This is my (Subhasis Chattopadhyay's) draft of PhD pre-submission. Dr. Scriver has (had) put it up online in her blog and I found it today, that is 1:06 pm, 28th May, 2017. I am grateful to her since intellectual ideas can otherwise be hijacked. She has done a wonderful editorial job.

“The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and Beyond” is one of the most useful single volumes available on the CISG. It includes the full text of the draft “UNCITRAL Digest” which catalogues the cases and arbitral awards to date that have interpreted and applied the CISG on an article by article basis. “The Digest and Beyond” includes also commentary by eminent CISG scholars that addresses issues not yet considered in the cases. With more than 1000 decisions applying the CISG in (...) courts and arbitral tribunals around the world, the UNCITRAL Secretariat charged five CISG experts from a variety of regions with the task of creating a digest of CISG case law. “The Digest and Beyond” includes the draft “UNCITRAL Digest”, even before it is released officially by UNCITRAL. It also goes where the authors of the Digest were not allowed to go, given the narrow mandate within which the drafters were asked to work. Its chapters build upon the work of the “UNCITRAL Digest”. The Digest describes the reasoning and results of existing CISG cases; in “The Digest and Beyond”, the Digest authors analyze those cases, and discuss issues that have not yet arisen in the case law. Thus, in many ways, “The Digest and Beyond” provides scholarship that can direct future cases in areas that have not yet been considered by courts and arbitrators as well as in areas in which contradictory court decisions exist. (shrink)

Bioethicists function in an environment in which their peers - healthcare executives, lawyers, nurses, physicians - assert the integrity of their fields through codes of professional ethics. Is it time for bioethics to assert its integrity by developing a code of ethics? Answering in the affirmative, this paper lays out a case by reviewing the historical nature and function of professional codes of ethics. Arguing that professional codes are aggregative enterprises growing in response to a field's historical experiences, it asserts (...) that bioethics now needs to assert its integrity and independence and has already developed a body of formal statements that could be aggregated to create a comprehensive code of ethics for bioethics. A Draft Model Aggregated Code of Ethics for Bioethicists is offered in the hope that analysis and criticism of this draft code will promote further discussion of the nature and content of a code of ethics for bioethicists. (shrink)

The basic (negative and positive) methodological maxims of three currents of philosophy of science (logical empiricism, falsificationism, and postpositivism) are formulated. Many of these maxims (stratagems) are controversial, e.g., the stance about the nonsense of metaphysics, and that of its indispensability. The restricted validity of these maxims allows for their unification. Within the framework of most of them there may be a relationship of (synchronic, or diachronic) subordination of the contradicting desiderata. In this vein ten stratagems are formulated.

ABSTRACTSome people might argue that there are already too many different documents, guidelines, and regulations in bioethics. Some overlap with one another, some are advisory and lack legal force, others are legally binding in countries, and still others are directed at narrow topics within bioethics, such as HIV/AIDS and human genetics. As the latest document to enter the fray, the UNESCO Declaration has the widest scope of any previous document. It embraces not only research involving human beings, but addresses broader (...) concerns in medicine and healthcare. The UNESCO draft declaration has some minor weaknesses, but on the whole, the strengths outweigh the weaknesses. One weakness is that some items in the draft are stated in a way that is too restrictive, thereby appearing to rule out legitimate activities. A strength of the Declaration is that it is relatively brief, yet at the same time contains sufficient detail to make it something more than a rehearsal of mere pieties. As the most recent of the numerous bioethics and human rights documents, the UNESCO draft draws on many of the earlier documents and also includes some of the most recent thinking about ethical norms and obligations. Perhaps its greatest strength lies not in details of the principles or their implementation, but rather in its stature as an international declaration issued by a United Nations organization. (shrink)

Draft for a statement of human obligations -- Human personality.

John Locke, Marylène Delbourg-Delphis. (56) — SIC COGITAVIT DE INTELLECTU HUMANO JO LOCKE AN 1671. INTELLECTUS HUMANUS CUM COGNITIONIS CERTITUDINE, ET ASSENSUS FIRMITATE. § 1. 1° J'imagine que toute ...

