Interacting with others frequently involves making common-sense inferences linking context, background knowledge, and beliefs to utterances in the dialogue. As language users we are generally good at this kind of dialogical reasoning, and might not even be aware we are involved in it while we engage in a conversation. However, sometimes it is not obvious how a particular contribution should be interpreted in terms of the underpinning assumptions warranting an inference. In dialogue involving participants who demonstrate atypical linguistic behavior, such (...) as patients with schizophrenia, the effects may be even more marked. (shrink)

The past two decades of psychoanalytic discourse have witnessed a marked transformation in the way we think about women and gender. The assignment of gender carries with it a host of assumptions, yet without it we can feel lost in a void, unmoored from the world of rationality, stability and meaning. The feminist analytic thinkers whose work is collected here confront the meaning established by the assignment of gender and the uncertainty created by its absence. The contributions brought together in (...) _Psychoanalytic Reflections on a Gender-free Case_ address a cross-section of significant issues that have both chronicled and facilitated the changes in feminist psychoanalysis since the mid 1980s. Difficult issues which have previously been ignored are considered first. The book goes on to address family perspectives as they interact and shape the child’s experience of growing up male or female. Other topics covered are the authority of personal agency as influenced by the language and theory of patriarchy, male-centred concepts that consistently define women as inferior, and the concept of gender as being co-constructed within a relationship. The gender-free case presented here will fascinate all psychoanalysts interested in exploring ways of grappling with the elusive nature of gender, as well as those studying gender studies. (shrink)

In this paper we treat humorous situations as a series of events underpinned by topoi, principles of reasoning recognised within a socio-cultural community. We claim that humorous effect in jokes and other discourse is often created by the juxtaposition of topoi evoked. A prerequisite for this is that there is a shift where the interpreter of the discourse updates their information state with regard to a second topos being evoked. This view of humour is consistent with an incremental analysis of (...) dialogue, and we therefore argue that interaction is central both for humour creation and interpretation. We point out some different ways in which topoi are juxtaposed in humorous dialogues as well as in jokes published in social media or in joke books, and take jokes from the coronavirus pandemic as an example because this makes lots of new topoi available and therefore offers the opportunity of creating novel jokes based on the juxtaposition of the new and existing topoi. We explore how the mechanisms of inference in dialogue can be applied to humour through the four elements from our title: old, new, borrowed and taboo. (shrink)

In 2008, the Minister of Health for Iceland issued a new regulation intended to govern assessment practices related to placement in nursing homes. One of the aims of the regulation was to ensure that those with the most severe need would have priority. This would be achieved, in part, by requiring older people to exhaust all available community‐based service options before an assessment for placement would even take place. The new regulation was received with some hostility and criticism on the (...) part of older people and their relatives, who described the changed expectations as ‘abandonment’ by the authorities. We present our analysis of these changes by examining how older people and families are reconfigured through the new policy and argue that this ‘new’ practice of de‐institutionalization is underpinned by a shifting epistemic and normative context that is working to create a new identity and a different way of life in advanced age in Iceland. The analysis has implications for other nations as well, as much policy related to older people is broadly informed by this idea that ‘home is best’, that is, the idea that more care simply needs to happen outside of institutional settings. (shrink)

An increase in the number of older people with dementia is currently a trend around the world. In low and middle countries, effective public health services are not yet well‐developed, and family care‐givers may be overwhelmed by the requirements of care. This paper has two purposes: to share findings from an ethnographic study about family dementia care practices in Brazil and to draw attention to the significance of the materiality of care practices in the family context. The study was conducted (...) in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. We describe the care trajectory of one family and, analysing data using the insights of Actor Network Theory, show the significance of objects in a networked relation of care. In particular, we show how incontinence products such as adult diapers assume different positions in the network, acting as either mediator or intermediary of care in relation to other elements of the network composed of family members and their living situation, the person with dementia herself, the doctor, and Brazilian health policies. Although the diaper is often seen as an ordinary object for care providers, its participation in a care network shapes relations, activating conflict, financial constraint, and disciplining the body of the person with dementia. (shrink)

