Along with a well-honoured tradition, we will accept that intentionality is at least a property a thought holds necessarily, i.e., in all possible worlds that contain it; more specifically, a necessary relation, namely the relation of existential dependence of the thought on its intentional object. Yet we will first of all try to show that intentionality is more than that. For we will claim that intentionality is an essential property of the thought, namely a property whose predication to the thought (...) is true in virtue of the identity, or nature, of such a thought. More particularly, for us intentionality will again be a relation, yet a relation of ontological dependence of the thought on its intentional object; specifically, the relation for the thought of being constituted by its object. Moreover, we will try to show that if intentionality is such a constitutive relation for the thought that has it, certain metaphysical consequences ensue. First, an objectual thought, a thought whose content basically consists in its intentional object, is nothing but that object in a certain cogitative modality, or, which is the same, as playing a certain motivational role for the subject entertaining the thought itself (at a certain time). Second, if an objectual thought is nothing but an intentional object in a cogitative modality, such a thought, not only as a type, but also as a token, is an abstract entity. More specifically, an objectual thought-type, an abstract object par excellence, is indeed instantiated by objectual thought-tokens which are again abstract particulars, yet of a specific kind: namely, tropes of a relational sort depending for their existence on their bearers (and possibly also on their temporal location). (shrink)

How has it been possible that the adoption of the passport – a measure closely associated to the Ancien Régime despotism – was generalized with the French Revolution? The article traces a genealogy of the identification regime that organized the government of mobility from within the liberal conceptual apparatus. The metamorphoses of police apparatus studied by social history are here considered in the light of constitutional debates of the Revolution. The concluding paragraph frames the political-economic implication of the emergence of (...) a modern rationality of identification in order to suggest a field of analysis and of historical periodization that I define «mobility regime». (shrink)

Typical spatial descriptions, such as “The car is in front of the house,” describe the position of a located object (LO; e.g., the car) in space relative to a reference object (RO) whose location is known (e.g., the house). The orientation of the RO affects spatial language comprehension via the reference frame selection process. However, the effects of the LO's orientation on spatial language have not received great attention. This study explores whether the pure geometric information of the LO (e.g., (...) its orientation) affects spatial language comprehension using placing and production tasks. Our results suggest that the orientation of the LO influences spatial language comprehension even in the absence of functional relationships. (shrink)

We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal external- ism is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up in the debate, we see (...) no reason to relinquish an idea that seems intuitive and appeals to many cognitive sci- entists: that phenomenology is narrow, i.e., that phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of our experiences. This idea grounds the opposite philosophical position, phenomenal internalism. (shrink)

P.T. Geach has maintained (see, e.g., Geach (1967/1968)) that identity (as well as dissimilarity) is always relative to a general term. According to him, the notion of absolute identity has to be abandoned and replaced by a multiplicity of relative identity relations for which Leibniz's Law - which says that if two objects are identical they have the same properties - does not hold. For Geach relative identity is at least as good as Frege's cardinality thesis which he takes to (...) be strictly connected with relative identity - according to which an ascription of cardinality is always relative to a concept which specifies what, in any particular case, counts as a unit. The idea that there is a close connection between relative identity and Frege's cardinality thesis has been issued again quite recently by Alston and Bennett in (1984). In their opinion, Frege's cardinality thesis is not only similar to relative identity - as Geach maintains - but it implies it. Moreover, they agree with Geach in claiming that a commitment to Frege's cardinality thesis forces a parallel commitment to relative identity. Against Geach, Alston and Bennett we will claim that (Tl): "Frege's cardinality thesis is similar to relative identity" is false and that therefore (T2) "Frege's cardinality thesis implies relative identity" is false as well. (shrink)