This paper is part of a larger campaign against moderation in foundational epistemology. I think the only plausible responses to a kind of Humean sceptic are, radical responses. The Humean sceptic I have in mind tells us about a sceptical scenario, ss, where our evidence is just as it actually is, but some purported piece of knowledge of ours is false. The sceptic names the proposition You aren’t in ss as s, and calls on us to respond to the following (...) argument. (shrink)

This chapter presents a facsimile of manuscript (MS) 139a pages 15 and 16 of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics, one of the two surviving manuscripts of the so‐called Lecture on Ethics delivered to The Heretics, a Cambridge student society. The text is in English in pencil on loose sheets of 204x330 mm. The text in the facsimile images is presented in normal text below each image to provide the reader a better understanding of the content in the images.

Director Kivu Ruhorahoza’s film Europa: ‘Based on a True Story’ is a blend of fiction, quasi-ethnography and autobiography. In this article, built in part on the foundations of Judith Butler’s conceptualizations of precariousness, precarity and assembly, Europa is read as a refusal to be relegated to the marginal spectrality of bare life. Simultaneously, this article considers the draft-like provisionality of the film as a hallmark of its precarity. Framed as an essay film about the fate of an African director (...) who attempts to make a film ‘out of Africa’, Europa provides a meditation on belonging and the precarious conditions of filming in Europe with an African passport. As Nandini Sikand writes, ‘the assumption of ethnographic fieldwork and participant observation is that by living and learning for an extended period alongside our informants, we are able to document and analyze their experience more accurately’ (2015: 45). Ruhorahoza’s film compels us to think about the position of the participant observer when the ‘extended period’ involves an agonizingly long asylum case, and when that observer is relegated to a space of unbelonging. (shrink)

In his text ‘The modern development of the foundations of mathematics in the light of philosophy’ from around 1961, Gödel announces a turn to Husserl's phenomenology to find the foundations of mathematics. In Gödel's archive there are two draft letters that shed some further light on the exact strategy that he formulated for himself in the early 1960s. Transcriptions of these letters are presented, together with some comments.

: The article provides an introduction to an autograph draft of a letter on dietetics Kant wrote to the physician Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland and uses it as a springboard for the critical discussion of Kant’s dietetics as well as its systematic place in his philosophy. The final draft of Kant’s letter to Hufeland became the third part of The Conflict of the Faculties. The article argues that Kant assigns dietetics, understood as the regulation of the traditional nonnaturals, to (...) philosophy and not to medicine; that he regards moral health as the basis for physical health; and that his view of the systematic place of dietetics in his philosophy is inconsistent. (shrink)

Rashīd al-Dīn Ṭabīb (d. 1318) has been called the “first world historian” because of how foreign historical sources are treated in the second volume of his Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh. New manuscript materials have shown, however, that his contemporary courtier and historian, ʿAbd Allāh Qāshānī, is likely the real author of much of the Jāmiʿ. This article advances the discussion about the creation of Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh by describing and analyzing an alternate version of Rashīd al-Dīn’s introduction to the collection. This alternate introduction, (...) preserved in a single manuscript in Munich, suggests that Rashīd al-Dīn initially had a very different purpose in mind for his world history than what has come down to us, envisioning it not as an ecumenical description of the world but as a programmatic argument for his patrons’ sovereign legitimacy. Examining this alternate introduction forces us to rethink Rashīd al-Dīn’s historiographical motive. It also helps answer open questions about the structure of Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh, its production, and how Qāshānī’s text came to be included in it. (shrink)

Criticism and recommendations are very much welcome. Please don't hesitate to contact me with them. -/- .