This inaugural volume of the Journal of the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists aims with its Issue 1 to clarify methodological issues that emerge when we rediscover the history of women philosophers. It is devoted to the questions which go hand in hand with the rediscovery of the history of women philosophers and scientists, asking whether and how we should place these newly discovered texts within the traditional patriarchal context. We do not know yet whether women are making different (...) ways into canonical thought, or whether we should abandon the idea of canonical thought at all. Submissions that we received for the first call for papers are subsumed under the theme “Beyond Borders.” Each article deals in some way with the writing or rewriting of women’s history, filling in lapsus in the historical canons of philosophy and related disciplines, addressing the gendered political intellectual tradition from modern India, engaging with the works and ideas of women thinkers. The light-hearted title of Karen Green’s article belies the seriousness of the question it poses. In “The Human in Feminist Philosophy: Or Woman Is a Social Animal, I’m Not So Sure about Man”, Green questions the adequacy of the structuralist account of language after critically assessing its role in feminist theory since the 1970s. Green argues that the hegemony of structuralism is as much a Western hegemony as the Enlightenment tradition of a transcendent subject. Texts historically written and published by women provide the raw material for an archaeology of the female subject, which, Green argues, leads to the discovery and exploration of the female subject. She offers an initial sketch of the results of such an exploration, concluding that many male theorists have portrayed humans as inherently self-centred and egoistic, while most female philosophers have assumed that humans are inherently social. Laura Kotevska’s contribution “Writing Women into the History of Philosophy: Contextualism Re-Examined” examines the advantages and disadvantages of contextualism as used as a methodology. Philosophical works by women have been neglected by historians of philosophy until recent decades. When such works were discussed, it was usually in the context of male philosophers with whom a female philosopher was associated in some way. Kotevska explores how different options for a contextualist history of philosophy can help explain a woman’s involvement in philosophy, or how they can undermine her intellectual authority and cloud our understanding of her work. To avoid some of the epistemically damaging results that can arise when a woman’s work is placed in her patriarchal context, Kotevska concludes with three suggestions for writing and teaching works produced by women, suggestions informed by the methodological considerations addressed in the essay. Priyanka Jha’s contribution addresses “The Shaping of the ‘Political’: Gendered Intellectual History of Ideas in Modern India (1880s–1940s)”. Her premise is that in most societies, women’s thought has been reflected in a significant and robust ‘political’ tradition, that this tradition of women’s political thought is situated in a larger universe of ideas than is commonly thought. Women have been and continue to be important interlocutors in debates about concerns and values that are central to the human condition. However, the kind of centrality and attention that should have been given to this school of thought as a “political tradition” has either been barely noticed or marginalized in comparison to other ideational currents. This act is not peculiar to postcolonial societies like India but has a global resonance and a universal scope. There are very few women who have been active as political thinkers or political philosophers worldwide. This paper locates the gendered tradition of political intellectuals in modern India by examining the works and ideas of women thinkers. In the paper on “Women and Freedom of Canonical Thought: A Propaedeutics”, Christine Lopes starts from the observation that in male or patriarchal canonical thinking there is no unified image and representation of women. She uses this broad space of presentation and calls this “the ways of women”. At the same time, she notes that even today we do not know whether women will bring different ways or possibly femininely coherent ways to canonical thought, or whether we can create women’s canonical thought or abandon the idea of canonical thought. For all, therefore, it can be stated that we are given the freedom to judge canonical thinking, to include or exclude ourselves, to adapt or not. The paper discusses some basic epistemological assumptions about such freedom. Bodil Hvass Kjems begins her reflections on “The Inclusion of Women in the Curriculum of Philosophy: Challenges and Solutions” with the fact that recent decades have made accessible an overwhelming number of philosophical works by women, but that the original conflict is still present. The sheer abundance of material is far from being adequately reflected in the curricula of philosophy departments. It therefore raises the question, as many do, of what the best argumentative strategy would be to make such inclusion successful. In doing so, the author references proposals, such as those of Sarah Tyson (2014), to frame the debate in the following way. For the author, the question is whether misogyny is an intrinsic feature of the (Western) philosophical tradition or merely an unfortunate development. That is, whether the response to the integration of women’s texts is corrective or transformative to the dominant model. In doing so, it assumes that both strategies, regardless of the ontological status of the philosophical discipline, promote engagement with women’s work in ways that revolutionise contemporary philosophical practice. In her article “Privacy, Feminism, and Moral Responsibility in the Work of Elizabeth Lane Beardsley”, Julie van Camp looks at the work of an important moral philosopher, Elizabeth Lane Beardsley. The article highlights Beardsley’s philosophical contributions. Using Beardsley as a case study, van Camp points to more general problems in recognizing the work of women philosophers and ensuring their rightful place in our professional dialogue. Van Camp considers sociological and professional factors that may partly explain why the work of women philosophers has not always received the attention it seems to deserve in professional dialogue. The article concludes with suggestions about efforts we can make to address these problems, including the selection of readings for our courses and the sources we consult for our own research and writings, as well as the preservation of records of conferences and other public gatherings that honor women philosophers. (shrink)

