Resum: Actualitzar la didàctica de la filosofia i adaptar-la al nou context digital i social que ha convertit l’ensenyament en una activitat complexa però fonamental és un dels reptes didàctics que ha d’ orientar l’ensenyament filosòfic dirigit a la formació de ciutadans crítics i responsables d’una societat democràtica avançada. Amb aquesta finalitat és necessari posar la filosofia a l’abast de tothom, utilitzar les xarxes socials (Youtube, Instagram, Twitter, etc.) com a recursos didàctics per a l’ensenyament filosòfic, acompanyar la formació de (...) la joventut i proporcionar-los els instruments bàsics del pensament filosòfic com a ajuda en l’anàlisi d’una realitat en transformació.Paraules clau: didàctica, filosofia, TIC, xarxes socials, educació, ciutadania. English title: Teaching to think to people who does not want to learn. Or how to innovate in teaching philosophy in the age of digital idiotismAbstract: Updating philosophy didactics and adapting it to the new digital and social context which has turned teaching into a complex but essential activity is one of challenges in didactics that must guide our efforts to develop citizens’ critical awareness and responsibility in an advanced democratic society. To achieve this aim, we need to make philosophy accessible, using social networking sites—like Youtube, Instagram, Twitter, etc.—as didactic resources for teaching philosophy, accompanying young people in their education, and providing them with basic tools of philosophic thinking as a help for analysing a reality which is constantly changing.Keywords: didactics, philosophy, ICT, social networking sites, education, citizenship. (shrink)

Susan Wolf famously claimed that the life of the moral saint is unattractive from the “point of view of individual perfection.” I argue, however, that the unattractive moral saints in Wolf’s account are self-defeating on two levels, are motivated in the wrong way, and are called into question by real-life counter-examples. By appealing to a real-life case study, I argue that the best life from the moral point of view is not necessarily unattractive from the individual point of view.

We emerge from certain activities with an altered sense of self. Whether returning from a warzone or from an experience as common as caring for an aging parent, one might remark, “I’m not the same person I was.” I argue that such transformations are relevant to debates about what morality requires of us. To undergo an alteration in one’s self is to make a special kind of sacrifice, a sacrifice of self. Since projects can be more or less morally obligatory (...) to the extent that they require more or less sacrifice, we must incorporate these unique sacrifices into any accounting of the contours and limits of moral obligation. But sacrifices of self pose a special difficulty for any such accounting, precisely because of their transformative nature. Unlike most other sacrifices, they cannot be analyzed entirely in terms of wellbeing. Using real-world case studies and examples, I argue for the existence of two types of sacrifice of self, involving changes in identity and moral agency. I argue that sacrifices of self require particular attention because they may be extra difficult to compare with other costs and with moral gains. (shrink)

Abstract It would be puzzling if the morally best agents were not so good after all. Yet one prominent account of the morally best agents ascribes to them the exact motivational defect that has famously been called a “fetish.” The supposed defect is a desire to do the right thing, where this is read de dicto . If the morally best agents really are driven by this de dicto desire, and if this de dicto desire is really a fetish, then (...) the morally best agents are moral fetishists. This is puzzling. I resolve the puzzle by showing that on a proper understanding of the interaction between de dicto and de re moral motivation, it is not only not fetishistic, but quite possibly desirable, to be motivated by a de dicto desire to do the right thing. My argument relies partly on an appeal to a non-buck-passing account of moral rightness, according to which rightness is itself an additional reason-giving property over and above the right-making properties of an action. If this account of moral rightness is correct, then we would expect the morally best agents to exhibit de dicto moral motivation. However, since their de dicto desire acts in concert with de re desires, there is no reason to consider it a fetish. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-19 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9825-z Authors Vanessa Carbonell, Philosophy Department, University of Cincinnati, P.O. Box 210374, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0374, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116. (shrink)

I discuss in detail the contents of the adiabatic hypothesis, formulated by Ehrenfest in 1916. I focus especially on the paper he published in 1916 and 1917 in three different journals. I briefly review its precedents and thoroughly analyze its reception until 1918, including Burgers’s developments and Bohr’s assimilation of them into his own theory. I show that until 1918 the adiabatic hypothesis did not play an important role in the development of quantum theory.