According to Frege a proposition—or, in his terms, a thought—is an abstract structured entity constituted by senses which satisfies, at least, the three following properties: it can be semantically assessed as true or as false, it is the object of so called propositional attitudes and it can be grasped. What Frege meant by 'grasping' is the peculiar way in which we can have epistemic access to propositions. The possibility for propositions to be grasped is put by Frege as a warrant (...) for their existence: to challenge their graspability would amount to jeopardise their ontological reality. But is it true, as Frege uncritically maintained, that the "graspability requirement" is satisfied as far as propositions are concerned? This is the topic of the present work. A negative answer to the above mentioned question has been given in recent time by the representatives of what has come to be labelled the "cognitive turn" in analytical philosophy. People such as Fodor and Johnson-Laird patently denied the possibility for propositions, conceived Frege, to be accessed by the grasping relation. What grounds their position is, to put it roughly, the following train of thought: in order for something to be the target of the grasping relation it must enter the mind. Nothing which is different from a mental entity can enter the mind. Therefore, what can be grasped must be mental. The upshot of this move implies, among other things, the rejection of that radical anti-psychologism which was characteristic of the forefathers of the analytical tradition. In our work we shall try to resist their conclusion by showing that it is not necessary to zero the distinction between propositions and mental entities in order to provide an adequate account of the grasping relation. What one has to give up, instead, is only Frege's late Platonism of the "third realm" which, in our view, is a wholly unnecessary and dispensable accretion of his picture. For, as we shall show, if Platonism is in place it is difficult to provide an account of the grasping relation which makes no use of the "representationalist hypothesis" — i.e. of the hypothesis that mediate our access to whatever can be given to us. But representationalism, once in place, makes the theoretical role of the notion of sense dispensable or purely additional. (shrink)

Climate change governance is extremely challenging because of both the intrinsic difficulty of the issues at stake and the plurality of values and world-views. For these reasons, the ethical concerns that characterise climate change should also be meaningfully addressed through a specific version of procedural justice. Accordingly, in this article we adopt an impure notion of procedural justice. On this theoretical basis, we define relevant fairness criteria and contextualise them for climate governance systems. Then, we empirically justify fairness criteria against (...) a critical and divisive element for the future governance of the Green Climate Fund, i.e., the no-objection procedure. The article concludes with some considerations prompted by the analysis. (shrink)

__: In this paper, we want to support Kriegel’s argument in favor of the thesis that there is a cognitive form of phenomenology that is both irreducible to and independent of any sensory form of phenomenology by providing another argument in favor of the same thesis. Indeed, this new argument is also intended to show that the thought experiment Kriegel’s argument relies on does describe a genuine metaphysical possibility. In our view, Kriegel has not entirely succeeded in showing that his (...) own argument displays that possibility. We present our argument in two steps. First, we attempt to prove that there is a cognitive phenomenology that is irreducible to any form of sensory phenomenology. Our proof relies on a kind of phenomenal contrast argument that however does not appeal to introspection. Second, by showing that the link between this form of cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenology of having thoughts, and sensory phenomenology in general is extrinsic, we also aim to demonstrate that the former is independent of the latter. _Keywords_: Cognitive Phenomenology; Irreduciblity; Independence; Having Thoughts; Grasping Thoughts _Un altro argomento in favore della fenomenologia cognitiva_ _Riassunto_: In questo articolo intendiamo corroborare l’argomento di Kriegel in favore dell’esistenza di una forma cognitiva di fenomenologia irriducibile a e indipendente da ogni altra forma di fenomenologia della sensibilità, avanzando un altro argomento a sostegno della stessa tesi. Nei fatti, questo nuovo argomento vuole anche mostrare che l’esperimento mentale su cui poggia l’argomento di Kriegel descrive effettivamente una genuina possibilità metafisica; e tuttavia crediamo che l’argomento di Kriegel non abbia mostrato fino in fondo proprio questa possibilità. Vogliamo presentare il nostro argomento in due passi. In un primo momento, tenteremo di provare l’esistenza di una fenomenologia cognitiva irriducibile a ogni altra forma di fenomenologia sensoriale. La nostra prova poggia su un tipo di argomento basato su un contrasto fenomenico che non si appella all’introspezione. In un secondo momento, mostrando che il legame tra questa forma di fenomenologia cognitiva, ossia la fenomenologia del possesso dei pensieri, e la fenomenologia sensoriale è un legame estrinseco, intendiamo dimostrare che la prima è indipendente dalla seconda. _Parole chiave_: Fenomenologia cognitiva; Irriduciblità; Indipendenza; Possesso dei pensieri; Afferramento dei pensieri. (shrink)

