The concept of the Formalesque preoccupied Bernard Smith during the last decades of his life. First propounded in Modernism's History (1998), the Formalesque is a proposed period style describing the art of the 20th century. Yet, despite his ambitions for the Formalesque as a new classification for modern art, the idea failed to appeal to academic art history. This paper does not attempt to salvage the Formalesque from art-historical obscurity. But it does argue Smith's work on this topic (...) is relevant by virtue of the contribution it makes to debates about modernism and art history. Although Smith's thesis emphasizes the necessity of period styles and the perennial development of art history, paradoxically, the Formalesque also highlights the limitations of art history. If the Formalesque has a place in art historiography, it belongs to a speculative discourse describing the end of the history of art. (shrink)

The authors of this collection of essays propose that climate change means serious peril. The approaches begin from archaeology, literature, religion, psychology, sociology, philosophy of science, engineering and sustainable development, as well as 'straight' history. Our argument, however, is not about the science per se. It is about us, our deep and more recent history, and how we arrived at this calamitous impasse. With contributions from academic activists and independent researchers, History at the End of the World (...) challenges advocates of 'business as usual' to think again. But in its wide-ranging assessment of how we transcend the current crisis, it also proposes that the human past could be our most powerful resource in the struggle for survival. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Recovery of the Philosophy of History The End of History: Hegel Redivivus The Clash of Civilizations: The Revenge of the Past? Bibliography.

The Philosopher at the End of the Universe demonstrates how anyone can grasp the basic concepts of philosophy while still holding a bucket of popcorn. Mark Rowlands makes philosophy utterly relevant to our everyday lives and reveals its most potent messages using nothing more than a little humor and the plotlines of some of the most spectacular, expensive, high-octane films on the planet. Learn about: The Nature of Reality from The Matrix, Good and Evil from Star Wars, Morality from Aliens, (...) Personal Identity from Total Recall, The Mind-Body dilemma from Terminator, Free Will from Minority Report, Death and the Meaning of Life from Blade Runner, and much more. A search for knowledge about ourselves and the world around us with a star-studded cast that includes: Tom Cruise, Plato, Harrison Ford, Immanuel Kant, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigourney Weaver, René Descartes, and Keanu Reeves. Rowlands anchors his discussions in easily understood everyday terms and relates them in a manner easy to identify with. Interspersed with a ready joke or two, he wonderfully explains why those SciFi movies we love so much are much deeper than they appear to be on the surface. Mark Rowlands's entertaining and stimulating guide is perfect for anyone searching for knowledge of the world around us. If Keanu can understand Descartes surely everyone can. (shrink)

This is a work by Josef Pieper, one of this century's most profound and lucid expositors of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas.

More often than not, business ethics textbooks have included sections on "the great economic debate," that is, the discussion of capitalism as a total system, of the criticisms against it and of the proposed alternatives. The reason for such sections is fairly obvious: at some point one has to consider whether or not all the particular problems of employment, of product quality, of environment, of regulation and so on prove beyond solution without a radical change in the basic institutions of (...) society. Since the collapse of real socialism as an alternative in the period 1989–1991, it has become increasingly difficult to have this discussion. Yet we cannot do without the critique of capitalism even if the answer may be that no other economic system is viable at this moment in history. My interest in this paper is to explore how we might now engage in this critique. Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History?" (1989) and Jacques Derrida's Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International (1993) provide a framework for this renewed engagement. (shrink)

Ever since its first publication in 1992, The End of History and the Last Man has provoked controversy and debate. Francis Fukuyama's prescient analysis of religious fundamentalism, politics, scientific progress, ethical codes, and war is as essential for a world fighting fundamentalist terrorists as it was for the end of the Cold War. Now updated with a new afterword, The End of History and the Last Man is a modern classic.

The possibility now exists of capturing a cradle-to-grave record of everything a person says or does. No longer must a personal history be a partial picture. Technology has made it possible to record, process, store, and retrieve all the text, sounds, and images that are required to paint a complete picture of an individual’s life. The efforts of future historians will be directed more to forgetting than to remembering. By default, society will forget nothing. For almost all of human (...) history, remembering has meant the judicious selection and organization of observations about events and people. There used to be an information frontier beyond which the past was a tabula rasa . That information frontier has gone the way of the dodo. The social memory of events in an individual’s life is not only detailed but permanent. Although physical storage is fallible and changes in technology may make some devices effectively unreadable, these limitations are more than made up for by the negligible cost of duplication and distribution in a network. The record of one’s triumphs and tragedies will haunt one forever. Gone is personal privacy since facts buried in the past can be uncovered at any moment. Gone is personal memory since it is easier to rely on the external social memory of cyberspace. In what follows, we explain these observations and trace their consequences. (shrink)