Mary Ellen Waithe has put together another collection of essays on seventeen different women philosophers. In addition to serving as the general editor, Waithe authors lengthy chapters on Murasaki Shikibu, a Japanese literary writer; Heloise, a French writer on love and friendship; Oliva Sabuco de Nantes Barrera, a Spanish writer in natural philosophy; and a short summary chapter on Roswitha of Gandersheim, Christine Pisan, Margaret More Roper, and Teresa of Avila.

When someone says she believes that God exists, is she expressing the same kind of mental state as when she says she thinks that a lake bigger than Lake Michigan exists⎯i.e., does she refer to the same kind of cognitive attitude in both cases? Using evidence from linguistic corpora (Study 1) and behavioral experiments (Studies 2-4), the current work provides evidence that individuals typically use the word “believe” more in conjunction with statements about religious credences and “think” more in conjunction (...) with factual statements, pointing to two different understandings of claims made with these two terms. These patterns do not appear to reflect low-level differences based on the amount of consensus surrounding a particular claim, the extent to which the truth of a particular claim is known to the participant, or linguistic differences between religious and factual statements. We discuss implications of these findings for religious cognition (e.g., as supporting the theory that religious credences are qualitatively distinct from factual beliefs) as well as cognitive processes more broadly. Finally, we relate the present findings to prior theoretical work on differences between factual belief and religious credence. (shrink)

The concept of moral distress comes from nursing ethics, and was initially defined as ‘…when one knows the right thing to do, but institutional constraints make it nearly impossible to pursue the right course of action’. There is a large body of literature associated with moral distress, yet multiple definitions now exist, significantly limiting its usefulness. We undertook a systematic review of the argument-based bioethics literature on this topic as the basis for a critical appraisal, identifying 55 papers for analysis. (...) We found that moral distress is most frequently framed around individual experiences of distress in relation to local practices and constraints, and understood in terms of power relations and workplace hierarchies. This understanding is directly derived from, and often still seen as specific to, nursing. Frequently the perspective of the morally distressed individual is privileged. Understandings of moral distress have evolved towards an ‘occupational health approach’, with the assumption that moral distress should be measured and prevented. Counter-perspectives were identified, highlighting conceptual problems. Based on our review, we propose a redefinition of moral distress: ‘Ethical unease or disquiet resulting from a situation where a clinician believes they have contributed to avoidable patient or community harm through their involvement in an action, inaction or decision that conflicts with their own values’. This definition is specific enough for research use, anchored in clinicians’ professional responsibilities and concerns about harms to patients, framed relationally rather than hierarchically, and amenable to multiple perspectives on any given morally distressing situation. (shrink)

