This paper describes a pilot study of a new model for narrative medicine training, “community-based participatory narrative medicine”, which centers on shared narrative work between healthcare trainees and patients. Nine medical students and eight patients participated in one of two, five-week-long pilot workshop series. A case study of participants’ experiences of the workshop series identified three major themes: the reciprocal and collaborative nature of participants’ relationships; the interplay between self-reflection and receiving feedback from others; and the clinical and pedagogical implications (...) of the CBPNM model. Principles and proposed outcomes of the CBPNM model are presented. (shrink)

Your session will time out in 5 minutes. Tip: Save your search strategies for future use at Recent Searches. Your APA PsycNET session timed out because it was inactive for 30 minutes. Ellis, Willis D. (Ed). (1938). A source book of Gestalt psychology. (pp. 210-216). London.

In light of the proposed expansion of eligibility for physician aid in dying (PAD) in Canada to people with psychiatric disorders, there is a new subset of individuals seeking PAD—those with poverty-induced depression. The dominant account defending the expansion is known as the “parity argument.” Defenders of the parity argument maintain that the expansion of PAD to those with psychiatric conditions is needed to reflect that the seriousness of a patient's suffering does not depend on the cause of that suffering. (...) Parity accounts, as they stand, would allow cases of poverty-induced depression to qualify. I raise a moral dilemma that the parity theorist must face considering this new subset of cases—expanding access to PAD, without adequate social protections, could produce more social inequality by aiming to reduce it. I propose six recommendations that policy-makers should consider before expanding PAD given these cases, social injustice, and the social determinants of mental health. (shrink)

According to influential view, using the criminal law against innocent actions or agents is wrong. In this paper, I consider four related arguments against this view: a debunking argument that suggests that the intuitive appeal of this view may be due to a conflation of different ideas; a counterexamples argument that points out that there are many cases in which using the criminal law against innocent actions ("non mala" actions that are not even "mala prohibita") or agents is justified; a (...) theoretical argument, according to which the force of the reasons for and against using the criminal law is a matter of degree and it is therefore implausible to hold that the latter always defeat the former; and an analogy argument, which holds that it is implausible to maintain that harming innocents is often justified in other contexts but (almost) never in the context of the criminal law. (shrink)

The main aim of Jeff McMahan's manuscript on the morality of war is to answer the question: why and accordingly when is it justified or permissible to kill people in war? However, McMahan argues that the same principles apply to individual actions and to war. McMahan rejects all doctrines of collective responsibility and liability. His claim is that every individual is liable for what he has done and not for the actions of others - even if both are part of (...) the same collective. Accordingly, McMahan challenges the common view that it is much easier to justify killing in war compared to killing in other contexts. Therefore, the scope of his project exceeds the context of war and extends to interpersonal conflicts between individuals that do not qualify as war. Many of McMahan's main claims are appealing. Particularly, appealing is his rejection of the collectivist account of war. Indeed, it seems that the simple story according to which people are responsible solely for their actions - rather than (also) to the actions of others - should be held on until a different, more complex, account of collective responsibility is put forward and its plausibility is explained. Therefore, the article focuses on the general principles advocated by McMahan with regard to the resolution of all interpersonal conflicts: Whether these conflicts are small scale or large scale (that is, whether few or a many people are involved in the conflict), and within the latter category of conflicts involving many people, whether these conflicts qualify as war (according to some standard) or not. (shrink)

[Bd. 1] Lernen: die erste Station des Pfades.--[Bd. 2] Dienen: zweite Station des Pfades.--Bd. 3. Erkennen, Kämpfen und Siegen: dritte, vierte und fünfte Station.

Definition and Development of Ethics The word 'ethics' comes from the Greek word 'ethos' which means customs or behaviour. The adjectival form in Greek is ...

Study with reference to philosophy of Joseph F. Fletcher on christian ethics.

One of the central normative questions regards a decision between conflicting moral values. A decision of this nature is often required in disciplines such as philosophy, economics and law. According to common terminology, a decision between conflicting values reflects a balance of values, considerations or interests. Several types of questions arise in this context. One category includes substantive questions: which values exist, which considerations should be derived from these values, what is the degree of importance of these considerations, and which (...) principles should be established for deciding between conflicting considerations? Another category includes institutional questions: which individual or body should decide normative questions, and should the normative nature of the decision be manifest or concealed? This paper is an abstract of a book that considers general aspects concerning these questions. (shrink)

The question of whether a mistake of law should negate or mitigate criminal liability is commonly considered to be pertinent to the culpability of the agent, often examined in light of the (epistemic) reasonableness of the mistake. I argue that this view disregards an important aspect of this question, namely whether a mistake of law affects the rightness of the action, particularly in light of the moral significance of the mistake. I argue that several plausible premises, regarding moral rightness under (...) uncertainty, the nature of law and the moral significance of law, entail a positive answer to this question. Specifically, I consider this argument: (1) one (subjective) sense of moral rightness depends on the (epistemically justified) belief of the agent concerning a non-moral fact that is morally significant; (2) a law is (partly) a non-moral fact; (3) a legal fact might be morally significant; (4) therefore an action that is compatible with an applicable moral standard, in light of the mistaken (justified) belief of the agent concerning a morally significant law, is (subjectively) right or less wrongful; (5) the (subjective) moral rightness of an action counts against criminal liability for this action; (6) therefore an action that is compatible with the applicable moral standard, in light of the mistaken (epistemically justified) belief of the agent, counts against criminal liability for the action if the law is morally significant. (shrink)