Through the summer and fall of 1989, Hegel scholars in America were treated to the unusual spectacle of a debate in the mass media over the meaning and truth of Hegel’s philosophy of history, a debate running through the pages of major daily newspapers, the weekly news magazines, and the journals of opinion. The occasion for this unaccustomed attention devoted to Hegel was the appearance of an article by Francis Fukuyama in the Summer 1989 issue of The National Interest (...) entitled “The End of History?”. (shrink)

Francis Fukuyama is one of the most significant political theorists of the past thirty years. Bursting into public awareness in 1989 with his provocative thesis about "the end of history," Fukuyama has made fascinating contributions to a wide range of subjects - the importance of trust in societies, the potential dangers of biotechnology, the development of political authority and the modern state, and most recently, the role of identity in politics. This book records a series of conversations with Fukuyama (...) in which he discusses his background and its role in shaping his thinking, the context and genesis of his major works, and his thoughts in light of the dramatic developments of the past decade, especially the rise of populism around the world. The result is a fascinating picture of a major intellectual. The book both provides an overview of Fukuyama's thought and reveals new insights into his best-known work. This book also allows readers to trace the themes which have animated Fukuyama's entire intellectual career. (shrink)

Jacobi held a position of unparalleled importance in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century intellectual history. This includes his role in bringing about the close of the Enlightenment, his central part in shaping the reception of Kant's philosophy and German idealism, and his influence on the development of Romanticism and existentialism.

(1994). The end of History or the end of Democracy? National identity and the future of the nation‐state. World Futures: Vol. 42, No. 1-2, pp. 161-171.

This paper highlights certain features of the metamorphosis that the concept “the end of the world” has undergone from its origin in early Christian thought to the present day. This concept has, in recent decades, become increasingly prominent within Western European Lutheran and Roman Catholic theology. This paperdemonstrates that the notion of the end of the world popularized by Jürgen Moltmann and Karl Rahner, despite the traditional, biblical language in which it is couched, has more affinity with the philosophical concept (...) “the end of history” developed by Hegel than it has with the ideas common in early Christianity. (shrink)

The 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol are the main legal documents governing the movement of refugee and asylum seekers across international borders. As the number of displaced persons seeking refuge has reached unprecedented numbers, states have resorted to measures to circumvent their obligations under the Convention. These range from bilateral agreements condemning refugees to their vessels at sea to the excision of certain territories from national jurisdiction. While socio-economic developments and the rise of the worldwide web have led (...) to deterritorialization of vast domains of the economy and the media which enable them to escape from state control, territorial presence, whether on terra firma or on vessels at sea which are functional surrogates for territorial sovereignty, continues to be the basis for the entitlement to human and citizens’ rights. We are facing a dual movement of deterritorialization and territorialization at once, both of which threaten the end of the 1951 Convention. This article is an exercise in non-ideal theory which, nonetheless, has implications for a seminal question in ideal democratic theory as to how to define and justify the boundaries of the demos. If the demos refers to the constitutional subject of a self-determining entity in whose name sovereignty is exercised, regimes of sovereignty, including those which govern the movement of peoples across borders, define the prerogatives as well as obligations of such sovereign entities under international law. The period ushered in by the 1951 Convention was such a sovereignty regime which today may be nearing its end. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider what it might mean to approach boredom as a problem of post-history, rather than of modernity as such. Post-history, or ‘end of history’, in this sense, is linked with the impossibility or unlikelihood of political-systemic change, and thus with the disappearance of the contingency or temporal flux that had been understood as the context or prerequisite of political action and political freedom. I will, argue, firstly, that both Rousseau and Fukuyama depict societies (...) that are ‘post-historical’, in this sense, and which are marked by ‘boredom’ of this specifically post-historical kind. Secondly, I will argue that both thinkers link post-historical boredom with the disappearance or diminution of the ‘drive for recognition’ that both understood as both an agent and effect of ‘history’. Thirdly, I will argue that while Fukuyama understands post-historical boredom as an ‘irritant’ that threatens to restart history without quite succeeding in doing so, Rousseau understands it as an essentially stabilising (and happy) condition that maintains post-historical man in an equilibrium modelled on the order of nature itself. And fourthly, I consider certain ways in which this ‘post-historical’ boredom might coexist and overlap with the ‘promise of intensity’ experienced in post-Fordist neoliberal society. (shrink)

