The effects of environmental degradation and climate change are propelling a discourse shift towards regenerative agriculture, yet understanding motivations for implementing regenerative practices on private agricultural lands is still a challenge. We study that challenge within the realm of regenerative ranching, a subcategory of regenerative agriculture. By examining the frequency of values articulated by respondents, a valuation typology stemming from 24 semi-structured interviews with ranchers in Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota is revealed. Instrumental valuations dominated in the studied region (...) in connection to regenerative ranching practices, although some respondents articulated relational and intrinsic valuations tied to their practices. While this study focuses on regenerative ranching, we posit that a better understanding of the interplay between diverse valuations as they relate to private land management practices is vital to promoting more resilient and thoughtful ecosystem governance. (shrink)

We perceive color everywhere and on everything that we encounter in daily life. Color science has progressed to the point where a great deal is known about the mechanics, evolution, and development of color vision, but less is known about the relation between color vision and psychology. However, color psychology is now a burgeoning, exciting area and this Handbook provides comprehensive coverage of emerging theory and research. Top scholars in the field provide rigorous overviews of work on color categorization, color (...) symbolism and association, color preference, reciprocal relations between color perception and psychological functioning, and variations and deficiencies in color perception. The Handbook of Color Psychology seeks to facilitate cross-fertilization among researchers, both within and across disciplines and areas of research, and is an essential resource for anyone interested in color psychology in both theoretical and applied areas of study. (shrink)

In light of the recent revival of interest for philosophy as a way of life, Cynicism has received relatively little attention. Classical cynicism, however, is a particularly rich and valuable school in this respect, offering a philosophy that is before anything else a way of life, combining philosophical reflection, a value system, and a practice of living. The present article articulates classical Cynicism as a philosophy as a way of life along these lines. Additionally, classical Cynicism offers a valuable contribution (...) both to current philosophical investigation and to philosophy’s contribution to the question of the good life. In particular, classical Cynicism gives a number of guidelines for a new cynicism, distinct from and regularly in opposition to common modern cynicism. (shrink)

Focusing on Heidegger and the work of Paul Klee, Schmidt pursues larger issues in the relationship between word, image, and truth.

This Perspective traces the evolution of certain central notions in the theory of Generative Grammar (GG). The founding documents of the field suggested a relation between the grammar, construed as recursively enumerating an infinite set of sentences, and the idealized native speaker that was essentially equivalent to the relation between a formal language (a set of well-formed formulas) and an automaton that recognizes strings as belonging to the language or not. But this early view was later abandoned, when the focus (...) of the field shifted to the grammar's strong generative capacity as recursive generation of hierarchically structured objects as opposed to strings. The grammar is now no longer seen as specifying a set of well-formed expressions and in fact necessarily constructs expressions of any degree of intuitive “acceptability.” The field of GG, however, has not sufficiently acknowledged the significance of this shift in perspective, as evidenced by the fact that (informal and experimentally-controlled) observations about string acceptability continue to be treated as bona fide data and generalizations for the theory of GG. The focus on strong generative capacity, it is argued, requires a new discussion of what constitutes valid empirical evidence for GG beyond observations pertaining to weak generation. (shrink)

Values that cannot be directly legislated by human courts, values by which we judge one another and ourselves.

This book offers a critical introduction to the work of American philosopher D. G. Leahy (1937-2014). Leahy's fundamental thinking can be characterized as an absolute creativity in which all creating is 'live' -- a happening occurring now that manifests a supersaturated polyontological actuality that is essentially created by the logic that characterizes it. Leahy leaves behind the categorial presuppositions of modern thought, eclipsing both Cartesian and Hegelian subjectivities and introducing instead an essentially new form of thinking founded in a nondual (...) logic of creation. The new thinking delineates the absolute unicity of existence as a creative interactivity beyond all traditional dichotomies (such as one vs. many, unity vs. plurality, identity vs. change): a fully "digitized" actuality that is nothing but newness, which inherently implies nothing but change. Through this new form of thinking, change itself is revealed to be the very essence of reality and mind. Any reader looking for a quantum leap beyond the thrall of modern and postmodern fixations is invited to hear and apprehend this new thinking that refuses to be conditioned by paradigms, categories, species, genera, walls, bridges, boundaries, or abstractions: an essentially free thinking that embodies creative novelty itself. (shrink)

