It is a working assumption in much of the literature on the meta-problem that problem intuitions are (fairly) universal, and they are (fairly) universally treated as being psychological or rationally significant. I argue that variation in the universality and psychological or rational significance of problem intuitions is worth taking seriously, and that doing so places significant and challenging constraints on what an answer to the meta-problem might look like. In particular, it raises a potential challenge for (full-blown) realists on how (...) solutions to the meta-problem link to the hard problem. (shrink)

E. Rae Harcum argues that Christians do not have to give up their religious faith to keep the contributions of science. He confronts the relation between the human body and its non-material parts—the mind and spirit—and provides a way of looking at these metaphysical issues.

An accessible selection of Professor Gombrich's best and most characteristic writing.

A collection of writings on Buddhist philosophy.

Par habitude, par nécessité ou en raison de la faiblesse de notre intelligence dépassée par le tsunami des savoirs et des informations, nos façons ordinaires de nourrir la vie des idées consistent à la découper en secteurs, à la compartimenter en disciplines, à l'atomiser en petites spécialités étiquetées bien comme il faut. Il s'agira ici de suivre le chemin inverse, de briser les enclos, s'encanailler, provoquer des courts-circuits au petit bonheur la chance et, si possible, des étincelles. D'associer des éléments (...) trop souvent séparés dans les analyses : physique et philosophie, pensée et action, réalité et imagination, hasard et destin, infini mathématique et engagement existentiel, intelligence analytique et courage physique, Einstein et Rolling Stones, image et mirage, langage et impesanteur, raison et déraison... Mettons le nez dehors, inventons une chimie nouvelle, bâtissons des molécules littéraires à partir d'atomes disciplinaires! É. K."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Real-life BioethicsGregory E. KaebnickMy academic training is in philosophy, and I tend to see the problems in bioethics as philosophical problems. And so they often are. What are moral values? What is the nature of rationality? These are certainly philosophical problems. But at the same time, they are not strictly philosophical problems, insofar as they are not the special purview of the field of philosophy. They require a broader (...) treatment, and that broader treatment might even lead us to believe that the standard philosophical treatment is unsatisfactory.In one way or another, several items in this issue of the Hastings Center Report raise questions about the standard philosophical answers to issues in bioethics. The challenge is most explicit in Barry Hoffmaster’s article, “The Rationality and Morality of Dying Children.” Hoffmaster launches a frontal assault on the typical philosophical understanding of ethics, applied ethics, and bioethics. “There is more rationality in our lives than there is in our philosophy,” he begins. The usual take in philosophy on rationality “hides the real nature and extent of the rationality and the morality in our lives because it denigrates, if not ignores, our experience and our creativity.” Closer attention to our experience is therefore needed, and Hoffmaster tries to take a step in that direction by considering anthropological research on how children dying of leukemia learned about their condition and then dealt with that knowledge.The lead article, by Tony Hope and three coauthors, questions standard philosophical approaches to decision-making in a different way. Hope and his colleagues consider whether the concept of authenticity is useful for exploring how patients with anorexia nervosa understand their condition and deal with that knowledge. Further, they ask, if the concept is important for people with anorexia, should it be important for clinicians, who sometimes need to make decisions on behalf of those women? Arguably, they explain, “in respecting autonomy, it is the authentic wishes that should be respected. This would be to give the idea of authenticity a role analogous to that of capacity (competence).”Hope and colleagues are skeptical that “authenticity” can help others make decisions on behalf of women with anorexia nervosa. There is no good way of deciding which decisions would count as “authentic.” But thinking about how to make decisions is not the full extent of bioethics. As the essay by Rebecca Dresser emphasizes, attempting to understand the patient’s experience of illness is another and important part of bioethics, even though bioethicists themselves do not always see it that way. “At times,” writes Dresser, “work in our field conveys the impression that seriously ill patients and their families would be in good shape if clinicians would only do things like give patients the proper information, respect patients’ choices, and follow advance directives.” Just as Hope and colleagues argued for attending more closely to the concept of authenticity, Dresser argues for attending to concepts like dignity, mortality, and grief. These concepts “may be difficult to incorporate into bioethical analysis, but they are the sorts of concerns that matter to people dealing with serious illness.”A bioethics that dealt better with them would still be a philosophical bioethics, but certainly not just a bioethics of philosophy. It would be what Dresser calls a “real-life bioethics.” —GEK [End Page 2]Copyright © 2011 The Hastings Center... (shrink)

Presenta a grandes rasgos su tesis doctoral. Dentro del marco de la teoría de los afectos, Spinoza sostiene una tesis sobre la alienación a partir de la imaginación y del tiempo, para ello produce una teoría del tiempo y, fundamentalmente, una teoría de las intensidades que sirve para explicar la ilusión.

