Hospital admission and mortality statistics suggested that peptic ulcer reached a peak prevalence in the mid-1950s. During the Second World War, against this background of serious and common pathology, an epidemic of dyspepsia afflicted both service personnel and civilians alike. In the absence of reliable diagnostic techniques, physicians struggled to distinguish between life-threatening illness and mild, temporary disorders. This article explores the context in which non-ulcer stomach conditions flourished. At a time when fear was considered defeatist and overt psychological disorder (...) attracted stigma, both soldiers and civilians exposed to frightening events may have unconsciously translated their distress into gastrointestinal disorders. While the nature of army food was initially identified as the cause of duodenal ulcer in servicemen, the pre-war idea that conscientious and anxious individuals were at high risk gathered support and fed into post-war beliefs that this was a stress-related illness. Diet continued to be employed as a means of management at a time when the nation was preoccupied by food because of the constraints imposed by rationing. The peptic ulcer phenomenon set much of the medical agenda for the war years and conflicted with the commonly held view that the British people had never been healthier. (shrink)

D’après Bolzano, une proposition est logiquement analytique si et seulement si elle est soit logiquement valide, soit logiquement non valide. Bolzano dit aussi parfois qu’une proposition est logiquement valide si et seulement si elle est et reste vraie sous toute variation simultanée et uniforme de ses parties non logiques. C’est essentiellement la même définition que donne Quine dans son article « Carnap and Logical Truth » où il attribue à ce dernier l’idée qu’un énoncé logiquement vrai est un énoncé au (...) sein duquel seuls les termes logiques sont essentiels. Mais qu’en est-il des propositions et des énoncés vrais qui sont composés exclusivement de parties logiques ? Selon la définition précédente, elles s’avèreraient toutes logiquement valides ou logiquement vraies. Une proposition telle que « Il y a quelque chose » n’est toutefois manifestement pas logiquement valide selon Bolzano. La définition courante de la validité logique doit être modifiée de manière à répondre aux intuitions bolzaniennes. Dans cet article, je propose une telle modification.A proposition is logically analytic according to Bolzano if and only if it is either logically valid or logically non-valid. And a proposition is sometimes said to be logically valid according to Bolzano if and only if it is true and remains true under all simultaneous and uniform variations of all of its non-logical parts. Basically the same definition is provided by Quine in his paper “Carnap and Logical Truth” where he attributes to Carnap the view that a logically true sentence is a true sentence which involves only logical words essentially. But, what about true propositions and sentences which are composed exclusively of logical parts ? Due to the definition mentioned above, all of them will trivially turn out as logically valid or logically true. A proposition like “There is something”, however, is clearly not logically valid according to Bolzano. The common definition of logical validity must be modified in order to match Bolzano’s intuitions. In this paper, such a modification is presented. (shrink)

In this essay, the author sets out the question: where bodies move according to Spinoza's physical thought? The question is linked to another one Oldenberg asked him then, about how objects acquire their unique individuality and the way nature behaves as a unit, despite the complexity of its constitution. The response refers not only to Spinoza's criticism to Cartesian mechanics, as usual, but will appeal to Spinoza's own interpretation, consistent with his system, about the constitution and dynamics of the physical (...) world, in terms of a mechanic interaction between bodies, firm enough to accomplish the task for which it was designed. (shrink)

Centrado en la respuesta a tres preguntasclave sobre el status epistémico de lasintuiciones y sus posibilidades comofuente de evidencia, el objetivo delpresente artículo es analizar las respuestasque a ellas ofrece la teoría de las VirtudesEpistémicas propuesta por E. Sosa, con elfin de determinar sus alcances y suslimitaciones más problemáticas.Focused on the answer to three keyquestions about the epistemic status ofintuitions and their possibilities as asource of evidence, the aim of this paperis to evaluate the answers offered by E.Sosa’s Epistemic Virtues (...) approach, inorder to determine its explanatory scopeand its more challenging limitations. (shrink)

The literary and scientific renaissance that struck Germany around 1800 is usually taken to be the cradle of contemporary humanism. Posthumanism in the Age of Humanism shows how figures like Immanuel Kant and Johann Wolfgang Goethe as well as scientists specializing in the emerging modern life and cognitive sciences not only established but also transgressed the boundaries of the “human.” This period so broadly painted as humanist by proponents and detractors alike also grappled with ways of challenging some of humanism's (...) most cherished assumptions: the dualisms, for example, between freedom and nature, science and art, matter and spirit, mind and body, and thereby also between the human and the nonhuman. Posthumanism is older than we think, and the so-called “humanists” of the late Enlightenment have much to offer our contemporary re-thinking of the human. (shrink)

The purpose of this research paper is to identify which types of corporate philanthropy (CP): cause-related marketing (CRM) or sponsorship, create higher moralcapital under two conditions: proactive or reactive (following a scandal). Results showed that CP created higher moral capital for a proactive company than for a reactive company. Both CRM and sponsorship were perceived as more sincere in the proactive company than the reactive company. However, CRM was seen as self-serving in the reactive company, but not the proactive company. (...) The study demonstrated that companies need to take into account the different types of CP, as it has an effect on their moral capital. Socially proactive firms should engage in both CRM and sponsorship philanthropy, as both types can generate high moral capital, which creates better company reputation. However, CP may not be the most effective or appropriate strategy for creating moral capital following negative publicity. (shrink)

Kessinger Publishing is the place to find hundreds of thousands of rare and hard-to-find books with something of interest for everyone.

