Dick Welbourn, who was Professor of Surgery at the Royal Postgraduate Medical School at Hammersmith Hospital from 1963 until 1979, was one of the early advisers of the London Medical Group .He served on its Consultative Council, whose function was to identify clinicians and others to address topics selected by students for inclusion in the London Medical ….

Cicely Saunders, the founder of St Christopher’s Hospice, who pioneered palliative care as a new specialty, died in July 2005 at the age of 87. She was an active supporter of the London Medical Group , lecturing annually under its auspices from 1963 until, in her own words, she “drew stumps” in 1989.Although she invariably lectured under the title of “The Nature and Management of Terminal Pain”, no lecture was repeated and it became clear, in retrospect, that she had been (...) reporting …. (shrink)

Gordon Dunstan was a priest who made an outstanding contribution to the study of medical ethics and whose work was recognised by four of the medical royal colleges of which he was made Fellow.He was the leading English moral theologian of his time, committed to the multidisciplinary discussion of issues raised by the practice of medicine. His non-partisan approach, his incisively analytical mind, and his attention to the facts, enabled him to collaborate with a wide cross-section of clinicians and research (...) scientists: and his respect for their professionalism was fully reciprocated.He argued persuasively that medical ethics must be shown to have an autonomy of its own and held that the concept of Natural Law was a necessary tool in discerning the moral consequences of advances in medicine.Dunstan gained a First in History at the University of Leeds in 1938 and was awarded an MA with distinction in 1939. He trained for the priesthood at the Mirfield Fathers’ College of the Resurrection and was ordained in 1941. After two curacies, he proceeded to his first academic appointment as Subwarden of St Deiniol’s Library, Hawarden, a post he held until 1949, when he …. (shrink)

The paper traces the development of programmes of lectures and symposia in most British medical schools, which have developed into a postgraduate programme of research and publication. It is asserted that a morally neutral approach is a necessary prerequisite for wide multidisciplinary involvement, as is a high level of student participation in identifying topics for discussion. Alternative possibilities for formal teaching are discussed and pitfalls highlighted.

The relation between theory and practice is the object of a central debate in the history of science. In a recent contribution to the issue, L. E. Sandelands equates practice with G. Ryle's "knowing how" and theory with Ryle's "knowing that," arguing that practice and theory are incommensurate forms of knowing such that theory cannot be translated into practice. R. T. Craig took issue with Sandelands' position, pointing out that it reflects an academic approach removed from everyday social behavior in (...) which problem solving is always both practical and theoretical. The authors agree and take this blurring of the theory/practice dichotomy as a cue to deconstruct the conception of two ways of knowing. J. Shotter's concepts of "joint action" and "knowing from within" suggest a third type of knowing which develops between knowers in particular contexts or circumstances. This third way of knowing has important implications for psychological training and inquiry. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The moral doctrine of Hobbes, in many ways the most interesting of our major British philosophers, is, I think, commonly seen in a false perspective which has seriously obscured its real affinities. This is, no doubt, largely due to the fact that most modern readers begin and end their study of Hobbes's ethics with the Leviathan , a rhetorical and, in many ways, a popular Streitschrift published in the very culmination of what looked at the time to be a permanent (...) revolution, and do not pay such attention to the more calmly argued statements of the same doctrine contained in the Elements of Law , circulated before the outbreak of the Civil War, or the De Cive. (shrink)

A prominent view of psychopathic moral reasoning suggests that psychopathic individuals cannot properly distinguish between moral wrongs and other types of wrongs. The present study evaluated this view by examining the extent to which 109 incarcerated offenders with varying degrees of psychopathy could distinguish between moral and conventional transgressions relative to each other and to nonincarcerated healthy controls. Using a modified version of the classic Moral/Conventional Transgressions task that uses a forced-choice format to minimize strategic responding, the present study found (...) that total psychopathy score did not predict performance on the task. Task performance was explained by some individual subfacets of psychopathy and by other variables unrelated to psychopathy, such as IQ. The authors conclude that, contrary to earlier claims, insufficient data exist to infer that psychopathic individuals cannot know what is morally wrong. (shrink)

A collection of writings on Buddhist philosophy.