In the contemporary period of history, so deeply contradictory and in many respects conflict ridden, eschatological themes, predictions of universal catastrophe and the ecological or nuclear destruction of mankind, and other motifs of the end of human history have become unprecedentedly widespread and greatly attractive. Despite the huge stores of scientific knowledge accumulated in the past few decades, many people are being drawn more and more into the stream of mystical monstrous visions and are beginning to connect the (...) end of the second millennium with implausible, obsessive apocalyptic presentiments with regard to the world as a whole as well as to our own Russian history. Soothsayers have appeared who have begun to link the phenomena of disintegration and decline and the destruction of political, ethical, and aesthetic criteria being manifested in our country in one way or another directly with the end of Russian history, with the final act of the Russian historical drama. In the sphere of concrete theoretical and philosophical-sociological knowledge, notions of the limit of historical progress, that history has fundamentally, in its essentials, run its course and that from now on the future will bring nothing essentially new, are being put forward and defended. (shrink)

This paper critically evaluates institution reconstructing critique—the central methodological strategy employed by Axel Honneth in his latest book Freedom’s Right designed to articulate and justify the normative standards employed by a critical theory of the present. It begins by considering, at a general level, the promises and limits of three ideal-typical normative methodologies of social critique: first principles critique, intuition refining critique, and institution reconstructing critique. It then turns to the details of Honneth’s history and diagnosis of market spheres (...) of society as one key example of institution reconstruction critique. This leads to a consideration of some challenges facing this kind of critique, paying particular attention to problems posed by alternative reconstructions of the same data. It argues, in particular, that there is a troubling indeterminacy in this reconstruction, since alternative teleologies yield substantively different normative analyses of capitalism, and hence substantively different social critiques. In conclusion, the paper suggests some methodological remedies which might need to be adopted in order to make good on the promise of institution reconstructing critique while avoiding some of its most challenging problems. (shrink)

Apart from the names of Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (1845-1929), Mikołaj Kruszewski (1851-1887), and, later, Jerzy Kuryłowicz (1895-1978), Polish linguists and Polish linguistics generally have been little known in the West. The first two were mentioned with approval by Saussure in an unpublished paper, and this reference was picked up by Roman Jakobson and others many years later. Kuryłowicz, for his part, made himself well known in the West through his important work as Indo-Europeanist, even Semiticist, and as a general (...) linguist. The present volume is a first attempt to broaden the perspectives on the Polish contribution to linguistics both inside and outside of Poland during the past centuries. Specialists in their respective fields contributed chapters on the origins and development of general linguistics (Z. Wąsik), applied linguistics (F. Grucza), lexicology (T. Piotrowski), dialectology (St. Gogolewski), and onomastics (S. Gala), followed by five chapters presenting the theories of the arguably most remarkable Polish linguistic thinkers, from Baudouin de Courtenay (A. Adamska-Sałaciak), Kruszewski (F. M. Berezin), and Kuryłowicz (W. Smoczyński) to Mikołaj Rudnicki (1881-1978) and Ludwik Zabrocki (1907-1977) (both written by J. Bańczerowski). Detailed individual bibliographies, a full index of names (with life dates of Polish linguists from the Renaissance to the present day), and a thorough index of subjects and terms make this volume an important reference tool for anyone wishing to acquaint himself with the rich heritage of Polish linguistic thought. (shrink)