According to Frege a proposition—or, in his terms, a thought—is an abstract structured entity constituted by senses which satisfies, at least, the three following properties: it can be semantically assessed as true or as false, it is the object of so called propositional attitudes and it can be grasped. What Frege meant by 'grasping' is the peculiar way in which we can have epistemic access to propositions. The possibility for propositions to be grasped is put by Frege as a warrant (...) for their existence: to challenge their graspability would amount to jeopardise their ontological reality. But is it true, as Frege uncritically maintained, that the "graspability requirement" is satisfied as far as propositions (as he conceived them) are concerned? This is the topic of the present work. A negative answer to the above mentioned question has been given in recent time by the representatives of what has come to be labelled the "cognitive turn" in analytical philosophy. People such as Fodor and Johnson-Laird patently denied the possibility for propositions, conceived à la Frege, to be accessed by the grasping relation. What grounds their position is, to put it roughly, the following train of thought: in order for something to be the target of the grasping relation it must enter the mind. Nothing which is different from a mental entity can enter the mind. Therefore, what can be grasped must be mental. The upshot of this move implies, among other things, the rejection of that radical anti-psychologism which was characteristic of the forefathers of the analytical tradition. In our work we shall try to resist their conclusion by showing that it is not necessary to zero the distinction between propositions and mental entities in order to provide an adequate account of the grasping relation. What one has to give up, instead, is only Frege's late Platonism of the "third realm" which, in our view, is a wholly unnecessary and dispensable accretion of his picture. For, as we shall show, if Platonism is in place it is difficult to provide an account of the grasping relation which makes no use of the "representationalist hypothesis" — i.e. of the hypothesis that ideas mediate our access to whatever can be given to us. But representationalism, once in place, makes the theoretical role of the notion of sense dispensable or purely additional. (shrink)

Prior research has demonstrated the impact of morality (vs. competence) information for impression formation. This study examines behavioral implications of people’s initial impressions based on information about their morality vs. competence in a workplace. School teachers and employees (N = 79) were asked to form an impression of a new school manager (i.e. a prospective boss), who was presented as High vs. Low in Morality and High vs. Low in Competence. Results showed that morality information rather than competence information determined (...) initial emotional responses to the new manager, which mediated willingness to help the newcomer adjust in task and social contexts. Results are discussed in terms of their theoretical and practical implications and future research directions are outlined. (shrink)

El presente trabajo intenta mostrar cómoes posible a partir de la ruptura con elmodelo platónico de pensamiento darlugar a una consideración de la estéticay de la subjetividad como ámbitos deexperimentación política. Ese ámbito deexperimentación se puede pensar en elseno mismo de la obra platónica, a partirde la disputa que éste mantiene con losartistas y que lo lleva a expulsarlos de lapolis. En esta expulsión del simulacro,de l o que s e t r at a es de as egur ar elbuen (...) orden de la ciudad, de encerraral arte en los límites de la mimesis y larepresentación. El escrito propone por lotanto pensar el Arte y la Política más alláde la representación, sólo deslizándosemás allá de esta condena platónica el arteabre el campo de resistencia por la quepresenta lo impresentable: lo nuevo.In this paper I intend to show how it ispossible starting with a rupture with thePlatonic model of thought to give rise to aconsideration of aesthetics and subjectivityas fields of politic experimentation. Suchfield of experimentation can be consideredin the very core of Platonic work, out of thedispute that this maintains with the artistand that leads him to expel them from thepolis. In this expulsion of pretense Platointends to secure the good order of the city,to enclose art within the limits of mimesisand representation. This paper suggeststo think about Art and Politics beyondrepresentation because only overcomingPlato’s condemnation, Art opens the fieldof resistance by which it introduces what isnot presentable: the new. (shrink)

With the exception of Anthony Manser’s recent treatise on Bradley’s logic, nothing noteworthy has been written on the British idealist since the studies of Wollheim and Vander Veer. This dearth of scholarship on one of the most powerful critics of empiricism and naturalism is surprising especially today when we witness a strong revival of interest in metaphysics and phenomenology. Hence Dario Sacchi’s monograph on Bradley’s Unity and Relation is particularly welcome. In addition, this study promises some interesting insights into (...) how an Italian scholar presumably familiar with various forms of continental idealism treats the British metaphysician. Unfortunately, students of Bradley’s thought will be disappointed. (shrink)

