Mimmo Paladino’s artistic research is characterized by an interest in the language and the relationship between “individual” and “community”. The idea of “individual” Paladino focuses in his work on is placed in the Mediterranean culture, and carries with itself the request of social emancipation — that can be ascribable to some Marxist topics — and the faith in the magical power. Along this route Paladino meets Ernesto De Martino’s South and Magic, Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévi-Strauss’s works. With the same (...) naturalness he makes coincide his sign with those of Matisse and Beuys, overlaps conceptually Spinoza to Jarry, Giordano Bruno to Beuys by getting the common trait in the transgressive dimension. It would be misleading trying to get a unitary route at all costs because only in the idea of the “encounter” apparently causal, that recalls the impracticable and audacious routes of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, we can get the meaning of the Paladino’s contaminations with philosophy. (shrink)

What role does habit formation play in the development of sport skills? We argue that motor habits are both necessary for and constitutive of sensorimotor skill as they support an automatic, yet inherently intelligent and flexible, form of action control. Intellectualists about skills generally assume that what makes action intelligent and flexible is its intentionality, and that intentionality must be necessarily cognitive in nature to allow for both deliberation and explicit goal-representation. Against Intellectualism we argue that the habitual behaviours that (...) compose skilful action are accompanied by their specific, non-cognitive form of intentionality: this is motor intentionality, which is purposive and adaptive while involving no explicit deliberation or goal representation. Our account of habit based on Motor Intentionality explains why the formation of motor habits can sometimes act as the sole basis of skilful acquisition: Motor Intentionality is inherently purposeful because it is an embodied source of sensorimotor anticipation, pre-reflective motivation, and pragmatic know-how. Skill development through exercise always builds on a motor intentional component even when it is guided by Deliberate Practice to the point that, pace Intellectualism, Deliberate Practice is disclosed, not constrained, by habit formation. As suggested by the fact that repetitive exercises can play a major role in the development of flexible and intelligent sport skills, automatism is not a drawback for strategic control and improvisation but rather their pragmatic foundation. (shrink)

Skilful expertise is grounded in practical, performative knowledge-how, not in detached, spectatorial knowledge-that, and knowledge-how is embodied by habitual dispositions, not representation of facts and rules. Consequently, as action control is a key requirement for the intelligent selection, initiation, and regulation of skilful performance, habitual action control, i.e. the kind of action control based on habitual dispositions, is the true hallmark of skill and the only veridical criterion to evaluate expertise. Not only does this imply that knowledge-that does not make (...) your actions more skilful, but it also implies that it makes them less skilful. This thesis, that I call Radical Habitualism, finds a precursor in Hubert Dreyfus. His approach is considered extreme by most philosophers of skill & expertise: an agent –says Dreyfus– does not perform like an expert when they lack the embodied dispositions necessary to control their action habitually or when they stop relying on such dispositions to control their actions. Thus, one cannot perform skilfully if their actions are guided by representations (isomorphic schemas, explicit rules, and contentful instructions), as the know-that that they convey disrupts or diminishes the agent’s habitual engagement with the task at hand. In defence of Radical Habitualism, I will argue that only the contentless know-how embedded in habitual dispositions fulfils (i) the genetic, (ii) the normative, and (iii) the epistemic requirements of skilful performance. I will examine the phenomenological premises supporting Dreyfus’ approach, clarify their significance for a satisfactory normative and explanatory account of skilful expertise, and rebut the most common objections raised by both intellectualists and conciliatory habitualists, concerning hybrid actions guided by a mix of habitual and representational forms of control. In revisiting Dreyfus anti-representationalist approach, I will particularly focus on its epistemological implications, de-emphasizing other considerations related to conscious awareness. (shrink)

On a Dreyfusian account performers choke when they reflect upon and interfere with established routines of purely embodied expertise. This basic explanation of choking remains popular even today and apparently enjoys empirical support. Its driving insight can be understood through the lens of diverse philosophical visions of the embodied basis of expertise. These range from accounts of embodied cognition that are ultra conservative with respect to representational theories of cognition to those that are more radically embodied. This paper provides an (...) account of the acquisition of embodied expertise, and explanation of the choking effect, from the most radically enactive, embodied perspective, spelling out some of its practical implications and addressing some possible philosophical challenges. Specifically, we propose: an explanation of how skills can be acquired on the basis of ecological dynamics; and a non-linear pedagogy that takes into account how contentful representations might scaffold skill acquisition from a radically enactive perspective. (shrink)