If the traditional problem of demandingness is that a theory demands too much of all agents, for example by asking them to maximize utility in every decision, then we should ask whether there is a related problem of “differential demandingness”, when a theory places vastly different demands on different agents. I argue that even according to common-sense morality, the demands faced by particular agents depend on a variety of contingent factors. These include the general circumstances, the compliance of others, the (...) available resources, the agent’s relevant relationships, the agent’s psychological constitution, and the agent’s knowledge. Some agents, for instance, find themselves in a “sacrifice hazard”: a situation where morality calls for a huge unforeseen sacrifice. I argue that if moral demands are differential, it is harder than one might think to assess a theory’s general level of demandingness in the abstract. (shrink)

En este ensayo, examino dos problemas que cualquier teoría del saber cómo y en particular una teoría del saber como grupal debe tratar: el problema de la posesión, que es la necesidad de explicar como un grupo puede estar en un estado de saber como hacer algo, y el problema de la atribución, que es la necesidad de dar cuenta de las condiciones en las que es admisible atribuir saber como a un grupo. Argumento que (a pesar de ciertas apariencias (...) iniciales) estos problemas son independientes, lo que es especialmente importante en el contexto de teorías del saber cómo donde este no puede en general reducirse a actitudes proposicionales. (shrink)

The moral community is a social community, and as such it is vulnerable to social problems and pathologies. In this essay I identify a particular way in which participation in the moral community can be constrained by social factors. I argue that features of the social world—including power imbalances, oppression, intergroup conflict, communication barriers, and stereotyping—can make it nearly impossible for some members of the moral community to hold others responsible for wrongdoing. Specifically, social circumstances prevent some marginalized people from (...) engaging in what Stephen Darwall calls “felicitous moral address” (Darwall 2006). We should think of some members of the moral community as having “second-class moral citizenship” in ways that parallel second-class political citizenship. The injustice of second-class moral citizenship can be understood by drawing an analogy with Miranda Fricker’s notion of “epistemic injustice” (Fricker 2007). Fricker’s account of how people can be undermined in their capacity as knowers can be extended to show how people can be undermined in their capacity as makers of moral claims, which can be called “claimant injustice”. (shrink)

In this paper, I raise the problem of dealing with counterpossible conditionals for theories of subject matter. I argue that existing accounts of subject matter need to be revised and extended to be able to a) provide reasonable (potentially non-degenerate) verdicts about what counterpossibles are about, b) explain the intuition that counterpossibles are in some sense about what would happen if the antecedent were true, and c) explain in what sense counterpossibles can be about individuals. I sketch how one could (...) extend atom-based and way-based theories of subject matters to handle the problem. Then, I raise the problem that it might be desirable for a theory of subject matter to prevent the inference that certain counterpossibles are about the kinds of things that they seem to mention. (shrink)

This article is devoted to give reasons against the naturalization of logic, in a sense which entails a revision of this science. The paper criticizes each historical important attempt to revise logical laws – intuitionism, quantum logic, alternative logics – and also it tries to argue that the explanation problem of quantum mechanics has nothing to do with a naturalization of logic.

I argue for the existence of a ‘ratcheting-up effect’: the behavior of moral saints serves to increase the level of moral obligation the rest of us face. What we are morally obligated to do is constrained by what it would be reasonable for us to believe we are morally obligated to do. Moral saints provide us with a special kind of evidence that bears on what we can reasonably believe about our obligations. They do this by modeling the level of (...) sacrifice a person can realistically bear. Exposure to moral saints thus ‘ratchets-up’ our obligations by combating a type of ignorance that would otherwise defeat those obligations. (shrink)

