to pray together in mosques. There were children next to the (...) adults in the ranks kept in masjids and mosques and they also participated in the educational activities. When the hadith sources are researched from this point of view, some rumors (riwâyât) were encountered about keeping children away from the mosques. In the mentioned rumors, it is requested that not only children but also insane people, those who trade, those who speak in a loud voice, those who argue, those who draw swords at each other, are kept away from the mosques. Also according to this rumors, al-hudûd crimes shouldn’t be carried out in the mosque. Considering the size of the present study, it is limited to the rumors that include keeping children away from mosques. In this study, the takhrîj of the mentioned rumors were studied and they were criticized in terms of isnâd and matn. In the context of this method, if any, narrators who criticized in the integrity of isnâd have been determined, al-jarh al-ta‘dil status of the relevant narrators and the effect of this situation on the authentication of the rumor has been figured out in this study. While researching the rumors, the fundamental hadith sources are taken as a basis for this study. The ultimate goal of the study is to determine the authentication of the mentioned rumors in terms of both isnâd and matn. At the end of this study, it was concluded that the mentioned rumors were weak in terms of both isnâd and matn. (shrink)

Focusing on ‘real actions’ of ‘real people’, normative behaviourism turns facts about observable patterns of behaviour into grounds for specific normative political principles. For this reason, this way of doing normative political theory has strong political realist credentials, given its methods, values and ambitions. In fact, according to its supporters, normative behaviourism is an improvement of political realism since it solves two problems that allegedly face many realists, namely, the ‘legitimacy problem’, i.e., how we should distinguish genuine acceptance of a (...) political system from false acceptance, and ‘the institutional problem’, i.e., how we should translate political principles into viable political institutions. In this paper, we make two claims. First, normative behaviourism does not solve the legitimacy problem encountered by realists, because its solution rests on a flawed distinction between foundational principles and ‘principles that matter’, together with a problematic use of a Humean internal reasons approach. Second, normative behaviourism does not solve the institutional problem encountered by realists, because its solution is in fact much more unfeasible than realist prescriptions, since feasibility is interpreted as mere possibility. We wind up our analysis by showing that normative behaviourism encounters new problems that realist approaches typically do not face. (shrink)

The “impossibility results” in algorithmic fairness suggest that a predictive model cannot fully meet two common fairness criteria – sufficiency and separation – except under extraordinary circumstances. These findings have sparked a discussion on fairness in algorithms, prompting debates over whether predictive models can avoid unfair discrimination based on protected attributes, such as ethnicity or gender. As shown by Otto Sahlgren, however, the discussion of the impossibility results would gain from importing some of the tools developed in the philosophical literature (...) on feasibility. Utilizing these tools, Sahlgren sketches a cautiously optimistic view of how algorithmic fairness can be made feasible in restricted local decision-making. While we think it is a welcome move to inject the literature on feasibility into the debate on algorithmic fairness, Sahlgren says very little about what are the general gains of bringing in feasibility considerations in theorizing algorithmic fairness. How, more precisely, does it help us make assessments about fairness in algorithmic decision-making? This is what is addressed in this Reply. More specifically, our two-fold argument is that feasibility plays an important but limited role for algorithmic fairness. We end by offering a sketch of a framework, which may be useful for theorizing feasibility in algorithmic fairness. (shrink)

A comprehensive exploration of theories of citizenship and inclusiveness in an age of globalization. The authors analyze democracy and the political community in a transnational context, using new critical, conceptual and normative perspectives on the borders, territories and political agents of the state.

Both for Kant and for Nietzsche, aesthetics must not be considered as a systematic science based merely on logical premises but rather as a set of intuitively attained artistic ideas that constitute or reconstitute the sensible perceptions and supersensible representations into a new whole. Kantian and Nietzschean aesthetics are both aiming to see beyond the forms of objects to provide explanations for the nobility and sublimity of human art and life. We can safely say that Kant and Nietzsche used the (...) dualities of the beautiful/sublime and Apollonian/Dionysian to advocate their general philosophical worldview, and that the initial formation (in Observations and The Birth of Tragedy) and final dissolution (in the Critique of Judgment and Zarathustra and other later works) of these dualities are determined by the gradually established telos of their philosophical endeavor. Therefore, by observing the evolution of these so-called dualities, Kaplama gathers important clues as to how Kant’s and Nietzsche’s aesthetics transformed into different ways to affirm human art and life. On the one hand, Kaplama argues, the Dionysian came to be the heart and soul of Nietzschean aesthetics and ethics, and the Apollonian (or the formal drive of individuation) was reduced into a mere aesthetic criterion. On the other, Kant treats the sublime (which is originally an idea-producing feeling and/or judgment) as a mere appendix to his Critique of Judgment and aesthetic theory teleologically reducing it into its possible moral consequences. This is why Schopenhauer calls the sublime “by far the most excellent thing in the Critique of Judgment” which touches on the real problem of aesthetics very closely but does not provide a real solution for it. Kant’s forced teleological move is to make his theory of aesthetic judgment stand as a ‘reaffirmation’ of the earlier ethical justification he believed to have accomplished in the first two Critiques and the Groundwork where he defends an affirmation of human life through a teleological morality centered on the principle of free-will. In contrast, Nietzsche’s aesthetics (particularly the Dionysian) guides his ethics and metaphysics again through defining an ideal human nature without which ethos would be static and meaningless, lacking the ability to move and change and represent the tragic pathos of human life. (shrink)