A strong impossibility is a situation that is epistemically, but not metaphysically, possible. Opponents of strong impossibilities (including Chalmers, Jackson and Stalnaker) have argued that we have “overwhelming reason” to reject and “very little” or “no reason” to think that such impossibilities exist. This partial draft argues that there are strong impossibilities and (very briefly) discusses the manner in which the existence of strong impossibilities is related to some much-discussed arguments in the philosophy of conscious experience. (The full version (...) of the paper will ultimately include a reply to the most significant argument against strong impossibilities, and a (slightly) more involved discussion of the relevance of all of this to issues in the philosophy of conscious experience.). (shrink)

The world, the all-inclusive unity of entities in real actuality, is the field whence the various positive sciences draw their realms of research. Directed straight at the world, these sciences in their allied totality seem to aim at a complete knowledge of the world and thus to take charge of answering all questions that can be asked about entities. It seems there is no field left to philosophy for its own investigations. But does not Greek science, already in its first (...) decisive beginnings, direct its unceasing efforts towards entities as such? Do not entities as such serve it as the subject matter of a fundamental science of being, a "first philosophy"? For Greek science, to directly determine entities -- both individuals and even the universal whole, and in whatever regard they be taken -- did not mean to understand entities as such. Entities as entities -- that is, with regard to their being -- are enigmatic.2 For a long time the lines of inquiry and the answers remain tangled in obscurities. Nonetheless, in the first steps of this "first philosophy"3 one may already see the source whence springs the questionability of entities as such. Parmenides seeks to clarify being4 via a reflection on one's thinking about entities. Plato's disclosure of the Ideas takes its bearings from the soul's.. (shrink)

本文深入探討人工智慧（AI）於實現共同福祉與幸福、公平與非歧視、理性公共討論及自主與控制之倫理與正義重要性與挑戰。以中央研究院LLM事件及國家科學技術委員會（NSTC）AI技術研發指導方針為基礎，本文 分析AI能否滿足人類共同利益與福祉。針對AI不公正，本文評估其於區域、產業及社會影響。並探討AI公平與非歧視挑戰，尤其偏差數據訓練問題，及後處理監管，強調理性公共討論之重要性。進而，本文探討理性公眾於 公共討論中之挑戰及應對，如STEM科學素養與技術能力教育之重要性。最後，本文提出“以人為本”方法，非僅依賴AI技術效用最大化，以實現AI正義。 -/- 關鍵詞：AI倫理與正義、公平與非歧視、偏差數據訓練、公共討論、自主性、以人為本的方法.

Judge Christian Byk renders service to the Steering Committee on Bioethics of the Council of Europe (CDBI) by proposing a draft of the protocol destined to fill in a gap in international law on the status of the human embryo. This proposal, printed in a previous issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics deserves nevertheless to be questioned on important points. Is Christian Byk proposing to legalise research on human embryos not only in vitro but also in utero?

This is a draft of a talk I have given at several venues. At one point I planned to revise it for inclusion in the Oxford Handbook I co-edited, but for various reasons I decided against that. Since I still think it contains some useful material, I have uploaded it here. Feedback welcome.

Words can mean different things to different people. This can be problematic, mainly for those working together in a bureaucratic institution, such as the secret service. Shared, certified, explicit and codified definitions offer a counter to subjective, solitary and/or culturally dominant definitions. It’s true that codified secrecy terms for secret services can be seen to involve a number of political, cultural, subcultural “languages”, but if words come from unclassified or declassified files, memorandums and/or records, one needs a deep understanding of (...) the secret services. A remarkable feature of this bureaucratic language is the evolving nature of, certain “keywords” as important signifiers of historical transformation. Thus, the changes in the language of the secret services depends at least as much on the internal changes of the secret services as on the transformation in the external political-social environment. In spite of the confusion of Hungarian secret services in the revolutions of 1918–1919 and the disintegration of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, in the early 1920’s became a stable system. Between the two World Wars, the Hungarian State Police directed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Military Intelligence and Counter-Espionage directed by the Ministry of Defence, and the Hungarian Royal Gendarmerie directed by both of the Ministries had their own operational service. This structure existed unchanged until 1945. Simultaneously with the forward advance of the soviet troops, government began to re-establish the former system of the secret services in the eastern part of the country. After WWII, in 1946, the “State-protection Department” as political police became independent from the police. However, from the beginning, they remained under the control of the Communist Party. After 1950, the State Security Authority provided special services for the MIA and the Military Political Directorate of the MoD. After quashing the revolution in 1956, in the spring of 1957, the MIA Political Investigation Department was established which—with slight modifications—kept the structure created during the “state protection era”. The MIA III. The State-Protection General Directorate was established in 1962. The reorganization was finalized in the middle of the 1960’s, which resulted in the new system, which—with the structure of Directorates—became the ultimate structure of the state secret police until the abolishment of the MIA General Directorate III in January 1990. These organizational transformations were largely the result of exogenous historical-political changes. Moreover, each new period had a major impact on the organizational communication, language use and vocabulary of the secret services. This study seeks to interpret these historical transformations. (shrink)

