The work examines the influence of the relationship that football players have with significant others on their psychological wellbeing (PWB), adopting a psychosocial perspective. According to this perspective, PWB can be considered a basic condition for an effective talent development and holistic growth of young athletes. Current literature on talent development in sport has been analyzed to support the theoretical hypothesis of psychosocial perspective. Thus, it has been tested empirically through a Structural Equation Model. Analysis reveals a strong and positive (...) influence of some dimensions of the relationships with significant others on the psychological wellbeing, specifically team effort, coach closeness and parental learning climate. Following ANOVA shows that élite players perceive significantly better relationships than sub-élite and amateurs and have significantly higher levels of PWB. Those results provide a first evidence for the importance of relationships within and outside sport for an effective talent development, since they positively influence players’ PWB, that is higher in higher competitive level players. It emerges the necessity to further investigate different aspects of psychological wellbeing and to deepen the knowledge about the meaning of relationship in developmental athletes according to a psychosocial approach. (shrink)

Research shows that animal cruelty shares many of the aetiologial pathways and risk factors that have been shown for other aggressive behaviors. The shared aetiology not only aids understanding of the co-occurrence that has been documented between animal cruelty and other aggressive and antisocial crimes, it also highlights the dangers over and above those to animals that are lurking where animal cruelty offenders remain unidentified and their crimes remain unsanctioned. This article reviews current understandings about the development of antisocial behaviors, (...) including human aggression, and animal cruelty behaviors. Available research leads one to ask, when individuals have been found to be guilty of animal cruelty, what other aggressive behaviors might they be guilty of? For young children, one must ask, are they victims of child abuse, are they living in circumstances of domestic violence, and/or what is the aggression or violence that they may have been witness to? Animal cruelty, and most aggressive behaviors from the later childhood years onward, are indicators of non-normative development. Early detection of such behaviors can provide a valuable opportunity to engage in preventative intervention for young people or for appropriate sanctions to be applied for adults. Such interventions would be beneficial for all, humans and animals alike. (shrink)

L’interlocuzione con la psicologia e la psicoanalisi, in particolare con il pensiero di Sigmund Freud, costituiva una delle componenti fondamentali dell’approccio multidisciplinare della prima generazione della Scuola di Francoforte. Ridimensionato da Habermas, tale aspetto torna ad assumere una posizione di rilievo nella concezione elaborata da Axel Honneth, ad oggi considerato il più autorevole prosecutore dell’eredità francofortese. In questo articolo mi propongo di ripercorrere criticamente gli sviluppi attraversati dalla concezione psicologica elaborata da Honneth. Inizialmente riassumerò la prospettiva originaria che Honneth delinea (...) in Lotta per il riconoscimento, la quale permane fin nell’articolo del 1999 Teoria delle relazioni oggettuali e identità postmoderna. Nel secondo paragrafo mi concentro invece sui temi delle origini psicologiche del misconoscimento e del «negativo», rispetto ai quali, in una serie di articoli pubblicati tra il 2001 e il 2002, Honneth compie diverse messe a punto della sua concezione, con esiti talvolta problematici. Nel paragrafo successivo considero infine la fase più recente delle riflessioni psico-analitiche honnethiane, che è anche la più vicina al programma della prima generazione di teorici critici francofortesi: qui Honneth rivolge la sua attenzione alle condizioni psicologiche individuali della cittadinanza democratica, giungendo a una interessante sistematizzazione delle sue prospettive. Tuttavia, come proverò a mostrare nelle conclusioni, tali riflessioni sarebbero state condotte alle loro coerenti conseguenze politiche e sociali solo se, nell’esporle, Honneth avesse messo a tema anche le necessarie condizioni sostantive – di tipo materiale, relazionale e culturale – che, per preservare una disposizione alla democrazia e al pensiero critico, andrebbero assicurate nella società a tutti i cittadini. (shrink)

In this work I reply to Zoltán Vecsey’s criticisms of the semantic account of fictional names I put forward in Orlando. The main tenet of that proposal is that fictional names refer to individual concepts, which I understand in terms of mental files. In Vecsey, the author presents three main objections: no referential shift can be ascribed to fictional names, fictional names are supposed to play two conflicting functions, and the mental file framework is incompatible with an antirealist view of (...) fictional objects. Although the objections are deep and thoughtful, the challenge they involve can be met if certain aspects of the proposal are clarified and developed. (shrink)