Studies examining the ways in which the training of engineers and scientists shapes their research strategies and scientific identities.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Real-life BioethicsGregory E. KaebnickMy academic training is in philosophy, and I tend to see the problems in bioethics as philosophical problems. And so they often are. What are moral values? What is the nature of rationality? These are certainly philosophical problems. But at the same time, they are not strictly philosophical problems, insofar as they are not the special purview of the field of philosophy. They require a broader (...) treatment, and that broader treatment might even lead us to believe that the standard philosophical treatment is unsatisfactory.In one way or another, several items in this issue of the Hastings Center Report raise questions about the standard philosophical answers to issues in bioethics. The challenge is most explicit in Barry Hoffmaster’s article, “The Rationality and Morality of Dying Children.” Hoffmaster launches a frontal assault on the typical philosophical understanding of ethics, applied ethics, and bioethics. “There is more rationality in our lives than there is in our philosophy,” he begins. The usual take in philosophy on rationality “hides the real nature and extent of the rationality and the morality in our lives because it denigrates, if not ignores, our experience and our creativity.” Closer attention to our experience is therefore needed, and Hoffmaster tries to take a step in that direction by considering anthropological research on how children dying of leukemia learned about their condition and then dealt with that knowledge.The lead article, by Tony Hope and three coauthors, questions standard philosophical approaches to decision-making in a different way. Hope and his colleagues consider whether the concept of authenticity is useful for exploring how patients with anorexia nervosa understand their condition and deal with that knowledge. Further, they ask, if the concept is important for people with anorexia, should it be important for clinicians, who sometimes need to make decisions on behalf of those women? Arguably, they explain, “in respecting autonomy, it is the authentic wishes that should be respected. This would be to give the idea of authenticity a role analogous to that of capacity (competence).”Hope and colleagues are skeptical that “authenticity” can help others make decisions on behalf of women with anorexia nervosa. There is no good way of deciding which decisions would count as “authentic.” But thinking about how to make decisions is not the full extent of bioethics. As the essay by Rebecca Dresser emphasizes, attempting to understand the patient’s experience of illness is another and important part of bioethics, even though bioethicists themselves do not always see it that way. “At times,” writes Dresser, “work in our field conveys the impression that seriously ill patients and their families would be in good shape if clinicians would only do things like give patients the proper information, respect patients’ choices, and follow advance directives.” Just as Hope and colleagues argued for attending more closely to the concept of authenticity, Dresser argues for attending to concepts like dignity, mortality, and grief. These concepts “may be difficult to incorporate into bioethical analysis, but they are the sorts of concerns that matter to people dealing with serious illness.”A bioethics that dealt better with them would still be a philosophical bioethics, but certainly not just a bioethics of philosophy. It would be what Dresser calls a “real-life bioethics.” —GEK [End Page 2]Copyright © 2011 The Hastings Center... (shrink)

The sudden emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic brought global disruption to every aspect of society including healthcare, supply chain, the economy, and social interaction. Among the many emergent considerations were the safety and public health of the public, patients, essential workers, and healthcare professionals. In certain locations, clinical research was halted—or terminated—in deference to the immediate needs of patient care, and clinical trials focusing on the treatment and prevention of coronavirus infection were prioritized over studies focusing on other diseases. Difficult (...) decisions were made rapidly; flexibility and reconsideration were necessary not only because the intensity and severity of infection varied over time and by locale but also because knowledge of the disease and understanding of its treatment grew. Here we discuss the ethical challenges in decision-making and competing ethical tensions during the pandemic in an effort to advance future preparedness. (shrink)

In this comment, I indicate several challenges and opportunities—out of the many—for an integrated science–humanities approach to emotions, from the perspective of a historian of the modern science...

What is silence? Is it a loss, an omission? Is it a stopping of the mouth, of the voice? An empty place where no meaning has come forward…or perhaps at times quite the opposite, an absence-as-presence Deleuze, 1990; Derrida, 1976)? Might silence evoke much more about what we assume is our monological, unitary reality, indexing possibilities yet unseen? This paper outlines the ways in which silence is typically understood according to scholarly orthodoxy: as omission in human communication or a silencing (...) of minoritized individuals or communities by those in power. It then moves to critique the preeminence of whitestream Western-centric academic authority, which self-perpetuates via the exclusion of outsider ways of doing, being and knowing such as those brought forward by silence, constituting a loss of meaning and knowledge from the social imaginary. This paper suggests that the pursuit of an articulate unknowing regarding silence as a creative, disruptive force beyond the control of rationality is a means of engaging with radical possibilities for a different, juster world. It proposes a socio-diologic politics of the real that welcomes silence as an unsettling of our current thinking about what is and will be possible, as well as who does and does not matter. It concludes by illustrating the ingenious force of silence in examples of subversive art that expose the hegemonizing, rational version of reality sold by academics and powerholders, bringing forward into the imagination what prospects for change, justice, and social transformation yet await. (shrink)

Quality and service improvement (QSI) research employs a broad range of methods to enhance the efficiency of healthcare delivery. QSI research differs from traditional healthcare research and poses unique ethical questions. Since QSI research aims to generate knowledge to enhance quality improvement efforts, should it be considered research for regulatory purposes? Is review by a research ethics committee required? Should healthcare providers be considered research participants? If participation in QSI research entails no more than minimal risk, is consent required? The (...) lack of consensus on answers to these questions highlights the need for ethical guidance. Three distinct approaches to classifying QSI research in accordance with existing ethical principles and regulations can be found in the literature. In the first approach, QSI research is viewed as distinct from other types of healthcare research and does not require regulation. In the second approach, QSI research falls within regulatory guidelines but is exempt from research ethics committee review. In the third approach, QSI research is deemed to be part of the learning healthcare system and, as such, is subject to a different set of ethical principles entirely. In this paper, we critically assess each of these views. While none of these approaches is entirely satisfactory, we argue that use of the ethical principles governing research provides the best means of addressing the numerous questions posed by QSI research. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to analyze succinctly the concept of faith through the very penetrating gaze of the Danish philosopher Sören Kierkegaard. Faith is analyzed by Kierkegaard from absurdity, resignation and the paradox of faith. In the same way, his concept of faith is carved with a chisel that would complete all his philosophy, that is, to touch human reality away from any abstract thought, trying at all times that his examination be seen on a personal dimension in (...) his rigorously individual coret. (shrink)