This article presents a sobering view of the discipline of cognitive neuropsychology as practiced over the last three or four decades. Our judgment is that, although the study of abnormal cognition resulting from brain injury or disease in previously normal adults has produced a catalogue of fascinating and highly selective deficits, it has yielded relatively little advance in understanding how the brain accomplishes its cognitive business. We question the wisdom of the following three “choices” in mainstream cognitive neuropsychology: (a) single‐case (...) methodology, (b) dissociation between functions as the most important source of evidence, and (c) a central goal of diagramming the functional architecture of cognition rather than specifying how its components work. These choices may all stem from an excessive commitment to strict and fine‐grained modularity. Although different brain regions are undoubtedly specialized for different functions, we argue that parallel and interactive processing is a better assumption about cognitive processing. The essential goal of specifying representations and processes can, we claim, be significantly assisted by computational modeling which, by its very nature, requires such specification. (shrink)

This collection of eleven papers by Elijah Millgram (nine of which have been previously published) is ostensibly united by the thesis that the best way to go about assessing moral theories is to identify the view of practical reasoning that each such theory rests upon, and evaluate the adequacy of these respective theories of practical reasoning. The correct moral theory, Millgram assures us, will be the one that is paired with the best theory of practical reasoning. He outlines this methodology (...) in a substantial (32 pp.) introduction. Why should we adopt Millgram’s method? A host of concerns immediately leap to mind. If two or more different moral theories rest on the same theory of practical reasoning, then how would discovering the latter to be the correct theory of practical reasoning help us decide among the moral theories? What if a given moral theory is consistent with two or more different theories of practical reasoning? What if we cannot evaluate theories of practical reasoning independently of having adopted a moral perspective? Millgram doesn’t address these natural questions head on, but rather proposes that the essays of the volume collectively constitute a “feasibility demonstration” (p. 3) of the method. In other words, the only way that we will be persuaded that the pairings between moral theories and practical reasoning theories are tight enough to support this grand project is to get our hands dirty in detailed discussion of particular moral theories, particular theories of practical reasoning, and the relations between them. It is through seeing the method at work that we will become convinced, Millgram hopes, of several interlocking theses: (1) that each of the major moral theories of the past has had a distinctive take on practical reasoning; (2) that pivotal structural elements of these theories are due to the underlying theory of practical reasoning; (3) that problems in a moral theory can often be traced to problems in the underlying theory of practical reasoning; (4) that theories of practical reasoning are “engines” (p.. (shrink)

This is a contribution to construction of a research roadmap for future cognitive systems, including intelligent robots, in the context of the euCognition network, and UKCRC Grand Challenge 5: Architecture of Brain and Mind. -/- A meeting on the euCognition roadmap project was held at Munich Airport on 11th Jan 2007. This document was in part a response to discussions at that meeting. An explanation of why specifying requirements is a hard problem, and why it needs to be done, along (...) with some suggestions for making progress, can be found in this presentation: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cosy/papers/#pr0701 "What's a Research Roadmap For? Why do we need one? How can we produce one?" Working on that presentation made me realise that certain deceptively familiar words and phrases frequently used in this context (e.g. "robust". "flexible", "autonomous") appear not to need explanation because everyone understands them, whereas in fact they have obscure semantics that needs to be elucidated. Only then can we understand what the implications are for research targets. In particular, they need explanation and analysis if they are to be used to specify requirements and research goals, especially for publicly funded projects. -/- First draft analyses are presented here. In the long term I would like to expand and clarify those analyses, and to provide many different examples to illustrate the points made. This will probably have to be a collaborative research activity. (shrink)