This paper motivates the idea that social robots should be credited as moral patients, building on an argumentative approach that combines virtue ethics and social recognition theory. Our proposal answers the call for a nuanced ethical evaluation of human-robot interaction that does justice to both the robustness of the social responses solicited in humans by robots and the fact that robots are designed to be used as instruments. On the one hand, we acknowledge that the instrumental nature of robots and (...) their unsophisticated social capabilities prevent any attribution of rights to robots, which are devoid of intrinsic moral dignity and personal status. On the other hand, we argue that another form of moral consideration—not based on rights attribution—can and must be granted to robots. The reason is that relationships with robots offer to the human agents important opportunities to cultivate both vices and virtues, like social interaction with other human beings. Our argument appeals to social recognition to explain why social robots, unlike other technological artifacts, are capable of establishing with their human users quasi-social relationships as pseudo-persons. This recognition dynamic justifies seeing robots as worthy of moral consideration from a virtue ethical standpoint as it predicts the pre-reflective formation of persistent affective dispositions and behavioral habits that are capable of corrupting the human user’s character. We conclude by drawing attention to a potential paradox drawn forth by our analysis and by examining the main conceptual conundrums that our approach has to face. (shrink)

Autonomous weapon systems could in principle release military personnel from the onus of killing during combat missions, reducing the related risk of suffering a moral injury and its debilita...

The first systematic collaboration between cognitive scientists and sports psychologists considers the mind–body relationship from the perspective of athletic skill and sports practice. This landmark work is the first systematic collaboration between cognitive scientists and sports psychologists that considers the mind–body relationship from the perspective of athletic skill and sports practice. With twenty-six chapters by leading researchers, the book connects and integrates findings from fields that range from philosophy of mind to sociology of sports. The chapters show not only that (...) sports can tell scientists how the human mind works but also that the scientific study of the human mind can help athletes succeed. Sports psychology research has always focused on the themes, notions, and models of embodied cognition; embodied cognition, in turn, has found striking confirmation of its theoretical claims in the psychological accounts of sports performance and athletic skill. Athletic skill is a legitimate form of intelligence, involving cognitive faculties no less sophisticated and complex than those required by mathematical problem solving. After presenting the key concepts necessary for applying embodied cognition to sports psychology, the book discusses skill disruption ; sensorimotor skill acquisition and how training correlates to the development of cognitive faculties; the intersubjective and social dimension of sports skills, seen in team sports; sports practice in cultural and societal contexts; the notion of “affordance” and its significance for ecological psychology and embodied cognition theory; and the mind's predictive capabilities, which enable anticipation, creativity, improvisation, and imagination in sports performance. Contributors Ana Maria Abreu, Kenneth Aggerholm, Salvatore Maria Aglioti, Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza, Duarte Araújo, Jürgen Beckmann, Kath Bicknell, Geoffrey P. Bingham, Jens E. Birch, Gunnar Breivik, Noel E. Brick, Massimiliano L. Cappuccio, Thomas H. Carr, Alberto Cei, Anthony Chemero, Wayne Christensen, Lincoln J. Colling, Cassie Comley, Keith Davids, Matt Dicks, Caren Diehl, Karl Erickson, Anna Esposito, Pedro Tiago Esteves, Mirko Farina, Giolo Fele, Denis Francesconi, Shaun Gallagher, Gowrishankar Ganesh, Raúl Sánchez-García, Rob Gray, Denise M. Hill, Daniel D. Hutto, Tsuyoshi Ikegami, Geir Jordet, Adam Kiefer, Michael Kirchhoff, Kevin Krein, Kenneth Liberman, Tadhg E. MacIntyre, Nelson Mauro Maldonato, David L. Mann, Richard S. W. Masters, Patrick McGivern, Doris McIlwain, Michele Merritt, Christopher Mesagno, Vegard Fusche Moe, Barbara Gail Montero, Aidan P. Moran, David Moreau, Hiroki Nakamoto, Alberto Oliverio, David Papineau, Gert-Jan Pepping, Miriam Reiner, Ian Renshaw, Michael A. Riley, Zuzanna Rucinska, Lawrence Shapiro, Paula Silva, Shannon Spaulding, John Sutton, Phillip D. Tomporowski, John Toner, Andrew D. Wilson, Audrey Yap, Qin Zhu, Christopher Madan. (shrink)