RésuméJ'ai soutenu dans un article de 1985 que s'il y avait des miracles, cela parlerait contre l'existence du Dieu judéo-chrétien. Dans son livre de 1988 sur le concept de miracle, Robert Larmer propose une critique de mes arguments. J'évalue ici la force de cette critique. Je montre que la redéfinition de «miracle» que propose Larmer est circulaire; que sa distinction est spécieuse entre violer une hi naturelle et la surmonter grâce à la création ou la destruction d'énergie par Dieu; et (...) que sa tentative de montrer que les miracles sont le produit d'un être rationnel, bienfaisant et tout-puissant est inadéquate. (shrink)

Humans can recollect past events in details and/or know that an object, person, or place has been encountered before. During the last two decades, there has been intense debate about how recollection and familiarity are organized in the brain. Here, we propose an integrative memory model which describes the distributed and interactive neurocognitive architecture of representations and operations underlying recollection and familiarity. In this architecture, the subjective experience of recollection and familiarity arises from the interaction between core systems and an (...) attribution system. By integrating principles from current theoretical views about memory functioning, we provide a testable framework to refine the prediction of deficient versus preserved mechanisms in memory-impaired populations. The case of Alzheimer's disease is considered as an example because it entails progressive lesions starting with limited damage to core systems before invading step-by-step most parts of the model-related network. We suggest a chronological scheme of cognitive impairments along the course of AD, where the inaugurating deficit would relate early neurodegeneration of the perirhinal/anterolateral entorhinal cortex to impaired familiarity for items that need to be discriminated as viewpoint-invariant conjunctive entities. The integrative memory model can guide future neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies aiming to understand how such a network allows humans to remember past events, to project into the future, and possibly also to share experiences. (shrink)

ExtractThe idea that all the entities in the world may be, for legal and moral purposes, divided into the two categories of ‘persons’ and ‘things’ comes down to us from the tradition of Roman law. In the law, a ‘person’ is essentially the subject of rights and obligations, while a thing may be owned as property. In ethics, a person is an object of respect, to be valued for her own sake, and never to be used as a mere means (...) to an end, while a thing has only a derivative value, and may be used as a means to some person's ends. This bifurcation is unfortunate because it seems to leave us with no alternative but to categorize everything as either a person or a thing. Yet some of the entities that give rise to the most vexing ethical problems are exactly the ones that do not seem to fit comfortably into either category. For various, different, kinds of reasons, it seems inappropriate to categorize a fetus, a non-human animal, the environment, or an object of great beauty, as a person, but neither does it seem right to say of such things that they are to be valued only as means.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.PERSONHOOD, ANIMALS, AND THE LAWVolume 12, Issue 34Christine M. KorsgaardDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175613000018Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. PERSONHOOD, ANIMALS, AND THE LAWVolume 12, Issue 34Christine M. KorsgaardDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175613000018Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. PERSONHOOD, ANIMALS, AND THE LAWVolume 12, Issue 34Christine M. KorsgaardDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175613000018Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation. (shrink)

This paper examines an application of epistemic injustice not fully explored in the literature. How does epistemic injustice function in broader contexts of relationships within countries between colonizers and colonized? More specifically, what can be learned about the ongoing structural aspects of hermeneutical injustice in Canada’s settler history of the forced assimilation of Indigenous peoples and the resultant erasing and marginalizing of Indigenous histories, languages, laws, traditions, and practices? In this paper, I use insights from Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (...) report to challenge dominant understandings of reconciliation, reciprocity, respect for agency, and the rule of law in settler nations. In its retrieval of the richness and diversity of Indigenous collective interpretive resources, both past and present, Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission draws on a broad and full account of relationships that have shaped Indigenous lives and communities, non-Indigenous lives and communities, the interactions of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples and communities, and the relationships of all of these to and through the state. (shrink)