Books reviewed:James D. G. Dunn and John W. Rogerson, Eerdmans Commentary on the BibleYairah Amit, Reading Biblical Narratives. Literary Criticism and the Hebrew BibleThomas L. Leclerc, Yahweh is Exalted in Justice: Solidarity and Conflict in IsaiahNuria Calduch‐Benages, Joan Ferrer, and Jan Liesen, La sabiduría del Escriba/Wisdom of the Scribe: Diplomatic Edition of the Syriac Version of the Book of Ben Sira according to Codex Ambrosianus, with Translations in Spanish and EnglishSidnie White Crawford and Leonard J. Greenspoon, The Book of Esther (...) in Modern ResearchPaolo Sacchi, The History of the Second Temple PeriodMary E. Mills, Biblical Morality. Moral Perspectives in Old Testament NarrativesRichard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God IncarnateH. Benedict Green, Matthew, Poet of the BeatitudesC. K. Barrett, On Paul. Essays on His Life, Work and Influence in the Early ChurchMichael D. Goulder, Paul and the Competing Mission in CorinthByron R. McCane, Roll Back the Stone: Death and Burial in the World of JesusMagnus Zetterholm, The Formation of Christianity in Antioch: A Social‐Scientific Approach to the Separation between Judaism and ChristianityDale V. Irvin and Scott W. Sunquist, History of the World Christian Movement, Volume I: Earliest Christianity to 1453Francis Clark, The ‘Gregorian’ Dialogues and the Origins of Benedictine MonasticismMichael Frassetto, The Year 1000: Religious and Social Response to the Turning of the First MillenniumPatrick Nold, Pope John XXII and his Franciscan Cardinal: Bertrand de la Tour and the Apostolic Poverty ControversyTeresa P. Reed, Shadows of Mary: Reading the Virgin Mary in Medieval TextsMichael D. Bailey, Battling Demons: Witchcraft, Heresy, and Reforma in the Late Middle AgesColm Lennon, An Irish Prisoner of Conscience of the Tudor Era: Archbishop Richard Creagh of Armagh, 1523–86Judith S. Graham, Puritan Family Life: The Diary of Samuel SewallCrawford Gribben, The Puritan Millennium. Literature and Theology, 1550‐1682M. Feingold, Jesuit Science And The Republic of LettersRobert Bireley, The Jesuits And The Thirty Years War: Kings, Courts, and ConfessorsTorkel Brekke, Makers of Modern Indian Religion in the Late Nineteenth CenturyP. Koslowski, The Concept of God, the Origin of the World, and the Image of the Human in the World ReligionsPeter Koslowski, The Origin and the Overcoming of Evil and Suffering in the World ReligionsJ. H. Laenen, Jewish Mysticism: An IntroductionBarbara Bowe, Biblical Foundations of Spirituality: Touching a Finger to the FlameThomas G. Weinandy and Daniel A. Keating, The Theology of St Cyril of Alexandria. A Critical AppreciationJames D. G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered: Christianity in the Making, Volume 1Daniel W. Hardy, Finding the Church: The Dynamic Truth of AnglicanismS. Mark Heim, The Depth of the Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of Religious EndsJohn Webster, Word and Church. Essays in Christian DogmaticsAlister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology. Volume 1: NatureJames Alison, On Being LikedMichael J. Langford, A Liberal Theology for the Twenty‐First Century: A Passion for ReasonGuy Mansini and James G. Hart, Ethics and Theological Disclosures:The Thought of Robert SokolowskiMark A. Wrathall, Religion After MetaphysicsGerd Van Riel, Pleasure and the Good Life: Plato, Aristotle, and the NeoplatonistsNomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral AgencyGernot Böhme, Ethics in Context: The Art of Dealing with Serious QuestionsErica Appelros, God in the Act of Reference: Debating Religious Realism and Non‐RealismMark C. Murphy, Natural Law and Practical RationalityRichard Brian Davis, The Metaphysics of Theism and ModalityJ. Brower and K. Guilfoy, The Cambridge Companion to AbelardBrian Davies, Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical PerspectivesStephen J. Pope, The Ethics of AquinasKevin White and Romanus Cessario, On The Virtues John CapreolusSteven Shakespeare, Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of GodSusan M. Felch and Paul J. Contino, Bakhtin and Religion: A Feeling for FaithRuth Coates, Christianity in Bakhtin: God and the Exiled AuthorDavid Michael Levin, The Philosopher's Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of EnlightenmentCharles Guignon and David R. Hiley, Richard RortyCelia E. Deane‐Drummond, Biology and Theology TodayOswaldo de Rivero, The Myth of Development: The Non‐Viable Economies of the 21st Century. (shrink)