POLITICS is a system of computer programs which simulates humans in comprehending and responding to world events from a given political or ideological perspective. The primary theoretical motivations were: (1) the implemention of a functional system which applies the knowledge structures of Schank and Abelson (1977) to the domain of simulating political belief systems; (2) the development of a tentative theory of intentional goal conflicts and counterplanning. Secondary goals of the POLITICS project include developing a representation for belief systems, investigating (...) cognitive processes such as goal‐directed inferencing, and the integration of several types of knowledge representations into a functional system. (shrink)

Resumen: Analizo y critico las principales objeciones que Carlos Blanco plantea, en Las fronteras del pensamiento, contra las 5 vías de Tomás de Aquino. Mi objetivo es mostrar que dichas objeciones fallan, lo cual nos va a permitir traer, a la literatura en español, ciertas discusiones del mundo filosófico anglosajón. Palabras clave: 5 vías, Tomás de Aquino, Tomismo, Existencia de Dios, Filosofía de la religión Abstract: I analyze and critique Carlos Blanco’s main objections against Aquinas’s 5 ways, to be found (...) in his latest book, Las fronteras del pensamiento. My aim is to show how these objections miss the mark. This will allow us to bring into the Spanish literature some discussions that have taken place in the English-speaking world. Kewyords: 5 ways, Thomas Aquinas, Thomism, God’s existence, Philosophy of religion. (shrink)

In this paper, I sketch a new model for the format of the content of understanding states, Compressible Graph Maximalism (CGM). In this model, the format of the content of understanding is graphical, and compressible. It thus combines ideas from approaches that stress the link between understanding and holistic structure (like as reported by Grimm (in: Ammon SGCBS (ed) Explaining Understanding: New Essays in Epistemollogy and the Philosophy of Science, Routledge, New York, 2016)), and approaches that emphasize the connection between (...) understanding and compression (like Wilkenfeld (Synthese 190(6):997–1016, 2018)). I argue that the combination of these ideas has several attractive features, and I defend the idea against some challenges. (shrink)

We analyze the evolution of EHRENFEST's thought since he proved the necessity of quanta in 1911 until the formulation of his adiabatic hypothesis in 1914. We argue that his research contributed significantly to the solution of critical problems in quantum physics and led to a rigorous definition of the range of validity of BOLTZMANN's principle.

El objetivo de este trabajo es reconsiderar el punto de vista defendido por los pensadores que se pueden adscribir al famoso ‘Círculo de Viena’ sobre el significado y, especialmente, sobre los enunciados asignificativos. Para ello, procedemos usando la típica forma científica, heredera de la tradición del Círculo, de medir empíricamente los conceptos adquiridos. Además, proporcionamos algunas notas históricas, así como algunas reflexiones sobre el pensamiento de Karl Menger sobre la carencia de una geometría adecuada para el micromundo.

Our object in this paper is to study the antecedents, contents, implications, and impact of a not well-known or appreciated paper by EHRENFEST in 1911 on the essential nature of the different quantum hypotheses in radiation theory. After a careful analysis of EHRENFEST’s notebooks, correspondence, and publications, we conclude that the essential points of EHRENFEST’s paper were not perceived to a large extent, and hence that its implications were not considered thoroughly. Specifically, we show that EHRENFEST contributed significantly to the (...) clarifications of the differences between PLANCK’s and EINSTEIN’s respective quantum hypotheses, as well as to those of the concepts ‘‘discontinuity,’’ ‘‘quantization,’’ and ‘‘corpuscularity.’’. (shrink)

A partir de reflexiones propuestas por Joseph Roth, Walter Benjamin, Sigfried Kracauer y Claudio Guillén, se presenta el concepto de “ciudad blanca” ligado a la frontera y la centralidad para concluir que la “ciudad blanca” es desfocalizada y periférica, invadida y rebelde, modelo (sueño o proyecto) e infierno (pesadilla o caos). El concepto se aplica al examen de cuatro ciu- dades “blancas” a propósito de secuencias significativas de cuatro films: Los olvidados (1950) de Luis Buñuel, Pizza, birra, faso (1998) de (...) Bruno Stagnaro e Israel Adrián Caetano, Dans la ville blanche (1983) de Alain Tanner y Biutiful (2010) de Alejandro González Iñárritu. (shrink)