In recent years, an increasingly assertive People’s Republic of China (PRC) leadership has sought to extend the PRC’s influence globally. To this end, it has developed diverse strategies ranging from soft power to more coercive means. The more visible strategies include the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese Dream, and ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy. At the soft power end of the spectrum, Chinese overseas students are at the nexus between two strategies of soft power – the Chinese diaspora and the internationalisation (...) of higher education. While there is an established literature analysing China’s soft power worldwide, relatively little has been done on the role of higher education, particularly where this concerns overseas Chinese students. The article will examine China’s use of overseas students to project its soft power. It then identifies the strategies that support this, viz. ideological and political education to prepare young people for this role and, once overseas, an appeal to a conception of the Chinese diaspora, as well as the organisations (e.g. embassies and student associations) that form potential channels to students and monitor and support them in their role. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 9, September 2019, Page 5-7.

This is a precious companion for all those who want to achieve a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics of innovation."--Roberto Verganti, author of "Design-Driven Innovation".

In this paper, I reframe the long-standing controversy between ‘psychological egoism’, which argues that human beings never perform altruistic actions, and the opposing thesis of ‘psychological altruism’, which claims that human beings are, at least sometimes, capable of acting in an altruistic fashion. After a brief sketch of the controversy, I begin by presenting some representative arguments in favour of psychological altruism before showing that they can all be called into question by appealing to the idea of an unconscious self-directed (...) motive. I will then point out that this argumentative strategy not only debunks the reasons for favouring psychological altruism, but also those for favouring psychological egoism; hence it is no use in settling the dispute between the two views. In the second part of the paper, I will try to break this deadlock by reframing the whole controversy, shifting it away from the concept of motive, towards the broader notion of motivation. As it turns out, this shift enables the debate to centre on altruistic emotions and their motivational power, thereby allowing evolutionary arguments to enter the debate and tilt the balance in favour of psychological altruism. (shrink)

At times the personal beliefs or values of graduate students in training programs for professional psychology can create complications in their providing therapy for certain patient populations. This issue has been brought to national attention recently through several prominent legal cases in which students have contested their expulsion from graduate programs due to their assertions that they were unable to treat clients in same-sex relationships because of their own religious beliefs. The goals of the current article are to review the (...) literature on values conflicts, provide an analysis of how portions of our professional Ethics Code directly relate to this issue, describe a developmentally sensitive theoretical framework that is designed to foster the growth of ethical reasoning over time, and provide a forum for trainee perspectives on this issue based on trainees’ responses to an ethical vignette describing an intern struggling with a values conflict. The trainee quotations are used to structure a discussion of practical recommendations for how to handle values conflicts within the context of training and clinical supervision in professional psychology. (shrink)

Now available in three thematic volumes, the second edition of _Moral Issues in Global Perspective_ is a collection of the newest and best articles on current moral issues by moral and political theorists from around the globe. Each volume seeks to challenge the standard approaches to morality and moral issues shaped by Western liberal theory and to extend the inquiry beyond the context of North America. Covering a broad range of issues and arguments, this collection includes critiques of traditional liberal (...) accounts of rights, justice, and moral values, while raising questions about the treatment of disadvantaged groups within and across societies affected by globalization. Providing new perspectives on issues such as war and terrorism, reproduction, euthanasia, censorship, and the environment, each volume of _Moral Issues in Global Perspective_ incorporates work by race, class, feminist, and disability theorists. In _Moral Issues_, the third of the three volumes, issues such as euthanasia and health care, reproductive issues, pornography and hate speech, animal rights, and environmental ethics are examined in the context of globalization and of differing social contexts and practices. Sixteen essays are new, one of which was written especially for this volume. _Moral Issues in Global Perspective_ is available in three separate volumes—_Moral and Political Theory_, _Human Diversity and Equality_, and _Moral Issues_. (shrink)