Linguistic study of Mongolian traditional classical translation.

Context: Phenomenology and the enactive approach pose a unique challenge to dream research: during sleep one seems to be relatively disconnected from both world and body. Movement and perception, prerequisites for sensorimotor subjectivity, are restricted; the dreamer’s experience is turned inwards. In cognitive neurosciences, on the other hand, the generally accepted approach holds that dream formation is a direct result of neural activations in the absence of perception, and dreaming is often equated with “delusions.” Problem: Can enactivism and phenomenology account (...) for the variety of dream experiences? What kinds of experiential and empirical approaches are required in order to probe into dreaming subjectivity? Investigating qualities of perception, sensation, and embodiment in dreams, as well as the relationship between the dream-world and waking-world requires a step away from a delusional or altered-state framework of dream formation and a step toward an enactive integrative approach. Method: In this article, we will focus on the “depth” of dream experiences, i.e., what is possible in the dream state. Our article is divided into two parts: a theoretical framework for approaching dreaming from an enactive cognition standpoint; and discussion of the role and strategies for experimentation on dreaming. Based on phenomenology and theories of enactivism, we will argue for the primacy of subjectivity and imagination in the formation of lived experience. Results: We propose that neurophenomenology of dreaming is a nascent discipline that requires rethinking the relative role of third-, first- and second-person methodologies, and that a paradigm shift is required in order to investigate dreaming as a phenomenon on a continuum of conscious phenomena as opposed to a break from or an alteration of consciousness. Implications: Dream science, as part of the larger enterprise of consciousness and subjectivity studies, can be included in the enactive framework. This implies that dream experiences are neither passively lived nor functionally disconnected from dreamers’ world and body. We propose the basis and some concrete strategies for an empirical enactive neurophenomenology of dreaming. We conclude that investigating dream experiences can illuminate qualities of subjective perception and relation to the world, and thus challenge the traditional subject-object juxtaposition. Constructivist content: This article argues for an interdisciplinary enactive cognitive science approach to dream studies. (shrink)

Context: In the digital era, it is important to investigate the potential impact of digital technologies in education and how such tools can be successfully integrated into the mathematics classroom. Similarly to many others in the constructionism community, we have been inspired by the idea set out originally by Papert of providing students with appropriate “vehicles” for developing “Mathematical Ways of Thinking.” Problem: A crucial issue regarding the design of digital tools as vehicles is that of “transfer” or “bridging” i.e., (...) what mathematical knowledge is transferred from students’ interactions with such tools to other activities such as when they are doing “paper-and-pencil” mathematics, undertaking traditional exam papers or in other formal and informal settings. Method: Through the lens of a framework for algebraic ways of thinking, this article analyses data gathered as part of the MiGen project from studies aiming at investigating ways to build bridges to formal algebra. Results: The analysis supports the need for and benefit of bridging activities that make the connections to algebra explicit and for frequent reflection and consolidation tasks. Implications: Task and digital environment designers should consider designing bridging activities that consolidate, support and sustain students’ mathematical ways of thinking beyond their digital experience. Constructivist content: Our more general aim is to support the implementation of digital technologies, especially constructionist learning environments, in the mathematics classroom. (shrink)

Spinoza's writings on metaphysics, ethics, and politics have had a remarkably diverse reception in recent times and have contributed to the current dialogue among philosophers, intellectual historians, and literary theorists.Errol E. Harris has written a brief and simplified introductory presentation of the major branches of Spinoza's philosophy. Spinoza's ideas are put forward in plain language and supported by convincing argument. Technicalities are either clearly explained or entirely avoided. Professor Harris also shows the student how Spinoza succeeded in reconciling the insights (...) of both the British empiricists and the continental rationalists.Errol E. Harris (Ambleside, Cumbria, England) is John Evans Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy (Emeritus) at Northwestern University, and the author of Fundamentals of Philosophy, Spinoza's Philosophy: An Outline, The Substance of Spinoza, The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science, Hypothesis and Perception, Cosmos and Anthropos: A Philosophical Interpretation of the Anthropic Cosmological Principle, Cosmos and Theos: Ethical and Theological Implications of the Anthropic Cosmological Principle, and One World or None: Prescription for Survival. (shrink)