Nel sesto libro del De musica Agostino pone il problema della natura del conoscere a partire da una descrizione, che si potrebbe definire fenomenologica, dei movimenti ritmici di cui il soggetto fa esperienza. Inizia così un percorso conoscitivo, che prendendo le mosse dalle tracce dei numeri arriva a indagare le condizioni di possibilità della conoscenza, rilanciando continuamente l’indagine su molteplici livelli. Con questo articolo si intende comprendere le più rilevanti implicazioni del paradigma conoscitivo agostiniano, il quale non appare riducibile a (...) una mera logica numerica ma permette di gettare uno sguardo filosofico fino alla realtà metafisica della creatura. In the De musica’s sixth Book Augustin puts the question of the knowledge’s nature from the description of the rhytmical movements experienced by the subject. This is the beginning of a cognitive process that starts from the numers’ traces and ends with the inquiry about the conditions of knowledge’s possibility, giving impulse to a research on several levels. The article’s purpose is to understand the most important implications of the Augustinian cognitive paradigm, that doesn’t seem to be a mere numerical logic but allow us to take a philosophical glance to the creature’s metaphysical truth. (shrink)

(1994). Science and art in perspective: Reflections in a socio‐historical key. World Futures: Vol. 40, Art and Science: Studies from the World Academy of Art and Science, pp. 45-48.

Is language – well beyond formulas and equations – important to science? This book dwells on the role played by Francis Bacon’s rich, original imagery in the early formulation of the new idea of science that would mature and flourish across the XVII century. A selection of Bacon’s key images, metaphors and analogies are analysed with an eye both to the XVI and early XVII century intellectual milieu that inspired them, and to Bacon’s own philosophical vision that creatively transformed them (...) and firmly held them together. (shrink)

In his paper "Rigid Application", Michael Devitt defends a particular version of the socalled 'essentialist conception' of rigidity for general terms, according to which rigid general terms are rigid appliers, namely, terms that if they apply to an object in any possible world then they apply to that object in every possible in which the object exists. Devitt thinks that the thereby defined notion of rigidity makes for an adequate extension to general terms of Kripke's notion, originally defined for singular (...) ones, inasmuch as it serves to accomplish its same primary task: namely, "to distinguish terms that are not covered by a description theory from ones that are". He then criticizes the alternative conception of rigidity for general terms as identity of designation -specifically, LaPorte´s version- on the basis of its entanglement with some controversial metaphysical theses regarding the existence of universals -including a commitment to a selective realism concerning them. In this paper, I try to defend the identity of designation conception from his criticisms: with this aim, I propose a version different from LaPorte's, and claim it to be the best one to accomplish the above-mentioned primary semantic task, namely, the one of showing that some general terms, just like most ordinary names, cannot be accounted for in descriptive terms. En su artículo "Rigid Application", Michael Devitt defiende una versión particular de la llamada 'concepción esencialista' de la rigidez para términos generales, según la cual los términos generales rígidos son aplicadores rígidos, esto es, términos que si se aplican a un objeto en algún mundo posible, se aplican a ese objeto en todos los mundos posibles en los que existe. Devitt considera que tal noción de rigidez constituye una adecuada extensión del concepto kripkeano, definido originalmente para términos singulares, en la medida en que permite cumplir la misma función semántica fundamental que aquél: distinguir a los términos que pueden ser explicados mediante una teoría descriptivista de aquéllos para los cuales eso no es posible. De este modo, critica la concepción alternativa de la rigidez para términos generales, basada en la idea de identidad de designación -en la versión de LaPorte -, a la cual acusa de estar comprometida con discutibles tesis metafísicas, incluido un realismo selectivo acerca de los universales. En este trabajo, me propongo defender a esta concepción de sus críticas, para lo cual presento una versión de la misma diferente de la de LaPorte. En mi opinión, la versión propuesta supera además a la definición de rigidez ofrecida por Devitt en el logro de su objetivo principal, a saber, mostrar que algunos términos generales, al igual que la mayor parte de los nombres ordinarios, no pueden ser explicados en términos descriptivistas. (shrink)

Self-regulation of learning is a key psychological factor that supports young athletes aiming to reach the elite level by promoting their involvement in deliberate practice. We contributed to the validation of the Italian version of the Bartulovic et al. Self-Regulation of Learning – Self-Report Scale for Sport Practice by testing its factorial structure, reliability, and measurement invariance among elite and non-elite football players, involving 415 male professional, semi-professional, and amateur youth academy players. The original six-factor structure did not fit the (...) data well and a five-factor solution was a better fit. This five-factor solution was measurement invariant across groups of elite and non-elite athletes. We found that elite athletes scored significantly higher than non-elite ones in each SRL subprocess. Implications for future validation studies and for the use of this tool are discussed. (shrink)

The purpose of the present article is to disentangle both Parfit’s and Whitehead’s views on personal identity. Issues regarding what it means to be a singular individual, how a person can remain the same over time, and what makes an individual an original being with specific characteristics will be examined.

