Your session will time out in 5 minutes. Tip: Save your search strategies for future use at Recent Searches. Your APA PsycNET session timed out because it was inactive for 30 minutes. Ellis, Willis D. (Ed). (1938). A source book of Gestalt psychology. (pp. 210-216). London.

Retold of Kālajñāna mattu tatvabōdhāmr̥ta by Kaivāra Nārēyaṇa, active 18th century-19th century; on the philosophy of life. Kannada novels contributed to art and culture of Karnataka.

Exhaustive study of philosophy of Advaita Vedanta with reference to Bhāmatī of Vācaspatimiśra, active 976-1000.

Articles on the relevance of Islam and a comparative look with European philosophy in the contemporary world.

Based on a general thesis regarding the proper resolution of interpersonal conflicts, this paper suggests a normative framework for the distribution of scarce health resources. The proposed thesis includes two basic ideas. First, individual well-being is the fundamental value. Second, interpersonal conflicts affecting well-being should be resolved in light of several conceptions of fairness, reflecting the independent value of persons and the moral significance of responsibility of individuals for the existence of interpersonal conflicts. These ideas are elaborated in several principles (...) that are applied with respect to the distribution of scarce health resources. (shrink)

There is a controversy as to the moral status of an action in the face of uncertainty concerning a non-moral fact that is morally significant (according to an applicable moral standard): According to the objective conception, the right action is determined in light of the truth, namely the actual state of affairs (regarding the pertinent fact), whereas according to the subjective conception, the right action depends on the epistemic state of the agent, namely her (justified) belief (concerning the pertinent fact). (...) A similar debate concerns the law, with respect to uncertainty regarding a legally significant fact. In this paper, I argue that moral and legal normative concepts are ambiguous and include two aspects: The ideal aspect, which is concerned with the constitutive feature of the normative standard, and the pragmatic aspect, which determines the correct action under uncertainty . With regard to each aspect, a different conception is appropriate: The objective conception should govern the ideal aspect and the subjective conception the pragmatic aspect. And the relevant aspect (and therefore the appropriate conception) depends on the question under consideration regarding the pertinent normative standard: what is its constitutive feature or whether an action is right (according to the applicable normative standard) in the face of uncertainty. (shrink)

We study the Medvedev degrees of mass problems with distinguished topological properties, such as denseness, closedness, or discreteness. We investigate the sublattices generated by these degrees; the prime ideal generated by the dense degrees and its complement, a prime filter; the filter generated by the nonzero closed degrees and the filter generated by the nonzero discrete degrees. We give a complete picture of the relationships of inclusion holding between these sublattices, these filters, and this ideal. We show that the sublattice (...) of the closed Medvedev degrees is not a Brouwer algebra. We investigate the dense degrees of mass problems that are closed under Turing equivalence, and we prove that the dense degrees form an automorphism base for the Medvedev lattice. The results hold for both the Medvedev lattice on the Baire space and the Medvedev lattice on the Cantor space. (shrink)

According to a famous maxim, ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse. This maxim is supposed to represent both the standard and the proper rule of law. In fact, this maxim should be qualified in both respects: ignorance and mistake of law sometimes are, and (perhaps even more often) should be, excused. But this dual qualification only reinforces the fundamental and ubiquitous assumption which underlies the discussions of the subject, namely, that the only ground of exculpation relevant to ignorance (...) or mistake of law is excuse due to lack of (sufficient) culpability. The paper challenges this consensus. I argue that, according to the best conception of justification, ignorance and mistake, including ignorance and mistake of law, could be justified. Generally, ignorance and mistake are justified when based on a rational analysis of the information the agent has and should have. The conceptual possibility of justified ignorance or mistake is demonstrated mainly with respect to ignorance or mistake of law due to reliance on the guidance of public officials or private lawyers. (shrink)

The paper considers a hierarchical theory that combines concern for two values: individual well-being – as a fundamental, first-order value – and (distributive) fairness – as a high-order value that its exclusive function is to complete the value of individual well-being by resolving internal clashes within it that occur in interpersonal conflicts. The argument for this unique conception of high-order fairness is that fairness is morally significant in itself only regarding what matters – individual well-being – and when it matters (...) – in interpersonal conflicts in which constitutive aspects of individual well-being clash. Consequently, the proposed theory is not exposed to claim that fairness comes at the expense of welfare. This theory is considered within a consequential framework, based on the standard version and, alternatively, on a novel interpretation of consequentialism. Thus, it refutes the claim that consequentialism does not take the distinction between persons seriously. (shrink)

Study with reference to philosophy of Joseph F. Fletcher on christian ethics.

Definition and Development of Ethics The word 'ethics' comes from the Greek word 'ethos' which means customs or behaviour. The adjectival form in Greek is ...

We show that there exists a real α such that, for all reals β, if α is linear reducible to β then β≤Tα. In fact, every random real satisfies this quasi-maximality property. As a corollary we may conclude that there exists no ℓ-complete Δ2 real. Upon realizing that quasi-maximality does not characterize the random reals–there exist reals which are not random but which are of quasi-maximal ℓ-degree–it is then natural to ask whether maximality could provide such a characterization. Such hopes, (...) however, are in vain since no real is of maximal ℓ-degree. (shrink)

In light of the proposed expansion of eligibility for physician aid in dying (PAD) in Canada to people with psychiatric disorders, there is a new subset of individuals seeking PAD—those with poverty-induced depression. The dominant account defending the expansion is known as the “parity argument.” Defenders of the parity argument maintain that the expansion of PAD to those with psychiatric conditions is needed to reflect that the seriousness of a patient's suffering does not depend on the cause of that suffering. (...) Parity accounts, as they stand, would allow cases of poverty-induced depression to qualify. I raise a moral dilemma that the parity theorist must face considering this new subset of cases—expanding access to PAD, without adequate social protections, could produce more social inequality by aiming to reduce it. I propose six recommendations that policy-makers should consider before expanding PAD given these cases, social injustice, and the social determinants of mental health. (shrink)

Many think that equality is an intrinsic value. However, this view, especially when based on a consequential foundation, faces familiar objections related to the claim that equality is sometimes good for none and bad for some: most notably the levelling down objection. This article explores a unique (consequential) conception of equality, as part of a more general conception of fairness concerning the resolution of interpersonal conflicts, which is not exposed to these objections.

[Bd. 1] Lernen: die erste Station des Pfades.--[Bd. 2] Dienen: zweite Station des Pfades.--Bd. 3. Erkennen, Kämpfen und Siegen: dritte, vierte und fünfte Station.

In several papers, I have argued for a theory of distributive justice and considered its implications. This theory includes a principle of responsibility that was endorsed by others within an account of defensive force (self-defense and defense of others). Whitley Kaufman criticizes this account which he refers to as the "distributive justice theory of self-defense" (DJ theory). In this paper, I respond to this criticism. I argue that Kaufman presents the theory inaccurately, that his standard of evaluation of the theory (...) is inadequate and that his claim that the theory should be rejected is unconvincing. (shrink)