Every student of the early history of mankind, and their numbers have greatly increased of recent years, must be well acquainted with the recent conflict between the advocates of diffusion in interpreting the origins and world-wide manifestations of civilization and those of independent development, or, in more exact terms, of the spontaneous generation of cultures. To an unbiassed observer of the evidence, it must also be a matter of astonishment that the ethnologists of the latter school have for so long (...) refused to admit a distribution of ideas, beliefs and customs which are not only of proved historical but daily and common occurrence. It is impossible to enter a library or a club, or to walk down Regent Street and look into the shop windows, without realizing that world-diffusion is the very stuff of civilized existence. It is impossible to travel the remoter regions of the globe to-day without being constantly reminded of London, Leeds and Manchester. Nobody, again,would dream of controverting the known phenomena of the spread of great religions, Christianity, Mohammedanism, Buddhism, from a single original centre. The school of independent development of cultures not merely ignores or twists to its own purposes a gigantic mass of evidence bearing upon the subject in dispute and capable of being interpreted in only one way; it displays a singular disregardof common sense and human nature. The innate conservatism of humanity, its readiness to live on the. (shrink)

On 5th June 1989 an unknown man stopped the leading tank in a column entering Tiananmen Square, Beijing. His ultimate fate is unknown. His courage reflects the dilemma of brave people faced by the force of authority. The rule of law attempts to control excess of authority, but is often ineffective and illusory. Realist jurisprudence acknowledges that the law is often flawed and unfairly administered and that the rule of law is an illusion. This book discusses the question what then (...) should the individual do? It suggests that ethical realism is a wise approach: acknowledging that in reality the law is flawed, but attempting when possible to do what ethics suggest, applying the classical concept of internal or virtue ethics. This approach has practical applications-- It would be ethical to have a 2 state solution in the Middle East as was resolved by the UN General Assembly in 1947; it would be ethical for the UK to remain in the EEA established by the Treaty of Rome after 48.7% of UK voters wanted to remain and when the 2016 referendum and 2017 legislation referred only to the EU. In the early 1960s I attended the realist jurisprudence lectures at Oxford and came away with a belief that the rule of law is an ideal rather than a reality but a belief that ethics encourage the individual to do what can be done in practice to alleviate failures of the rule of law. (shrink)

My dissertation is called Politically Engaged Wild Animals; in it, I suggest that wild animals live in a politicized world, which gives their behaviour unintended political meanings—if humans will listen appropriately. To arrive at this conclusion, I start with Dinesh Wadiwel's biopower critique according to which any proposals to conserve wilderness or protect wild animals, which relies on human representatives, suffer from a particular sort of risk, namely that of transforming the current overt domination into a neoliberal form of continued (...) human supremacy. I find this critique has traction against proposals like Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka's suggestion of Wild Animal Sovereignty. However, it has less traction against Anishinaabe legal traditions, which prioritize respect for wild animals and the ecosystems we share with them. In these legal systems, wild animals are not under the jurisdiction of human societies; they are in independent communities that are part of a shared interspecies world. Thinking of wild animal communities as independently entitled to share the land, water, and air with humans can highlight the interspecies political meanings of conflict between human society and wild animal communities. I suggest we can listen to the behaviour patterns of wild animal communities to reveal unintended political meaning. Further, researchers are already developing ways to better communicate with wild animals so we all might safely share contested spaces. The moral-political implications of these research projects are typically left in anthropocentric terms. In my view we should reframe this communication as a way of respecting the relationships we already have with wild animal communities. If we can communicate with them, negotiating mutually beneficial boundaries, then we ought to take this communication as a form of political participation. Wild animal communities are speaking for themselves, on land they share with humans, in a politicized world. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Modernism Postmodern Thought Law and Postmodernism The Postmodern State Conclusion References.

(1991). The importance of asking the right questions. Social Epistemology: Vol. 5, Social epistemology of the law, pp. 75-77. doi: 10.1080/02691729108578600.

