In this article, we describe an ontology aimed at the representation of the relevant entities and relations in the philosophical world. We will guide the reader through our modeling choices, so to highlight the ontology’s practical purpose: to enable an annotation of philosophical resources which is capable of supporting pedagogical navigation mechanisms. The ontology covers all the aspects of philosophy, thus including characterizations of entities such as people, events, documents, and ideas. In particular, here we will present a detailed exposition (...) of the entities belonging to the idea branch of the ontology, for they have a crucial role in the world of philosophy. Moreover, as an example of the type of applications made possible by the ontology we will introduce PhiloSurfical, a prototype tool we created to navigate contextually a classic work in twentieth century philosophy, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. We discuss the potential usage of such navigation mechanisms in educational and scholarly contexts, which aim to enhance the learning process through the serendipitous discovery of relevant resources. (shrink)

From within a “systemic approach” to deliberative democracy, political parties can be seen as crucial actors in facilitating deliberation, by playing epistemic, motivational, and justificatory functions that are central to the deliberative ideal. However, we point out that if we assume a purely outcome-oriented conception of the role of parties within a deliberative system, we risk losing sight of a central tenet of deliberative democracy and of its distinctive principle of legitimacy, namely, that citizens must be able to exercise critical (...) reflection on the grounds of democratic decisions. We argue that parties have a special responsibility in making a deliberative system meet this requirement, and that such special role can be fulfilled only if parties’ programs, values, and strategies are shaped through intra-party deliberation. On the grounds of this discussion, we define a model of intra-party deliberation that is based on the principles of mutual acceptability, pluralism, and publicity. (shrink)

1. Epistemologia, logica e dialettica -- 2. Fisica, antropologia e metafisica -- 3. Filosofia pratica -- 4, pt. 1. L'influenza di Aristotele: antichità, Medioevo e Rinascimento -- v. 4, pt. 2. L'influenza di Aristotele: età moderna e contemporanea.

I. In analytic philosophy, so-called 'univocalism' is the prevailing interpretation of the meaning of terms such as 'being' or 'existence', i.e. the thesis that these terms have only one meaning (see Russell, White, Quine, van Inwagen). But some analytical philosophers, inspired by Aristotle, maintain that 'being' has many senses (Austin, Ryle). II. Aristotle develops an argument in favour of this last thesis, observing that 'being' and 'one' cannot be a single genus, because they are predicated of their differences (Metaph. B (...) 3). III. But 'being' for Aristotle has also a unity, i.e. 'focal meaning', which coincides with substance (Metaph. Γ 2), and substance has not only an ontological priority, but also a logical priority, in respect to the other beings, as was shown by G. E. L. Owen. IV. This 'focal meaning' cannot be identified with primary substance, i.e. with the unmovable mover, as some interpreters pretend, because this latter has only an ontological, not a logical, priority in respect to the world. V. The impossibility of this interpretation results from Aristotle's rejection of an essence and a substance of being (Metaph. B 4), i.e. the rejection of what the Christian philosophers called esse ipsum subsistens. (shrink)

This paper analyses the possibility of granting legitimacy to democratic decisionmaking procedures in a context of deep pluralism. We defend a multidimensional account according to which a legitimate system needs to grant, on the one hand, that citizens should be included on an equal footing and acknowledged as reflexive political agents rather than mere beneficiaries of policies, and, on the other hand, that their decisions have an epistemic quality. While Estlund’s account of imperfect epistemic proceduralism might seem to embody a (...) dualistic conception of democratic legitimacy, we point out that it is not able to recognize citizens as reflexive political agents and is grounded in an idealized model of the circumstances of deliberation. To overcome these ambiguities, we develop an account of democratic legitimacy according to which disagreement is the proper expression of citizens’ reflexive agency and the attribution of epistemic authority does not stem from a major expertise or specific ability, but it comes through the public confrontation among disagreeing agents. Consequently, the epistemic value of deliberation should be derived from the reasons-giving process rather than from the reference to the alleged quality of its outcomes. In this way, we demonstrate the validity of the multidimensional perspective of legitimacy, yet abstain from introducing any outcome-oriented criterion. Finally, we argue that this account of legitimacy is well suited for modeling deliberative democracy as a decision-making procedure that respects the agency of every citizen and grants her opportunity to influence public choices. (shrink)

In his recent edition, with translation and commentary, of Aristotle, Eth. Nic. VI, Hans-Georg Gadamer reproposes his interpretation of Aristotle's practical philosophy as a model for his own hermeneutics, confirming in this way his tendency to identify practical philosophy with the intellectual virtue of phronesis. Furthermore, although he recognizes the primacy attributed by Aristotle to the theoretical life, Gadamer tends to undervalue it and to consider phronesis and sophia at the same level. In particular he believes that the theoretical life (...) was for Aristotle an ideal accessible only to the gods. Unlike Heidegger, who refuses Aristotle's position because of the primacy of theoretical life, but appropriates his practical philosophy, Gadamer thinks that today is still possible to follow Aristotle, but only if we reduce that primacy. The article shows how, according to Gadamer, what Aristotle says about theoretical life, if rightly understood, can still be accepted. /// Na sua edição recente, com tradução e comentário ao Livro VI da Ética a Nicómaco de Aristóteles, Hans-Georg Gadamer reaflrma a sua interpretação dafllosofia prática de Aristóteles como modelo para a sua hermenêutica, confirmando deste modo a sua tendência a identificar a filosofia pratica de Aristóteles com a virtude dianoética da phronesis. Além disso, e apesar de reconhecer o primado atribuido por Aristóteles à vida teorética, Gadamer tende a desvalorizá-lo e a considerar a phronesis e a sophia como estando no mesmo piano. Gadamer parece especialmente convencido de que a vida teoretica para Aristóteles constitui um ideal apenas acessivel aos deuses. Ao contrário de Heidegger, que refuta a posição de Aristóteles por causa do primado atribuido à vida teorética, mas se apropria da sua filosqfia prática, Gadamer pensa ser ainda possivel seguir Aristóteles, para o efeito apenas se exigindo uma redimensionação desse primado. Enfim, o artigo demonstra como, segundo Gadamer, aquilo que Aristoteles diz acerca da vida teorética pode, se correctamente entendido, ser aceite ainda hoje. (shrink)