Ofrecemos un estudio introductorio del papel que tuvo el concepto de partícula en los artículos fundacionales de la mecánica cuántica. Nos centramos en el período 1925-1927, lo que incluye el análisis de los primeros trabajos de Heisenberg, Born, Jordan, Schrödinger y Dirac, y también las primeras formulaciones de la complementaridad de Bohr. Nuestro objetivo es discutir hasta qué punto se puso en duda entre los creadores de la nueva teoría, justo en el momento de su creación y cuando aún no (...) existía una interpretación consensuada ni establecida, el concepto de partícula. Posteriores desarrollos, como la teoría cuántica de campos, pusieron la vigencia de ese concepto bajo sospecha. Mostramos que un análisis historiográfico articulado mediante este concepto permite caracterizar la relación que los distintos autores de la mecánica cuántica mantuvieron con la visualización de los procesos atómicos. En algunos casos, como el de Heisenberg, su evolución es especialmente significativa. Asimismo, también citaremos algunos fragmentos donde los autores considerados reclaman para sí el legado de la antigua teoría cuántica, tratando de legitimar sus propios desarrollos a partir de su coherencia con los primeros descubrimientos de los Planck, Einstein o De Broglie. De prácticamente todos ellos hemos encontrado textos en este sentido. (shrink)

En s’appuyant sur une enquête de terrain concernant un établissement de la filière automobile, cet article cherche à montrer que le temps de travail a adopté un caractère flexible et fragmenté à la suite de transformations concomitantes de l’organisation du travail et des relations professionnelles. Ce temps est articulé au flux et au volume de production, ce qui le rend moins régulier et prévisible pour les salariés. Leur temps de travail peut ainsi varier à la hausse ou à la baisse (...) selon des contraintes de marché ou des aléas industriels. À cette flexibilité s’ajoute la désynchronisation du temps des différents ateliers et équipes à l’usine. En conséquence, les salariés et leurs représentants ont de moins en moins de prise sur un temps de travail qui semble s’imposer à eux, de l’extérieur. Face à cette situation, les marges de revendication des élus du personnel se réduisent. Ils tentent de redonner une certaine régularité et synchronicité au temps de travail quand il ne s’agit pas de négocier des contreparties salariales. Les transformations de l’organisation du travail en cours remettent donc en cause – mais de façon discrète – l’une des mesures dominantes du travail en régime fordien en réformant profondément les modalités de négociation sur le temps de travail. (shrink)

A través de una serie de ejemplos matemáticos elementales se Ilega a proponer una definición bastante general de Indistinguibilidad, por medio de operadores con valores en semigrupos conmutativos ordenados. Tal definición se aplica a casos provenientes de diversos campos, muchos de los cuales exhiban la propiedad da rotura de las cadenas de objetos relacionados a causa de un cierto parecido.

This paper deals with the relation with Fuzzy Logic of some of the ideas of Karl Menger published between 1942 and 1966 and concerning what he called “Hazy Sets”, Probabilistic Relations and Statistical Metric Spaces. The author maintains the opinion that if Lofti A. Zadeh is actually the father of Fuzzy Logic, Menger not only was a forerunner of this field but that his ideas were and still are influential on it.

Malicious moral envy is an aversive reaction to a rival’s moral properties or accomplishments, accompanied by a tendency to level-down the target by morally tarnishing or sabotaging them. In this essay I give an account of malicious moral envy, showing how it is a sub-type of envy more generally. I describe Donald Trump’s behaviors toward Barack Obama and Anthony Fauci as a case study of malicious moral envy. I argue that malicious moral envy is puzzling, first because it is self-defeating, (...) and then—more interestingly—because it betrays an ambivalence about morality and moral requirements. I explore how malicious moral envy relates to other issues in the literature on moral ambivalence, including moral exemplars, moral saints, admirable immorality, and the pathologizing of moral outliers. Ultimately I suggest that mild forms of malicious moral envy may play an important role in helping agents navigate the socially complex and constantly changing landscape of moral requirements. (shrink)