The responses to the questions of why? when?, how?, where?, and in what ways? business ethics should be taught in the BusinessEthics classroom inundate the scholarly literature. Yet, to date, despite some very interesting ideas, with respect to the answers givento the above question, not only has nothing even close to consensus been reached, but this particular area of pedagogy is instagnation—authors still challenge both the very idea of teaching business ethics as well as the practical value of such courses (...) for ourstudents once they graduate to the corporate world.In this paper I will suggest that the reason for this lack of pedagogical progress is that there has been a serious oversight regarding the most important teaching question of all: Who? I will show that the pedagogical issue of whom should be teaching Business Ethics has been largely ignored, skirted or answered incorrectly. I will then boldly argue that the only necessary condition for successful courses inBusiness Ethics is that they be taught by experts in ethics, i.e., Ph.D.s in philosophy. (shrink)

I. Introduction Two kinds of remedies have traditionally been employed for breach of contract: legal relief and equitable relief. Legal relief normally takes the form of money damages. Equitable relief normally consists either of specific performance or an injunction – that is, the party in breach may be ordered to perform an act or to refrain from performing an act. In this article I will use a “consent theory of contract” to assess the choice between money damages and specific performance. (...) According to such a theory, contractual obligation is dependent on more fundamental entitlements of the parties and arises as a result of the parties' consent to transfer alienable rights. My thesis will be that the normal rule favoring money damages should be replaced with one that presumptively favors specific performance unless the parties have consented to money damages instead. The principal obstacle to such an approach is the reluctance of courts to specifically enforce contracts for personal services. The philosophical distinction between alienable and inalienable rights bolsters this historical reticence, since a right to personal services may be seen as inalienable. I will then explain why, if the subject matter of a contract for personal services is properly confined to an alienable right to money damages for failure to perform, specific enforcement of such contracts is no longer problematic. Finally, I shall consider whether the subject matter of contracts for corporate services is properly confined to money damages like contracts for personal services, or whether performance of corporate services can be made the subject of a valid rights transfer and judicially compelled in the same manner as contracts for external resources. (shrink)

Encore un livre sur saint Thomas, dira-t-on. Que pourrait ajouter celui-ci à tout ce qui existe déjà? Nous voudrions d'abord dans cet ouvrage répondre simplement mais en vérité, et en lisant les textes eux-mêmes de saint Thomas et d'Aristote, à certaines objections ou lieux communs entendus ou lus plus ou moins régulièrement, qui empêchent de commencer à vouloir connaître la pensée de frère Thomas. Il s'agit de mettre en évidence la grande richesse, pour l'intelligence et le coeur humains, de sa (...) pensée philosophique, de ses analyses, de ses manières de poser les questions et d'interroger le réel. Un préambule pour une introduction à la philosophie de Thomas, telle est essentiellement l'intention de ces quatre études et non pas une introduction à la philosophie thomasienne purement et simplement. Elles cherchent ainsi à définir l'esprit d'un apprentissage philosophique qui a aussi en lui tout ce qui convient pour aider à un apprentissage théologique et spirituel, mystique même. (shrink)

Ancient moral philosophers, especially Aristotle and his followers, typically shared the assumption that ethics is primarily concerned with how to achieve the final end for human beings, a life of “happiness” or “human flourishing.” This final end was not a subjective condition, such as contentment or the satisfaction of our preferences, but a life that could be objectively determined to be appropriate to our nature as human beings. Character traits were treated as moral virtues because they contributed well toward this (...) ideal life, either as means to it or as constitutive aspects of it. Traits that tended to prevent a “happy” life were considered vices, even if they contributed to a life that was pleasant and what a person most wanted. The idea of “happiness” was central, then, in philosophical efforts to specify what we ought to do, what sort of persons we should try to become, and what sort of life a wise person would hope for. (shrink)

In The Form of Truth: Hegel’s Philosophical Logic, Elena Ficara offers a reappraisal of G.W.F. Hegel’s logic within the history of logic and in relation to the logics of today. She brings together...