Célestin Freinet’s pedagogy faces important challenges today. On one side, cognitive psychology suggests that it is useful to move from the students’ free expressions only if this process permits the acquisition of concepts and competences, on the other hand institutional pedagogy, tracing back to psychoanalysis, teaches how important is to build mediation institutions within the group. In many experiences of institutional pedagogy the relationship, through the “places of word”, becomes the main purpose of education. But in this way knowledge, which (...) contributes to the formation of personality, would be denied. Institutional pedagogy anyway induces Freinet’s pedagogy to consider the importance of the institutional processes within the group and of the educational techniques as mediation structures in interpersonal relationships. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that a progressive approach to normative political theorizing should incorporate a conception of meaningful political change that is nonutopian (it conceives of advancements as gradual stages), large-scale (it involves the largest possible numbers of organized and unorganized social movements), and democratically emancipatory (it displays a commitment to breaking down the barriers that prevent individuals from feeling responsible for the direction of society). Bearing this in mind, such an approach should be organized around a cooperative effort (...) between theorists and agents of change and should be oriented toward the collective construction of large-scale actionable proposals for social and political change here and now. (shrink)

Comparaison entre la philosophie pratique aristotélisante d'aujourd'hui, représentée en Allemagne surtout par H.G. Gadamer, J. Ritter et leurs élèves, et les théories d'Aristote sur la phronesis et l'ethos, visant à montrer que ces dernières, dans la pensée du Stagirite, ne remplissent pas, contrairement à ce que croient ces interprètes, le rôle de la philosophie pratique toute entière. Contrast between the aristotelizing practical philosophy of today, represented in Germany especially by H.G. Gadamer, J. Ritter and their followers, and Aristotle's theories on (...) phronesis and ethos, in order to show that these theories, in the Stagirite's thought, don't play, against the opinion of those interpreters, the rôle of the whole practical philosophy. (shrink)

For centuries, scholars have not doubted that Macrobio Ambrogio Teodosio was pagan. Recently, prof. Alan Cameron in his The Last Pagans of Rome clamied that the late antique writer was actually a Christian. This essay seeks to refute this assumption. --Translated from back cover.

In the first part of this paper, published in issue 1 of Augustinianum 63 (2023), 9-45, we examined the question of whether Irenaeus of Lyons depended on the Exposition of Logia about the Lord of Papias of Hierapolis. In this second and final part we focus on the way Irenaeus used information which, since the first decades of the second century, had been attributed to presbyters of Asia and then in particular on the way he identifies the succession of presbyters (...) with that of bishops (primarily in Rome). He links the latter with Christian origins but also profoundly alters the function traditionally attributed to the presbyters themselves, within a system he devised in order to respond to urgent problems, in a context quite different from the era in which the traditions to which he appeals were born. (shrink)

La classificazione delle scienze di Pietro d'Abano costituisce un'interessante riformulazione della classificazione analoga, proposta da Aristotele in Metaph. VI, e della teoria degli abiti dianoetici, proposta da Aristotele in Eth. Nic. VI. Come risulta dal Conciliator per quanto concerne la medicina e dal Lucidator per quanto concerne l'astronomia, Pietro segue la classificazione aristotelica e le interpretazioni che di essa erano state date nel medioevo , aggiungendovi come contributo originale l'introduzione di una parte pratica sia nella medicina che nell'astronomia , dove (...) quest'ultima deriva da Tolomeo e dagli Arabi. Peter of Abano's classification of the sciences is an interesting reformulation of the analogous classification proposed by Aristotle in Metaphysics VI, and of Aristotle's theory of the dianoetic habits found in Nichomachean Ethics VI. As apparent in the Conciliator for medicine and in the Lucidator for astronomy, Peter follows the Aristotelian classification and the interpretations of it given in Middle Ages , adding as his own original contribution the introduction of a practical part on medicine and on astronomy , the latter derived from Ptolemy and the Arabs. (shrink)

The chapters in this book deal with different, though related, topics concerning the tense relationship between democracy and diversity. On the one hand, social diversity represents an opportunity, widening the horizon of social options and perspectives of innovation, but, on the other hand, it creates problems for the social cohesion and peaceful coexistence of many groups, be they majority or minority. The chapters depart from the intrinsic connection between democracy and diversity – and the unavoidable challenges that pluralism poses to (...) decision-making procedures – investigating, from different perspectives, how the normative requirement of fully respecting agents’ reflexive agency impacts the revision of democratic decision-making procedures and the way in which institutions react to citizens’ justice-based claims. (shrink)