The aim of this article is to explore the impact of Darwinism in metaethics and dispel some of the confusion surrounding it. While the prospects for a Darwinian metaethics appear to be improving, some underlying epistemological issues remain unclear. We will focus on the so-called Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) which, when applied in metaethics, are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of moral beliefs so as to undermine their epistemic justification. The point is that an epistemic disanalogy (...) can be identified in the debate on EDAs between moral beliefs and other kinds of beliefs, insofar as only the former are regarded as vulnerable to EDAs. First, we will analyze some significant debunking positions in metaethics in order to show that they do not provide adequate justification for such an epistemic disanalogy. Then, we will assess whether they can avoid the accusation of being epistemically incoherent by adopting the same evolutionary account for all kinds of beliefs. In other words, once it is argued that Darwinism has a corrosive impact on metaethics, what if its universal acid cannot be contained? (shrink)

In this essay, I appeal to the mental file approach in order to give an anti-realist semantic analysis of statements containing fictional names. I claim that fictive and parafictive uses of them express conceptual, though not general, propositions constituted by mental files, anchored in the conceptual world of the corresponding fictional story. Moreover, by positing a referential shift determined by the presence of a simulative referential intention characteristic of those uses, it is possible to take them to be true with (...) respect to those conceptual worlds. As for metafictive uses, since they are grounded on mixed intentions, they are considered to express hybrid propositions, partly conceptual and partly referential. (shrink)

This paper is about paradigmatic slurs, i.e. expressions that are prima facie associated with the expression of a contemptuous attitude concerning a group of people identified in terms of its origin or descent, race, sexual orientation, ethnia or religion, gender, etc. Our purpose is twofold: explaining their expressive meaning dimension in terms of a version of stereotype semantics and analysing their original and most typical uses as insults, which will be called with a neologism ‘insultive’, in terms of a speech (...) act theory. (shrink)

The paper explores the interplay among moral progress, evolution and moral realism. Although it is nearly uncontroversial to note that morality makes progress of one sort or another, it is far from uncontroversial to define what constitutes moral progress. In a minimal sense, moral progress occurs when a subsequent state of affairs is better than a preceding one. Moral realists conceive “it is better than” as something like “it more adequately reflects moral facts”; therefore, on a realist view, moral progress (...) can be associated with accumulations of moral knowledge. From an evolutionary perspective, on the contrary, since there cannot be something like moral knowledge, one might conclude there cannot even be such a thing as moral progress. More precisely, evolutionism urges us to ask whether we can acknowledge the existence of moral progress without being committed to moral realism. A promising strategy, I will argue, is to develop an account of moral progress based on moral understanding rather than moral knowledge. On this view, moral progress follows increases in moral understanding rather than accumulations of moral knowledge. Whether an understanding-based account of moral progress is feasible and what its implications for the notion itself of moral progress are, will be discussed. (shrink)

Evidence-based approaches to policy-making are growing in popularity. A generally embraced view is that with the appropriate evidence at hand, decision and policy making will be optimal, legitimate and publicly accountable. In practice, however, evidence-based policy making is constrained by a variety of problems of evidence. Some of these problems will be explored in this article, in the context of the debates on evidence from which they originate. It is argued that the source of much disagreement might be a failure (...) to addressing crucial philosophical assumptions that inform, often silently, these debates. Three controversial questions will be raised which appear central to some of the challenges faced by evidence-based policy making: firstly, how do certain types of facts candidate themselves as evidence; secondly, how do we decide what evidence we have, and how much of it; and thirdly, can we combine evidence. In addressing these questions it will be shown how a philosophically informed debate might prove instrumental in clarifying and settling practical difficulties. (shrink)

How does science enter policy making, and for what purpose? Surely consulting scientific facts in making policy is done with a view to making policy decisions more reliable, and ultimately more objective. In this paper I address the way/s by which science contributes to achieving objectivity in policy making and social debate, and argue that objectivity is not exhausted by what scientific evidence contributes to either. In policy making and social debates, scientific evidence is taken into account alongside other relevant (...) factors. Such complex contexts of practical interaction constitute a challenge both for the objectivity of scientific evidence, and for the objectivity of the role of the scientist in the policy-making process I analyse a case study - the ongoing debate over the spread of bovine TB in the UK - that displays some of the worries and several of the aspects we ought to keep in mind when we bring scientific objectivity to bear on social debate and policy making. I argue in favour of a picture where scientific objectivity enters a productive and effective dialogue with practical objectivity. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that metaphors are used in science. Great scientists, such as Darwin and Einstein, believed that the use of metaphors is vital to the development of scientific ideas. The history of science is full of examples of scientific metaphors as tools at the forefront of discoveries of new facts and new concepts.