It is not possible to talk about bioethics without recognizing the plurality inherent in it. In this sense, the notion of person is important due to its multiplicity of possible interpretations depending on its cultural context. This fact is highlighted in the case of organ transplantation in Japan. While there are many critiques against this procedure from scholars in various fields, those that deal with the problem of brain death are especially problematic. This is because the definition of person that (...) is invoked in such debates does not seem to coincide with how the notion of person has been understood in the Japanese tradition. Hence, investigating the Japanese concept of ningen could be helpful in not only partially clarifying some of the attitudes that exist in Japan towards the notion of brain death, but also to illustrate the need to recognize the plurality of views in modern bioethics. (shrink)

It is well-known that racism is encoded into the social practices and institutions of medicine. Less well-known is that racism is encoded into the material artifacts of medicine. We argue that many medical devices are not merely biased, but materialize oppression. An oppressive device exhibits a harmful bias that reflects and perpetuates unjust power relations. Using pulse oximeters and spirometers as case studies, we show how medical devices can materialize oppression along various axes of social difference, including race, gender, class, (...) and ability. Our account uses political philosophy and cognitive science to give a theoretical basis for understanding materialized oppression, explaining how artifacts encode and carry oppressive ideas from the past to the present and future. Oppressive medical devices present a moral aggregation problem. To remedy this problem, we suggest redundantly layered solutions that are coordinated to disrupt reciprocal causal connections between the attitudes, practices, and artifacts of oppressive systems. (shrink)

El cálculo proposicional se basa proposiciones que son tautologías, antilogías y de tipo contingente, construidas con las operaciones de disyunción, conjunción, y negación, así como con el llamado condicional material para trasladar los enunciados condicionales. Con todo ello se obtiene una estructura de álgebra de Boole, que permite equiparar el cálculo proposicional al cálculo algebraico booleano. En parte, la simplificación conceptual que se obtiene resulta de ser el orden parcial del álgebra equivalente a la afirmación del condicional material. Además, con (...) tal metodología cabe ver qué partes del cálculo proposicional clásico pueden trasladarse, aun con limitaciones, a estructuras más débiles y, a la vez, más generales, como son los ortoretículos no booleanos o las álgebras de De Morgan.El cálculo proposicional trata con la deducción. Por ello, el artículo lo desarrolla a partir de un operador de consecuencias en el sentido de Tarski. Ampliado el modelo deductivo, es fácil ver otras consecuencias que las usualmente consideradas en los textos elementales; en particular, se analizan cuatro esquemas de razonamiento deductivo típicos y, entre ellos, se presta especial atención a los usuales Modus Ponens y Modus Tollens. En el caso de las estructuras algebraicas de conjuntos ‘borrosos’, ninguna es de álgebra de Boole ni siquiera de orto-retículo y sólo cabe trabajar, en algunos casos, con álgebras de De Morgan-Kleene. Por lo tanto el cálculo proposicional ‘fuzzy’ debe construirse de acuerdo con la estructura algebraica que corresponda en cada caso y una vez elegida como representación del condicional una función que verifique el Modus Ponens. (shrink)

The purpose of cultural competence education for medical professionals is to ensure respectful care and reduce health disparities. Yet as Berger and Miller (2021) show, the cultural competence framework is dated, confused, and self-defeating. They argue that the framework ignores the primary driver of health disparities—systemic racism—and is apt to exacerbate rather than mitigate bias and ethnocentrism. They propose replacing cultural competence with a framework that attends to two social aspects of structural inequality: health and social policy, and institutional-system activity; (...) and two psychological aspects of structural inequality: the clinical encounter, and the epistemic. -/- We agree with the structural approach. To that end, we think it would be fruitful to include attention to physical contributors to structural inequality, namely the material artifacts used in medicine. Devices, tools, and technologies can materialize biases, perpetuate oppression, and contribute to health disparities. Granted, not everything that interests philosophers can be squeezed into medical education. Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons for including the study of material artifacts in education designed to reduce health disparities. First, devices and tools often carry forward biases from the past, and keep biases hidden from plain sight. Second, by studying these artifacts, future clinicians can begin to see themselves as part of a larger sociotechnical system. Finally, as medicine becomes increasingly tech-laden, it’s important for clinicians to see how material artifacts (including algorithms) connect individuals to structures. This will help to undermine oversimplified narratives according to which objective tools and technologies can correct for the bias and subjectivity of flawed human beings. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza algunos temas de inteligencia artificial y ética. Desde una óptica humanista pone en el centro la reflexión antropológica para pasar a una exploración de la dimensión ética. En definitiva, el artículo realiza una defensa del ser humano, indaga sobre la responsabilidad ética de esa ciencia y muestra gran interés en que todos (pobres y ricos) se vean beneficiados por sus avances. La inteligencia artificial nos obliga a reflexionar de nuevo sobre los procesos éticos. Durante un tiempo parecía (...) que la ética de esta ciencia estaba dominada por filosofías transhumanistas. Es hora de poner al hombre en todas sus dimensiones en el centro del pensamiento. (shrink)