This collection of essays explores 'the end' in various contexts, including art, politics, and the philosophy of time and existence. In different ways, all of the essays address emerging horizons of meaning and reality.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Ends of the Divine:David Bentley Hart and Jordan Daniel Wood on GraceJames Dominic Rooney O.P.David Bentley Hart and Jordan Daniel Wood stand alongside some modern theologians in their diagnosis that there is a problem in an overly transcendent account of the divine nature. If God were unable to be affected by what happens in the world, many think, then God cannot really be responsive to or care about (...) us. Unlike "radical kenotic" theologians who hold that God is affected by the world and deny the classical doctrine of divine impassibility, however, Hart and Wood argue that we can get an intimate God–world relation without denying impassibility. If it were true that God was so free and unlimited as to express himself without hindrance in creating this world and guiding its history (they argue), then the world would necessarily express God's own inner life perfectly. There would be a non-contingent and mutual relation between the world and God's inner life.The Hart/Wood strategy appears to have all the right upshots of the radical kenotic views without sacrificing the metaphysics. However, this strategy rests upon a seriously fraught modal claim: that God could not have done otherwise than what he did (in creation, the Incarnation, redemption, etc.). This modal claim supports their inferences about the ways in which creation and its history will necessarily reflect who or what God is. Phrases about God being unable to do otherwise or acting "necessarily" lend themselves to equivocation, as it is easy to slip between de re and de dicto uses of "necessary." We need to distinguish: [End Page 811]1. Necessarily, if God creates, then God creates (and does so from eternity).2. If God creates, then God necessarily creates.To affirm 1 is true is only to say (de dicto) that, necessarily, whenever it is true God creates, then it is true he creates. This first proposition poses no serious metaphysical or theological puzzle. The necessity here concerns a relation among propositions. On reading 1, the "necessity" qualifies over not God's creating, but the conditional; there thus could be other logically possible situations where God does not create. That is, if "God creates" is true, then "God creates eternally" is also true, simply on account of God's actions necessarily being eternal in duration. The mere fact that God has a relation to the universe which is "necessarily eternal" in that way does not by itself entail that God cannot do otherwise than create.To affirm 2, by contrast, would be to switch to the claim that God creates necessarily, with the necessity concerning God's creating itself. Thus, 2 involves a relation of metaphysical necessity (de re). If God cannot not do or cause x, then x is metaphysically necessary insofar as x "could not not exist" or "could not not be otherwise." What I will show is that Hart and Wood both hold that, given God's character, his choices and actions simply could not be otherwise. That is, both hold reading 2. Since Hart and Wood appeal to God's character, they do not appeal to a relation among propositions or the relation among facts such that, necessarily, given God chose to create, God chooses to create. Their views involve a strong modal thesis about God's actions that goes beyond traditional claims that God's actions befit his wisdom, since, on those traditional claims, many possible courses of action could equally befit God's wisdom. Both Hart and Wood deny that God could have done anything else apart from what he (actually) did in creation and salvation that would befit his wisdom or character.I will show that, if such a modal claim is to support the implications that Hart and Wood (and others) draw from it, God would bear a relation to the world that is constitutive of his divine identity. I group these two together since Hart and Wood represent what appear to be the fundamentally logically exhaustive ways of pursuing this strategy in terms of either the divine nature or the persons. And their strategy is embraced by a family of theoretically similar contemporary proposals... (shrink)

The last generation of German Jewish philosophers—the best known (Buber, Rosenzweig, Baeck, Strauss, Scholem) and the less known (Breuer, Birnbaum, Klatzkin, Guttmann)—are thoroughly explicated here with generous primary text citations appearing in English for the first time.

The concept of the “End of History” was originally developed by G. W. F. Hegel in the Phenomenology of the spirit in 1806 (Hegel, 2018). The concept can be closely related to a utopia, the completion of the work of philosophers, and the creation of a perfect framework of the finished system of ideas. Hegel had a lot of influence on Western philosophy with the development of this idea and on Marx, who obviously thought of history in dialectic (...) terms. However, he developed the idea of “communism”, which would have been a state of humankind very similar to the concept of Hegel, with no class differences and no opiates of the people—and no place for further development (Marx & Engels, 2002). The “End of History” is based on this theoretical viewpoint that mankind has reached the final and most advanced form of societal development. However, the theorists and their intellectual followers both have to realize a painful way that the phenomenon can only be attained preliminarily. It proves to be a utopia. (shrink)

The history of the research on peptic ulcer disease is characterized by a premature abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis, which subsequently had its comeback, leading to the discovery of Helicobacter pylori—the major cause of the disease. In this paper we examine the received view on this case, according to which the primary reason for the abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis in the mid-twentieth century was a large-scale study by a prominent gastroenterologist Palmer, which suggested no bacteria could be found (...) in the human stomach. To this end, we employ the method of digital textual analysis and study the literature on the etiology of PUD published in the decade prior to Palmer’s article. Our findings suggest that the bacterial hypothesis had already been abandoned before the publication of Palmer’s paper, which challenges the widely held view that his study played a crucial role in the development of this episode. In view of this result, we argue that the PUD case does not illustrate harmful effects of a high degree of information flow, as it has frequently been claimed in the literature on network epistemology. Moreover, we argue that alternative examples of harmful effects of a high degree of information flow may be hard to find in the history of science. (shrink)

How has it been possible that the adoption of the passport – a measure closely associated to the Ancien Régime despotism – was generalized with the French Revolution? The article traces a genealogy of the identification regime that organized the government of mobility from within the liberal conceptual apparatus. The metamorphoses of police apparatus studied by social history are here considered in the light of constitutional debates of the Revolution. The concluding paragraph frames the political-economic implication of the emergence (...) of a modern rationality of identification in order to suggest a field of analysis and of historical periodization that I define «mobility regime». (shrink)

