Jon Kabat-Zinn's Full Catastrophe Living skilfully succeeded in translating traditional Buddhist concepts in modern everyday language so as to make them accessible to the West. It was a stroke of genius to take mindfulness training out of the Buddhist context, but the risk might be that, instead of opening a door to the Dharma (the Buddhist teaching), it might also close a door leading to the vast richness of that context full of valuable insights and practices. This article aims at (...) back translating some mindfulness concepts to basic Buddhist concepts (in a movement opposite to Jon Kabat-Zinn's first move) to make Buddhist literature more accessible to MBSR/ct teachers that are less familiar with the Buddhist traditions and to allow us reconnect with some treasures that are present in our roots. It freely walks through texts and concepts of different Buddhist traditions when they seem relevant to this enterprise, drawing from the logic of the Pali Canon, the metaphors of the Mahayana sūtras and the paradoxes of Zen koans. (shrink)

This book presents the results of an experiment in interdisciplinary collaboration to clarify theories of morality and anthropology and philosophy, showing how ...

To illustrate one way in which philosophy may be helpful rather than merely critical in the present state of psychoanalytic theorizing, an attempt is made to disentangle issues in controversies about the unconscious. Eleven questions are distinguished and discussed. Logical, linguistic, methodological, metaphysical, empirical, and pragmatic components are set apart. It is found that there are no logical barriers to a construct of the unconscious, that it is linguistically feasible, need violate no methodological concepts, nor foreclose a metaphysical issue, nor (...) have deleterious pragmatic effect. Feasibility and desirability of the construct in all these respects will depend on the character and extent of the scientific findings. Some issues are also raised concerning desirable types of models in the explanation of conduct, and concerning the relevance of recent studies of consciousness. (shrink)

Using the concepts of epistemic virtue and vice as defined by José Medina, and reciprocal recognition as outlined by Glen Coulthard, I argue that the Canadian state is currently in a non-reciprocal relationship with Indigenous peoples as a result of epistemic failure on the part of the state. This failure involves a surfacelevel recognition of Indigenous peoples at the same time as the manifestation of the epistemic vices of arrogance, laziness and closed-mindedness. The epistemic injustice framework alongside a critique of (...) the politics of recognition can help shed light on what is going wrong betweenthe settler state and Indigenous peoples. Moreover, by appealing to grounded normativity, an Indigenous ethical framework, I argue that a land-based ethics of reciprocity can help us move toward reciprocal recognition and equality, if we are epistemically humble, curious and open-minded to it. (shrink)

John Dewey insisted that the events, beliefs, social structure of a period all had a constitutive role in its philosophical theory. This text shows how this theory was illustrated in Dewey's own writings: "Ethics", written with Tuft, appeared in 1908, with a revised edition appearing in 1932.

INTRODUCTION Readers of traditional treatises on ethical theory sometimes find the writers looking upon their disagreements as a kind of intellectual game, ...

The term “value” has a wide range of current usage in philospohy and the sciences. Descriptively, a man's “values” may refer to all his attitudes for-or-against anything. His values include his perferences and avoidances, his desire-objects and aversion-objects, his pleasure and pain tendencies, his goals, ideals, interests and disinterests, what he takes to be right and wrong, good and evil, beautiful and ugly, useful and useless, his approvals and disapprovals, his criteria of taste and standards of judgment, and so forth.

In this dissertation I develop a philosophical theory of scapegoating that explains the role of blame-shifting and guilt avoidance in the endurance of oppression. I argue that scapegoating masks and justifies oppression by shifting unwarranted blame onto marginalized groups and away from systems of oppression and those who benefit from them, such that people in dominant positions are less inclined to notice or challenge its workings. I first identify a gap in our understanding of oppression, namely how oppression endures despite (...) widespread formal commitments to principles of equality and justice. I argue that prominent theories of oppression do not place enough weight on the question of how oppression is justified and concealed from us through blame-shifting, in ways that enable its persistence without our explicit approval of its systems. Scapegoating, a concept as old as the Bible, offers potential insight into the means through which we shift blame and avoid responsibility. However, my survey of the genealogy of scapegoating shows that existing conceptualizations of scapegoating are limited in their scope and cannot be applied to explain the endurance of oppression. I propose an ameliorative theory of scapegoating that accounts for deficiencies in prevailing theories of both oppression and scapegoating. Distinct from interpersonal theories and psychologistic analyses of scapegoating, my theory characterizes scapegoating according to its social function in oppression, thereby explaining structural dimensions that are not already captured by other accounts.With the motivation and ingredients in place, I develop my theory of scapegoating as made up of three sub-mechanisms: essentialization of marginalized groups as blameworthy, collective interest in protection against a threat, and social exclusion of the blamed. These sub-mechanisms work together to construct certain groups as scapegoats and encourage us to treat them accordingly through various structural and interpersonal means. I argue that scapegoating has important implications for the formation of social identities; namely, scapegoating constructs social identities in an oppressive arrangement that is largely hidden from us but informs our social and affective relations. By constructing some identities as essentially blameworthy and threatening, dominantly situated identity groups are encouraged to internalize a protected status, act together in defense of their status, and maintain systems of oppressive exclusion. Finally, I elaborate the epistemic dimensions of my theory of scapegoating to argue that scapegoating functions within our social imaginaries and structural epistemic practices. In particular, I focus on the ways that ignorance functions to maintain the scapegoat mechanism, and how scapegoating helps insulate structural forms of ignorance. I end by considering the potential for resistance to scapegoating. (shrink)