My goal is to emphasize the way we generally use the word ‘logic’ and the sort of problems related to the definition of logic and the sort of problems related to the definition of logic. I also wish to underline the differences between human intelligence and artificial intelligence.

Each month brings new scientific findings that demonstrate the ways in which human activities, from resource extraction to carbon emissions, are doing unprecedented, perhaps irreparable damage to our world. As we hear these climate change reports and their predictions for the future of Earth, many of us feel a sickening sense of _déjà vu_, as though we have already seen the sad outcome to this story. Drawing from recent scholarship that analyzes climate change as a form of “slow violence” that (...) humans are inflicting on the environment, _Climate Trauma_ theorizes that such violence is accompanied by its own psychological condition, what its author terms “Pretraumatic Stress Disorder.” Examining a variety of films that imagine a dystopian future, renowned media scholar E. Ann Kaplan considers how the increasing ubiquity of these works has exacerbated our sense of impending dread. But she also explores ways these films might help us productively engage with our anxieties, giving us a seemingly prophetic glimpse of the terrifying future selves we might still work to avoid becoming. Examining dystopian classics like _Soylent Green _alongside more recent examples like _The Book of Eli_, _Climate Trauma_ also stretches the limits of the genre to include features such as _Blindness_, _The Happening_, _Take Shelter_, and a number of documentaries on climate change. These eclectic texts allow Kaplan to outline the typical blind-spots of the genre, which rarely depicts climate catastrophe from the vantage point of women or minorities. Lucidly synthesizing cutting-edge research in media studies, psychoanalytic theory, and environmental science, _Climate Trauma _provides us with the tools we need to extract something useful from our nightmares of a catastrophic future. (shrink)

Imagine a society of fisherfolk, who, in the state of nature, fish on a lake of finite size. Fishing on the lake is characterized by decreasing returns to scale in labor, because the lake's finite size imply that each successive hour of fishing labor is less effective than the previous one, as the remaining fish become less dense in the lake. In the state of nature, the lake is commonly owned: each fishes as much as he pleases, and, we might (...) suppose, calculates his fishing plan by taking the labor of the others as given, as he sees it. Each knows that the distribution of fish will be proportional to labor expended among the fisherfolk: if I fish twice as long as you, I will end up with twice as much fish as you. This is not due to some kind of concern with equity among the fisherfolk; it is a technological fact, implied by the assumption that fishing labor is homogeneous, and all are equally likely to catch a fish in a unit of time. An equilibrium under common ownership can be thought of as a Nash equilibrium of the game where each computes his optimal fishing plan, given the labor of the others and knowing what the consequent distribution of fish would be. (shrink)

Linguistic study of Mongolian traditional classical translation.

The article examines Husserl's work On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Firstly, it seeks to show the surplus of cosmic time with regard to the temporality of consciousness. Secondly, an attempt is made to establish whether the Husserlian description of the form of the flow of consciousness is circular, i.e., whether it does not presupposes the objective time that it purports to constitute. Thirdly, a critical analysis of the self-manifestation of the absolute flow of consciousness is advanced. (...) Finally, a reference is made to the aporetics that befalls any investigation that tries to reduce one form of time to the other or to apprehend them independently. (shrink)

The role of imagination in Descartes. The critic of Sartre to the concept of image in Descartes.

This book intends to introduce readers to the work of Charles E. Butterworth, and thereby to introduce students to Medieval islamic political philosophy, of which Butterworth is one of the world's most prominent scholars. In a wider sense, the Festschrift introduces its readers to the current debates on Medieval islamic political philosophy, related as they are to the questions of the relationship between islam and Christianity, the Medieval to the Modern world, and reason and revelation. Butterworth's scholarship spans six decades, (...) primarily translating, editing, and interpreting the works of the Muslim political philosopher Alfarabi (d. 950) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd, d. 1198). He began his studies of Muslim political philosophy at a time when the Middle East and islam did not have the political salience they have acquired in more recent years. instead, Butterworth's reason for engaging with islam was rooted in the question of the relationship between reason and revelation. While one possible answer was pursued in the Christian, latin West, the islamic borderlands of Greek, Roman, and Muslim civilization offered another. By exploring Averroes, who provides the possibility of an Aristotelian-Islamic political philosophy, and Alfarabi, who pursues a Platonic-islamic political philosophy, Butterworth showed how islamic civilization provided a viable alternative to the theologico-political question reason v revelation, as well as serving as an inspiration to the latin West. (shrink)