Contentful Moral Perceptualists such as Audi (2013), Lord (2018), McNaughton (1988), McBrayer (2010a, 2010b), Cowan (2014, 2015), and Werner (2016, 2018) claim that moral propositions can serve as the content of perception for moral subjects. However, in my original interpretation, recent critics of moral perceptualism, such as Faraci (2015), Väyrynen (2018), and Chudnoff (2015), subtly suggest that it is more reasonable to claim that moral propositions are the content of cognition rather than perception. Faraci, Väyrynen, and Chudnoff argue that the (...) so-called "moral perception" posited by Contentful Moral Perceptualists is actually dominated by dominative moral principles, representing a psychological state inferred from principles. Therefore, these critics believe that the so-called "moral perception" lacks the non-inferential characteristic of genuine perceptual experience and is not true perception. This paper will evaluate whether the "contentful moral perceptual model" can respond to the challenges posed by these critics. I will provide a preliminary defense for an affirmative answer. -/- Keywords: Moral Perception, Phenomenal Contrast Method, Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Experience, Non-Inferential Characteristics of Perception . (shrink)

Vegans do not eat meat. This statement seems so obvious that one might be tempted to claim that it is analytically true. Yet several authors argue that the underlying logic of veganism warrants – perhaps even demands – eating meat. I begin by considering an important principle that has been important in motivating vegan meat-eating, related to an obligation to reduce or minimise harm. I offer an alternative, rights-based view, and suggest that while this might support an obligation to eat (...) meat in some cases, it fundamentally changes how we should view the arguments on offer. I consider such arguments with respect to three categories of animals: cows, crickets and clams. Rather than assigning importance to the particular choice of animal, readers should take each of these to stand for particular categorisations of non-human animals: animals who certainly have some capacities that we regard as morally relevant in humans, such as sentience, or the capacity for desires (‘cows’); animals who might have one or more of these capacities, but where current research is inconclusive (‘crickets’); and animals that are, according to our current knowledge, extremely unlikely to have any of these capacities (‘clams’). (shrink)

Given its psychological and sociological importance, especially in non-liberal societies, honor may be the most undertheorized normative phenomenon. Philosophical neglect of honor is due partly to the doubtful moral bona fides of honor: honor-typical motives have been usually viewed by philosophers in both the Christian and liberal West as either non-moral or immoral but replaced by morally sounder ones. More practically, honor (and what is usually translated into the English “honor”) connotes a number of apparently contradictory meanings, further bedeviling analyses. (...) Four particularly salient conceptions of honor emerge in the anthropological, literary, and philosophical literature on honor: honor as prestige, honor as the ethos characteristic of “cultures of honor,” honor as honestas, and honor as agonism. (shrink)

Evolutionary debunking accounts claim that the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs provide a problem for moral realists because evolutionary explanations of our moral beliefs have more plausibility than realist accounts. A certain kind of response, which I term ‘rationalist’ offers a dual response to evolutionary debunking. First, they offer a supposedly plausible account of how we acquire objective moral knowledge through use of our rationality. Second, they claim that certain moral beliefs are not amenable to evolutionary explanation. I argue (...) that neither of these putative advantages survives further scrutiny. An appeal to ‘rational insight’, although it makes reference to a somewhat familiar faculty, gives no useful explanation of how we come to know moral facts. Moreover, the supposedly problematic moral beliefs are in fact amenable to evolutionary explanation. As such, rationalist accounts are, like other realist accounts, on the wrong side of the balance of justification against evolutionary debunking. (shrink)

Subjectivists about welfare face two problems that pull them in opposite directions. The Paradox Problem, outlined by Ben Bradley, is that, for an agent who desires that her life go badly, subjectivist theories are sometimes unable to give a determinate answer about how well her life goes. This problem demands that subjectivists choose a complex mental attitude to ground well-being. The Infant Problem, from Eden Lin, is that many subjective theories end up denying that infants (and some others) have welfare. (...) This problem demands that subjectivists choose a simple attitude to ground well-being. I argue that subjectivists should respond by adopting Disjunctive Subjectivism. Your welfare depends on your judgements that things are intrinsically good or bad for you (c.f. Dorsey), unless you are not capable of such judgements. In that case, it depends on your desires. I then defend DS against objections from Lin, and the potential charge of being ad hoc. (shrink)