This paper employs a feminist model of scapegoating designed to capture the function that scapegoating plays in the justification and masking of oppression, and examines specific forms of legislation that target the rights of trans people to uncover their scapegoating patterns. Because scapegoating is experienced as a justified attribution of blame, it evades the understanding of those participating in its dynamics. My aim is to make apparent the transphobic rhetoric that convinces people of its necessity, such that we can determine (...) the best means to undermine its discriminatory consequences. I do this by examining the scapegoating logic behind bills that seek to impact various aspects of the lives of trans people, including education, sports, identification, and healthcare. (shrink)

The book is divided into three parts. The first criticizes in some detail the various naturalistic theories as they appear in philosophy and the sciences. Thus Professor Vivas reckons with the interest theory of Santayana and R. B. Perry, the postulational theory of Charner Perry, the instrumentalist theory of Dewey, the linguistic theory of Stevenson, and again, the cultural relativity of the anthropologists and the genetic account of conscience in Freud. Once these are demolished, the second part looks for the (...) generic structure of the moral experience as focussed in the process of resolving a moral perplexity. Professor Vivas stresses the role of a hierarchically organized system of values espoused by the self which constitutes the person, and repeatedly insists on the objective or "ontic" status of the values. The person is regarded as an axiological not a psychological category; and it is only through resolving moral perplexities that a man finds out, by creating, what he is. The creative element prevents moral decision from being simply self-expression. In fact, the ethical stage, as distinguished from the moral, is characterized by the overthrow of a man's dominant values: "when we repudiate our constitutive values altogether and forge an entirely new personality, a naked, empty self must do the choosing, and how this process is possible is not at all obvious". The third part presents the rise of the ethical attitude in this second birth. Its essence lies in the absolute sanctity of the person, and Professor Vivas sees this as the answer to the conflict of values in our time. (shrink)

Since its foundation, militant democratic arguments have underpinned an enforced secularism in Turkey. The 2002 election of the AKP, described as a “moderate Islamist party”, has challenged Turkey’s secular identity. In the more than twelve years since the AKP has been in power, Turkey’s political landscape has experienced significant changes, with periods of extensive democratic reforms punctuated by regression in certain areas, notably freedom of expression and the right to protest. State repressive measures coupled with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s reluctance to (...) exit the political stage have been the focus of much commentary and analysis. This article argues, however, that under AKP rule the Kurdish issue – critical to ensuring the normalization of politics and democratization in Turkey – has been brought in from the political cold and assesses the creation and role of the HDP, a Kurdish political party that is endeavoring to situate itself in the mainstream of Turkey’s political landscape. We posit that the HDP can be viewed as the offspring of this “democratic opening,” a project that was meant to ensure a radical transformation of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Through analysing the historical trajectory of both AKP and HDP and the militant democratic arguments that led to their predecessors’ exclusion from the public sphere, this article engages with the key question of the extent to which the AKP’s treatment of the Kurdish issue has provided a vehicle for broader democratisation and facilitated a reconsideration of the Kurdish question in Turkey. (shrink)

This chapter first considers the most important of Kelsen's own express statements of a connection between his legal theory and the philosophy of Cohen. It then argues that Cohen's interpretations of Kant as well as his own ‘System of Philosophy’ actually differ profoundly from the historical Kant, thus showing the key theorem of Cohen's system to be not Kantian in origin but Platonic. Finally, the chapter considers the centrepiece of Kelsen's theory, the doctrine of the basic norm. It shows that (...) Kelsen's solution to the problem of establishing legal validity by appeal to the basic norm represents a direct application of the key theorem of Cohen's system, and that this theorem offers one plausible possibility — albeit not the only one — for the problem of validity on the basis of a concept of law that refers neither to natural law nor to any metajuridical source. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, applied ethics has turned increasingly toward theories that explore ethical questions faced by a variety of professions and away from classic moral concerns. Abraham Edel, Elizabeth Flower, and Finbarr O'Connor utilize examples of professional, public policy, and personal decision making to illustrate the strengths and limitations of the application of ethics in a rapidly changing world. They first discuss the emergence of applied ethics and how it functions within a philosophical tradition. They are not (...) concerned, however, with solving the problems they expose, but with employing them as a means to critique applied ethics. Using human rights and health and welfare issues, the authors examine the subsequent ethical stumbling blocks that surround the "moral order" of these social concerns. Through a historical discussion of the abundant ethical theories posited since the Enlightenment, they suggest ways to decide which can serve as intellectual tools for applied ethics and consider how knowledge and experience enter into any moral decision. Turning to the factors pertinent in the analysis and solution of moral problems, they dissect the underlying influences on the practice of ethics, the way in which a moral problem is diagnosed and its relevant contexts established, the ensuing conflicts between the concerns of the individual and of society, and the degree of inventiveness in issues of morality. The authors suggest that, instead of viewing theory as a set consequence derived from prior applications, relating theory to practice will engage a process of mutual aid, from which each element will learn, refining and improving the other. Author note: Abraham Edel is Research Professor, University of Pennsylvania, and Distinguished Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, City University of New York. Elizabeth Flower is Professor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania. Finbarr O'Connor is Professor of Philosophy, Beaver College. The three collaboratively edited Morality, Philosophy, and Practice: Historical and Contemporary Readings and Studies. (shrink)