In this work, our hypothesis is that the parody towards historiography and its textualities is the principal axis in Los Perros del Paraíso, by the Argentinian Abel Posse, considered by the critics as part of the New Latin-American historical novel. This textual feature allows questioning the historiographic story and articulating other possible visions of history. This parody is manifested through three mechanisms: 1) form, through which quotations and referents coincides, as well as notes, data and other elements usually found in (...) other formats than literature, i.e., text pretending veracity and non-fiction; 2) superposition of stories overlapping and co-occurring in opposition to the line and causality of the historical text; and 3) the subjective perspective of the narrator, who constantly comments events, thus opposing the historicist objectivity. (shrink)

Despite Albert Einstein’s claim that “God does not throw dice,” it is widely believed that quantum physics presents an intrinsically random universe. This conflicts with the theological view that nature operates in one and the same way, unless it be prevented as a result of divine providence. A proposed projection paradigm is based on respect for the integrity of each science. Apparent conflicts between science and theology may be resolved by the consistent application of the principles of science, each within (...) its valid domain. Using this approach, paradoxes are found to involve a covert Platonism among quantum theory’s interpreters. Rather than endorsing an interpretive hypothesis, this essay seeks to apply accepted physics to quandaries posed by quantum theory. (shrink)

Philosophical naturalists claim macroevolution shows order emerging by pure chance. This claim is incompatible with accepted physical and biological principles. The present state of the universe is implicit in its initial state and the laws ofnature. Logical principles essential to science require these laws to be maintained by a self-conserving reality identifiable as God. Further, the laws share a common dynamic with human committed intentions. Both are logical propagators seen to the intentional by theists and naturalists alike. Mechanism and teleology (...) project a single reality into different conceptual spaces. Statistically, evolution is only possible given predefined goals. For fitness to be explanatory, it must be prior to survival events, entailing immanent goals verified by convergent evolution, toolkit genes, and evolutionary stasis. Aristotle's falsifiable claims for teleology are confirmed by evolution. Evolution is not random, but fully intentional, evidencing mind in nature. (shrink)

I respond to Michał Chaberek’s and Robert A. Delfino’s criticisms of my argument that evolution is compatible with Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. Biological species, as secondary substances, are beings of reason founded in the natures of their instances. They are traceable to God’s creative intent, but not to universal exemplars. Aquinas teaches that concepts are derived from sensible accidents. Thus, evolution’s directed variation of such accidents will eventually require new species concepts. This accords with projective realism, which allows diverse, well-founded concepts based (...) on the multiple perspectives and conceptual spaces of knowing subjects. Charges that this is nominalism, not moderate realism, are rebutted; however, it is relativism because knowledge is a subject-object relation. Other metaphysical issues are considered. Chaberek’s thesis that species cannot evolve naturally fails because he: (1) reifies the species concept, (2) misrepresents the motivation, structure and conclusions of evolution, (3) confuses Aristotle’s four causes and (4) limits God’s creative omnipotence. Finally, Chaberek is out of step with contemporary theology. (shrink)

This is a work of constitutional theory that explores the nature of American constitutional interpretation through a reconsideration of the long-standing debate between the interpretive theories of originalism and nonoriginalism. The book presents the novel argument that a critique of the underlying premises of originalism dissolves not just originalism but nonoriginalism as well, which leads to the recognition that constitutional interpretation is already and always structured. By their fidelity to the Constitution, Americans are a textual people in that they live (...) in and through the terms of a fundamental text. On the basis of this central idea, the book presents a new understanding of constitutional interpretation and an innovative account of the democratic legitimacy and binding capacity of the Constitution. (shrink)

In the year 1471 a member of the Sorbonne, Guillaume Fichet, looking back on the history of what today we should call communication technology, divided it into three periods: antiquity , a subsequent period which we should identify as the Middle Ages , and a period just beginning . Just over five hundred years later an American scholar, Walter J. Ong, looking back on a longer historical span, divided it into orality, writing, printing, and electronic communications. No matter how much (...) these two figures may differ over details, they occupy a similar position: each stands at the start of a communications shift which has alerted him to changes in the past, and Ong claims explicitly that contrasts “between electronic media and print have sensitized us to the earlier contrast between writing and orality.” We do not have to go as far as Eric A. Havelock, who suggests that our new awareness can be precisely dated by a number of publications appearing in the annus mirabilis 1963 , in order to accept the general point that recent work has been stimulated by recent technology. (shrink)

It has been argued for example by Ingmar Persson, that genetic therapy performed on a conceptus does not alter the identity of the person that develops from it, even if we are essentially persons. If this claim is true then there can be person-regarding reasons for performing genetic therapy on a conceptus. Here it is argued that such person-regarding reasons obtain only if we are not essentially persons but essentially animals. This conclusion requires the defeat of the origination theory, which (...) says that personal identity is determined by the identity of the foetus from which one originates. It is argued that the origination theory is false in the special case relevant to performing genetic therapy on a conceptus for person-regarding reasons. (shrink)