This paper focuses on the treatment of prudence by Adam Smith. Smith was one of the few philosophers to conceive of it as a moral virtue. Smithian prudence is the care of one's own happiness that is limited and ennobled, respectively, by the sense of justice and that of self-command. A reconstruction of Smith's view of prudence helps to clarify three central points in his thought: the interaction between the agent's economic and moral dimensions, the relationship between the self and (...) the other, and the dialectical tension between partiality and impartiality. Furthermore, Smithian prudence is important, in itself, as an approach to the above-mentioned points that is still viable. These three points are recurrent crucial issues in the history of ethics. (shrink)

Using a range of examples from specific social sciences, the book both identifies the practical and theoretical procedures involved in the identification of the ...

In this article, first of all, I point out the difference I perceive between the conception of social freedom Honneth delineates in Freedom’s Right and the one, inspired by the proto-socialists’ pr...

Recommendation systems (RSs) predict what the user likes and recommend it to them. While at the onset of RSs, the latter was designed to maximize the recommendation accuracy (i.e., accuracy was their only goal), nowadays many RSs models include diversity in recommendations (which thus is a further goal of RSs). In the computer science community, the introduction of diversity in RSs is justified mainly through economic reasons: diversity increases user satisfaction and, in niche markets, profits.I contend that, first, the economic (...) justification of diversity in RSs risks reducing it to an empirical matter of preference; second, diversity is ethically relevant as it supports two autonomy rights of the user: the right to an open present and the right to be treated as an individual. So far, diversity in RSs has been morally defended only in the case of RSs of news and scholarly content: diversity is held to have a depolarizing effect in a democratic society and the scientific community and make the users more autonomous in their news choices. I provide a justification of diversity in RSs that embraces all kinds of RSs (i.e., a holistic moral defense) and is based on a normative principle founded on the agency of the user, which I call the right to be an exception to predictions. Such a right holds that the proper treatment of a RS user qua agent forbids providing them with recommendations based only on their past or similar users’ choices. (shrink)

During the era of the English Revolutions and shortly after that, some spaces, albeit limited, of female visibility open up. Thanks to the window of opportunity caused by the collapse of censorship, the participation in the radical sects and in the Civil war, some remarkable women succeed in introducing themselves in the public sphere, shaping it since its very genesis. Moreover, analysing law institutions as jointure and feoffment, the attempt is to reconstruct some fragments of juridical female autonomy, which belie (...) the total pervasiveness of coverture in the XVII century. As in private law, in public law women, in the role of queens, gain centrality: the principle of female authority, while safeguards the holding of the monarchical regime, destabilizes its patriarchal structure. Going through the works of Katherine Chidley, Margaret Cavendish, Damaris Masham and Mary Astell, the essay aims at reconstructing women's public voice, a voice which upsets the consolidated frames and subverts the established positions, questioning the same social hierarchies. (shrink)

Proposer une interprétation du rôle que revêt Israël dans la première période de la pensée hégélienne, de l'Esprit du christianisme et son destin jusqu'à la Phénoménologie de l'esprit, c'est ce à quoi s'attelle cet essai et ceci en montrant de quelle manière la confrontation entre Hegel et Israël est à la base de la formation des concepts de réconciliation, pardon et expérience. Hegel développe en effet certaines des thématiques centrales de sa réflexion justement au contact d'Israël, ce qui témoigne bien (...) que ce signe d'Abraham ne cesse d'interroger la pensée hégélienne dans son coeur génératif. A travers la façon dont la confrontation de Hegel avec Israël permet de jeter une lumière nouvelle sur son interprétation de l'entendement kantien, du problème de la loi (de dérivation paulinienne) et de celui du langage, cet essai entend illustrer comment la confrontation du jeune Hegel avec son fond théologique est aussi l'occasion pour la pensée de réfléchir sur sa propre genèse et sur son propre statut. En passant en revue les changements de position qui caractérisent la relation de Hegel avec Israël comme figure de la pensée, cet ouvrage montre comment l'expérience de la pensée est aussi une expérience dans le sens subjectif de ce génitif. La dernière partie de ce volume, consacrée à la dialectique qui aboutit au pardon dans l'oeuvre de 1807, unit ainsi le problème historiographique au problème théorique. (shrink)