Arguyo en este escrito que la epistemología del primer Schelling (al menos hasta 1797) debe interpretarse como un antirrealismo trascendental. Reconstruyo aquí los argumentos en esas obras tempranas contra el realismo de los kantianos, que son desarrollos de premisas tomadas de la Crítica de la razón pura. Muestro coherentemente que el idealismo del primer Schelling resalta los límites trascendentales del discurso sobre objetos de conocimiento y que en realidad no incurre en dogmatismo, ni siquiera en el escrito Vom Ich.

El artículo examina las posibilidades de una lectura naturalista del Sistema del idealismo trascendental (1800) de F. W. J. Schelling. Defiende que en el rechazo de un concepto absolutista de la voluntad y la teoría del surgimiento de la conciencia por medio del reconocimiento recíproco entre seres racionales se encuentra el principio (no desarrollado por Schelling) de una filosofía de la mente materialista no eliminativista plausible. Presento esas doctrinas en el contexto de las reacciones de F. H. Jacobi y J. (...) G. Fichte a las ambiguas consecuencias para el dogmatismo de la crítica kantiana del uso teórico de la razón. (shrink)

Die stratigraphischen Einheiten, durch welche heute die Erdgeschichte untergliedert wird, haben eine unterschiedliche und zum Teil recht komplexe Entstehungsgeschichte, wie hier am Beispiel des Keupers gezeigt werden soll. Das Wort ‘Keuper’ geht auf einen volkstümlichen Namen für bunte Tongesteine im Raum Coburg zurück. In den geologischen Sprachgebrauch wird es 1822 durch Leopold von Buch eingeführt, der es noch als Gesteinsnamen verwendet und die entsprechenden Schichten dem Buntsandstein zuweist. Die richtige Einstufung dieser Schichten über dem Muschelkalk gelang erstmals Ludwig Hausmann und (...) Peter Merian um 1820. Doch erst nachdem in den nachfolgenden Jahren deren Ergebnisse durch die Arbeit etlicher anderer Forscher bestätigt wurden, fand die neue, bis dahin unbenannte Formation aus bunten Mergeln und Sandsteinen breite Anerkennung. Als stratigraphischer Begriff, der auch Sandsteine und Gips umfaßt, wird die Bezeichnung Keuper erstmals von Friedrich Hoffmann im Jahre 1823 verwendet und von Christian Keferstein 1824 in die Literatur eingeführt. Eine wichtige Rolle spielten die Arbeit an den ersten geologischen Übersichtskarten Deutschlands und die Aufnahme der neuen Formation in die erste internationale Formationstabelle durch Keferstein . Mit der Integration des Keupers in die neue Formation ‘Trias’ durch Friedrich August von Alberti 1834 bekommt diese Einheit ihren seither festen Platz in der Stratigraphie.Geologic time is commonly subdivided by a set of stratigraphic terms, which all have their individual and sometimes complex histories. ‘Keuper’, now used as a stratigraphical term for the Upper Triassic, originated from a popular rock name of the Coburg area in southern Germany. The term ‘Keuper’, though still as a rock name, was first introduced into geological usage by Leopold von Buch in 1822, when he designated varicoloured marls and claystones, of what he thought to be Bunter Sandstein, as ‘Keuper’. In a stratigraphical sense, the term ‘Keuper-Formation’ was coined by Friedrich Hoffmann in 1823, who was the first to include sandstones and gypsum rocks with this notion. A year later it was introduced into the literature by Christian Keferstein. At this time, the existence of a distinct formation between Muschelkalk and Lias was already accepted by a number of geologists, though it had not yet been named. This ‘new’ formation has formerly been confused with Buntsandstein and even Carboniferous deposits by various authors until it was set into its right position by Ludwig Hausmann and Peter Merian in 1820. In the following years, the work of several geologists confirmed their results and led to general acceptance of the Keuper Formation as a separate entity. An important impetus came from the compilation of the first small-scale geological maps of Germany edited by Keferstein in the early 1820s, and from his international stratigraphical table , which already included the ‘Keuper-Formation’ as an integral part. In 1834, Friedrich August von Alberti included the ‘Keuper’ as part of the new Formation ‘Trias’ and thus defined its place in modern stratigraphy. (shrink)

Aristóteles parece negar el estatuto ontológico de los artefactos que no serían sustancias. Se analizan los textos básicos al respecto y sus principales interpretaciones. Se discute la opinión de R. Katayama, para mostrar que acierta en remarcar la importancia de la separabilidad de los compuestos, pero se equivoca en la noción de separación. Se sostiene que las formas no son separables de sus compuestos tanto naturales como artefactos, pero los primeros poseen un tipo de separación de otras formas o especies (...) que no poseen los segundos y, por ello, son substancias. Aristotle seems to deny the ontological status of artifacts which are not substances. In this paper I discuss the basic regarding this topic and its main intepretations. I discuss R. Katayama's opinion to show that he is right to underline the importance of the trait of separation, but he is wrong regarding the the notion of separation. My thesis is that neither the forms of natural things nor those of artifacts are separable from the composites, but the former possess a different kind of separation from other forms or species, which the latter do not possess. Hence, the former are substances. (shrink)