Taking inspiration from the film Wit (2001), adapted from Margaret Edson’s (1999) Pulitzer Prize-winning play, this article explores the particularities of witnessing a cinematic cancer narrative juxtaposed with the author’s own cancer narrative. The analysis reveals the tenuous line between death and dying, illness and wellness, life and living and the resulting identities shaped in the process of understanding both from a personal and professional lens. By framing these representations of illness experience within the narrative constructions of drama, time, metaphor (...) and morality, the personal stories of intellectual knowledge converging with intimate and embodied knowing are revealed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Politics of Practical Reason: Why Theological Ethics Must Change Your Life by Mark RyanDavid ElliotThe Politics of Practical Reason: Why Theological Ethics Must Change Your Life Mark Ryan eugene, or: cascade books, 2011. 229 pp. $20.80If the spirited debate between Stanley Hauerwas and Jeffrey Stout remains front-page news in theological ethics, then Mark Ryan’s subtle and penetrating The Politics of Practical Reason will help keep it there. (...) Ryan argues that practical reason is the hinge of ethical thinking and that it is “political” in the sense of shaping the community or polis. Given this hinge, the pressing question is of course, “Whose practical reason?” To answer this, Ryan probes major contemporary ethicists from Charles Taylor to Alasdair MacIntyre, but the book always circles back to Hauerwas and Stout. Their debate is ultimately decided by proxy, through a mediating philosopher whose work on practical reason Ryan sees both as the gold standard and as the indispensable background for understanding Hauerwas. Expecting this to be MacIntyre, the reader may be surprised—and perhaps even convinced—that the philosopher who best explains and possibly vindicates Hauerwas is in fact Elizabeth Anscombe, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s protégé, close friend, and translator.The book opens with Anscombe’s Intention (1957), which Donald Davidson called “the most important treatment of action since Aristotle.” In it, Anscombe argued that intention presupposes desire and is declared in public language within a context of social practices presupposed for agency to be intelligible. The implication is that we form intentions as members of a community with a particular form of life sustained by social practices. With human desire as its motivating nisus, Ryan insists that intention “is part of the very form of practical reasoning, then, to be political” (144).Having retrieved Anscombe’s model of practical reason, Ryan examines the field of contemporary ethics to see who measures up. Charles Taylor fails to place agents in a particular community, locating us instead in that bloated abstraction called “modernity.” Ryan therefore concludes that Taylor’s is an “ethics for anybody,” which leaves the self finally disembodied (94–98). Stout fares little better due to his refrain that Hauerwas went astray when he abandoned justice talk. Ryan counters that Stout’s sort of justice should be abandoned; lacking a substantive vision of the good and a teleology of freedom, Stout’s justice is reckoned a blind guide who cannot see or say why the polis should pursue one end and not another. Hauerwas, on the other hand, specifies a particular polis within which practical reason can intelligibly function: the church. It has [End Page 218] a substantive vision of the good (i.e., the peaceable kingdom) located in a scriptural narrative displayed by social practices requiring formation in the virtues (119–21). Ryan therefore endorses Hauerwas’s politics of practical reason, indebted to MacIntyre and made possible by Anscombe.I see one lacuna in this otherwise excellent book. Ryan seemingly advocates a pragmatic model of practical reason that is wholly internal to the polis rather than grounded in “truths of human nature as such” (101). This makes Anscombe an uneasy ally. Her “Modern Moral Philosophy” famously proposed a retrieval of virtue that required an overhauled “account of human nature … and above all of human flourishing” (41). This move opened the door for ethical naturalism, perhaps even natural law—both of which Anscombe and the later MacIntyre endorse. But these look suspiciously like what Ryan calls an “ethics for anybody.” So in the end are Anscombe and MacIntyre turncoats, or do Hauerwas and Ryan not follow them far enough? This crucial question remains unanswered.Despite this wrinkle, Ryan’s book is the best intervention in the Hauerwas–Stout debate that we now have. It throws light on Hauerwas, challenges Stout, shows why Anscombe matters, and gives practical reason its generous due. Philosophically deft and charitable in tone, it deserves to be read and studied as a major contribution to the field.David ElliotUniversity of Notre DameCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)