In the last couple of years, increased attention has been directed at the question of whether there is such a thing as a distinctively political normativity. With few exceptions, this question has so far only been explored by political realists. However, the discussion about a distinctively political normativity raises methodological and meta-theoretical questions of general importance for political theory. Although the terminology varies, it is a widely distributed phenomenon within political theory to rely on a normative source which is said (...) to be political rather than moral, or at least foremost political. In light of this concern, the present paper moves beyond political realism in the attempt to explore alternative ways of understanding distinctively political normativity, in a way which may be useful for political theorists. More specifically, we investigate two candidate views, here labelled the “domain view” and the “role view,” respectively. The former traces distinctness to the “domain,” that is, to the circumstances of politics. This view has gained a lot of support in the literature in recent years. The latter traces distinctness to “role,” that is, the role-specific demands that normative-political principles make. Our twofold claim in this paper is that the domain view is problematic but that the role view is promising. (shrink)

The Right to Justification : Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice.

The practice-dependent approach to justice has received a lot of attention in post-millennium political philosophy. It has been developed in different directions and its normative implications have been criticized, but little attention has been directed to the very distinction between practice-dependence and practice-independence and the question of what theoretically differentiates a practice-dependent account from mainstream practice-independent accounts. The core premises of the practice-dependent approach, proponents argue, are meta-normative and methodological. A key feature is the presumption that a concept of justice (...) is dependent on the function or aim of the social practices to which it is supposed to be applied. Closely related to this meta-normative thesis is an interpretive methodology for deriving principles of justice from facts about existing practices, in particular regarding their point and purpose. These two premises, practice-dependent theorists claim, differentiate their account since they are not accepted by practice-independent accounts and they justify different principles of justice than practice-independent accounts. Our aim in this article is to refute both and, demonstrating that practice-independent accounts may indeed accept the meta-normative and methodological premises of the practice-dependent accounts, and that we are given no theoretical reason to think that practice-dependent accounts justify other principles of justice for a practice than do practice-independent accounts. In other words, practice-dependent theorists have not substantiated their claim that practice-dependence is theoretically differentiated from mainstream accounts. When practice-dependent proponents argue for other principles of justice than mainstream theorists, it will be for the usual reason in normative theory: their first-order normative arguments differ. (shrink)

Some artworks are called sublime because of their capacity to move human imagination in a different way than the experience of beauty. The following discussion explores how Van Gogh’s The Starry Night along with some of his other late landscape paintings accomplish this peculiar movement of imagination thus qualifying as sublime artworks. These artworks constitute examples of the higher aesthetic principles and must be judged according to the cosmological-aesthetic criteria for they manage to generate a transition between ethos and phusis (...) and present them in unity. Here, referring to Heraclitean, Kantian, Nietzschean and Heideggerian metaphysics and aesthetics, I propose that the principles of motion and transition be the new cosmologic-aesthetic categories for the judgment of sublime artworks as well as for the understanding of the world (Weltanschauung) they represent. (shrink)

Political realists’ rejection of the so-called ‘ethics first’ approach of political moralists, has raised concerns about their own source of normativity. Some realists have responded to such concerns by theorizing a distinctively political normativity. According to this view, politics is seen as an autonomous, independent domain with its own evaluative standards. Therefore, it is in this source, rather than in some moral values ‘outside’ of this domain, that normative justification should be sought when theorizing justice, democracy, political legitimacy, and the (...) like. For realists the question about a distinctively political normativity is important, because they take the fact that politics is a distinct affair to have severe consequences for both how to approach the subject matter as such and for which principles and values can be justified. Still, realists have had a hard time clarifying what this distinctively political normativity consists of and why, more precisely, it matters. The aim of this paper is to take some further steps in answering these questions. We argue that realists have the choice of committing themselves to one of two coherent notions of distinctively political normativity: one that is independent of moral values, where political normativity is taken to be a kind of instrumental normativity; another where the distinctness still retains a justificatory dependence on moral values. We argue that the former notion is unattractive since the costs of commitment will be too high, and that the latter notion is sound but redundant since no moralist would ever reject it. Furthermore, we end the paper by discussing what we see as the most fruitful way of approaching political and moral normativity in political theory. (shrink)

Although the concept of “AI governance” is frequently used in the debate, it is still rather undertheorized. Often it seems to refer to the mechanisms and structures needed to avoid “bad” outcomes and achieve “good” outcomes with regard to the ethical problems artificial intelligence is thought to actualize. In this article we argue that, although this outcome-focused view captures one important aspect of “good governance,” its emphasis on effects runs the risk of overlooking important procedural aspects of good AI governance. (...) One of the most important properties of good AI governance is political legitimacy. Starting out from the assumptions that AI governance should be seen as global in scope and that political legitimacy requires at least a democratic minimum, this article has a twofold aim: to develop a theoretical framework for theorizing the political legitimacy of global AI governance, and to demonstrate how it can be used as a compass for critially assessing the legitimacy of actual instances of global AI governance. Elaborating on a distinction between “governance by AI” and “governance of AI” in relation to different kinds of authority and different kinds of decision-making leads us to the conclusions that much of the existing global AI governance lacks important properties necessary for political legitimacy, and that political legitimacy would be negatively impacted if we handed over certain forms of decision-making to artificial intelligence systems. (shrink)