The current status of Beilock and Carr's "execution focus" theory of choking under pressure in performance of a sensorimotor skill is reviewed and assessed, mainly from the perspective of cognitive psychology, and put into the context of a wider range of issues, attempting to take philosophical analysis into account. These issues include other kinds of skills, pre-performance practice, post-performance evaluation and repair, and integrating new and creative achievements into repertoires of heavily practiced routines. The focus is on variation in the (...) demand for reflection versus automaticity across the full gamut of learning and experience, not just game-time performance. Though automaticity remains important and there are many circumstances in which being "in the zone" is good whereas “execution focus” can do harm, it appears that reflective action deserves just as much a place at the performance table as does unreflective action. (shrink)

"Timed to publish in advance of the Joker sequel Joker: Folie a Deux, the volume will have at least two sections will be dedicated to chapters that take up questions raised by 2019's Joker and the Todd Phillips depiction in general. Chapters will also be sought on the many other iterations of the Joker. A number of high-profile philosophers have already written insightful pieces on Joker and the volume editors hope to solicit new essays from some of them. Joker is (...) a symbolically rich and philosophically fascinating character. With his enigmatic motivations, infectious irreverence, and almost selfless devotion to evil, Joker's psychology is a puzzle that provokes a host of philosophical questions, ranging across issues of morality, human nature, the metaphysics of freedom, the nature of evil, political and social philosophy, aesthetics, and more"--. (shrink)

A comparative study of Charles S. Peirce’s and Ernst Cassirer’s triadic phenomenological theories of categories. Both Peirce and Cassirer developed, in a mature stage of their philosophical reflection, phenomenological theories on three fundamental categories: Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are the names of Peirce’s categories,while Cassirer’s ‚basis phenomena‘ are denominated with the personal pronouns Ich, Du and Es. Prompted by John Michael Krois’s suggestion of an indirect similarity between the two phenomenological theories of categories, this essay aims to find a possible (...) justification for this convergence, thereby reconstructing its metaphysical and epistemological grounding. The study is divided into four sections. In the first part, Peirce’s and Cassirer’s theories of knowledge are compared as expressions of a similar symbolic conception of thought. Secondly, I offer a parallel account of the reasons which led the two philosophers toward a more metaphysical grounding of their symbolic theories, focusing in particular on the relevance of the problem of life in both views. In the third section, I concentrate on the content of the two phenomenological theories and argue that they both represent an attempt to conciliate the tension between the transcendental premises of their symbolic theories of knowledge and the living character of experience. Finally, the reflections of Goethe and Schiller are presented as a possible source of Peirce’s and Cassirer’s triadic phenomenological theories. (shrink)

This article distinguishes three archetypal ways of articulating spatial cognition: (1) via metric representation of objective geometry, (2) via somatosensory constitution of the peripersonal environment, and (3) via pragmatic comprehension of the finalistic sense of action. The last one is documented by neuroscientific studies concerning mirror neurons. Bio-robotic experiments implementing mirror functions confirm the constitutive role of goal-oriented actions in spatial processes.

Spero che mi si perdonerà lo slancio con cui, in queste pagine, sottolineerò gli aspetti militanti del pensiero neurofenomenologico, concedendomi toni che potrebbero apparire enfatici o retorici, e che potrebbero forse non rispecchiare la sensibilità degli altri contributori di questo volume, ma che ritengo più che mai opportuno usare, anche per onestà intellettuale, essendo implicitamente chiamato a dichiarare, in questa curatela, la mia opinione sulla funzione reale della neurofenomenologia...

We call those gestures “instrumental” that can enhance certain thinking processes of an agent by offering him representational models of his actions in a virtual space of imaginary performative possibilities. We argue that pointing is an instrumental gesture in that it represents geometrical information on one’s own gaze direction, and provides a ritualized template for initiating gaze coordination and joint attention. We counter two possible objections, asserting respectively that the representational content of pointing is not constitutive, but derived from language, (...) and that pointing directly solicits gaze coordination, without representing it. We consider two studies suggesting that attention and spatial perception are actively modified by one’s own pointing activity: the first study shows that pointing gestures help children link sets of objects to their corresponding number words; the second, that adults are faster and more accurate in counting when they point. (shrink)