La Práctica Filosófica tiene lugar en el asesoramiento que realiza un filósofo con un cliente que le plantea un problema vital suyo. Este encuentro se realiza siempre mediante el diálogo. Sin embargo, este diálogo siempre está condicionado por unos presupuestos metafísicos del filósofo asesor porque, de hecho, estos condicionan toda acción del filósofo. En este dialogar conjunto, el cliente clarifica su relación con el entorno y le permite comprenderlo mejor. Esta comprensión genera en él un bienestar. El bienestar que gana (...) nuestro cliente no parece responder al resultado de una terapia si se toma la palabra en su significado actual, que tiene su origen en un cambio semántico al ser tomada del griego por el latín: la curación de un mal físico. El proceder de las terapias, alternativas o no, tampoco responde a la forma de comprender los problemas que es característica de la filosofía. En definitiva, las terapias no consideran al ser humano en su totalidad, como sí pretende hacerlo la filosofía. (shrink)

El principio de proporcionalidad constituye hoy en día quizá el más conocido y el más recurrente "límite de los límites" a los derechos fundamentales, y en esa medida supone una barrera frente a intromisiones indebidas en el ámbito de los propios derechos. La idea de este libro es la de difundir entre los interesados una serie de herramientas hermenéuticas que son necesarias para lograr la adecuada protección de los derechos fundamentales. Las constituciones de América Latina, siguiendo la tendencia que ya (...) se apuntaba sobre el carácter fuertemente "materializado" de las cartas supremas de nuestros días, contienen todas ellas un amplio catálogo de derechos fundamentales. Pero su aplicación práctica ha dejado y sigue dejando mucho que desear. Esperamos que con la publicación de este libro se inicie un debate provechoso sobre las mejores formas de proteger los derechos fundamentales, a partir de una correcta interpretación de los mismos. Desde luego, Colombia lleva en este punto mucha ventaja respecto de otros países latinoamericanos, pues cuenta con la mejor jurisdicción constitucional de todos ellos. La Corte Constitucional de Colombia es reconocida y respetada en toda América Latina por su liderazgo intelectual y por su fuerte activismo progresista en materia de derechos fundamentales. (shrink)

RESUMEN En De Anima III 10, Aristóteles introduce la noción de phantasía logistikē como uno de los principios de la acción racional. A partir de la exposición de algunos textos del De Anima y de Ética a Nicómaco, se busca interpretar el lugar de aquel tipo de imaginación en el razonamiento práctico. Para ello, se presenta primero la doctrina aristotélica de los principios de la acción y la problemática de su articulación, y luego se discute el papel de la imaginación (...) racional en la configuración del objeto del deseo. ABSTRACT In De Anima III 10, Aristotle introduces the notion of phantasía logistikē as one of the principles of rational action. On the basis of some texts from De Anima and the Nicomachean Ethics, the paper seeks to interpret the place of that type of imagination in practical reasoning. To that effect, it first sets forth Aristotle's doctrine regarding the principles of action and the issue of their articulation, and then goes on to discuss the role of rational imagination in the configuration of the object of desire. (shrink)