Se trata de unareflexión interdisciplinar, a partir de W. Benjamin, sobre las relaciones entre experiencia, tiempo y memoriahistórica. La 1. parte analiza el empobrecimiento moderno de la Erfahrung que genera una“nueva barbarie”, a la vez que expenmentación innovadora, y que reclama un concepto más rico de experiencia, ligada ala totalidad concrete de la existencia. La 2. señala algunas paradojas de la memoria, muestra la inconsistencia del tiempo, cristalizado en el mito de Cronos, comoprincipio ordenador, y toma en consideración experiencias relevantes (...) que requieren concebir otro tiempo. En esa dirección, la 3. parte desarrolla la idea de Jetztze¡t, nucleo de la concepción crítica de la historia como tradición de los oprimidos, en cuyos bistantes de peligro relanipagea el angelus novus.Il s’agit d’une reflexion interdisciplinaire sur les liaisons entre expérience, temps et bistoire. La lére partie analyse l’appauvrissement moderne de l’Erfahrung, qui produit, selon W. Benjaniin, experimentation créatice et á la fois “une nouvelle barbarie”, et qui exige la construction d’un concept plus tiche d’expérience, liée á la totalité concréte de l’existence. La 2&me ¡nontre quelques paradoxes de la mémoire, sovligne ]‘inconsistance dv lemps comino principe d’ordre, et rappelle l’existence d’expériences qui demandent un autre concept du temps. La 3éme partie developpe ¡‘idee benjaininienne de Jetztzeit, noyau de sa conception critique de l’histoire conune tradition des opprimés, et analyse particuliérement la figure de l’angelus novus. (shrink)

In this comment, I indicate several challenges and opportunities—out of the many—for an integrated science–humanities approach to emotions, from the perspective of a historian of the modern science...

What is silence? Is it a loss, an omission? Is it a stopping of the mouth, of the voice? An empty place where no meaning has come forward…or perhaps at times quite the opposite, an absence-as-presence Deleuze, 1990; Derrida, 1976)? Might silence evoke much more about what we assume is our monological, unitary reality, indexing possibilities yet unseen? This paper outlines the ways in which silence is typically understood according to scholarly orthodoxy: as omission in human communication or a silencing (...) of minoritized individuals or communities by those in power. It then moves to critique the preeminence of whitestream Western-centric academic authority, which self-perpetuates via the exclusion of outsider ways of doing, being and knowing such as those brought forward by silence, constituting a loss of meaning and knowledge from the social imaginary. This paper suggests that the pursuit of an articulate unknowing regarding silence as a creative, disruptive force beyond the control of rationality is a means of engaging with radical possibilities for a different, juster world. It proposes a socio-diologic politics of the real that welcomes silence as an unsettling of our current thinking about what is and will be possible, as well as who does and does not matter. It concludes by illustrating the ingenious force of silence in examples of subversive art that expose the hegemonizing, rational version of reality sold by academics and powerholders, bringing forward into the imagination what prospects for change, justice, and social transformation yet await. (shrink)

Quality and service improvement (QSI) research employs a broad range of methods to enhance the efficiency of healthcare delivery. QSI research differs from traditional healthcare research and poses unique ethical questions. Since QSI research aims to generate knowledge to enhance quality improvement efforts, should it be considered research for regulatory purposes? Is review by a research ethics committee required? Should healthcare providers be considered research participants? If participation in QSI research entails no more than minimal risk, is consent required? The (...) lack of consensus on answers to these questions highlights the need for ethical guidance. Three distinct approaches to classifying QSI research in accordance with existing ethical principles and regulations can be found in the literature. In the first approach, QSI research is viewed as distinct from other types of healthcare research and does not require regulation. In the second approach, QSI research falls within regulatory guidelines but is exempt from research ethics committee review. In the third approach, QSI research is deemed to be part of the learning healthcare system and, as such, is subject to a different set of ethical principles entirely. In this paper, we critically assess each of these views. While none of these approaches is entirely satisfactory, we argue that use of the ethical principles governing research provides the best means of addressing the numerous questions posed by QSI research. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to analyze succinctly the concept of faith through the very penetrating gaze of the Danish philosopher Sören Kierkegaard. Faith is analyzed by Kierkegaard from absurdity, resignation and the paradox of faith. In the same way, his concept of faith is carved with a chisel that would complete all his philosophy, that is, to touch human reality away from any abstract thought, trying at all times that his examination be seen on a personal dimension in (...) his rigorously individual coret. (shrink)