Le thème de la « relation personnelle à Dieu » peut à la fois être approché comme un lieu théologique parmi d’autres et comme une condition de l’exercice théologique en tant que tel. Cet article propose d’explorer au niveau doctrinal la relation entre ces deux aspects de la « relation personnelle à Dieu ». Il effectue d’abord un rappel des conditions contemporaines du travail de la théologie systématique comme herméneutique du discours religieux. Dans un second temps, il situe la place (...) de la « relation personnelle à Dieu » dans la dogmatique. Finalement, il présente le statut et la place de la « relation personnelle à Dieu » pour l’exercice contemporain de la théologie à partir de trois figures théologiques – la prière, l’amour et le témoignage – sans nier la brisure qui traverse l’existence humaine. (shrink)

Presents a metaphysical foundation for ethics grounded in non-relative, personalist values that can be communicated cross-culturally. Examines the philosophical bases of ethical criteria and applies them to issues in medical practice ranging from genetic engineering to euthanasia.

This document describes the technique and technology currently used to apply cryosurgery, a technic based on low temperatures for medical purposes that allows the controlled destruction of pathological cells and tissues. Cryosurgery is an effective and innocuous process that is painless, safe and economical, applied to multiple specialities in which it provides alternatives to its traditional methods. A search was carried out for articles and bibliographic reviews referring to Cryosurgery and from whose information this technical note was obtained. Research on (...) the application of Cryosurgery presents solid evidence of its benefits. Therefore, it has been used in several countries and health campaigns, showing excellent results, so it is advisable to implement it in health systems. (shrink)

This study examines the problem of belief revision, defined as deciding which of several initially accepted sentences to disbelieve, when new information presents a logical inconsistency with the initial set. In the first three experiments, the initial sentence set included a conditional sentence, a non‐conditional (ground) sentence, and an inferred conclusion drawn from the first two. The new information contradicted the inferred conclusion. Results indicated that conditional sentences were more readily abandoned than ground sentences, even when either choice would lead (...) to a consistent belief state, and that this preference was more pronounced when problems used natural language cover stories rather than symbols. The pattern of belief revision choices differed depending on whether the contradicted conclusion from the initial belief set had been a modus ponens or modus tollens inference. Two additional experiments examined alternative model‐theoretic definitions of minimal change to a belief state, using problems that contained multiple models of the initial belief state and of the new information that provided the contradiction. The results indicated that people did not follow any of four formal definitions of minimal change on these problems. The new information and the contradiction it offered was not, for example, used to select a particular model of the initial belief state as a way of reconciling the contradiction. The preferred revision was to retain only those initial sentences that had the same, unambiguous truth value within and across both the initial and new information sets. The study and results are presented in the context of certain logic‐based formalizations of belief revision, syntactic and model‐theoretic representations of belief states, and performance models of human deduction. Principles by which some types of sentences might be more “entrenched” than others in the face of contradiction are also discussed from the perspective of induction and theory revision. (shrink)

I examine two explanatory models of choking: the representationalist model and the anti-representationalist model. The representationalist model is based largely on Anderson's ACT model of procedural knowledge and is developed by Masters, Beilock and Carr. The antirepresentationalist model is based on dynamical models of cognition and embodied action and is developed by Dreyfus who employs an antirepresentational view of know-how. I identify the models' similarities and differences. I then suggest that Dreyfus is wrong to believe representational activity requires reflection and (...) attention. I also argue that the representationalist model of choking is preferable, since some embodied actions require appeals to representations, something not available to Dreyfus's anti-representational model. (shrink)

There is a widespread view that well-learned skills are automated, and that attention to the performance of these skills is damaging because it disrupts the automatic processes involved in their execution. This idea serves as the basis for an account of choking in high pressure situations. On this view, choking is the result of self-focused attention induced by anxiety. Recent research in sports psychology has produced a significant body of experimental evidence widely interpreted as supporting this account of choking in (...) certain kinds of complex sensorimotor skills. We argue against this interpretation, pointing to problems with both the empirical evidence and the underlying theory. The experimental research fails to provide direct support for the central claims of the self-focus approach, contains inconsistencies, and suffers from problems of ecological validity. In addition, qualitative studies of choking have yielded contrary results. We further argue that in their current forms the self-focus and rival distraction approaches both lack the theoretical resources to provide a good theory of choking, and we argue for an expanded approach. Some of the elements that should be in an expanded approach include accounts of the features of pressure situations that influence the psychological response, the processes of situation appraisal, and the ways that attentional control can be overwhelmed, leading to distraction in some cases, and in others, perhaps, to damaging attention to skill execution. We also suggest that choking may sometimes involve performance-impairing mechanisms other than distraction or self-focus. (shrink)