The concept of solidarity has been receiving growing attention from scholars in a wide range of disciplines. While this trend coincides with widespread unsuccessful attempts to achieve solidarity in the real world, the failure of solidarity as such remains a relatively unexplored topic. In the case of the so-called European Union refugee crisis, the fact that EU member states failed to fulfil their commitment to solidarity is now regarded as established wisdom. But as we try to come to terms with (...) failing solidarity in the EU we are faced with a number of important questions: are all instances of failing solidarity equally morally reprehensible? Are some motivations for resorting to unsolidaristic measures more valid than others? What claims have an effective countervailing force against the commitment to act in solidarity? (shrink)

L’idea di una costruzione logica del mondo (eines logischen Aufbaus der Welt), cruciale per la filosofia della scienza del XX secolo, non è nuova. La tradizione aristotelica ha giocato una parte fondamentale nello stabilire una connessione essenziale fra scienza e logica, come pure più avanti le discussioni filosofiche del primo periodo moderno. Parallelamente, il possibile utilizzo metodologico e pratico della logica ha spesso indirizzato il lavoro dei praticanti dell’arte medica, i pedagogisti, gli enciclopedisti, i riformisti sociali e i primi utilitaristi. (...) A partire dalla seconda metà del XX secolo assistiamo al consolidamento di due specifici orientamenti. Da un lato, la logica si è espansa fino ad includere un numero crescente di forme argomentative e discorsive applicate ai domini più disparati del ragionamento umano; dall’altro lato, la logica formale si è applicata con successo crescente a campi di riflessione altamente specializzata. In questa antologia sono raccolti contributi che prendono in considerazione prospettive storiche e contemporanee sui rapporti fra logica, epistemologia, le scienze e la pratica – prendendo le mosse da un convegno organizzato a Ca’ Foscari su questi temi nel maggio 2019. (shrink)

The image of man’s dominion over nature is deeply rooted in Western thought. It first appears, in different forms, in the Book of Genesis. It also reappears as one of the leading images of the emerging ‘new science’ in the 16th century. Francis Bacon puts particular emphasis on this image, which he takes to be the guiding principle of his new vision of science and practical knowledge. It is this vision which, as is widely acknowledged, will open the path to (...) modern science. In what follows I will first sketch some relevant background for the emergence of this image. I will then analyse how the image takes shape in the context of Bacon’s philosophical project, paying attention to the novelties of his project but also to its continuities with tradition (especially Christian thought). It is indeed this mixture of past and future which suggests how natural order and human rule come to speak as one voice in the vision of the new science. (shrink)

In this introduction I start by presenting and examining the main positions on the current debate concerning the semantic analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions. As is known, the debate in question has started off with Russell's proposal, which has been initially criticized by both Strawson and Donnellan. Nowadays, waters are divided on this issue: some philosophers, representing the so-called univocality approach, defend Russell's original analysis, according to which all definite descriptions are quantificational expressions, whereas there are others who, following (...) Strawson´s and Donnellan´s objections, consider that at least some descriptions are genuine singular terms and hence have referential meanings. Among the defendants of the last approach, known as the ambiguity theory, we can find Michael Devitt. In the second part of the paper, I then survey Devitt's stance on some traditional arguments for the ambiguity theory -mainly, the arguments from misdescription, incompleteness, opacity, and anaphora-, and finally I consider the new ones that he has put forward in favor of the existence of referential descriptions: the argument from regularity, the one based on the comparison with demonstratives, and the argument based on weak rigidity. En esta introducción comienzo por presentar y analizar las distintas posiciones que caracterizan el debate actual en torno al análisis semántico de las oraciones que contienen descripciones definidas. Como es sabido, tal debate se origina a partir de la propuesta de Russell, la cual fue inicialmente objetada por Strawson y por Donnellan. En la actualidad las aguas están divididas: algunos filósofos, representantes del aquí llamado enfoque de la univocidad, defienden el análisis russelliano, según el cual todas las descripciones son susceptibles de ser analizadas como expresiones cuantificacionales ; otros, por el contrario, haciéndose eco de las objeciones anteriores, consideran que algunas descripciones son términos singulares genuinos y, en tanto tales, expresiones referenciales. Entre los defensores más conspicuos de este enfoque, conocido como teoría de la ambigüedad, se encuentra Michael Devitt. En la segunda parte de esta introducción, resumo la posición de Devitt respecto de los argumentos tradicionales a favor del enfoque de la ambigüedad -fundamentalmente, los argumentos basados en las descripciones fallidas, las descripciones incompletas, los casos de opacidad y los de anáfora-, y luego presento y analizo los nuevos argumentos por él ofrecidos, a saber, el argumento basado en el uso regular, aquél basado en la comparación con los demostrativos y el que se vale de la noción de rigidez débil. (shrink)