The green economy redefines the function of economics as the study and management of sustainability for solving economic crisis. This article suggests the existence of economic paradigms, arguing they have no solution. They are the same ones of complexity; in other words, around all living beings who study the system, within the various biological levels: in the bioeconomy. The study of these paradigms is based on the contemporary scientific method conditioned to classical logic. A view towards the non-classical logic particular (...) to the sciences of complexity is proposed as well. (shrink)

The argument from thinking in Aristotle’s On Ideas deals with the problem of ‘presence in absence’. It argues that, to solve it, one must posit Forms. Scholars claim that Aristotle takes the argument as valid either for Forms or for his own universals. I argue against both alternatives, for Aristotle thinks that the problem that motivates the argument does not require a metaphysical solution, but only a psychological solution.

The purpose of this cross-sectional study was to examine pre-service teachers’ perceptions of their mathematical pedagogical content knowledge and to determine effect of demographic variables (Gender, year of study) on their mathematical pedagogical content knowledge. A Likert scale questionnaire was used to collect data from 104 pre-service teachers. Descriptive statistics and Mann-Whitney U-test were used to examine pre-service teachers’ perceived knowledge of teaching strategies, mathematical language and symbols, misconceptions, curriculum, and their perceived knowledge of learners. Results show that in general, (...) majority pre-service teachers have strong perceptions of their mathematical pedagogical content knowledge. They consider lesson planning, purpose of the mathematics curriculum and assessment tools used in a mathematics classroom as important aspects of their perceived knowledge of the curriculum. It was also revealed that their perceived knowledge of misconception would enable them to know and anticipate their learners’ misconceptions. However, results also indicated that there was no statistically significant difference in pre-service teachers’ mathematical pedagogical content knowledge based on gender and year of study. Study implications are also discussed. (shrink)

This discussion note deals with Jurriaan de Haan's paper The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Problem (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4(3), 2001, pp. 267–284). In the first, critical part I will point out a confusion in the logical analysis of the paper in question. In the second, constructive part I will indicate how the analysis of moral dilemmas should proceed within the framework of a possible world semantics.

The conventional approach to developing expert systems views the domain of application as being “formally defined”. This view often leads to practical problems when expert systems are built using this approach. This paper examines the implications and problems of the formal approach to expert system design and proposes an alternative approach based on the concept of semi-formal domains. This approach, which draws on the work of socio-technical information systems, provides guidelines which can be used for the design of successful expert (...) systems. (shrink)

Is it allowable for your government, or anyone else, to influence or coerce you 'for your own sake'? This is a question about paternalism, or interference with a person's liberty or autonomy with the intention of promoting their good or averting harm, which has created considerable controversy at least since John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. Mill famously decried paternalism of any kind, whether carried out by private individuals or the state. In this volume of new essays, leading moral, political and (...) legal philosophers address how to define paternalism, its justification, and the implications for public policy, professional ethics and criminal law. So-called 'libertarian' or non-coercive paternalism receives considerable attention. The discussion addresses the nature of freedom and autonomy and the relation of individuals to law, policy and the state. The volume will interest a wide range of readers in political philosophy, public policy and the philosophy of law. (shrink)

A great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to coercion. Less attention has been paid to what might be a more pervasive form of influence: manipulation. The essays in this volume address this relative imbalance by focusing on manipulation, examining its nature, moral status, and its significance in personal and social life.

This introductory chapter has several relatively modest aims, all in the service of preparing readers for the substantive chapters in the volume. First, we provide a basic summary of the contours of debate about the ethics of self-defense. In so doing, we highlight and explain some of the central terms in the debate, as there is a complex, specialized vocabulary that may be unfamiliar to some readers. Second, we distinguish and discuss the different contexts in which the need for self-defense (...) might arise. Third, we describe and briefly discuss how the discussion of the ethics of self-defense is typically carried out—the predominant methodology employed by the authors in this volume. (shrink)

I first argue that there are many true claims of the form: Φ-ing would be morally required, if anything is. I then explain why the following conditional-type is true: If φ-ing would be morally required, if anything is, then anything is actually morally required. These results allow us to construct valid proofs for the existence of some substantive moral facts—proofs that some particular acts really are morally required. Most importantly, none of my argumentation presupposes any substantive moral claim; I use (...) only plausible claims that most moral skeptics and error theorists can and do accept. The final section diagnoses why my arguments work. Here, I offer an explanation for the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral that may help those worried that the strategy is a sophisticated trick. I conclude by considering two objections. In replying to these objections, I explain why the strategy may allow us to demonstrate more than “obvious” moral truths, and why it may also address a stronger version of error theory, according to which, moral truths are not possible. (shrink)