This paper sets out to examine the place of theory in preschool education, considering the theories to which practitioners and providers have access and which provide a rationale for everyday practices and shape the experiences of young children. The paper reflects the circumstances of preschool provision, practices and thinking in the UK in general and in Scotland in particular. The central argument is that while there may be little obvious recourse to theorising and limited exposure to explicit theory about children’s (...) development, learning and education, practitioners and those responsible for provision have tacit understandings or implicit theories which can be seen to shape their practices. The paper begins by considering the explicit theory which practitioners are exposed to through the development of practice guidance and professional education. This is followed by an examination of the explicit theories adopted from psychology and more recent theoretical developments which have their roots in other disciplines and perspectives. Some influences on practitioners’ implicit theories are discussed before considering two key aspects of the dominate consensus about good practice: that play is the medium through which children learn and that practice should be child-centred. The paper concludes with a discussion of the ‘identity’ of preschool education theory and the benefits of articulating the implicit theory and folk beliefs on which local practices are based. (shrink)

This Article examines normative arguments for legal pluralism in regulation. First I briefly set out what we know in fact about how plural regulatory orderings interact and compete with state agency regulatory action. Second, I sketch, and reject, a simple legal pluralist response to regulatory pluralism. In the third part of the Article I show that "responsive" and "reflexive" approaches to intentional pluralization in the design of law should be seen as providing different but complementary pictures of pluralized law. Finally (...) I argue that this pluralized view of law might provide us with the conceptual tools to identify a type of emergent, pluralistic law, without or beyond the state, which would be relevant to thinking about both transnational regulation and multiculturalism. (shrink)

A satisfactory sociology of markets requires that both order and disorder in markets be addressed, yet sociologists have seemed more concerned with theorizing market stability and order. Change, however, is too fundamental a part of markets to receive so little sociological attention. One perspective that provides a fertile ground for moving ahead with developing an agenda for studying both stability and change in markets is American pragmatist social theory. This article therefore examines the influence of a pragmatist viewpoint on two (...) broad modern theoretical approaches that have implications for the sociology of markets, one focused on stabilization processes, the other on institutional designs for promoting change. Most particularly, it draws on work carried out from a pragmatist viewpoint and illustrates a pragmatic approach to change in markets using the case of the EU’s Forest, Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) action plan and initiative. (shrink)

Born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland, John Rawls received his undergraduate and graduate education at Princeton. After earning his Ph.D. in philosophy in 1950, Rawls taught at Princeton, Cornell, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and, since 1962, at Harvard, where he is now emeritus. Rawls is best known for A Theory of Justice (1971) and for developments of that theory he has published since. Rawls believes that the utilitarian tradition has dominated modern political philosophy in English-speaking countries because its critics (...) have failed to develop an alternative social and political theory as complete and systematic. Rawls's aim is to develop such an alternative: a contractarian view of justice, derived from the tradition of Locke, Rousseau, and especially Kant. Rawls carries social contract theory to a "higher order of abstraction" by viewing the principles of justice themselves as the objects of a social contract. Justice is the solution to a problem, which arises in this way: Society, as it is conceived in a liberal democracy, is a cooperative venture between free and equal persons for their mutual advantage. Individuals participate in it in order to implement their conceptions of the good life. Cooperation makes a better life possible for everyone by increasing the stock of what Rawls calls "primary goods" - things which it is rational to want whatever else you want, because they are required for any conception of a good life. Primary social goods include rights, liberties, powers, opportunities, income, wealth, and the social bases of self-respect. But society is also characterized by conflict, since people disagree not only about how its benefits and burdens should be distributed, but also about conceptions of the good. Principles of justice are used to evaluate the distributions of benefits and burdens and the institutions which effect them. Rawls's idea is to identify an acceptable conception of justice by asking what principles it would be reasonable for the members of society to agree to, which is to say, what principles would be fair.. (shrink)

ago that thinking (along with speaking and acting) “like a woman” was taken as a matter of shame and weakness. The phrase remains an insult to any man who is accused of being “like a woman” in any respect. But the only reason the phrase ...