Di fronte alla varietà di espressione artistiche che si pongono, o si sono poste, sotto il sigillo del Postmoderno, si vuole qui indagare se esso sia un variegato, e generico, movimento artistico sviluppatosi, a partire dagli anni Settanta, nel design, nell’architettura, nell’urbanistica, nel cinema o comunque nella generalità di quelle che un tempo erano chiamate “arti figurative” oppure un autonomo stile, con i suoi propri e specifici connotati. Il punto di partenza è, in ogni caso, che il Postmoderno è una (...) strategia artistica associata a idee “radicali” e che, contrapponendosi, almeno implicitamente, al “Modernism”, ne spezza il progressivo universalismo adottando strategie legate alla parodia, al pastiche, alla citazione, in modo da reinventare il passato. Spezzare la narrazione del Moderno genera progressivamente, anche se non con evidenza, un nuovo “stile”, che pervade il mondo delle arti e della comunicazione. La conclusione, tuttavia, è che il Postmoderno non possa definirsi solo come “rottura” dei fondamenti dei vari “modernismi”. Al contrario, se se ne vuole comprendere un senso teorico e artistico, bisogna dedurre che esso si pone nella strategia del Moderno, inteso come pluralità dialogica, dove privilegiare una voce piuttosto che un'altra è solo il segno della scelta di una specifica curvatura interpretativa, non di una verità che si afferma a scapito di altre. La difficoltà di restringere questo mobile e variegato insieme in una sola immagine, induce così alla certezza che, proprio in virtù delle sue irrisolte aporie, l’epoca in cui viviamo sia nata qui: la genesi e lo sviluppo del Moderno ha mostrato che non vi è spazio per un’astratta purezza e che meccanico e organico, ragione e retorica, logica ed estetica, storico e antistorico, pur opposti, e per nulla dialettici, in una società che non è, e non sarà mai, di “puri spiriti”, hanno prodotto quella complessità che anche oggi attraversiamo, “nominandola” in vari modi. (shrink)

Il saggio discute la lettura proposta da Francesco Novati della figura di san Francesco d’Assisi, a partire dalla interpretazione di quelle di Dante e Giotto. Alla luce dei rapporti con Gabriele d’Annunzio, la lettura novatiana di Francesco rivela una prospettiva che tende a offrire una visione estetizzante, dannunziana e decadente, immagine della modernità e non sempre aderente al messaggio originario. In questo modo Francesco diviene sostenitore di un progetto di riforma interno alla Chiesa che, con spirito dannunziano, supera il dualismo (...) tra materia e spirito per arrivare quasi a un elogio dell’immanenza. Attraverso una sorta di mitizzazione della figura di Francesco, Novati parla del proprio tempo più che di un personaggio vissuto nel passato. The essay discusses Francesco Novati’s reading of the figure of St. Francis of Assisi, starting from the interpretation of those of Dante and Giotto. In the light of the relationship with Gabriele d’Annunzio, the Novati’s reading of St. Francis reveals a perspective that tends to offer an aestheticising view, which is “dannuntian” and decadent, image of modernity that not always adheres to the original message. In this way, St. Francis purposes an inside reform project of the Church, which, with a “dannuntian” spirit, goes beyond the matter-spirit dualism in order to arrive almost to a praise of the immanence. Through such a mythologisation of the figure of St. Francis, Novati talks about his own time more than about a man who lived in the past. (shrink)

Les frontières de l’Europe ne s’arrêtent pas aux frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne, ni même aux limites territoriales des États-nations, mais s’étendent de différentes manières à l’intérieur des pays et des sociétés. Le système de gestion de l’asile vise à dissuader et à trier les personnes en quête de protection, empêchant la plupart d’entre elles d’arriver pleinement dans le pays, même des années après s’y être installées. Cette exclusion continue s’opère notamment en maintenant les personnes dans une situation d’incertitude et (...) de limbes juridiques étendues, ainsi qu’à travers des pratiques d’isolement horizontal et vertical, en les logeant dans des endroits reclus, parfois souterrains, éloignés des centres urbains et des réseaux de solidarité. Afin d’analyser la violence (in)directe du « dispositif d’asile suisse », Border Forensics développe de nouvelles méthodes à travers les échelles du territoire, de l’architecture et du corps. (shrink)