Autor článku se snaží dokázat, že při formulaci vhodných kritérií je možné (a užitečné) provést komparaci a hierarchizaci kultur. Práce se opírá o teoreticko-historickou metodu (Smith, Hume) i o metodologické přínosy Hayeka (kompozitivní metoda). V souladu s konceptem svobody, který je rozvíjen u Kanta, Hegela, Černého, Patočky, je v návaznosti na Fukuyamu koncipován "ideální typ" konce-vrcholu dějin. Je jím kombinace klasické liberální demokracie a kapitalismu volné tržní soutěže. Jak ukazuje historická evidence, směřování k tomuto vrcholu je inherentní tendencí samotného dějinného (...) pohybu. Pouze klasická liberální demokracie spojená s kapitalismem laissez-faire umožňuje v nejvyšší možné míře uspokojovat lidské potřeby a rozvíjet lidskou přirozenost; tento systém poskytuje prostor pro vrcholný stupeň individuální svobody, totožné se zákonem a zahrnující odpovědnost za právní a politický řád, který umožňuje spontánní fungování volné tržní soutěže. Takto formulovanou svobodu nalézáme pouze v západní kultuře. Na závěr práce je argumentována problematičnost integrace příslušníků kultury s nižší mírou svobody. (shrink)

More than forty years of commitment to nuclear weapons may have prepared Britain to take part in Armageddon, but not to defend itself against attack. What made British governments choose this path and how have they justified it? How have they responded to the moral questions it raises? Using material from recently-released official documents, Roger Ruston presents a moral history of British defence policy, from the 'lesson' of Appeasement to the nuclear modernizations of the eighties, and answers many of (...) the questions that governments have avoided. The book will be of great interest to defence historians, moralists, politicians, and general readers who need a clear account of their country's defence predicament as a basis from which to devise workable and morally acceptable alternatives. (shrink)

Alex Rosenberg’s latest book purports to establish that narrative history cannot have any epistemic value. Rosenberg argues not for the replacement of narrative history by something more science-like, but rather the end of histories understood as an account of human doings under a certain description. This review critiques three of his main arguments: 1) narrative history must root its explanations in folk psychology, 2) there are no beliefs nor desires guiding human action, and 3) historical narratives are (...) morally and ethically pernicious. Rosenberg’s book reprises themes about action explanation he first rehearsed 40 years ago, albeit with neuroscience rather than sociobiology now “preempting” explanations that trade on folk psychological notions. Although Rosenberg’s argument strategy has not altered, the review develops a number of reasons as to why his approach now lacks any plausibility as a strategy for explaining histories, much less a successful one. (shrink)

Given the history of the twentieth century, it is understandable that many contemporary philosophers—in the wake of Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche—have turned against Hegel’s seemingly unbridled optimism. As I will argue in this chapter, however, Hegel’s account of modern civilizations is much less optimistic than his account of the past. Hegel’s hesitation as to the capacity of modernity to resolve its immanent conflicts preeminently emerges in his account of the oppositions between poverty and wealth and between the state and (...) its citizens. In this chapter I will focus on passages from the Essay on Natural Law, the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, and the Philosophy of Right that express this hesitation and, hence, complicate the prevailing view of Hegel’s philosophy of world history. (shrink)

A popular saying attributed to Aristotle states that ‘medicine begins where philosophy ends’—but this principle does not seem entirely valid for the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, when medicine and philosophy were considered to be integral parts of the same branch of knowledge. For this reason, although today medicine and philosophy are clearly distinct disciplines, historians of ideas cannot study them entirely separately. Indeed, since the early modern era was a period of profound revision of knowledge, probably only a (...) truly interdisciplinary investigation can identify the conceptual shifts and transfers capable of reinstating medicine in its fundamental role in the development of civilisation and modern thought, in particular as a model of a rational knowledge aimed at improving the social good through a fitting interpretation of experience. This article intends to offer arguments in support of such a historiographical approach, and to illustrate certain interesting methodological ideas that emerge from a study in which the history of philosophy and history of medicine cross-pollinate. (shrink)

Baumard proposes that life history slowing in populations over time is the principal driver of innovation rates. We show that this is only true of micro-innovation rates, which reflect cognitive and economic specialization as an adaptation to high population density, and not macro-innovation rates, which relate more to a population's level of general intelligence.