A whole set of apprehensions blocks the relation of value theory to science. There is fear of a scientific authoritarianism in which a presumed scientific account of man's nature will dictate men's duties. There is a sensitive theoretical concern with the dangers of reductionism, the danger of sweeping aside the finer shades of human reactions that so far only phenomenological inspection has been able to reveal. There is the apprehension that causal inquiry will be substituted for responsible evaluative decision, or (...) that there may be helpless acquiescence in man's pitiful smallness instead of a sense of commitment and a stiffening of moral fibre. There is the danger too that the temporary character of many scientific hypotheses will be forgotten when they become the factual bases of ethical decisions. One cannot say that value theory which has spoken in the name of science has wholly avoided these dangerous pitfalls. But does not the avoidance of science in the realm of values have its own roster of dangers? Have not the dogmatisms of intuition, tradition, authority, been far more peremptory and far more arrogant in rejecting the need for evidence than a scientific dogmatism could ever be, hampered as it is by a built-in probabilism? Think of the many anxious beliefs about life and death that have taken the garb of certainty in issuing moral imperatives, or of arbitrary preferences unchecked in their universal pretensions. Recall the historical clinging to the familiar in a world that demands change, and the harsh striking down of the unconforming, the cramping effect on value creativity in all domains from art to morals. And what of the likelihood--if indeed there are scientific bases for value judgments--that turning the other way means simply making a faith out of outworn beliefs or yesterday's science rather than incorporating what is vital and growing in the expansion of human knowledge? One who would work in value theory has no other recourse than to appraise the relation of science and value in its own terms as a theoretical issue, and one of central importance. (shrink)

Background: A high prevalence of cognitive impairment and frailty complicates the feasibility of advance care planning in the long-term-care population. Research aim: To identify challenges in implementing the ‘Let Me Decide’ advance care planning programme in long-term-care. Research design: This feasibility study had two phases: (1) staff education on advance care planning and (2) structured advance care planning by staff with residents and families. Participants and research context: long-term-care residents in two nursing homes and one community hospital. Ethical considerations: The (...) local research ethics committee granted ethical approval. Findings: Following implementation, over 50% of all residents had completed some form of end-of-life care plan. Of the 70 residents who died in the post-implementation period, 14% had no care plan, 10% (with capacity) completed an advance care directive and lacking such capacity, 76% had an end-of-life care plan completed for them by the medical team, following discussions with the resident (if able) and family. The considerable logistical challenge of releasing staff for training triggered development of an e-learning programme to facilitate training. Discussion: The challenges encountered were largely concerned with preserving resident’s autonomy, avoiding harm and suboptimal or crisis decision-making, and ensuring residents were treated fairly through optimisation of finite resources. Conclusions: Although it may be too late for many long-term-care residents to complete their own advance care directive, the ‘ Let Me Decide’ programme includes a feasible and acceptable option for structured end-of-life care planning for residents with variable capacity to complete an advance care directive, involving discussion with the resident (to the extent they were able) and their family. While end-of-life care planning was time-consuming to deliver, nursing staff were willing to overcome this and take ownership of the programme, once the benefits in improved communication and enhanced peace of mind among all parties involved became apparent in practice. (shrink)

Introduction Ours is an Age of Criticism. Very few institutions, professions or vocations, modes of life, ways of thought have escaped criticism in the ...

_An eloquent call to draw on the lessons of the past to address current threats to international order_ The ancient Greeks hard‑wired a tragic sensibility into their culture. By looking disaster squarely in the face, by understanding just how badly things could spiral out of control, they sought to create a communal sense of responsibility and courage—to spur citizens and their leaders to take the difficult actions necessary to avert such a fate. Today, after more than seventy years of great‑power (...) peace and a quarter‑century of unrivaled global leadership, Americans have lost their sense of tragedy. They have forgotten that the descent into violence and war has been all too common throughout human history. This amnesia has become most pronounced just as Americans and the global order they created are coming under graver threat than at any time in decades. In a forceful argument that brims with historical sensibility and policy insights, two distinguished historians argue that a tragic sensibility is necessary if America and its allies are to address the dangers that menace the international order today. Tragedy may be commonplace, Brands and Edel argue, but it is not inevitable—so long as we regain an appreciation of the world’s tragic nature before it is too late. (shrink)