Se diserta sobre “RESISTENCIA TRIBUTARIA” JUSTIFICADA EN EL ECUADOR. Ello, porque gobierno del presidente Daniel Noboa estableció todo un “paquete” de “impuestos de guerra”, como la Contribución Temporal de Seguridad (CTS); un incremento del IVA, a discreción del presidente de la República, el pechaje del sector construcción, transferencias al exterior y otros impuestos. Ley Orgánica para Enfrentar el Conflicto Armado Interno, la Crisis Social y Económica (en adelante, la Ley), publicada en el Registro Oficial, Suplemento No. 516 del 12 de (...) marzo de 2024, trayendo a discusión los aspectos jurídicos que vician de posible inconstitucionalidad dicha Ley, con fundamento en la normativa constitucional y tributaria de Ecuador. Con la Ley, dado el contexto de su aprobación, el gobierno creó un ´impuesto de guerra´, para financiar una guerra inexistente, partiendo del hecho que la Corte Constitucional del Ecuador estableció que en el país no existe un “Conflicto Armado Interno” (CAI). Así lo estableció en sus Dictámenes 5-24-EE/24 del 9 de mayo de 2024 y 6-24-EE/24 del 13 de junio de 2024, en los que declaró inconstitucionales los decretos ejecutivos No. 250 de 30 de abril de 2024 y 275 del 22 de mayo de 2024, relacionados con el Estado de Excepción que ha regido en Ecuador desde el 10 de enero de 2024, soportado éste en la presunta existencia de un CAI, “decertado” y reconocido sin fundamento jurídico, pese a que no cumple con los supuestos fácticos y normativos fijados, con fuerza ius cogens, por el Derecho Internacional Humanitario (DIH)7 para ser calificado como tal. El ´impuesto de guerra´, fijado en la Ley, por inconstitucional, es confiscatorio. Los Dictámenes, en el plano de la reflexión tributaria, reflejan la patética violación al principio de la constitucionalidad y de la legalidad fiscal, resultando viciada de nulidad absoluta la Ley y, con ella, la configuración del tributo, porque el hecho imponible (CAI) es inexistente, implicando que el presupuesto establecido por la Ley para configurar cada `impuesto de guerra´ jamás tendrá materialización práctica (por inexistente) y nunca tendrá validez jurídica (por inconstitucional), resultando en un tributo confiscatorio, surgido contra la Carta Fundamental y evidente fraude a la legalidad tributaria del país, en perjucio del patrimonio personal o corporativo de los contribuyentes, residentes fiscales o establecimientos permanentes en el país a los que somete a un pago indebido sancionado en el artículo 122 10 , concordado con los artículo 306 al 307 del Código Tributario del Ecuador. La nulidad absoluta e ineficacia del hecho imponible, por inconstitucional, deriva en la invalidez plena y la irrelevancia constitucional del inexistente hecho generador del tributo -proveniente de un acto de naturaleza jurídica - por la no realización fáctica, tangible y concreta del presupuesto generatriz establecido (CAI) en la Ley para su configuración. Como consecuencia, nunca jamás surge válidamente la obligación tributaria, cuya exigencia resulta ineficaz, por ilegal e ilusoria. La obligación tributaria, tiene que calificarse, en tal sentido, como no nacida lícitamente en el ámbito fiscal. Con ello, habría de resultar confiscatorio el pago de la alicuota del `impuesto de guerra´ fijado por el gobierno ecuatoriano de modo inconstitucional abusando del ejercicio del poder tributario relacionado con la urgencia en materia económica. Ante las hondas repercusiones económicas que genera en la población y el sector productivo del país, se describen las posibles vías institucionales disponibles en la regulación ecuatoriana para impugnar la Ley ante la Corte Constitucional del Ecuador -o en la jurisdicción constitucional- sin menoscabo de la eventual activación de la competencia derogatoria de la Asamblea Nacional frente a la misma. Se reafirma el principio de justicia tributaria y la vigencia del Estado social de derechos y de justicia consagrado en la República del Ecuador y la plena efectividad de los derechos y garantías fundamentales de los hermanos ecuatorianos ubicados en la posición de destinatarios de un "impuesto de guerra" tan arbitrario como inconstitucional, que riñe con el enunciado constitucional y convencional del respeto a la dignidad humana y la incolumidad de la propiedad privada frente a actuaciones del Estado que representan un claro abuso en el ejercicio del poder público en desmedro de la legalidad fiscal, generador de un supuesto de patética injusticia tributaria adoptada a contracorriente de toda regulación en materia de impositiva con la publicación de la Ley Orgánica para Enfrentar el Conflicto Armado Interno, la Crisis Social y Económica. En la lucha contra conductas gubernamentales transgresoras de la dignidad humana y frente a leyes inconstitucionales que afectan los derechos fundamentales, la libertad económica y la propiedad privada de los hermanos contribuyentes ecuatorianos y sus empresas afectadas. Este esfuerzo intelectual, realizado por nuestra familia de abogados, es una reverencia a la gesta de nuestros libertadores y un llamado al pueblo ecuatoriano económicamente afectado a resistir, por medios institucionales, frente al pago de impuestos arbitrarios e ilegales que atentan contra los principios fundamentales del orden público económico previsto en la Ley Fundamental. Lo anterior, como una singular expresión reglada, lícita y avanzada de dar al traste con una ley orgánica fiscal tan arbitraria como injusta, activando los mecanismos de protección de los derechos fundamentales constitucionalmente establecidos en el Ecuador. La pretensión judicial traduciría, mutatis mutandis, en la activación institucional de la añeja figura de la "resistencia tributaria" (objeción fiscal, desobediencia tributaria), que, en sus orígenes, nació como expresión de la desobediencia civil frente a leyes impositivas injustas, con el precedente del escritor estadounidense Henry David Thoreau, encarcelado por negarse a pagar un tributo electoral, reticente a contribuir con la continuidad de la esclavitud y la financiación de la Guerra entre México y EEUU, basado en la idea de que las personas deben priorizar su conciencia sobre la obediencia a leyes injustas. -/- . (shrink)