The article attempts to determine whether aristotle's conception of epideictic rhetoric included not only display of the orator's powers but also the functions of judgment and comprehension. It is argued that the term "theoria" or "observation" implies judgment and comprehension as well as perception as the function of epideictic, Therefore paralleling the faculty of practical understanding as described in the "nicomachean ethics". The result is a view of epideictic as an intellectual process through which the audience assesses the speaker's ability (...) to make judgments and, In turn, Receives critical insight into the praiseworthy or blamable object. (shrink)

Conscience is the psychological faculty by which we aware of and respond to the moral character of our own actions. It is most commonly thought of as the source of pains we suffer as a result of doing what we believe is wrong --- the pains of guilt, or “pangs of conscience.” It may also be seen, more controversially, as the source of our knowledge of what is right and wrong, or as a motive for moral conduct. Thus a person (...) who is motivated to act on principle is said to act “conscientiously.” These terms come from the Latin “conscientia,” a direct translation of the Greek “syneidesis.” This ranges in meaning from being aware of something to “knowing something in common with” someone. Knowing something in common with someone can mean sharing his secret, and this puts you in a position to serve as a witness against him. Thus the term came to have a judicial use, to describe one who could bear witness. In certain contexts, “syneidesis” came to mean a state of knowing in common with oneself, and so of bearing witness against oneself. Although these terms appear in Stoic and Epicurean works, conscience did not receive extensive philosophical treatment until the Medieval period, when treatises on conscience became standard. Medieval philosophers distinguished two aspects of conscience, “conscientia” and “synderesis.” Roughly, “synderesis” refers to the ineradicable and infallible basis of conscience in human nature, while “conscientia” refers to the more particular judgments we make about our actions. There are various ways of specifying the two ideas further. In Thomas Aquinas’s account, which became standard, synderesis grasps the basic moral principles which are the first premises of practical reasoning, while conscientia is the conclusion, the act of judging that one ought to perform a particular action. (shrink)

This ground-breaking book considers current perspectives on special education reform in the Asia-Pacific region. It has a major focus on a new era of special education, and how this relates to education reform towards inclusive education. With major changes being proposed under current educational reform and confusion as to how to instigate these measures, this book provides ways to better prepare teachers. It is helpfully divided into three different sections of education reform: "Education Reform in the Asia-Pacific region" reviews broad (...) trends and issues in special education across the region, including Taiwan, Korea, Australia, India, China and Hong Kong. "Preparing Teachers to work in Inclusive Classrooms" focuses on curricula and pedagogical practices for teacher education. This section considers different approaches to preparing teachers such as cross-categorical, collaborative, innovations, and the impact of teachers’ attitudes, perceptions and concerns on inclusion. "Effective Special & Inclusive Practices" draws upon evidence–based research to provide best practice models to assist in developing inclusive school communities. Each section addresses a list of objectives and questions; suggests best practice pedagogy; and concludes with a support section with useful websites and suggested professional development activities. This book will interest teachers, teacher educators, university lecturers in education and post graduate students. (shrink)

La direction générale des finances publiques a mis en place un dispositif interne de médiation pour aider les équipes de travail à résoudre des situations de conflits relationnels. Conçu comme un outil managérial, dans le respect de la déontologie de la médiation, il permet d'apaiser les tensions par une action plurielle et collective au sein de l'institution.

One of the most‐exciting and controversial discoveries of the last decade has been the isolation of embryonic stem cells from human embryos. The capacity of these cells to form all somatic cell types in the human body has captured the imagination of researcher and clinician alike, the perspectives that they represent for cell replacement therapies in multiple chronic disorders being used to justify the use of embryos for this purpose. However, there is a gradual realization that cell therapies are in (...) the far future and some find that the other, more immediately applicable, types of research give less justification for the use of embryos. Here, cardiomyocytes derived from human embryonic stem cells are discussed. The research opportunities created by having human heart cells available routinely in the laboratory are explored and the types of questions that can be addressed are placed in the context of alternative cell and animal models. BioEssays 29:572–579, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)