We show that in the c.e. weak truth table degrees if b < c then there is an a which contains no hypersimple set and b < a < c. We also show that for every w < c in the c.e. wtt degrees such that w is hypersimple, there is a hypersimple a such that w < a < c. On the other hand, we know that there are intervals which contain no hypersimple set.

In this essay I wish to consider the implications for theory and practice of the following two propositions, either or both of which may be controversial, but which will here be assumed for the sake of argument: Libertarianism is the correct framework for political morality. The vast majority of our fellow citizens disbelieve. 1.

Este artigo questiona a dimensão crítica da democracia analisada por Sheldon S. Wolin. A partir da década de 1980, o impulso de Wolin de diagnosticar as falhas da democracia americana ao conectar o liberalismo ao totalitarismo se manifesta de uma nova maneira. Ele observa que, no processo de lutar ostensiva- mente contra o totalitarismo durante a Guerra Fria, o próprio governo americano passou a incorporar uma forma totalizante de poder. Essa crítica culmina em seu diagnóstico de uma crise do século (...) XXI: a condição neoliberal de “totalitarismo invertido”. Aqui Wolin argumenta não apenas que o sistema político americano compartilha algumas características com o totalitarismo, mas também que está começando a constituir uma nova versão do totalitarismo emergindo de dentro, e não em reação ao liberalismo. Palavras-chave: Democracia. Totalitarismo. Liberalismo. (shrink)

Elsewhere I have defended utilitarianism as a philosophy peculiarly well suited to the conduct of public affairs, on grounds of the peculiar tasks and instruments confronting public officials. Here I add another plank to that defence of ‘utilitarianism as a public philosophy’, focusing on the peculiar role responsibilities of people serving in public capacities. Such ‘public service utilitarianism’ is incumbent not only upon public officials but also upon individuals in their capacities as citizens and voters. I close with reflections on (...) how best to evoke appreciation of these utilitarian role responsibilities from officials and electors alike. (shrink)